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Abstract
The civil rights movement in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, went beyond a  battle 
between blacks and whites over segregation. Within each racial group, factions 
developed along class, generational, and educational lines. Interactions among these 
groups shaped the nature and pace of change in the city.
In 1945, black World W arn veterans launched the movement. Committed to 
working within the legal system, they established voter registration schools, 
participated in the 1953 bus boycott, and sued to equalize teachers’ salaries and to 
integrate public schools, hi thel960s, black college students rose to prominence in the 
movement and used direct action, including sit-ins and marches, to challenge 
segregation laws. At the same time, working-class activists undertook protests of their 
own. Like the veterans and the students, they wanted increased voter registration and 
integrated public facilities, but they also demanded equal employment. In the late 
1960s, young blacks abandoned nonviolence, embraced Black Power, and advocated 
racial separatism.
Each stage o f the movement frightened the city’s white leaders. Although they 
supported segregation, white leaders realized that civil rights demonstrations threatened 
industrial development in their community. To preserve the stability they felt essential 
to continued economic expansion, they attempted to appease the activists by meeting 
with traditional black leaders — racial diplomats — and making small changes to the 
system of segregation. The compromises delayed integration and angered the activists.
Agreements reached by black and white leaders also infuriated segregationists 
and white liberals. Segregationists believed that any changes to Jim Crow would
vi
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destroy southern society and promised to defend racial separation at any cost. 
Conversely, white liberals supported the civil rights activists and believed that 
compromises undercut the movement. However, most white Baton Rougeans supported 
the delaying tactics of their leaders.
In 1972, the black: activists’ pent up anger at the slow pace of change erupted in 
deadly clashes with the police. By then, strict segregation in Baton Rouge had ended, 
but blacks had made inroads into the city’s political system. Although whites remained 
in control, older African-American activists believed that they could work within the 
existing framework to facilitate change.
vii
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Introduction
Located on the Mississippi River, 240 miles north o f its mouth, Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana, served as the state’s capital city and was a thriving port and business center 
at the beginning o f the twentieth century. Cotton farmers and sugar cane planters from 
the rural areas surrounding the city used the port to ship their goods to market and 
bought equipment and supplies from local wholesalers. In 1908, one wholesale grocery, 
Holmes & Barnes, Ltd., did more than one million dollars worth o f business. Even with 
its prosperity, the city possessed few industries and grew slowly. That changed in 1909 
when Standard Oil opened a refinery in the community. When production started on the 
facility, the city’s economy grew at an astonishing rate. Construction wages for the 
plant equaled two-thirds of the value of all those in East Baton Rouge Parish, of which 
Baton Rouge served as the parish seat, for 1909, and when the facility opened, the 
community’s economic base quickly went from one that relied on agriculture to one 
based on industry. As the twentieth century progressed, the city’s economy continued to 
flourish until the Great Depression when many small businesses closed and thousands 
of citizens lost their jobs. However, Standard Oil’s refinery remained open and helped 
to ease the city’s financial woes by employing large numbers o f Baton Rougeans. As 
the nation’s economy began to improve in the late 1930s, three more national 
corporations — Solvay Process, Consolidated Chemicals, and Ethyl Corporation — 
opened plants in the Baton Rouge.1
‘Mark Carleton, River Capital: An Illustrated History o f Baton Rouge 
(Woodland Hills, California: Windsor Publications, Inc., 1981), 156-157,174, 189;
1
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Although all of Baton. Rouge’s industries played a vital role in the city’s 
economic success, Standard Oil remained dominant and, in 1940, employed one-third 
of the metropolitan area’s population. The bombing of Pearl Harbor in December 1941 
launched a wave of industrial growth. During the war, industries spent $125 million on 
new construction or expansion o f existing facilities in Baton Rouge. In fact, on the day 
after the Japanese attack, Standard Oil announced that it would expend $ 17 million to 
expand its Baton Rouge refinery. The plant soon produced more than 75 percent of the 
nation’s aviation fuel and opened a  chemical division that manufactured synthetic 
rubber. By the end of the war, Standard Oil-Baton Rouge was one of the largest 
facilities o f its kind in the world. Industry so dominated Baton Rouge’s economy that in 
1944 approximately 55 percent of the population worked for one of the major 
corporations.2
With the rapid industrialization during World War II, the city of Baton Rouge 
and East Baton Rouge Parish experienced a period of phenomenal growth. In 1930, 
approximately 68,000 people lived in the parish. By 1940, the number increased to
Works Progress Administration, Louisiana: A Guide to the State (New York: Hastings 
House, 1941), 136-164.
2 Numan V. Bartley, The New South, 1945-1980, History of the South Series, 
eds. Wendell Holmes Stephenson and E. Merton Coulter (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1995), 10-21; Conrad Louis Rein, “From Southland to Sunbelt: The 
Legacy of Dependent Development in New Orleans and Louisiana,” (Ph.D. diss., 
University o f New Orleans, 1997), 229,238; Carleton, River Capital, 156-157,174,
189; Works Progress Administration, Louisiana, 254; Harland Bartholomew and 
Associates, The Master City-Parish Plan: Metropolitan Baton Rouge, Louisiana (Baton 
Rouge: City-Parish Planning Committee, 1948), 8; Jerry Sanson, “A History of 
Louisiana, 1939- 1945" (Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State University, 1984), 421-507; Stuart 
O. Landry, ed., Louisiana Almanac and Fact Book, 1940 - 1950, (New Orleans: 
Louisiana Almanac and Fact Book, Inc., 1949), 100.
2
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88,500, and five years later, it topped 107,000. A decade later, the parish boasted more 
than 158,000 residents. Throughout this period of expansion, African Americans made 
up approximately 35 percent of the population. With the huge influx of workers, the 
city of Baton Rouge quickly outgrew its corporate limit o f five square miles, and 
unplanned neighborhoods with poor streets and drainage systems sprang up on the 
outskirts of town. Because these unincorporated urban areas were outside its 
boundaries, the city government could not provide basic services, such as sewerage or 
water to these residents. The police jury, Louisiana’s form of parish government, was 
dominated by representatives from the rural areas of the parish and was ill-equipped to 
handle the demands o f its urban residents. Realizing that the unplanned, haphazard 
growth created by industrial expansion needed to be addressed, the city and parish 
governments, at the request of the Baton Rouge Chamber of Commerce, created a joint 
committee to study the problem.3
Members of this planning commission quickly recognized that the existence of 
both a city and a parish government was “badly divided, inefficient, and obsolete.” This 
dual system threatened to undermine Baton Rouge’s continued economic expansion. 
White leaders proposed creating a consolidated government with a mayor-president as 
the chief executive and a city-parish council as the legislative body. The plan also 
expanded Baton Rouge’s corporate limits to include the suburban areas surrounding the
3Harland Bartholomew and Associates, Preliminary Report: The Twenty-Five 
Year Plan fo r Metropolitan Baton Rouge, Louisiana (Baton Rouge: City-Parish 
Planning Committee, 1945), 13, introduction; Milbum Calhoun, ed., Louisiana 
Almanac, 1992-1993 (Gretna, Louisiana: Pelican Publishing Company, 1992),142; 
Rudolf Heberle, The Labor Force in Louisiana (Baton Rouger Louisiana State 
University Press, 1948), 40; Bartholomew, Master Plan, I.
3
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city. Ia 1947, the state legislature approved a constitutional amendment to alter the 
parish’s governmental system, and a heated debate erupted in the parish. Reaction to the 
proposed constitutional amendment was mixed. People who lived in urban areas 
supported the new plan o f government wholeheartedly. Rural residents balked at the 
expansion of Baton Rouge and feared that the growing metropolis would engulf them. 
To appease the rural population, the plan allowed the small towns of Baker and 
Zachary, located in the northern part o f the parish, to elect their own mayors and city 
councils. On August 12, 1947, voters approved the new plan of government with 7,012 
people voting for the change and 6,705 against i t  Rural voters comprised most o f the 
nays. Hailed as a sign of progress, the plan went into effect in 1949.4
Although its city and parish governments were unified, the community’s 
educational system remained divided by race. Baton Rouge served as the home o f the 
state’s largest institutions of higher education for both whites and blacks — Louisiana 
State University and Southern University. While funded by the state, the two schools 
played integral roles in the community. Many local men and women, who went on to be 
community leaders, received their education from these institutions and quickly became 
staunch supporters of their alma maters. The faculties and staffs of LSU and Southern, 
many of whom came from other parts of the country, made up an academic elite in both 
the white and black communities and played a role in the civil rights movement.
Along with the two universities, by 1946, Baton Rouge boasted ninety 
manufacturing plants, most of them small, that pumped approximately $30 million in
“Carleton, River Capital, 196-197; Bartholomew, Master Plan, 1.
4
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payrolls into the city’s economy and produced more than $ 160 million in goods 
annually. The city sustained more than nine hundred retail establishments, four hotels, 
and sixteen movie theaters. Many of these businesses, including Kress, Welch & Levy, 
and Rosenfield’s, lined Third Street, which served as the heart of the downtown 
commercial district.5
Although they frequented the businesses on Third Street, African Americans in 
Baton Rouge created a separate society for themselves. They owned their own 
businesses, formed their own social and fraternal organizations, and attended their own 
churches. The city boasted many black-owned businesses, including thirty-nine 
restaurants, twenty-three barber shops and twenty-five beauty parlors, six drug stores, 
two funeral homes, and one hotel. Seven African-American doctors and three dentists 
practiced in the community. One of the most successful black businessmen, Horatio 
Thompson, owned several service stations, hi the early 1940s, a group of African- 
American entrepreneurs formed the Negro Chamber o f Commerce to encourage the 
growth of business in their neighborhoods, and, byl945, the organization was thriving.6
Religion played an important role within Baton Rouge’s black population. The 
city had seventy-eight African-American churches, including sixty-four Baptist, eight 
African Methodist Episcopal (A.M.E.), one Catholic, and one Presbyterian. These 
churches varied greatly in size and in the wealth of their congregations. Reverend
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Gardner Taylor headed the largest and most prominent, Mount Zion Baptist, which 
played a key role in the early years of the civil rights movement.7
Black Baton Rouge also enjoyed a  very active social life. Headed by John G. 
Lewis, proprietor o f the Fraternal Press, the Prince Hall Masons owned and operated 
the Masonic Temple. By day, a variety o f black businesses used it as an office building, 
but on the weekends, the Temple’s Roof Garden served as a ballroom for members of 
the black middle and upper classes. For members of Baton Rouge’s black elite, several 
social clubs existed. Men could join the Purple Circle or the Bonanza, both of which 
held formal dances. Several organizations existed for women as well. One, the Junior 
Matrons, later renamed the Matrons, organized in 1941 and quickly became the most 
prominent. In 1946, it established a debutante ball; a similar debutante system already 
existed in the white community. Besides these social organizations, members of the 
black community belonged to several benevolent societies including the Knights of 
Pythius, the Daughters of Universal, four Odd Fellows Lodges, and one Elks’ lodge. 
Most of these groups met at the Masonic Temple, which served as the center of black 
social life.8
Although African Americans created a world for themselves, they could never 
forget that they lived in a segregated society and were considered second-class citizens. 
Each encounter with a white person reminded them of their inferior status. When they
7Ibid., 771.
8Dupuy Anderson, interview by Maxine Crump, tape recording, December 29, 
1993, T. Harry Williams Center for Oral History Collection, Louisiana Lower 
Mississippi Valley Collection, Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana, 18; Carleton, River Capital, 209, 193; Polk’s City Directory, 781.
6
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
shopped at downtown department stores, they could not eat a sandwich or have a glass 
o f lemonade at a department store’s cafeteria or be served at the same lunch counter as 
white customers. African Americans also suffered wage and job discrimination. 
Although the plants and refineries hired black workers, these facilities relegated African 
Americans to low-paying menial and unskilled positions. The East Baton Rouge Parish 
School Board also paid its black teachers a fraction o f what it paid white ones.
Disparity also existed between the parish’s white and black public schools. The 
School Board maintained seventeen elementary, three junior high, and two high schools 
for the approximately 7,700 white children that it served. All twenty-four were 
constructed out of brick. Seventeen had auditoriums, six had laboratory facilities, and 
five had cafeterias. Baton Rouge and Istrouma High schools contained gymnasiums. 
While the board maintained a sufficient number o f facilities to meet the needs of white 
children, it crowded nearly 5,000 black children into seven elementary and two high 
schools.9 The enrollment o f white elementary schools ranged from 350 to 500 with a 
maximum class size of 35 pupils. More than 700 students attended the larger black 
schools whose class size ranged from 51 to 73. Schools housing black students were 
poorly constructed and not well maintained. Only four black schools were made of 
brick; the others were wood-frame. Churches provided and maintained the buildings for 
two elementary schools — Zion City and Valley Park. Only McKinley High School had 
both an auditorium and laboratory facilities. None housed cafeterias or gymnasiums.
9The School Board maintained no junior high schools for African Americans. 
Most elementary schools included grade seven, and the two high schools offered either 
grades seven or eight through eleven.
7
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
African-American children also used cast-off materials from the white schools, 
including textbooks. Black parents could do little to force the School Board to equalize 
public education because they were, for the most part, disenfranchised and could not 
exert political pressure on elected officials. East Baton Rouge Parish’s Registrar of 
Voters kept a tight rein on the number o f black voters and only allowed African 
Americans to register as Republicans. In 1940, only 144 black Baton Rougeans could 
vote.10
The discrimination faced by African Americans on a daily basis and the 
disparity that existed between black and white society had long been a source of 
concern to many within Baton Rouge’s black community, and in the late 1920s they 
organized a branch of the NAACP to address these problems. Insurance agent Benjamin 
Stanley headed the organization from 1930 to 1955 and created a stable institution that 
survived the Depression. When the nation’s economy crashed, most of Louisiana’s 
NAACP branches collapsed only to be reorganized as conditions improved. Having 
survived the Depression intact, the Baton Rouge branch boasted 800 members in 1940, 
and by the end of World War n, many of them, especially the young veterans of World 
War n, stood poised to fight the system of segregation.11
10At the time, the Democratic Party dominated Louisiana politics and most 
elections were decided in party primaries. Therefore Republicans rarely voted in state 
and local elections but could cast votes in presidential contests. Bartholomew, 
Preliminary Report, 13-26.
"Perry Howard, “An Analysis of Voting Behavior in Baton Rouge,” The 
Proceedings o f the Louisiana Academy o f Sciences, XV (5 August 1952): 88; Adam 
Fairclough, Race and Democracy: The Civil Rights Struggle in Louisiana, 1915-1972 
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1995), 46-47.
8
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One o f the first large-scale challenges to the Jim Crow occurred in 1953 when 
African Americans in Baton Rouge launched a boycott against segregated seating on 
the city’s buses. The protest lasted for nine days and ended with a compromise that 
maintained separation of the races on the city’s buses by reserving two seats for whites 
and two for blacks. The deal allowed the rest of the seats to be filled on a first come, 
first served basis. O f course, the agreement stipulated that African Americans could not 
sit with or in front of white passengers. This agreement maintained  segregated seating 
to continue until 1963 when a federal court order formally banned the practice. The 
boycott established a pattern o f protest, compromise, and anger that continued to 
characterize the civil rights movement in Baton Rouge. This pattern did not develop 
spontaneously but grew out of a well-established tradition of race relations in 
Louisiana’s capital. When the civil rights movement began in the mid 1940s, white 
businessmen and politicians turned to the African Americans with whom they had had 
long associations for help in ending the demonstrations and ignored the black 
“agitators” who were challenging the status quo. White leaders believed that the 
activists represented a small portion of the population and were convinced that the 
members of the black leadership represented the entire African-American population. In 
reality, African-American leaders occupied a tenuous position in the black com munity 
and when their meetings with whites produced compromises that fell far short of the 
protestors’ demands, their influence declined. The agreements also created animosity 
between the black leaders and the activists, and as the civil rights movement 
progressed, the anger and discontent of both the activists and the black com munity  
grew. Dissatisfaction reached a boiling point in November 1972 when students at the
9
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historically black Southern University clashed with police on the school's campus. That 
encounter left two students dead. The only way to understand fully how a movement 
that began with negotiations and compromises ended in violence is to look beyond 
black and white and examine how the interplay between race, class, and generations 
shaped the civil rights movement in Baton Rouge.
The relationship between white and black leaders that developed in the decades 
before the civil rights movement was not unique to Baton Rouge. Similar relationships 
existed in communities throughout the South. In Greensboro, North Carolina, for 
example, white leaders felt paternalistic toward African Americans and selected 
representatives of the black community, usually ministers, businessmen, and 
professionals, with whom they would work. When these black leaders needed 
assistance, they would approach their white benefactors and, with proper deference, ask 
for help. The benefactors would then render aid and were “convinced that the exchange 
testified to how good communications were between the races.” Whites believed that 
their hand-picked representatives were the true leaders of the black community. 
Therefore when the civil rights movement began, they turned to them to help ease 
tensions and assumed that black activists would gladly accept any compromise their 
“leaders” reached.12
Yet, in Baton Rouge, as in other cities, African-American leaders did not 
represent their entire race. The black leaders with whom members of the white power 
structure associated belonged to the city’s small black middle and upper classes. Most
I2William Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina, and 
the Black Struggle fo r Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 8.
10
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were ministers, doctors, lawyers, school teachers, or businessmen, and because they 
earned more money than most African Americans, industrial workers also belonged to 
this group. Daniel Thompson in The Negro Leadership Class called them racial 
diplomats. The racial diplomats understood southern traditions and felt a sense of pride 
for their cities. They identified “with the problems of the total community and. . .  
[cared] about the welfare of [all] human beings ...[ ,]  not just about ‘what is good for 
the Negro,’ ” according to Thompson. While protecting their own interests, racial 
diplomats thought they were also looking out for the well-being o f their communities. 
They knew that the system of segregation made all African Americans second class 
citizens, and most of the diplomats wanted to end segregation. Fearing that protests and 
demands for change would only strengthen resistance in the white community, 
however, they believed that meeting with white leaders and asking for small 
concessions would eventually bring an end to segregation.13
Although white leaders used them to advance their own programs, the racial 
diplomats also benefitted from the relationship. Before the civil rights movement, being 
one of the “chosen few” with whom whites met gave them immense power. If 
“ordinary” African Americans needed help from a white leader, they would have to ask 
a racial diplomat to intercede for them. In his memoir Black in Selma, J. L. Chestnut 
recalls that some black leaders in his hometown profited from their relationships with 
whites. Reverend D. V. Jemison, the father of Baton Rouge’s black leader Theodore
13Robin Kelley, Race Rebels (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 39; Daniel 
Thompson, The Negro Leadership Class (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
1963), 68-70.
11
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Judson Jemison, was “the most powerful black man in Selma,” according to Chestnut. 
“White people showed uncommon respect for Jemison, too.” They called him “Dr. 
Jemison.” Chestnut said, ‘Tor little crumbs o f power, black preachers and other leaders 
could be counted on ‘to keep the natives in line’ — to cool off potential uprisings and 
to preach that blacks should clean up their own back yards rather than challenge the 
system.” These advantages came with a price. Racial diplomats could not openly 
criticize the status quo. If they did, they lost all o f the benefits that went along with 
being part o f the African-American leadership class.14
Before World War II, Baton Rouge’s black population allowed the racial 
diplomats to represent them and regarded the concessions that their leaders wrested 
from the white community as signs of progress. As veterans returned to Baton Rouge 
from the battlefields of Europe and the Pacific, the willingness of African Americans to 
accept small changes to the status quo diminished rapidly, and the first group of civil 
rights activists emerged. These World War n  activists came from backgrounds similar 
to those of the racial diplomats but were, for the most part, younger and just starting 
their careers as professionals and businessmen. Almost all had served in the armed 
forces and had risked their lives for principles of freedom and democracy in foreign 
countries, only to be treated as second class citizens when they returned home. World 
War II activists nevertheless believed in the American system and wanted to claim a 
piece of it for themselves. They championed voter registration, played an active role in 
the city’s 1953 bus boycott, and sued to desegregate LSU’s Graduate and Law Schools
14J. L .Chestnut and Julia Cass, Black in Selma: The Uncommon Life o fJ  L. 
Chestnut, Jr. (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1990), 39-41.
12
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and to gain admission to the city’s public parks and golf courses. The racial diplomats 
and the World War H activists shared many o f the same goals; for example, both 
advocated voter registration and participation in the electoral process. They differed on 
a key point. While the diplomats used their votes to curry favor with white leaders, the 
World War II activists wanted to take part in policymaking, so they ran for public 
office. None won. When the movement entered its direct action phase in 1960, college 
students supplanted the World War II activists as the driving force behind the fight for 
racial equality, but the group of older activists remained staunch supporters of the civil 
rights movement and the students. However, they also continued their efforts to end 
segregation by working within the system.
Unlike the World War II activists, student activists believed that working 
through legal and political channels would accomplish little. They came of age in a 
decade marked by the civil rights victory of Brown v. Board ofEducation o f Topeka, 
Kansas, and watched as white southerners used every means at their disposal to prevent 
its implementation. In response, student activists around the South, including Baton 
Rouge, adopted the strategy of direct action and nonviolent civil disobedience to 
desegregate lunch counters and other public facilities. Baton Rouge’s student activists 
attended Southern University, and when police arrested them for staging sit-ins, they 
obtained financial and legal support from both the World War II activists and the racial 
diplomats. Older African Americans assisted the younger college students for several 
reasons. First, student activists belonged to the upper echelons of black society, and 
many were the children o f racial diplomats. In addition, when they protested, they did 
so with dignity, even civility. They dressed in their finest clothes for their sit-ins and
13
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politely asked for service at segregated lunch counters. When arrested, they held their 
heads high and allowed the police to lead them away. Although student activists 
garnered support from the black community, white leaders viewed the students as a 
threat to the city’s image of racial harmony and ordered Southern University’ s 
president, Felton Clark, to expel them. Fearing white reprisals against the university if 
he refused, Clark complied.
The nature of student activism changed as the civil rights movement progressed, 
and, by the late 1960s, a group of angry young men and women spouting Black Power 
slogans and advocating the use o f violence to overthrow the white oppressor replaced 
the first student activists. Black Power activists believed that the best way to change 
southern society was through force. Naturally, the white community feared the Black 
Power activists even more than they did their predecessors, and white leaders went after 
them literally with their guns drawn. The racial diplomats and World War II activists 
never identified with this group of young African Americans and refused to support or 
help them. Instead, they greeted Black Power activists with scorn, and some blamed 
them for the 1972 riot at Southern University. In return, the students despised the racial 
diplomats and called them “sellouts” and “Uncle Toms” because of their willingness to 
work with white leaders.
A final group of activists, working-class African Americans, came to the 
forefront of the movement in 1962. Like other activists, they wanted increased voter 
registration and the desegregation of schools and public facilities, but they differed 
from the other groups in that they also pushed for equal employment, hi 1962, the 
working-class activists announced their plan to conduct sustained protests until white
14
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leaders capitulated to their demands. Like the Black Power activists who arrived on the 
scene several years later, they did not subscribe to the principles o f passive resistance. 
They fought back when arrested and shouted while they picketed; their protests often 
ended in violent clashes with whites. The white leaders saw the working-class activists 
as uneducated and undignified and refused to meet with them. Other than race, the 
black leadership had little in common with the working-class activists and sought to 
undercut their demands for change. For example, when the working-class activists 
reorganized the city’s chapter of the NAACP in 1962, racial diplomats, who had been 
the mainstay o f the branch in the 1940s and 1950s, abandoned the organization. Instead, 
they formed their own association, Federated Organization for the Cause of Unlimited 
Self-Development (FOCUS), which worked to increase voter registration, thus 
undercutting one plank of the NAACP’s program. The creation of a competing 
organization led to animosity between the two groups and almost completely severed 
the ties between the racial diplomats and the working-class activists. Working-class 
activists also garnered support from the black masses and threatened the racial 
diplomats’ position of leadership within the community. To protect their emissaries, 
white leaders consciously granted concessions aimed at appeasing the African- 
American population. In 1963, they established a biracial committee to discuss and 
recommend solutions for racial problems in. Baton Rouge. In turn the committee 
requested and received approval for the hiring of black police officers, the 
desegregation of facilities in the Municipal Building, and the admission of black 
doctors to the staffs of white hospitals. The biracial committee failed to address the
15
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working-class activists* concerns, however, and the gulf between them and the racial 
diplomats continued to widen.
Although white leaders created the biracial committee to bolster the status of the 
racial diplomats and prevent dissension within the ranks o f the African-American 
population, they could do little to stop the divisions within their own community. The 
majority of white Baton Rougeans wanted to maintain segregation, but their level of 
commitment to the system of Jim Crow varied. White leaders belonged to the city’s 
business and political elite and embraced industrial expansion.15 They realized that to 
convince national corporations to build multimillion dollar plants and refineries in the 
community they needed to create a stable environment in Baton Rouge. White business 
leaders had spearheaded the consolidation o f the city and parish governments in large 
part to create a plan for the economic growth of East Baton Rouge Parish. When the 
civil rights movement began, white leaders feared that racial conflict would disrupt the 
stability that they wanted to maintain, so they worked closely with the racial diplomats 
to end any protests quickly. Although they wanted to maintain segregation, the white 
leadership had “no dogmatic commitment to segregation” and refused to risk the city’s 
economic well-being to preserve it. When they could, they made small changes to the 
system of segregation. White leaders knew that granting token concessions would 
appease the black leaders and make the activists look like irrational troublemakers.
They also believed that with these compromises, they could forestall demands for
lsThe terms white leaders, white business leaders, and business leaders are used 
interchangeably throughout this account.
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greater desegregation and, at the same time, maintain control o f the city’s government 
and economy.16
Segregationists, on the other hand, thought that any changes to the system of 
segregation would destroy the “southern way of life” and lead to the mongrelization of 
the white race. In the years following the Supreme Court’s Brown decision, 
segregationist sentiment in Baton Rouge increased as whites faced the prospect of black 
and white children attending the same schools, and three anti-integration organizations 
formed in the city. Immediately following the Brown decision, businessman John 
Easterly formed a segregationist group, the Southern Gentlemen, to preserve “the 
southern way of life.” Drawing members from the city’s upper and middle classes, it 
actively searched for integrationist sentiment in Baton Rouge’s public institutions, 
including LSU; when the Southern Gentlemen found any inkling of it, they publicly 
denounced the offending office holder. Baton Rouge also had a chapter of the White 
Citizens’ Council, a segregationist organization founded in October 1954 in 
Mississippi. Like the Southern Gentlemen, the Citizens’ Council wanted to expose and 
destroy integrationist sentiment in the community. In the 1960s, District Attorney 
Sargent Pitcher, a charter member of the Baton Rouge chapter, placed black activists 
under surveillance, arrested them on trumped-up charges, and sought the longest 
possible sentences for them. He filed motions in court to ban civil rights organizations, 
such as the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), from holding protests in the city. A
l6Numan Bartley, The Rise o f Massive Resistance (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1971), 16.
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third group, the Ku Klux Klan, made a brief appearance in the city in the mid 1950s, but 
it played virtually no role in the segregationists’ fight against integration.
In the early 1960s, the white leaders gained an ally when a new group, the 
accommodationists, stepped into the fray. Although this group preferred, even 
advocated the continuation of segregation, its members refused to destroy Baton 
Rouge’s economic well-being to maintain it. Disgusted by the state’s open defiance of 
the federal government during the 1960 New Orleans school desegregation crisis, the 
accommodationists wanted East Baton Rouge Parish to acknowledge the authority of 
the federal government and to comply with court-ordered school desegregation. They 
feared that open defiance would lead to immediate and sweeping school integration and 
believed that accommodation would allow them to draft a plan to drag the process out 
for years. As Numan Bartley pointed out in The Rise o f Massive Resistance, “a 
considerable number of segregationists were unwilling in the end to tear apart the fabric 
of southern society and commit the region to anarchy in defense of segregation.” Like 
the white leaders, the accommodationists were businessmen, professionals, and 
educators who belonged to the city’s middle and upper classes. The accommodationists 
wielded economic power and possessed enough clout to silence the segregationists, and 
their support gave white leaders enough power to devise a plan for the peaceful but 
piecemeal integration of the parish’s schools.17
In addition to white leaders, accommodationists, and segregationists, Baton 
Rouge’s white community boasted another group that played an active role in the civil
l7Ibid.
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rights movement— liberals. Most of the city’s liberal population belonged to one of 
three groups, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), the Council on Human 
Relations, and the Louisiana Chapter o f the American Civil Liberties Union (LCLU)- 
Although all three worked to end segregation, they were active at different times and 
focused on different issues. The AFSC arrived in Baton Rouge in 1955 and initially, 
sought to end workforce segregation in the city’s plants and refineries. When this failed, 
they turned their attention to social issues and began to support the black activists’ fight 
to desegregate public facilities and schools. The AFSC left Baton Rouge in the mid 
1960s when its national office turned its attention to ending the war in Vietnam. The 
Council on Human Relations picked up where the AFSC left off. Its members worked 
closely with the World War II activists to bring a peaceful end to the segregation of 
public facilities and took part in sit-ins in local restaurants. Some members of the 
organization even tutored the first African-American students to attend integrated 
schools. Although active in the school desegregation fight of the late 1950s, the LCLU 
focused most of its attention on combating police brutality'. Most o f the liberals came 
from other parts of the country, and many worked at LSU. Although some were 
southem-bom, white leaders and segregationists accused the liberals of being outside 
agitators intent on stirring up the city’s content black population.
Both groups targeted the liberals for “special attention” and intimidation. White 
office holders ordered the police and sheriff’s department to place all three 
organizations under surveillance. Policemen would cruise the parking lots where the 
groups met, write down the license plate numbers of all o f the cars, and either they or 
the FBI would pay a visit to those who attended. Segregationists used harsher methods
19
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to silence the liberals. In 1955, a group of them shot out the windows of the AFSC’s 
office, and in 1960, they tapped the phones of several prominent liberals. Despite the 
threats and harassment, white liberals remained committed to ending segregation and 
attaining full citizenship for African Americans.
The divisions that existed within Baton Rouge’s white community were not 
unique to Louisiana’s capital city. In fact, historians have discovered similar splits in 
cities throughout the South. Subsequent historians have examined the roles played by 
these different groups in the civil rights movement. The essays in Southern 
Businessmen and the Civil Rights Movement, edited by Elizabeth Jacoway and David 
Colburn, examine the impact of industry on the South and conclude that in New SGuth 
cities controlled by business leaders who were committed to industrialization 
desegregated with very little violence. David Chappell, in Inside Agitators: White 
Southerners in the Civil Rights Movement, agreed with the essayists in Southern 
Businessmen that white business leaders helped to shape the outcome of the civil rights 
movement but added that the divisions within the white community also led to the 
ultimate destruction of the system of Jim Crow. According to him, African Americans 
understood that white solidarity on the issue of segregation was fragile and directed 
their protests at the segment of the community most likely to abandon the system of Jim 
Crow, the moderate white leaders. However, the willingness o f the white leaders to 
agree to changes in segregation laws led black leaders to accept incomplete victories 
while white supremacy remained intact. Works on liberals also abound. In one of the
20
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most notable works, Outside Agitators, Charles Eagles studied northern liberal Jonathan 
Daniel’s battle against segregation in Alabama.18
Although they are discussed in most studies of the civil rights movement, few 
works specifically examine segregationists. One of the most comprehensive studies of 
staunch segregationists is Neil McMillen’s The White Citizens’ Council. In it McMillen 
looks at the creation and development of the organization and its use of massive 
resistance to prevent integration. Bartley’s Rise o f Massive Resistance also examines 
the evolution of segregationist sentiment in the South, specifically during the post- 
Brown era. Unlike McMillen, whose focus is narrower, Bartley discusses the response 
of “business conservatives” and “neopopulists” to the extreme segregationists.19
While most studies of the era focus on either whites or blacks, the civil rights 
movement in Baton Rouge and in other southern cities went beyond black and white, 
and the divisions that plagued both communities and the interactions between different 
racial groups determined the course of the movement. However, few scholars have
l8Bartley, Rise o f Massive Resistance, 1-24; Elizabeth Jacoway and David 
Colburn, eds., introduction to Southern Businessmen and Desegregation (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1982), 1-14; David Chappell, Inside Agitators: White 
Southerners in the Civil Rights Movement (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1994), xxii-xxv, 214-215; Charles Eagles, Outside Agitator: Jon Daniels and the 
Civil Rights Movement in Alabama (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 
1993); Other works on southern liberals include: Gary Huey, Rebel with a Cause: P. D. 
East, Southern Liberalism and the Civil Rights Movement, 1953-1974 (Wilmington: 
Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1985); Linda Reed, Simple Decency and Common Sense: The 
Southern Conference Movement, 1938 -1963 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1991); John T. Kneebone, Southern Liberal Journalists and the Issue of Race, 1920- 
1944 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985).
l9Neil McMillen, The Citizens’ Council (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1971); Bartley, Rise o f Massive Resistance.
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examined the impact of these divisions and interactions on the freedom straggle. In the 
1960s, a bevy o f political scientists, sociologists, and historians conducted studies on 
the civil rights movement, and by the 1970s, their number burgeoned. These early 
studies examined various aspects of the movement, including the nature of black 
leadership, the impact of direct action on desegregation, and the segregationist’s 
reaction to Brown?0 They usually depicted the movement as one driven by national 
leaders and organizations and focused on key events such as the Freedom Rides, the 
March on Washington, and violent clashes between activists in cities such as 
Birmingham and Selma, Alabama. These studies implied that national leaders and 
organizations drove the movement. But, in fact, as Claybome Carson pointed out in his 
introduction to Essays on the American Civil Rights Movement, the lives of residents of 
communities throughout the South “were affected as much by concessions gained from 
local white officials and from the development of the local movement. . .  as by the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 1965 Voting Rights Act.”21
20These early studies include: Emmett Buell, Jr., “The Politics of Frustration: An 
Analysis of Negro Leadership in East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana, 1953-1966" 
(masters thesis, Louisiana State University, 1967); Thompson, The Negro Leadership 
Class; James H. Laue, Direct Action and Desegregation, I960 -1962: Toward a Theory 
o f the Rationalization o f Protest, Martin Luther King and the Civil Rights Movement 
Series, ed. David Garrow (New York: Carlson Publishing, Inc., 1989); Emily Stoper, 
The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee: The Growth o f Radicalism in a Civil 
Rights Organization, Martin Luther King and the Civil Rights Movement Series, ed. 
David Garrow (New York: Carlson Publishing, Inc., 1989); Earlean M. McCarrick, 
“Louisiana’s Official Resistance to Desegregation” (Ph.D. diss., Vanderbilt Univesity,
1964); August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights 
Movement, 1942-1968 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); David L. Lewis, 
King: A Biography (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970).
21 Steven Lawson, Running For Freedom: Civil Rights and Black Politics in 
America Since 1941 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), ix; Claybome
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Beginning with Aldon Morris’s groundbreaking work, The Origins o f the Civil 
Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing fo r Change, scholars shifted their 
attention away from the movement as a national phenomenon and examined grassroots 
activism. Recent studies, including Charles Payne’s I ’ve Got that Light o f Freedom:
The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom Struggle and John Dittmer’s 
Local People: The Struggle fo r  Civil Rights in Mississippi, also emphasized the 
importance o f community activism. However works such as these rarely depict the 
divisions that existed within black communities. Dittmer, for example, alludes to the 
existence of a black leadership class that worked with white officials to bring an end to 
protests, but he does not examine the impact of their relationships with whites on the 
movement22
Although most of these studies mention the divisions within the black and white 
communities and the interactions among the different factions, few examine the impact 
of these groups on the movement. William Chafe’s study of Greensboro, North 
Carolina, Civilities and Civil Rights, is one of the books that looks at the movement in a 
mid-size New South city and examines both the black and white communities.23 It
Carson, introduction to Essays on the Civil Rights Movement, eds. John Dittmer,
George C. Wright, and W. Marvin Delaney (Arlington: University of Texas Press,
1995), 4-5.
“ Aldon Morris, The Origins o f the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities 
Organizing fo r Change (New York: The Free Press, 1984); Charles Payne, I ’ve Got that 
Light o f Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom Struggle 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); John Dittmer, Local People: The 
Struggle fo r Civil Rights in Mississippi (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1995).
“ Other studies that examine community development are David Colburn’s 
Racial Changes and Community Crisis: St. Augustine, Florida, 1877- 1980 (New York:
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focuses on the impact of civility on the civil rights movement, which brought small 
changes to the system of race relations through a series of polite interactions between 
black and white leaders. Greensboro and Baton Rouge had much in common. Industry 
served as the basis o f both of their economies. Each had an African-American and a 
white college and possessed black communities with clear class delineations. The 
AFSC opened offices in both cities in the mid 1950s. The white populations of both 
Greensboro and Baton Rouge included white leaders, accommodationists, 
segregationists, and liberals. The movement these two communities followed a pattern 
of protest, compromise, and delayed resolution that culminated in violent clashes 
between police and the students from the African-American universities. Chafe claims 
that this pattern grew out of the politics of moderation rooted in white leaders’ 
commitment to the principle of civility and their desire to preserve their city’s peace 
and stability, but devotion to these two abstract ideals cannot explain the actions of 
white leaders. Why did they hold on to the politics of moderation in the face of rabid 
segregationist attacks? Why did they meet with black leaders to hammer out 
compromises? Where did their commitment to maintaining peaceful race relations 
come from? White leaders in most Alabama and Mississippi cities did not share their
Columbia University Press, 1985) and Robert Norrell’s Reaping the Whirlwind: The 
Civil Rights Movement in Tuskegee (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1985). Large cities 
have merited more studies. Works on Atlanta, for example, include: Ronald H. Bayor, 
Race and the Shaping o f Twentieth-Century Atlanta (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1996); David Andrew Harmon, Beneath the Image o f the Civil Rights 
Movement and Race Relations: Atlanta, Georgia, 1946-1981 (New York: Garland 
Publishing, Inc., 1996); and David Garrow, ed., Atlanta, Georgia, 1960-1961, Martin 
Luther King, Jr. and the Civil Rights Movement (Brooklyn: Carlson Publishing, Inc., 
1989); Gary Pomerantz, Where Peachtree Meets Sweet Auburn: The Saga o f Two 
Families and the Making o f Atlanta (New York: Schribner, 1996).
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concerns; they allowed segregationists free reign. Leaders in these cities did not try to 
meet with African Americans to bring an end to protests. What was different about 
Greensboro, Baton Rouge, and other cities that exhibited a similar pattern of race 
relations?24
24Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights, 1-47.
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Chapter 1
The CtvU Rights Movement in the 1940s
During World War II, Baton Rouge experienced a period of rapid growth and 
industrialization. As the demand for wartime material increased, the chemical plants 
and refineries that had lined the banks of the Mississippi River since shortly after the 
turn of the century began producing jet fuel, synthetic rubber, and other military 
necessities. Increased wartime production brought prosperity to East Baton Rouge 
Parish, and white business and political leaders wanted this economic growth to 
continue after hostilities ended and that made industrial development their primary 
concern. Like their counterparts in other southern industrial and business centers 
(Atlanta, Houston, Dallas, Tampa, and Greensboro) the economies of which relied on 
influxes of northern investment, white leaders in Baton Rouge knew that racial unrest 
was bad for business and committed themselves to preserving order and stability. 
Montgomery and other “Old South” cities lacked this industrial base, and when the civil 
rights movement began, their political leaders allied with ardent segregationists and met 
demands for equality with massive resistance. When black veterans who fought for the 
principles of freedom and democracy returned from the war determined to bring an end 
to segregation and to win frill citizenship for African Americans, white leaders in Baton 
Rouge and other New South cities adopted two methods to silence them, delay and 
diplomacy. Whites employed the first tactic when the veterans began launching legal 
challenges to segregation laws and used motions and appeals to tie these cases up in 
court for years. When civil rights activists continued to demand changes in the system 
of segregation or launched protests, members of the white power structure turned to
26
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traditional African-American leaders— businessmen, professionals, and ministers who 
had served as liaisons or diplomats between the white and the black communities for 
decades — to negotiate compromises to end the protests. These racial diplomats 
understood the nature of race relations in the South. While they too wanted equality and 
an end to segregation, they believed that these goals could only be obtained by working 
with white leaders and not fighting them in court or holding demonstrations. Their 
policy of conciliation angered the veterans and led to divisions within the black 
community that grew as the civil rights movement progressed.1
In 1945, racial diplomats were the undisputed leaders of Baton Rouge’s black 
community. They belonged to the city’s middle and upper classes and served as 
intermediaries between the black and white communities. Racial diplomats could bring 
problems to the white leaders and ask for their assistance in solving them. “Common” 
African Americans, ones without ties to the white leadership, could also ask the 
diplomats to intercede for them. Like their white counterparts, black leaders included 
businessmen and professionals who wanted to insure the continued economic expansion 
of Baton Rouge. Many belonged to the Negro Chamber of Commerce, and most were 
active in social, fraternal, and benevolent societies. One of the most powerful racial 
diplomats, John G. Lewis, Jr., served as president of the Prince Hall Masons, operated
‘Jacoway and Colburn, Southern Businessmen, 1-6; W. Marvin Dulaney, 
“Whatever Happened to the Civil Rights Movement in Dallas, Texas?” in Essays on the 
American Civil Rights Movement, 66-95; Christopher Silver and John Moeser, The 
Separate City: Black Communities in the Urban South, 1940-1968 (Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky, 1995), ix-xi; Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights, 4-8; J. 
Mills Thornton, “Challenge and Response in the Montgomery Bus Boycott o f 1955- 
1956,” The Alabama Review, 33 (July 1980): 184-186; Thompson, The Negro 
Leadership Class, 68-70.
27
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the Fraternal Press, and ran the Masonic Temple Building- Lewis formed a close 
alliance with the NAACP in the 1940s and provided meeting places, offices, and 
financial support for the organization. Like his father, John, Sr., he was active in 
Republican Party politics and attended every national convention from 1928 to 1940. 
Other leading racial diplomats included Doctors George and Leo Butler, Beverly V. 
Baranco, and Horatio Thompson. Not only did the Butler brothers practice medicine, 
they also owned the Ideal Drug Store and were socially active. Both brothers belonged 
to the NAACP, and Leo was active in the Boy Scouts and the YMCA. A dentist, 
Baranco was the son of a long-time black leader and businessman who had been active 
in the Black and Tan faction of the Republican Party and served as a delegate-at-large 
to several Republican national conventions. A graduate o f Southern University, 
Thompson owned several service stations and developed the city’s first up-scale 
subdivision for African Americans —  Southern Heights. He worked his way through 
college by chauffeuring Southern President J. S. Clark, handling campus mail, 
operating a branch of Ideal Drug Store out of his dorm room, and establishing a taxi 
company. In the early 1940s, he served as secretary of the local branch of the NAACP.2
The ranks of the racial diplomats also included another group — plant workers. 
Although the city’s industries segregated their workforces and relegated black workers 
to menial, unskilled positions and paid them less than whites, these industrial workers
2Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 70; “Baton Rouge Raises Scout Camp 
Fund,” Pittsburgh Courier, June 8, 1940,22; “Baton Rougeans Protest Unwarranted 
Attacks on Citizenry by Policemen,” Louisiana Weekly, June 28, 1941,1; Carleton, 
River Capital, 121; “Thompson the Man Behind the Scenes,’’Advocate, February 19, 
1995, 1G.
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earned more money than most black Baton Rougeans. Working for Standard Oil or 
another national corporation also provided these black employees with both economic 
and job security. Most belonged to labor unions and established relationships with 
white leaders through these organizations. Both white and black workers at the city’s 
major plants and refineries belonged to segregated labor unions. Usually, one union 
represented the workers at a plant but was divided into a white section and a black 
section. When asking for higher wages or improved working conditions, the two 
sections usually joined efforts in their meetings with management. This cooperation did 
not transfer into a sense of working class unity. Although they asked their employers 
for increased wages and better working conditions, these African-American employees 
never sought major changes in their employment status and never asked that the 
managers integrate the workforces. They took great pride in the fact that they worked 
for these national corporations, and some formed all-black booster clubs to promote 
industrial development and expansion. In June 1941, two ESSO employees, Joe 
“ESSO” Williams and the Reverend Anderson Brooks announced their support of the 
plant’s fifteen million dollar building program and secured the promise of plant 
officials that the company would employ more African Americans. When the same 
group held a picnic in 1952 over 7,500 attended. Black ESSO employees also formed a 
health association in 1948 to provide insurance for themselves and their families. By 
1952, ESSO employed 1,200 African Americans. Because of the com m unity ’s 
industrial base, the economic status of black Baton Rougeans was the highest in the
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state. That year, 40 percent of the city’s black population owned their own houses as 
compared to 12 percent in New Orleans and 1 8 percent in Shreveport.3
When they saw a need within their community, these plant workers and the 
other racial diplomats approached white leaders and asked them for help in meeting it. 
As long as the request did not challenge the racial status quo, white leaders usually 
complied. If African Americans needed the financial assistance o f their white 
benefactors, they asked the black community to provide a portion o f the funds. In June 
1940, Leo S. Butler asked white leaders to help pay for black youth to attend a 
segregated Boy Scout camp. A white attorney, Fred Benton, promised to donate $1,000 
to the cause if African Americans matched that amount. To meet their quota, black Boy 
Scout supporters held various fond raisers.4
In the early 1940s, racial diplomats recognized the need for a black elementary 
school in an African-American neighborhood inhabited by plant workers. They 
obtained the money for this school from the Julius Rosenwald Fund. Rosenwald had 
amassed millions of dollars through an investment in Sears, Roebuck and Company in 
the late 1890s and established a philanthropic fund to improve the well-being of 
Americans, particularly African Americans. As one of its primary goals the fund
3Eugene Sutherland to Thelma Babbitt, March 2, 1955, American Friends 
Service Committee Papers, Visits with Community Leaders, South Central Regional 
Office, 1954-1955, American Friends Service Committee Archives, Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania (hereafter cited as AFSC); “Baton Rouge Column,” Louisiana Weekly, 
June 28,1941, 7; “ESSO Boosters Picnic a Spectacle of Fun,” Weekly Leader, June 28, 
1952,2; “ESSO Health Ass’n to Hold Election,” Weekly Leader, March 29,1952, 1; 
“Legislative Lobby Reports,” Weekly Leader, June 28,1952,7.
““Baton Rouge Raises Scout Camp Fund"Pittsburgh Courier, June 8, 1940,22.
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established a program to build elementary schools for black children. It provided one- 
third of the money to construct the school, and the local community contributed the rest. 
In Baton Rouge, black parents, who wanted their children to attend a neighborhood 
school, raised the money for the new building and turned it over to the School Board to 
staff and administer. The board, over the protests o f black parents, promptly assigned 
white children to the school and renamed it Gilmer Wright, after one of its deceased 
members. The racial diplomats who raised the money to construct the school knew that 
challenging the board on this issue would complicate their future dealings with whites, 
so they remained silent.5
The classification of Gilmer Wright as a white school revealed the disregard that 
many white Baton Rougeans had for the city’s black citizens and hinted at the racial 
tension that the city’s economic prosperity masked. In 1940, a Louisiana State 
University sociology class studying race relations polled a group of African Americans 
and discovered discontent within the black community. Black Baton Rougeans 
complained “that the lack of hospitalization, proper housing facilities, prejudicial 
attitudes on the part o f whites and the low economic sphere” in which the city’s blacks 
were placed created a situation that would lead to racial unrest instead of peaceful 
discussion. A year later, violence erupted. While responding to a call about a fight 
between two men at one of the city’s black-owned theaters, the McKinley Theater,
sPatti Elizabeth Smith, “The Distribution o f Rosenwald Schools in Louisiana 
and Their Suggested Impact on Black Education” (master’s thesis, Louisiana State 
University, 1992), 20-25; Edwin R. Embree and Julia Waxman, Investment in People: 
The Story o f the Julius Rosenwald Fund (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), 28; 
Minutes of the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, June 30,1943, Minute Book, 
vol. 4, East Baton Rouge Parish School Board Office, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
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police chased their suspects into Ideal Drug Store. The officers beat and then arrested 
several people, including Leo’s chauffeur. The Butler brothers had long been active in 
the NAACP and had worked with white leaders to improve conditions for black Baton 
Rougeans. These men never expected to be the target o f such an attack. In the end, 
George paid the bail for every one arrested and then circulated a petition denouncing 
police brutality. Many racial diplomats, including members o f the all-black Baton 
Rouge Civic League, several ministers, and numerous prominent black professionals 
signed it.6
Fearing racial unrest, white leaders convened a grand jury to investigate police 
brutality. Over two hundred African Americans attended the hearing, and many testified 
to the brutality of the Baton Rouge police force and the sheriffs department. One 
woman, Florence Atkins, claimed that police beat her because she refused to say, “Yes, 
sir,” and “No, sir,” when they addressed her. Thomas Delpit, the owner of the Chicken 
Shack, one of the city’s most popular black restaurants, testified that several officers 
entered his restaurant and beat him because he “did not know how to talk to a white 
man.” Immediately following the incident, the state’s leading African-American 
newspaper, the Louisiana Weekly reported, “This is the first time Negroes of Baton 
Rouge have been so aroused. They indignantly requested that the Attorney General 
investigate the reported police brutality and unwarranted arrests” and even threatened to
6“Discuss Race Relations in Baton Rouge,” Louisiana Weekly, May 4, 1940,4; 
Sociology Class Report, “The Negro in Baton Rouge, 1939-1940,” (Louisiana State 
University, 1940), 48-56; “Baton Rougeans Protest Unwarranted Attacks on Citizenry 
by Policemen,” Louisiana Weekly, June 28,1941,1; “Baton Rouge Column,” Louisiana 
Weekly, June 28,1941, 7; “Baton Rouge Citizens SeekFederal Aid to Stop Police 
Brutal Attacks on Negroes,” Louisiana Weekly, July 26,1941,1.
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send a petition to the federal government. In the end, the grand jury found that the 
police acted properly in using force in the arrests at Ideal Drug Store and that they had 
not used excessive force in other encounters with African Americans. Although they 
grumbled, the racial diplomats accepted the grand jury’s ruling. But the brutality did not 
end. On December 25,1942, police for no apparent reason launched a raid into one of 
South Baton Rouge’s black neighborhoods. Armed with sawed-off shotguns, 
submachine guns, revolvers, and tear gas, they combed the area, terrorizing the 
citizenry and arresting sixty-nine African Americans. Once again, African Americans 
circulated a petition that white leaders ignored. The racial diplomats, rather than 
demand change, dropped the issue.7
In the 1940s, other groups of whites attacked the city’s African-American 
population, with bus drivers being the worst offenders. Unlike many white Baton 
Rougeans, bus drivers had daily contact with large numbers of African Americans.
They ferried black passengers around the city and expected them to follow their orders. 
In March 1944, a bus driver shot a black passenger for being insubordinate. The 
passenger, Wiley Kent, a defense plant worker from Washington, D. C., was visiting his 
parents in Baton Rouge. While riding a bus from his parents’ house to his brother’s 
home, several young white boys started calling the black passengers “niggers” and 
“black birds.” Kent told them to stop, but the boys ignofed him and continued their 
taunts. The driver did nothing until Kent reached his destination. As he disembarked, he
7“Baton Rouge Grand Jury Completes ‘Wrong Way’ Police Brutality Probe,” 
Louisiana Weekly, August 2,1941,1; “Baton Rouge Citizens Continue Their Fight 
Against Police Brutality,” Louisiana Weekly, January 23,1943,1.
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held the door for two black women, and the driver angrily got off the bus and asked him 
why he was holding the door. When he tried to leave, the driver shot him. Once again, 
Baton Rouge’s black population grumbled, and once again, the racial diplomats refused 
to confront the white power structure.8
Although these incidents strained race relations in Baton Rouge, they did not 
lessen the support of the black community for World War H. African Americans saw 
their backing of the war effort as proof of their loyalty and of their worthiness for foil 
citizenship. Racial diplomats in Baton Rouge also believed that their support of the war 
would improve conditions for blacks when the fighting ended. Shortly after the 
bombing of Pearl Harbor, Southern University President Felton Clark, a racial diplomat 
who used his relationship with white leaders to secure funding for his school, declared 
“The negro [sic] is most proud of his record of loyalty to his country.” He added that by 
supporting the war effort African Americans would show their worthiness for being 
integrated into “American life and democracy.” Felton, the son of president emeritus of 
Southern J. S. Clark, had taken over as head of the university in 1938. Like his father, 
Felton Clark realized that accommodation and not confrontation could assure the safety 
of Southern. The city’s Negro Chamber of Commerce also sponsored war bond rallies 
and parades to encourage black Baton Rougeans to show their patriotism by purchasing 
bonds. As Clark said at the 1941 rally, the best way to integrate black citizens into 
American life was for them to show their readiness for full citizenship. Other African
8Catherine Barnes r Journey From Jim Crow: The Desegregation o f Southern 
Transit (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 38; “Defense Worker Shot by 
Driver in Baton Rouge,” Louisiana Weekly, March 4,1944, 11.
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Americans realized that their demonstrations of patriotism would never convince whites 
that they deserved equality.9
While the racial diplomats attempted to show their merit by purchasing war 
bonds and holding parades, thousands of black Baton Rougeans were drafted into a 
segregated armed forces. Most servicemen who later became activists came from 
backgrounds similar to those of the racial diplomats. The majority came from middle 
class families. Many were in college when the Japan launched its attack against Pearl 
Harbor. For the most part, the activists were at least a decade younger than the racial 
diplomats, and even before becoming soldiers, they took pleasure in defying the system 
of segregation at every available opportunity. But it was the war itself that convinced 
many young veterans to fight for racial equality.
African-American soldiers encountered discrimination on all fronts. They 
reported to segregated camps for training, lived in substandard quarters, and served in 
non-combat companies headed by white officers. Drafted into the Army Air Corps 
immediately following the bombing of Pearl Harbor, dental school student Dupuy 
Anderson encountered a racist colonel at an induction center. Upon examining the new 
inductees, who were all medical students and second lieutenants in the Medical 
Administrative Corps, he commented, “Well I'll be damned, here's a bunch of niggers 
without syphilis or gonorrhea.” At one point, the army sent Anderson to Baton Rouge’s
9Iris Johnson Perkins, ‘Telton Grandison Clark, Louisiana Educator,” (Ph.D. 
diss., Louisiana State University, 1976), v; “Negroes Urged to Rally for Defense in 
Present Crisis,” State-Times, December 22,1944,10; “Baton Rouge to Hold Bond 
Rally and Parade Tues.,” Louisiana Weekly, June 9, 1945, 1.
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military air base, Ryan Field, to serve as a medical officer. When he reported for duty,
he received a cold reception.
I went over to the hospital, every typewriter stopped typing, every head turned 
toward me. A gray-haired colonel walked out; the captain gave him my papers. 
He threw them back to me [and] said, “They must have made a mistake.” I took 
my papers, and I came home [and] took offmy uniform. I felt like burning it. I 
stayed around here [for a year] and received my pay until I got orders to move. I 
got a letter from the Air Force surgeon general wanting to know where I had 
been. Where had I been? I was furious!”
The army then sent Anderson to the all-black Tuskegee Air Field, and this time his
commanding officer accepted his paperwork. He soon discovered that conditions for
black soldiers there were dismal as well.
The base was known as the old and the new base. We were put on the new base 
[and a group of white soldiers occupied the old base]. [There were] hardly any 
recreation facilities [on the new base], no swimming pools, nothing. Up on the 
main base, they had a nice club, swimming pool, and everything. We weren’t 
allowed up there. So, a group o f us decided we were going up there. We were 
given a reprimand [for our actions, but] they couldn't do anything about i t . . .  
People don't realize what we went through wearing a uniform.
Southern University student Johnnie Jones also encountered racism. As one of
army’s first black warrant officers, Jones held a position of leadership in his unit and
occupied a position slightly below the officers' corps. Because he ranked higher than a
regular enlisted man, he received benefits not afforded to the rank-and-file soldiers. He
lived in the officers barracks, ate in their mess hall, and had his own driver. Yet his
position meant nothing to white troops and the white citizenry. To them, he was just
another “nigger.” As Jones’s unit prepared to leave for England, the army sent it to
Charleston, South Carolina, for last minute preparations. Most bases had separate
barracks for white and black officers, but Charleston did not. In fact, Jones was one of
the first black officers to go through the facility. Unsure of how to handle him, the
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base’s administration decided to place him in the same barracks as white officers. After 
being shown to his living quarters, Jones unpacked his belongings and then left to 
attend to his duties. While he was gone, the white civilian crew that cleaned the 
barracks dumped all of his possessions out into the street. He reported the incident to 
his white colonel, but his commanding officer refused to take action, claiming that to do 
so would lead to bloodshed. Left with no place to stay, Jones went into the city and 
rented a room. On base, he also encountered racism from enlisted men who refused to 
salute him and called him derogatory names.10
Although the war served as a catalyst for their activism, most of these veterans 
had developed a resentment against segregation as children and even before the war had 
challenged the system whenever possible.11 Bom December 30, 1918, Dupuy Anderson 
grew up in middle-class black family in a predominately white neighborhood. His 
father worked as a postman, and his mother stayed at home to care for the family. With 
white children as his playmates, he became aware of discrimination at an early age. 
Unlike his white Mends who rode the bus to a school that was only a few blocks away 
from their homes, he walked two miles to and from school every day. In the mid 1930s,
I0Barbara Dennis, “A Second Front: Racial Violence and Black Soldiers in 
Alexandria, Louisiana During World War II” (master’s thesis, Louisiana State 
University, 1992), 31-33; Richard Dalifume, Desegregation o f the U. S'. Armed Forces 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 1-4; Anderson, interview by Maxine 
Crump, December 8, 1993, 6-10; Johnnie A. Jones, Sr., interview by author, tape 
recording, September 4, 1993, T. Harry Williams Center for Oral History Collection, 
Louisiana Lower Mississippi Valley Collection, Louisiana State University Libraries, 
Baton Rouge, 27-35.
11 Chafe points out in Civilities and Civil Rights that the men and women who 
become activists during the civil rights movement grew up fighting the system in 
segregation in small ways and had parents or school teachers who encouraged defiance.
37
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
African Americans in Baton Rouge organized a Boy Scout troop, but the local white
council refused to allow them to wear the organization’s uniforms. Angered by this
blatant discrimination, Anderson and some of his fellow Scouts protested. Initially, the
local council refused to change its policy, but in the late 1930s relented and allowed
them to wear uniforms. As a teenager, he also recognized the inequities that existed
between black and white schools. On one occasion, the principal of his high school
asked him and several other students to pick up a case of used books at a  white high
school. Realizing that the books he and the other students at his school had been using
were cast-off, he became angry. His anger at the system of segregation continued to
grow as he became an adult. His contempt for racial diplomats did as well. He recalled:
They were part of unions at the Standard Oil, which was a big company then, 
with its prejudices and racism. They were ministers and the like, and they had
the control of the union They were little clowns. Baton Rouge wasn't a
Montgomery or Birmingham or a Mississippi, but it had its faults and brutality 
and the like. But not as bad as some places. People were, “Don't rock the boat.” 
Well, it's time we rock the boat.
One of his first acts of protest occurred before the end of the war. While on leave he
traveled to Baton Rouge to take the state’s dentistry exam. He went to the public library
to study and to read through some medical books only to be told by the librarian that
African Americans could not use the facility. She offered to send the book over to the
black library, which consisted of a poorly lit room. Anderson, who was dressed in his
uniform, refused and told her, “I’m not going. I’m going to read this book here.”
Sympathizing with the young soldier, the librarian led him to an empty reading room
and allowed him to use the books. “I didn't need to go there every day,” he recalled,
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“but I went every day, walked through the front door and got the books and went in 
there and read.”12
Johnnie Jones’s activism also had deep roots. A native of Laruel Hill, Louisiana, 
a small town located in West Feliciana Parish, halfway between St. Francisville, 
Louisiana, and Woodville, Mississippi, he grew up defying the system of segregation. 
Unlike most other African Americans in the area who worked as sharecroppers, the 
Jones family rented their land outright from white landowners. His father, Henry Jones, 
served as an unofficial member of the West Feliciana School Board in 1918 and told his 
children that the way to achieve better lives for themselves was through education. 
Unlike the children of sharecroppers who could not attend school because they had to 
work in the fields, Jones and his younger brother, George, went every day. The school 
year for black children lasted six months, and then, their father hired the teacher to hold 
classes for the two boys and a few other neighborhood children for three more months. 
Because the family had very little money, Henry Jones paid the teacher with vegetables 
and meat that the family produced. Whites objected to the amount of time the Jones 
children attended school. White men driving log trucks from Woodville, Mississippi, 
often taunted them and attempted to force them off the side of the road as they walked 
to school. Although his brother and the other children would run from the drivers, 
Johnnie Jones refused to back down. He stood on the shoulder and faced them, but 
never stepped off the shoulder. Similarly, his father refused to back down on the issue
12Anderson, interview by Maxine Crump, December 22, 1994,23; Anderson, 
interview by Maxine Crump, December 15, 1993, 1-10, 16-18; Class Report, “The 
Negro in Baton Rouge,” 112.
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of education for his children. Jones’ intelligence became apparent while he was in 
elementary school, and that made whites, who disliked the idea o f educating black 
children, uneasy. Before he completed elementary school, the man from whom his 
father rented land ordered him to take Jones out of school and put him to work in the 
field. Henry Jones refused. The school for black children in Laurel Hill ended with 
grade six, and there was no black high school in the area for Johnnie to attend. His 
father sent him to Southern University’s demonstration school in Baton Rouge, and 
upon graduation, he enrolled in the industrial education program at Southern. Although 
his father scrounged together the money to pay his tuition to the demonstration school, 
Jones was the poorest member o f his class and the only one whose parents farmed. To 
help out with expenses, he took a job as a dishwasher at the white-owned Mike and 
Tony’s Restaurant but refused to take part in the degrading tipping practice perpetuated 
by white customers. They would announce that they were tipping and invite any black 
kitchen help — the waiters were all white— who wanted a tip to step outside. The 
white patrons would then flip coins into the air and require that the black workers catch 
them in their mouths.13
After the war, Jones resumed his studies and began to openly fight the system of 
segregation. He immediately helped to organize a college chapter of the NAACP at 
Southern. To stir up the student body, he made what he called a rabble-rousing speech, 
in which he proclaimed that he could no longer accept the racial status quo and urged 
them to join him in fighting it. “Parents and all didn’t  believe too much in the
13 Jones, interview, September 1,1993, 1-64; Jones, interview, December 4, 
1993,102-103.
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movement that we was making,” Jones said. They thought that he and this new group of 
activists were too radical, but Henry Jones supported his son’s stand.14
Johnnie Jones made his determination to fight Jim Crow clear in the summer of 
1946 when a state policeman pulled him over for a traffic violation and beat him. Jones 
was on his way to New Orleans to have a piece of shrapnel that had lodged in his neck 
during the Normandy Invasion removed. With him were two teenage boys on their way 
to visit family. The officer stopped Jones and accused him of speeding. (In a 1993 
interview, Jones claimed that he had not been speeding.) The trooper pulled Jones out 
of the car by his collar, threw him to the ground, and began kicking him. After the 
attack, he let Jones go telling him, “Nigger, I don’t want you to be driving over the 
speed limit anymore.” Angered by the abusive treatment he received, Jones drove 
directly to the office of New Orleans civil rights attorney Alexander Pierre Tureaud, 
filed an affidavit with him and Daniel Byrd, Field Secretary for the NAACP, and 
decided to sue the state police. Tureaud and the NAACP brought his complaint to the 
superintendent o f state police who met with Tureaud and other black leaders and 
promised to dismiss the officer. The racial diplomats viewed the meeting with the 
superintendent as an honor and saw the dismissal of the trooper as a victory for all 
African Americans. The superintendent urged Tureaud not to file a suit and claimed that 
if he did racial tensions in the state would escalate.
After conferring with the racial diplomats, Tureaud, who was the state’s leading 
civil rights attorney, reluctantly agreed to drop the suit. Because Tureaud was one of the
14 Jones, interview, September 4, 1993, 51-53.
41
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
only black: lawyers in the state and no white lawyer would take his case, Jones was 
forced to drop his suit, but he did so reluctantly. “Those guys hadn’t gone to war. They 
hadn’t fought over at the Normandy Invasion,” Jones recalled. “They didn’t  have that 
same feeling [as those of us who did]. They were all good people and good Mends of 
mine, and I respected [them]. But,. . .  times was [sic] changing.” He added that the 
racial diplomats belonged to a different generation, one that believed demonstrating and 
demanding change was too militant.15
Although Jones and the other World War II activists returned from the war 
determined to obtain equality and therefore chafed at the conservatism of racial 
diplomats, they lacked the organization and the support within the black community to 
challenge the racial diplomats’ cautious leadership of the black community. In 1945, 
most activists were in their early or mid-twenties, were either still in college or just 
starting out in their careers, and had yet to establish themselves as community leaders. 
On the other hand, the older racial diplomats were well-established and well-respected. 
They owned businesses, taught school, and worked in the city’s plants and refineries. 
The diplomats also played active roles within the black community and served as 
church deacons, sang in the choir, or headed Boy Scout troops. The black masses knew 
them, so when racial diplomats championed a cause, they could count on support from 
the AMcan-American community. World War II activists realized that they could not 
strike out on their own and often cooperated with the racial diplomats on projects aimed
15 Jones Affidavit, ca. July 1946, A. P. Tureaud Papers, box 15, folder 21, 
Amistad Research Center, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana (hereafter cited 
as APT); Jones, interview, September4,1993, 55-63.
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at advancing the cause of racial equality. At the same time, they criticized the racial 
diplomats for accepting compromises offered by white leaders that actually perpetuated 
segregation. The activists also revitalized a project initiated by the racial diplomats but 
abandoned when they became controversial — the equalization o f teachers’ salaries. 
They even initiated some of their own programs and even garnered support for them 
from racial diplomats, most notably voter registration and the desegregation of 
Louisiana State University. Through their efforts to gain recognition within the black 
community, the World War II activists succeeded in creating a strong civil rights 
constituency in less than a decade.
The reaction of World War II activists to the construction of a public swimming 
pool for black children revealed their willingness to simultaneously work with and 
criticize the racial diplomats. In the summer of 1946, Reverend Willie K. Brooks, a 
thirty-eight-year-old employee of ESSO and scoutmaster for the city’s black Boy Scout 
troop, proposed that African Americans build a public swimming pool for black 
children. At the time, the city’s only public swimming pool was located in City Park 
and was reserved for whites. African Americans who wanted to swim were forced to 
brave the rivers and lakes that surrounded the city. The previous summer, several Boy 
Scouts from Brooks’s troop drowned in the treacherous Mississippi and Comite Rivers 
while trying to earn their swimming badges. Saddened and angered by their deaths, 
Brooks decided that the city’s African-American population needed a pool of its own. 
Knowing that white leaders would never agree to use public funds to build one, he 
proposed that the black co m m u n ity  pay for its construction and then turn it over to the 
Recreation and Parks Commission to administer. Because he worked within the
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traditional framework o f race relations and did not demand that the city integrate the 
white pool or finance a black one, white leaders embraced his proposal and announced 
that they would raise $40,000 of the $60,000 necessary to construct the new facility. 
The willingness to pay for such a facility was a typical response o f white leaders in 
New South cities. With the sanction o f white leaders, racial diplomats sprang into 
action. They created the United Negro Recreation Association (UNRA) to direct the 
fund drive and asked African-American businessmen, churches, and other organizations 
to procure black volunteers to build the pool. With the approval of Felton Clark, 
Southern University proudly donated $5,000.16
While racial diplomats whole-heartedly supported the idea o f building a pool for 
black children, World War H activists opposed i t  Although they agreed that black 
children needed the facility, they thought that the city should either pay for it or 
desegregate the white pool. Dupuy Anderson explained the World War II activists’ 
reservations: “We were paying taxes. We were part of the community. They had a white 
swimming pool that we could not use. I objected to raising money to build a black 
swimming pool.” He believed that the pool at City Park should be available to all 
children, not just white ones. Johnnie Jones concurred and also spoke out against using 
private funds to build the public pool. To him, the idea seemed ludicrous. Yet he 
realized that black children needed such a facility and donated $ 100. As he put his
16Charles Smith, interview by Marc Sternberg, tape recording, August 24, 1994, 
October 25, 1994, T. Harry Williams Center for Oral History, Louisiana Lower 
Mississippi Valley Collection, Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana; “City Planners to Determine Site for Negro Pool,” State-Times, August 2, 
1946, 11A.
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money into the collection plate, he told the racial diplomats, “Let this be the last time.” 
Not accustomed to having their deals with whites questioned, the racial diplomats 
attacked Jones. They labeled him as a militant and attempted to discredit him in the 
black community by calling his ideas crazy and foolish. They claimed that by speaking 
out against the pool, he was challenging their authority as leaders. Jones defended 
himself. He asserted, “I wasn’t against what Brooks was doing. Brooks was doing a 
community service. He was going about it the only way he thought it could be done.” 
Jones and Anderson wanted to find a new way of doing things. Turning a deaf ear to the 
objections of World War II activists, racial diplomats proceeded with their fond raisers 
and within a year, raised the required $20,000. In June 1947, city planners selected a 
site for W. K. Brooks Park pool three blocks away from the all-white City Park pool.17
In addition to reluctantly cooperating with the construction of the Brooks Park 
pool in 1946, World War II activists also rekindled interest in East Baton Rouge 
Parish’s teacher salary equalization suit. In 1943, racial diplomats launched a legal 
battle to equalize the salaries o f black and white teachers in East Baton Rouge Parish. 
Heartened by the 1942 ruling by Federal Judge Wayne Borah that required the Orleans 
Parish School Board to pay white and black teachers equal salaries, the Louisiana 
Colored Teachers’ Association (LCTA) decided to file similar suits throughout the
l7W. K. Brooks, interview by Marc Sternberg, tape recording, October 25,1995, 
T. Harry Williams Center for Oral History Collection, Louisiana Lower Mississippi 
Valley Collection, Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; 
Anderson, interview by Maxine Crump, December 22,1994,24-25; Jones, interview, 
October 2, 1993,20-25; Marc Sternberg, ‘Terpetuation, Accommodation, and 
Confrontation: The Evolution o f Civil Rights Protest in Baton Rouge, 1946-1961" 
(senior thesis, Princeton University, 1995), 11.
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state. The discrepancy between teacher salaries in East Baton Rouge Parish was 
appalling. First-year white teachers with no degree earned $104.14 per month, and 
those with a degree earned $123.85. The salary for an African-American teacher with 
fifteen years experience and a master’s degree was only $97.35. In early 1943, LCTA 
President J. K. Haynes contacted the pastor o f Mt Zion Baptist Church, Gardner Taylor, 
a friend of Dupuy Anderson and an activist. Haynes asked Taylor to call a meeting of 
black leaders to discuss teacher salary equalization in East Baton Rouge Parish. A 
native of North Louisiana, Haynes was older than most World War II activists but 
shared their commitment to obtaining equality for African Americans. As president o f 
the LCTA, which later became the Louisiana Education Association (LEA), he used the 
organization’s funds to finance school desegregation suits. As the pastor of one of the 
city’s largest and wealthiest African-American chinches, Taylor commanded respect 
within the black community and occupied a position of leadership. When he asked the 
traditional black leaders to talk to Haynes, they complied. Several prominent black 
businessmen and educators attended the meeting at Mt. Zion Baptist. The attendees 
included: Doctor George Butler and Doctor Beverly V. Baranco, Jr., Horatio 
Thompson, ESSO employee Roosevelt Smith, and educators Leon Netterville and Fred 
Piper. After listening to Haynes, the group decided to sponsor a suit to equalize the 
salaries of black and white teachers and asked A. P. Tureaud to handle their case.
Earlier that year, the LCTA had retained Tureaud as a lawyer and agreed to fund all of 
the education suits filed under the auspices of the NAACP. The group searched for 
several months but could not find a p laintiff because any complaint against the School 
Board would endanger the job of the teacher who filed the suit This threat became a
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reality in October 1943 when the Jefferson Parish School Board fired that parish’s 
plaintiff, Eula Mae Lee, and the boards in several other parishes did the same. In the 
end, teachers in Baton Rouge decided to limit the danger o f job loss by filing as a 
group. Yet they could not agree on how to proceed, and their suit died.18
Fearing that equalization would come at their expense, white teachers 
throughout Louisiana lobbied for a plan that would pay teachers according to their 
qualifications, experience, and ability. The State Board of Education endorsed their 
proposal and added merit and responsibility to the criteria that parishes would use to 
determine the pay level o f their teachers. Parishes throughout the state quickly adopted 
these new guidelines.19
In 1946, Haynes once again tried to organize the black teachers in Baton Rouge 
to file suit for salary equalization. Once again, he enlisted the help of Gardner Taylor 
and also turned to W. W. Stewart, the activist dean o f Southern’s College of Education. 
Both men looked for a plaintiff, but no one wanted to sue. “Most of the people were 
afraid back then,” Haynes recalled. “The black-white relationship was not very good, 
and there was a lot of fear about it [filing suit].” After searching for a plaintiff, the 
group convinced Malcolm Legarde, a World War II veteran who headed the 
Department of Math at McKinley High School, to act as the plaintiff. Knowing that
l8J. K. Haynes interview by Miranda Kombert, tape recording, March 15, 1995, 
T. Harry Williams Center for Oral History Collection, Louisiana Lower Mississippi 
Valley Collection, Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Leon 
Wallace to A. P. Tureaud, March 29,1953, APT, box 31, folder 13; A. P. Tureaud to 
Leon Wallace, December 6, 1943, APT, box 31, folder 13.
I9Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 100.
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Legarde would either be fired or forced to leave his position at McKinley, W. W. 
Stewart met with the parish’s black teachers and asked each of them to donate ten 
dollars to help support him. The activists also tried to convince teachers to sign a 
petition declaring that Legarde represented them in this class action suit. Only a few 
black teachers signed. The majority feared that if they openly supported the suit, they 
would lose their jobs. Although most of them agreed to contribute ten dollars to a fund 
to support Legarde, few actually chipped in.20
Fearing that the School Board would use intimidation to force Legarde to drop 
his suit, Tureaud filed suit before the board had a chance to act. Although not above 
resorting to intimidation to get their way, white leaders knew that meeting Legarde’s 
suit with outright resistance would only unite the teachers and strengthen their resolve 
to sue. The board adopted a plan of action designed to keep Tureaud off balance. First, 
in August 1946, its secretary, C. L. Barrow, refused to give Tureaud a copy of the 
minutes for the meeting in which they voted on the budget for the 1946-1947 school 
year which prevented the civil rights attorney from knowing how much money had 
been allocated for teachers’ salaries. Barrow claimed that the board had not approved or 
published the minutes, so he could not release the information. In a letter to Gardner 
Taylor, Tureaud claimed, ‘1 am not expecting him to comply with this [request].” He
20Malcolm Legarde to A. P. Tureaud, March 1, 1946, APT, box 31, folder 14; 
Willis Reed, interview by author, tape recording, June 23, 1998, T. Harry Williams 
Center for Oral History Collection, Louisiana Lower Mississippi Valley Collection, 
Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Willis Reed, interview 
by Marc Sternberg, tape recording, August 24,1994, T. Harry Williams Center for Oral 
History Collection, Louisiana Lower Mississippi Valley Collection, Louisiana State 
University Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
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also warned Taylor not to discuss the suit because he believed that informants would 
tell board members about their plans. White leaders also tried to use the courts to delay 
the case. H. Payne Breazeale and Victor Sachse, two o f Baton Rouge’s most powerful 
attorneys, represented the board and filed petition after petition to secure continuances. 
A frustrated Tureaud wrote to NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) head Thurgood 
Marshall, “They are going to delay all they can and are using this method for that 
purpose.”21
In addition to delaying the suit, the School Board also adopted a policy of divide 
and conquer; it offered to raise black teachers’ salaries by 20 percent a year over five 
years if Legarde dropped his suit Sachse warned, “any other terms . . .  would impede 
the budgetary program of the Parish School Board.” Tureaud denounced this offer and 
argued that a five-year delay was much too long. Although the proposed equalization 
schedule was protracted, Tureaud feared that the black teachers in East Baton Rouge 
Parish who supported Legarde would abandon the suit if  he pushed the case through the 
courts. “It has been a difficult problem to get the teachers organized for these fights, 
because no one wants to sacrifice his job,” he noted in a letter to Carter. Tureaud added 
that only a few die-hard teachers, the ones who started the equalization fight, wanted to 
continue with the case. The board destroyed the resolve o f the less committed teachers 
by offering this incremental equalization and immediately raised the salaries and 
classifications of black teachers not involved in the suit. White leaders would return to
21 A. P. Tureaud to Thurgood Marshall, April 30, 1946, APT Papers, box 31, 
folder 14; A. P. Tureaud to Gardner Taylor, August 30,1946, ibid.; A. P. Tureaud to 
Robert Carter, August 12,1946, ibid.; A. P. Tureaud to Thurgood Marshall, September 
18, 1946, ibid.
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their strategy of appeasement throughout the civil rights movement. “Baton Rouge is 
known for appeasement,” Dupuy Anderson recalled. “Give us a little taste of the pie, 
and they quieted us down.”22
Those African Americans who wanted more than “a little taste of the pie” failed 
to get it. With the support o f the majority of black teachers lost, Tureaud quickly 
negotiated a settlement with Sachse. The board agreed to equalize salaries in three years 
if the teachers agreed to drop their suit. J. K. Haynes denounced the plan. “We do not 
want any such compromise,” he proclaimed. “They’ve had all these years to do these 
things and have done literally nothing. We insist that something must be done now.” 
African-American teachers in East Baton Rouge Parish refused to follow Haynes’ 
advice. Instead, they accepted the concessions offered by the School Board and trusted 
its members to equalize their pay by September 1948. Of course, the School Board did 
nothing.23
Two years later, in April 1948, the teachers o f East Baton Rouge Parish asked 
Tureaud to revive the case of Legarde v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board. Once 
again, the School Board maneuvered to avoid a legal battle. In early August 1948, it 
promised the parish’s African-American teachers that it would equalize salaries 
beginning in the 1948-1949 school year if they dropped their suit. A year earlier, a
22A. P. Tureaud to Robert Carter, September 23, 1946, APT, box 31, folder 14; 
A. P. Tureaud to Robert Carter, October 11, 1946, ibid.; Anderson, interview by 
Maxine Crump, January 5, 1994, 3.
23 A. P. Tureaud to Robert Carter, October 11, 1946, APT, box 31, folder 14; J. 
K. Haynes to A. P. Tureaud, October 2,1946, ibid.; A. P. Tureaud to Victor Sachse, 
November 11, 1946, ibid.
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federal judge had ordered the equalization of teachers’ salaries in Iberville Parish, and 
in 1948, a similar ruling brought the salaries of white and black teachers in line in 
Jefferson Parish. At that point, the NAACP formulated a plan to file equalization suits 
throughout the state in an attempt to force the State Department o f Education and the 
state legislature into action. To forestall further litigation, the Department of Education 
ordered every school system to equalize the salaries of its African-American and white 
teachers, and the legislature voted to allocate $8 million for that purpose. With money 
in hand, the East Baton Rouge School Board quickly voted to equalize pay beginning in 
September 1948.24
The School Board still punished Legarde for his insubordination. He lost his job 
as head o f McKinley’s Math Department. Although he obtained other teaching 
positions, the stigma of being the man who sued the School Board followed him. Years 
later, he was appointed principal for the summer school session, and somebody 
reminded the board that he had filed suit to equalize salaries. The board promptly 
dismissed him, and according to J. K. Haynes, he made no money that summer. Fearing 
that any interaction with Legarde would label them as troublemakers, African- 
American school teachers shunned  him and his wife, and he lost his status within the 
black community.25
24Horatio Thompson to A. P. Tureaud, April 3, 1948, APT, box 31, folder 15; 
Victor Sachse to A. P. Tureaud, ca. August 1948, ibid.; Daniel Byrd to A. P. Tureaud, 
August 11, 1948, APT, box 9, folder 12; A. P. Tureaud to Horatio Thompson, August
14, 1948, APT, box 31, folder 15; Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 106-108.
“ Steven Lawson, Black Ballots: Voting Rights in the South 1944-1969 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1976), x; Haynes, interview by Miranda Kombert; 
Reed, interview, June 23, 1998.
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The battle of teacher salary equalization reinforced the World War II activists’ 
belief that in order to effect change African Americans needed to be a part of the 
political process. In Black Ballots, Steven Lawson noted that African Americans 
believed that once they attained the vote they could assert influence on elected officials. 
“Once Negroes experienced their vote, the could help elect sheriffs who would be less 
likely to brutalized them,” Lawson wrote. “They would select officials who would see 
to it that ghetto streets were paved and cleaned and ultimately they would use their 
ballots to dismantle the entire Jim Crow caste system.” Yet only a handful of black 
Baton Rougeans could vote. In 1940, the city’s voting rolls included only 144 blacks. 
World War H veteran Willis Reed was one of them. Reed, who quit school in the fourth 
grade to help support his family, worked for a grocery wholesaler in Baton Rouge 
before the war. As a trusted employee, he made daily trips to the downtown Post Office 
to pick up the owner’s mail. Always interested in politics and current events, he loitered 
around the Post Office’s garbage can and read the newspapers and m agazines that 
customers threw away. In the 1930s, Reed, then a teenager, became fascinated with 
Huey Long and established the city’s only black Share-Our-Wealth club. For his 
interest in politics, African Americans chastised him and told him that he should keep 
his nose out of white people’s business. Before the war, Reed decided to register to vote 
and encountered no resistance when he asked to sign up. He simply filled out the forms, 
and Registrar o f Voters Jodie Smith declared him a registered Republican. Smith 
offered Reed no choice of party affiliation. Dupuy Anderson experienced similar 
treatment. When he reached the age o f majority in 1939, he also decided to register to 
vote. After meeting all requirements, he wrote on his application that he wanted to be a
52
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member of the Democratic Party. “They immediately stamped Republican [on my 
form],” he recalled. Both men became enfranchised before the 1944 Supreme Court 
decision in Smith v. Allwright, which declared Texas’s white primary unconstitutional. 
Since the Democratic Party dominated politics in the South, the outcome of the primary 
election, in which Republicans could not vote, determined which candidate won the 
office. Republicans in Louisiana and in Baton Rouge rarely ran a candidate o f their own 
in the general election. Since black Republicans could only vote in presidential 
elections, a few African-American Republicans posed no threat to the white-dominated 
Democratic party and its domination over the city’s politics.26
Even after the April 1944 Supreme Court ruling in Smith, East Baton Rouge 
Parish Registrar of Voters Jodie Smith ignored the ruling and refused to allow African 
Americans to register as Democrats. Until someone complained or threatened to sue, 
Smith and other white leaders in Baton Rouge saw no reason to change their policy.
The chairman of the Louisiana Democratic Committee, Fred Odom, spoke for white 
Baton Rouge when he noted that a ruling against Texas’s white Democratic primary did 
not affect the Louisiana primary system. “Even if it does apply,” he added, “I doubt that
26Howard, “Voting Behavior,” The Proceedings o f the Louisiana Academy o f 
Sciences, XV (August 5, 1952): 88; Reed, interview, June 24, 1998; Anderson, 
interview Maxine Crump, December 8,1993,3; Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 103; 
Jack Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts: How a Dedicated Band o f Lawyers Fought 
for the Civil Rights Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 108-109; Lawson, 
Running for Freedom, 13-15.
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it will change the set up in Louisiana until, or unless, the colored Democrats are invited 
to participate in party primaries by white Democrats.”27
In 1942, the Baton Rouge chapter of the NAACP, at the time dominated by 
racial diplomats, established a  registration committee, but instead o f encouraging 
African Americans to become voters, its members wanted to call the attention of their 
“liberal-minded white friends” to the problem of black disenfranchisement. This 
strategy added few names to the rolls. Before the end of the war, a few activists, led by 
Gardner Taylor, tried to increase black registration, but they received little support from 
the racial diplomats. Taylor and his supporters decided that stressing the importance of 
registration to members of their communities, establishing a voter education program, 
and filing suit would be the only ways to insure black enfranchisement. The same group 
met a month later to raise money to fund a voter registration suit Very little came of 
their meetings. The activists, whose numbers were small, failed to gamer enough 
support in their communities for their voter education program or their suit.28
World War II veterans returned home determined to register to vote and to 
convince others to do the same. They believed that the only way to secure and protect 
their civil rights was through the ballot. Although many African Americans remained
27“Southemers Consider Plan to Offset Ruling Allowing Negro Voting,” State- 
Times, April 4,1944, 5A.
28Baton Rouge Branch News Bulletin, April 20,1942, Branch Files, National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People Papers, Group II, box C69, folder 
1, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited as NAACP Papers); “Leaders 
Discuss Right to Vote,” Louisiana Weekly, December 11, 1943,2; “Second Statewide 
Ballot Conference Endorses $ 10,000 Vote Campaign Fund,” Louisiana Weekly, January 
15, 1944,1.
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loyal to the Republican Party, most World War IT activists wanted to register as 
Democrats. Many blacks idealized Franklin D. Roosevelt and believed that his New 
Deal policies improved conditions for them during the Depression. Because the party 
dominated city and state politics, they knew that registering as Republicans would 
accomplish little. Voting in Democratic primaries would give them a voice in the 
electoral process and allow them some power over office holders.29
Although they could tolerate a few black Republicans, white leaders did not 
want large numbers of African Americans voting, so they made the registration process 
difficult and demeaning for black Baton Rougeans. Yet, unlike their counterparts in 
Mississippi, whites in Baton Rouge never used violence or threats of violence to 
prevent black enfranchisement. To register, African Americans had to take time off 
work, go downtown, and stand in line. Most blacks worked for white employers and 
would have to explain why they needed time off. At best, they would lose a few hours 
pay; at worse, they would lose their jobs for wanting to register to vote. To keep their 
employers from knowing what they were doing, some African Americans would slip 
away from work without telling anyone where they were going. Even if willing to brave 
the wrath of their employers, blacks still had no guarantee of becoming a registered 
voter. Those who made it to the courthouse faced a difficult and degrading registration 
process. The registrar of voters required that applicants calculate their ages in days.
29David Goldfield, Black, White, and Southern: Race Relations and Southern 
Culture, 1940 to the Present (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), 
27-45; Patricia Sullivan, “Southern Reformers, the New Deal, and the Movement’s 
Foundation,” in New Directions in Civil Rights Studies, Armstead Robinson and 
Patricia Sullivan, eds. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1991), 82-87.
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This requirement prevented many who wanted to vote from even attempting to register. 
If  an applicant passed this math portion o f the test, filling out the registration form 
provided the next obstacle. The registrar searched for any error on the form, and if he 
found one, even a minor one, he denied the application. If that happened, the rejected 
petitioner could not reapply for thirty days. The applications of African Americans who 
wanted to join the Democratic Party received the most scrutiny. The registrar rejected 
most of their forms by declaring that the applicants spelled the name o f the party 
incorrectly. If  an African American indicated that he wanted to register as a 
“Democrat,” the registrar would tell him that the proper spelling was “Democratic.” If 
he indicated that he wanted to be a member o f the “Democratic” Party, the registrar 
would deny his application saying that “Democraf’was the name of the party. Usually, 
if an African American wanted to join the Republican Party, Smith simply added his or 
her name to the rolls.30
To counter these obstacles, in 1945, World War II activists quietly set up voter 
registration schools throughout the parish. Johnnie Jones opened one in the North Baton 
Rouge community of Scotlandville. Dupuy Anderson and Raymond Scott set one up in 
South Baton Rouge, and Willis Reed created one in the city’s First Ward. To encourage 
African Americans to attend the schools, the NAACP formed a speakers bureau to 
travel from church to church announcing times and locations of registration classes. 
Although they acted independently from one another, these schools shared many
30Lawson, Running fo r Freedom, 21; Payne, I ’ve Got that Light o f Freedom, 23- 
28,47-55; Corinne Maybuce, interview by Jacqueline Holmes, tape recording, 
December 31, 1982, YWCA Oral History Series, Centroplex Branch, East Baton Rouge 
Parish Library, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Jones, interview, December 4,1993,22-23.
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common characteristics. Volunteers, most o f them women, ran these schools and taught 
their students how to calculate their ages in days and showed them how to properly fill 
out a registration form. The “teachers” worked with potential voters until they 
memorized the answers to all of the questions. Registrar Smith would not allow African 
Americans to bring in slips of paper with this information written on them. To insure 
that their students actually went down to the courthouse to register, Jones or one of the 
other activists gave them free rides downtown or put them on buses and paid their 
fares.31
Even though all of the new applicants could properly fill out the forms, Jodie 
Smith continued to reject their applications because of “mistakes” on their registration 
forms. Jones knew this would happen and sent several groups of applicants to the 
courthouse before he attempted to register because he wanted to challenge Smith on his 
refusal to allow African Americans to register as Democrats. Knowing that Smith 
rejected applicants for “misspelling” the party’s name, Jones decided to abbreviate it. 
Smith declared that Jones failed because he did not to spelled the word and informed 
him that he could not attempt to register again for thirty days. Jones ignored this order 
and returned the next day. “I was looking for trouble,” he recalled. He got none. While 
Smith wanted to intimidate African Americans to keep them from registering as 
Democrats, he did not want a direct confrontation with black applicants. He and other 
white leaders feared that if such a confrontation occurred that the city’s peaceful race
3lMrs. D. J. Dupuy to Lucille Baker, April 14,1945, NAACP Papers, Group n, 
box C69, folder 1; Jones, interview, December 4,1993,23; Anderson, interview by 
Maxine Crump, December 15, 1993,46-48.
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relations might be disrupted and thereby tarnish Baton Rouge’s image of being a stable 
and progressive community.32
In the late 1940s, Smith began allowing greater numbers of African Americans 
to register as Democrats. Although the reasons for his change in attitude remain 
unclear, in all probability, white leaders trusted in their relationships with racial 
diplomats and believed that they could control their ballots and, through the diplomats, 
the ballots of the black community. White leaders also knew that Smith could easily 
limit the number o f African Americans registered. By 1952, nearly 6,000 blacks could 
vote in East Baton Rouge Parish, with most of them registering between 1948 and 1952. 
Although the number of registered blacks increased by over 5000 percent from 1940 to 
1952, only 10 percent of the city’s 60,000 plus African-American population could 
vote. World War II activists continued to encourage black Baton Rougeans to register, 
but the number of applicants declined rapidly in the early 1950s. Clay Williams, the 
assistant secretary o f the NAACP and member of the East End Civic Club, which 
worked for increased voter registration, lamented that African Americans simply were 
not interested in voting. Willis Reed believed that blacks refusal to register grew out of 
psychological impact of segregation. African Americans in Baton Rouge were 
convinced that politics rested in the white domain and that they had no right to take part 
in the process.33
32 Jones, interview, December 4, 1993,23-26.
33Letter from the Executive Board o f the Baton Rouge NAACP to A. P. 
Tureaud, December 22,1947, APT; Reed, interview, June 23, 1998; Clay Williams to 
Lucille Black, November 29, 1948, NAACP Papers, box C69, folder 2.
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Disappointed that only seventy new black names had been added to the rolls 
between January and June 1952, the city’s activist African-American newspaper, the 
Weekly Leader, launched a voter registration campaign for the July 1952 city-parish 
elections. The paper stressed that the laws passed by the city-parish council and rulings 
by the School Board affected all citizens, including African Americans, and claimed 
that by voting they would have a voice in city-parish government. The paper even 
attempted to comfort its readers and informed them that the registration process was 
easy and that “the people in the [registrar’s] office are very congenial and cordial.” 
Several civic groups accepted the Weekly Leader’s challenge and began urging African 
Americans to register. The Baton Rouge Women’s Civic and Political Organization sent 
15,000 letters to black women throughout the parish urging them to register and set up a 
voter education program to teach others how to fill out the form. The Weekly Leader 
even held a voter registration rally but reported sadly that attendance was sparse. In the 
end, the Weekly’s voter registration campaign added only a few name to the rolls.34
Despite the disappointing registration drives, the 1952 city-parish election 
marked the entrance of African Americans into the political arena and revealed the 
strength and solidarity of the black vote. In that election, two African Americans 
announced their candidacies for the School Board. Although one immediately dropped 
out of the race, the other, Carrie Taylor— a native Baton Rougean, owner of Carrie’s
34Howard, “Voting Behavior,” 88; Perry Howard, Political Tendencies in 
Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1971), 286; “Delirium,” 
Weekly Leader, June 5, 1952,4; "WPCO Registration School is Set for Friday 
Evening,” Weekly Leader, June 14, 1952, 1; “A Last Moment Plea,” Weekly Leader, 
June 28, 1952,4; Clay Williams to Lucille Black, November 29,1948, NAACP Papers; 
Reed, interview, June 23,1998.
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Beauty School, and member o f the Negro Chamber o f Commerce and the NAACP — 
remained in the race and received 1,815 votes in the primary election. Although she did 
not make the run-off, she received more votes than two white candidates. Even with her 
unprecedented candidacy, the issue of race played no role in either the campaigns or in 
the outcome o f the election. Race baiting in Baton Rouge did not begin until after the 
Supreme Court’s 1954 Brown v. Board o f Education decision.35
In addition to trying to secure equality through voter registration, World War II 
activists also filed suit in federal courts to obtain full citizenship. One of the first 
inequities they attacked was the segregation o f graduate and professional schools at 
Louisiana State University. Although battle to desegregate higher education was a 
statewide one, the city’s white leadership led the fight against integration, and 
desegregation orders had a direct impact on race relations in Baton Rouge.
The first attack against the state’s segregated system of higher education came 
in 1943 when the LCTA demanded that the state provide graduate education for black 
Louisianians. J. K. Haynes organized a committee on graduate and professional 
education, asked racial diplomat and president emeritus of Southern University, J. S. 
Clark, to serve as chairman, but named several activists to the committee. The activist 
dean of Southern’s College of Education, W. W. Stewart, declared that he was tired of 
paying taxes to support a university that African Americans could not attend and 
suggested filing a suit to integrate the graduate programs at white Louisiana State
35“Two Negroes Qualify for Office in City-Parish Race,” Louisiana Weekly,
June 7,1952, 1; “How East Baton Rouge Voted in Yesterday’s Primary,” State-Times, 
July 30,1952, 7A; “Jesse Webb, Jr.,” Morning Advocate, July 3,1952, 11A; “Join the 
Fight,” Morning Advocate, August 22,1952, 9B.
60
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
University. Stewart’s proposal prompted Clark, who had cultivated a relationship with 
the state’s board o f education, to speak out. I f  a committee upon which he sat advocated 
integrating LSU, Clark warned, white leaders would vent their wrath upon Southern 
University and slash its funding-36
After conducting a study, the committee decided not to sue for admission to 
LSU but instead to ask the state to pay the tuition of black students who went to 
graduate schools in other states, a practice that other southern states also adopted in the 
1940s. Josh Gibson, head of the board of education, fearing that African Americans 
would attempt to desegregate LSU if other arrangements were not made, approved the 
plan and asked the legislature to appropriate $100,000 to pay for the program. The bill 
breezed through both houses only to have Governor Jimmie Davis veto it. As a result, 
in August 1944, Kermit Parker, an African-American pharmacist from New Orleans, 
applied to LSU’s Medical School. The university rejected his application because of his 
race. When the legislature met again, a bill funding out-of-state graduate study once 
again sailed through and this time, received the governor’s signature. Haynes later 
admitted that the decision to request funds for out-of-state graduate study disappointed 
him, but he acknowledged its contribution. “Many of our teachers and doctors and 
lawyers and others who did their graduate work, did it at the expense o f the state with 
out-of-state aid. It might have been a compromise, but at that time, I think it was the 
best that we could do.” World War II activists, in an attempt to make the program as
36Haynes, interview by Miranda Kombert.
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costly as possible, immediately began flooding the state with requests for out-of-state 
tuition waivers.37
State officials did not allocate funds for out-of-state tuition because they wanted 
to provide educational opportunities for African Americans. Rather, their so-called 
“generosity” grew out o f the fear that black applicants would take the state to court and 
be granted admission to the state’s white colleges and universities. Their fear was not 
unfounded. In 1938, the U. S. Supreme Court had ordered the University of Missouri to 
admit Lloyd Gaines to its law school because the state failed to furnish a separate but 
equal one for African Americans. Louisiana officials also realized that to prevent the 
courts from ordering them to admit black students to LSU’s law, medical, and graduate 
schools they needed to establish these divisions at Southern, but they decided to wait 
until the situation warranted their creation.38
After Parker’s fight to enter the Medical School ended with the rejection o f his 
application, the next applicant to LSU, Charles Hatfield, proved more persistent and 
forced officials to devise a plan to keep him out of the university. On January 10, 1946, 
Hatfield wrote to LSU’s registrar expressing his desire to enroll in the Law School. He 
clearly stated that he had received his undergraduate degree from Xavier University in 
New Orleans, an all-black private school, and that he wanted to enroll that summer. 
Fourteen days later, Law School Dean Paul Hebert informed him, “LSU does not admit
37“Louisiana Board Asks $100,000 for Negro Study,” Louisiana Weekly, May 
20, 1944, 1; “State has Authorized S. U. to Set Up Medical School,” Louisiana Weekly, 
October 28, 1944,1; Haynes, interview by Miranda Kombert.
38George Lynn Cross, Blacks in White Colleges: Oklahoma’s Landmark Cases 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1975), ix.
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colored students’* but added that the state of Louisiana had recently authorized the 
creation of a law school at Southern. When Hatfield wrote to Southern’s president, 
Felton Clark, asking about the new division, Clark replied that his university did not 
have a law schooL39
Telling Hatfield to apply to a nonexistent law school was just one of many 
delaying tactics university officials used to prevent him from filing a suit. In the 
summer of 1946, Hatfield resubmitted his application, this time directly to LSU’s Board 
of Supervisors. Realizing that he would not easily give up, a special joint committee of 
the Board of Supervisors and the State Board o f Education convened to discuss the 
problem of black applicants. The committee agreed that Hatfield met all requirements 
for admission, “except for his race,” and that the only way to get around the Gaines 
decision would be to create a law school at Southern. Yet until the school opened, the 
courts could force LSU to admit Hatfield, so officials devised an ingenious method to 
delay the inevitable suit. The university’s attorney, B. B. Taylor, advised Board of 
Supervisors President James McLemore and Dean Hebert to make themselves scarce. la 
an August 12 letter to McLemore, he wrote, “We might get a little time from these 
colored students by telling them that you are out of the state and will not return for 
some weeks.” Hebert and McLemore followed Taylor’s advice. When Hatfield’s 
attorney, A. P. Tureaud, wrote to Hebert on August 22 asking for a clarification of 
LSU’s position on the admission of black students, Taylor replied, five days later,
39Charles Hatfield to Registrar, January 10,1946, APT, box 66, folder 22; Paul 
Hebert to Charles Hatfield, January 24,1946, ibid.; Felton Clark to Charles Hatfield, 
February 15,1946, ibid.
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saying that both Hebert and McLemore were out o f state but assured him that LSU was 
studying the question. On September 5,1946, the joint committee met and voted 
unanimously to establish a law school at Southern beginning in the 1947-1948 school 
year. Days later, Taylor met with Tureaud and attempted to persuade him “to defer 
taking legal action against the University.” He also suggested that Hatfield attend an 
out-of-state law school until the one at Southern opened. Far from being dissuaded, 
Tureaud informed Taylor that a suit would be filed within days.40
Tureaud faced a dilemma. In July 1946, NAACP Legal Defense Fund Attorney, 
Robert Carter warned him, “Hatfield will definitely go to some other law school in 
September if we do not file suit.” Yet Tureaud and LDF attorneys delayed for nearly 
two months because they could not decide whether to file the suit in state or federal 
court. On this issue, Tureaud received conflicting advice. Thurgood Marshall, head of 
the LDF team, wanted to follow existing NAACP policy and file in state court while 
Robert Carter urged breaking with tradition and going directly to a federal district court. 
Following Marshall’s advice, Tureaud chose to file both Hatfield’s suit and one to 
desegregate LSU’s Medical School in a state court. In April 1947, a state judge refused 
to admit Hatfield and Viola Johnson, the Medical School applicant, saying that the
R eport of the Meeting of the Representatives of LSU and Representatives of 
the State Board of Education, August 12,1946, Board of Supervisors Records, Record 
Group #A0003, drawer 4, box 1, folder 294, University Archives, Louisiana State 
University Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; B. B. Taylor to McLemore, ibid.; B. B. 
Taylor to Tureaud, August 27,1946, APT, box 66, folder 22; A. P. Tureaud to Paul 
Hebert, August 22, 1946, ibid.; Minutes of the Meeting o f the Special Committee on 
Higher Education for Negroes in Louisiana, September 5,1946, Board of Supervisors 
Records, drawer 4, box 1, folder 294; B. B. Taylor to James McLemore, September 18, 
1946, ibid.; B. B. Taylor to A. P. Tureaud, September 17,1946, ibid.
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Board of Education had taken steps to open both a law school and a medical school at 
Southern. The decision to file in state court puzzled and disappointed some black: 
leaders. In a 1995 interview J. K. Haynes said, “Fve never understood why Tureaud 
filed it in state court.” Yet, he conceded, “They gave us the Southern University Law 
School which was a blessing. When I started out, we had one black lawyer and that was 
A. P. Tureaud.”41
In the remaining years of the 1940s, several other African Americans applied to 
LSU only to be turned down. In light of these rejections and countless others in schools 
throughout the South, the LDF reevaluated its strategy. After losing case after case in 
state courts, its attorneys decided to go directly to the federal courts with their school 
desegregation suits. Employing their new strategy, in 1950 LDF lawyers filed suit on 
behalf of Hermann Sweatt against the University of Texas’s Law School and in it 
attacked the constitutionality of “separate but equal.” They argued that segregation 
automatically meant inequality and pointed out the huge disparities between Texas’ 
black and white institutions of higher education. They also compared the University of 
Texas’ Law School with the state’s black law school and showed that tangible 
inequalities existed, such as the lack of a law library and a faculty at the black school. 
On June 5,1950, the United States Supreme Court found the separate law school 
inferior and ordered the University of Texas to admit Sweatt42
“‘Robert Carter to A. P. Tureaud, July 10,1946, APT, box 66, folder 22; Robert 
Carter to A. P. Tureaud, September 4,1946, ibid.; Haynes, interview by Miranda 
Kombert.
42Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts, 65 -78.
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Heartened by the Sweatt decision, African Americans in Baton Rouge and in 
Louisiana once again prepared to attack segregation at LSU. With the support of the 
Louisiana Education Association (LEA), formerly the LCTA, a group of black 
applicants from Baton Rouge decided to march to the campus and to fill out 
applications for various graduate and undergraduate programs. Yet once again black 
leaders were divided. After hearing about the proposed march, Tureaud attempted to 
dissuade the organizers from holding i t  Previously the NAACP’s lawyers conference 
had agreed to conduct a fight against school segregation at all levels, but had decided 
not to begin filing suits until the national office had drafted and approved a plan o f
I
action. Refusing to wait for permission to proceed, on July 6, nine African Americans, 
six of whom were veterans, marched to LSU to apply for admission.43
LSU’s president, Harold Stoke, a northerner, immediately contacted the 
university’s attorneys for advice. They told him to allow the men to submit their 
applications and to turn them over to the Board of Supervisors for review. When Stoke 
gave them to the board, he noted that all nine men met “formal requirements for 
admission.” He added that before the recent Supreme Court decision, the university 
could have simply turned them down, but the Sweatt ruling raised “serious questions as 
to the validity of the University’s basis for the rejection of these applicants.” Refusing 
to admit African Americans before directly ordered to by the courts, the board ignored 
his advice.44
43A. P. Tureaud to J. B. Moore, June 29, 1950, APT, box 70, folder 1.
44Administrative Council Meeting, July 11,1950, Office of the President 
Records, Record Group #A0001, drawer 6, box 2, folder 1127, University Archives,
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At this point, NAACP attorneys sprang into action. Thurgood Marshall urged A. 
P. Tureaud “to push all of these cases as hard as possible.” Within days, Tureaud wrote 
J. K. Haynes, whose organization funded the LSU desegregation suit, and asked him to 
get the applicants together. African-American leaders decided not to pursue all o f these 
cases but rather chose to focus all resources and attention on desegregating the Law 
School. This decision brought with it a dilemma— whom to select as the plaintiff. The 
choice came down to two, brothers, Roy and Henry Wilson from Ruston, Louisiana. 
Haynes wanted Henry to be the plaintiff. Although he had not graduated from college, 
Henry had completed one year of law school in Texas and met the necessary 
requirements for enrollment at LSU. Haynes stated that something about Roy made him 
feel uneasy, but Tureaud and LDF lawyers believed Roy’s chances for admission were 
better than Henry’s because he had a college degree. In a rush to file a class action suit 
before the semester began, they did not investigate Roy Wilson’s past.45
At Wilson’s hearing, NAACP attorneys called several witnesses, including the 
presidents and the Law School deans of both Southern and LSU. Their testimony 
showed that the quality of LSU’s Law School facilities, library, and faculty far 
exceeded those at Southern, which had been established only three years before. While 
LSU could not deny the disparity that existed between the two schools, its attorneys
Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Harold Stoke to LSU 
Board of Supervisors, July 18,1950, Board of Supervisors Records, drawer 9, box 1, 
folder 698.
4SThurgood Marshall to A. P. Tureaud, July 12, 1950, APT, box 73, folder 1; A. 
P. Tureaud to U. Simpson Tate, July 31, 1950, ibid.; J. K. Haynes to A. P. Tureaud, 
September 9, 1950, APT, box 73, folder 2; A. P. Tureaud to Thurgood Marshall, 
September 11,1950, ibid.
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attacked the suit itself, claiming it did not meet the criteria for a class action suit. Its 
attorney, Lawrence Brooks, claimed that “the numbers of Negro citizens in Louisiana 
seeking admittance to LSU are not numerous.” Of course, the university’s refusal to 
even consider black applicants probably helped to keep that number down. The court 
denied Brooks’ request and ordered the University to admit Wilson immediately. It 
ruled that “the Law School at Southern University does not afford the plaintiff 
educational advantages equal or substantially equal to those that he would receive if 
admitted to the Department of Law of the Louisiana State University. — ” With the 
semester already underway, Wilson, accompanied by J. K. Haynes, enrolled at LSU in 
late October 1950 and began taking classes.46
Although the officials complied with the ruling and admitted Wilson, they 
immediately appealed the judges’ decision and began investigating Wilson’s past 
Within days, Hebert’s successor, Law School Dean Henry McMahon, phoned Tureaud 
and began asking questions about Wilson’s character. In a letter to Thurgood Marshall, 
Tureaud said that Wilson had recently told him that he and his wife were separated, but 
Tureaud added that he did not think this would be serious enough to keep Wilson out of 
LSU. Unbeknownst to Tureaud, problems with Wilson’s character went far beyond his 
separation. In a matter of weeks, school officials learned about Wilson’s long history of 
violent behavior. Grambling University had suspended him for six months for fighting. 
He briefly attended Southern and left after an altercation with his roommate. He lost
46“Asks Admission Suit Dismissal,” State-Times, September 29, 1950,1; Wilson 
v. Board o f Supervisors, October 7, 1950, Board of Supervisors Records, drawer 4, box 
2, folder 299.
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three defense jobs for disputes with other workers, received a dishonorable discharge 
from the army, and was arrested and jailed for perjury in connection with his divorce. 
Of course none of this information appeared on his application to LSU, and neither 
Haynes nor Tureaud knew about Wilson’s previous problems. But Wilson’s past gave 
LSU, which required its students to have good character, legitimate grounds to expel 
him.47
Wilson’s expulsion threw Tureaud and LDF attorneys into a tailspin. Thurgood 
Marshall told Tureaud, “There is no doubt in my mind that Wilson will be bounced out 
with as much ceremony and with much publicity and we will get bad press on it.” He 
went on to say that the case took precedence and that they should immediately 
substitute another plaintiff. He also advised Tureaud not to defend Wilson and added, 
“If we had known of his past background and his character, we would not have 
represented him in the first place.” He also urged Tureaud to make this clear to LSU, its 
attorneys, and the judges and advised him to make careful background checks of future 
plaintiffs. In the end, Wilson’s expulsion did not destroy the case. Tureaud found a new 
plaintiff, Robert Collins, and the next year, he and another student, Ernest N. Morial, 
began their studies and eventually graduated from the LSU.48
47A. P. Tureaud to Thurgood Marshall, November 8, 1950, APT, box 73, folder 
2; Deposition of Roy Wilson, January 3,1951, Board o f Supervisors Records, drawer 4, 
box 1, folder 299,4 - 38; A. P. Tureaud to Thurgood Marshall, January 4, 1951, APT, 
box 73, folder 8.
48Thurgood Marshall to A. P. Tureaud, November 15,1950, APT, box 73, folder 
2; Thurgood Marshall to A. P. Tureaud, January 10, 1951, ibid.
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With the desegregation of the Law School underway, black leaders turned their 
attention to the Graduate School. In June 1951, Lutrill Payne submitted an application 
for admission to the master’s program in agriculture. LSU’s new president, General 
Troy Middleton, a native Mississippian and a veteran of both world wars, immediately 
rejected it. The state, he explained, “maintained LSU for white students.” But the 
university could do nothing to keep him out. Lutrill Payne was not another Roy Wilson. 
He had an exemplary past and enjoyed the wholehearted support of the LEA and the 
NAACP. In fact, the forty-year-old Payne served on the executive committee o f the 
NAACP. Before taking a job as a vocational agricultural instructor who taught farmers 
better production methods, he had worked as a teacher and a principal in his home 
parish of Natchitoches. His wife of ten years also taught school and served as a 
principal. Although accepted by Cornell University, Payne decided to sue for admission 
to LSU because he wanted to attend graduate school in Louisiana. On June 13, federal 
Judge Herbert Christenberry issued an injunction ordering Payne’s admission. The 
following day, he registered for the summer session and moved into a dorm. At the end 
of the summer, Payne reported to Tureaud, “I had the most enjoyable summer at LSU. I
am pleased to tell you that everyone at LSU treated me most royal [«c] You may
be assured that my conduct was, and will be [,] of such a nature that you will never 
regret your effort.”49
49“Negro Seeks to Enter LSU,” State-Times, June 2,1951, 1; ‘Teacher Files Suit 
Against LSU,” Louisiana Weekly, June 9,1951, 1; Lutrill Payne to A. P. Tureaud, May 
20, 1951, APT, box 69, folder 15; E. A  Johnson to Tureaud, May 16,1951, ibid.; “LSU 
Graduate School Ordered to Admit Negro Applicant,” Morning Advocate, June 13,
1951,1; “Negro Enters Graduate School,” Daily Reveille, June 14,1951, 1; Lutrill 
Payne to A. P. Tureaud, August 21, 1951, APT, box 69, folder 15.
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Although it is doubtful that LSU treated Payne royally, he and the several 
hundred graduate students who followed him in the 1950s were not segregated on 
campus. They lived in the same dormitories, sat in the same classrooms, and ate in the 
same dining halls as white graduate students. For the most part, the university 
community did not welcome them. James Reddoch, special assistant to Troy Middleton, 
taught one of the first black graduate students. “I had one of them in class,” he recalled, 
“There were a few students who told me that they wanted a seat where they would be in 
front of and not near the black student When he came into class, he chose to sit on the 
back row.” The reaction of Reddoch’s students was mild compared to several other 
incidents on campus: two cross burnings; one near-riot at a football game; rocks thrown 
through the window of a black married couple’s campus apartment; and a shooting that 
injured two black graduate students outside of their dormitory. University officials even 
apologized for the presence of black graduate and law students. On one occasion Board 
of Supervisors member Stewart Slack stated, “Louisiana State University has repeatedly
made it clear it does not want Negro students___It admits them under court order.
They attend LSU through no fault of the University.”50
Although they attempted to achieve equality through legal means, World War II 
activists also challenged the system of segregation whenever the opportunity arose. In
50James Reddoch, interview by author, tape recording, February 17,1993, T. 
Harry Williams Center for Oral History, Louisiana Lower Mississippi Valley 
Collection, Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 28 ; Affidavit 
of Troy Middleton, Board o f Supervisors et al. v. A. P. Tureaud, 15540, U.S. Fifth 
Circuit Court o f Appeals, APT, box 7, folder 19; Vertical File - Segregation - Education 
Higher, Louisiana Lower Mississippi Valley Collection, Louisiana State University 
Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
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1949, for example, they refused to march in a segregated American Legion parade 
being held as part of the organization's state convention. As a black member of the 
arrangement’s committee, Willis Reed helped to plan the convention but knew nothing 
about the segregated parade. When he learned that white veterans would march in the 
front half of the parade and black veterans would bring up the rear, Reed demanded that 
the parade be integrated. In a meeting with the commander of his post, Fred Piper, who 
served as a captain in the army and worked as a teacher at McKinley High School, the 
two agreed that Reed should continue to oppose the segregated parade. Because he 
feared for his job, Piper could not make his views public. Reed worked for the black- 
owned Keystone Insurance Company and had a degree of job security. When the white 
legionnaires discovered that Reed’s post intended to pull out of the parade if it remained 
segregated, they demanded a meeting to discuss the situation. Representatives of the 
white Nicholson Post and the Legion’s state officers met in Reed’s office. The whites, 
who felt uncomfortable negotiating with the activist Reed, asked that racial diplomat W. 
K. Brooks to attend the meeting. Reed refused because he feared that Brooks would 
agree that the parade should remain segregated. “Reverend Brooks was well like by 
both whites and blacks,” according to Reed, “but mostly by the white people, and they 
[the whites] believed Reverend Brooks could persuade us to get back in the parade.” 51
Instead, he called his new pastor, Reverend Theodore Judson Jemison of Mount 
Zion Baptist Church. Bom in 1919 in Selma, Alabama, Jemison replaced Gardner 
Taylor as the church’s pastor in 1949. The son of D. V. Jemison, president of the
SIReed, interview, June 23, 1998; Reed, interview by Marc Sternberg.
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National Baptist Convention (NBC), he belonged to one o f the nation’s premier black 
Baptist families. Initially, Jemison occupied the middle ground between the racial 
diplomats and World War II activists, and until the early 1960s could not decide to 
which group he belonged. He supported many of the goals of the activists, but his 
ambition to succeed his father as president of the NBC prevented him from offering 
them his full support. Jemison realized that the conservative members o f the convention 
would never elect a radical as their president. Reed knew very little about the newcomer 
Jemison but hoped he would side with him. After tracking Jemison down at a local 
prayer meeting, Reed asked him to attend the meeting with the white legionnaires, and 
the young pastor agreed. Initially, Reed regretted his decision to invite Jemison because 
he seemed to be siding with the whites. He told them, “We’re all in this thing together, 
and we’re going to have to try to live together.” Jemison’s comments startled Reed, 
who feared Jemison would give in. Instead, Jemison told the white Legionnaires, “If we 
went into the foxholes together and we fought battles together, we can march down the 
street together.” The whites disagreed and refused to allow the black veterans to march 
alongside them; Reed’s post pulled out of the parade.52
While Jemison’s stand on the parade seemed to challenge white authority, it 
actually followed the city’s traditional pattern of race relations. Initially, Jemison used
52Reed, interview by Marc Sternberg; Sternberg, “Perpetuation,
Accommodation, and Confrontation,” 34; Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America 
in the King Years, 1954-1963 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), 145,336; T. J. 
Jemison, interview by Marc Sternberg, tape recording, March 15, 1995, T. Harry 
Williams Center for Oral History Collection, Louisiana Lower Mississippi Collection, 
Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Reed by Marc Sternberg; 
Reed, interview, June 23, 1998.
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conciliatory language when dealing with the whites at the meeting. He assured them 
that he did not want to challenge the system o f segregation. Only when whites refused 
to negotiate a compromise on the parade's line-up did he decide that the black 
participants should pull out of the parade. Jemison's stand delighted World War II 
activists who believed that he would follow in the footsteps o f his predecessor Gardner 
Taylor.
By the end o f the 1940s, the World War H activists had started to challenge the 
racial diplomats for the leadership of the black community. They attracted the attention 
of the black masses by denouncing the construction of Brooks Park pool, reviving the 
teacher salary equalization suit, establishing voter education programs, and supporting 
the NAACP’s efforts to integrate LSU’s Law and Graduate Schools. To preserve their 
standing in the black community, the racial diplomats were forced to adopt some of the 
activists’ programs, such as voter registration. The initiatives of World War II activists 
also caused white leaders to agree to some changes in the system of segregation. To 
preserve racial stability, white leaders accepted teacher salary equalization and allowed 
increased voter registration. But they refused to make any sweeping changes to the 
system of segregation. By employing the tactics o f delay and diplomacy, white leaders 
successfully stalled most of the activists’ initiatives. Surprisingly, segregationists 
offered little opposition to these changes in the system of Jim Crow, and white leaders 
held out hope that race relations in this booming industrial center would remain 
peaceful. They soon discovered that the World War II activists wanted more than token 
changes in the system o f segregation and would defy both the racial diplomats and the 
white leaders to achieve them.
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Chapter 2 
The Bus Boycott, 1953
As the 1940s ended, racial diplomats remained firmly entrenched as leaders of 
the black: community, but the status o f World War H activists had risen. Their 
commitment to obtaining equality for African Americans had attracted the attention of 
the black masses, but their following remained small. Many blacks refused to take part 
in the activists’ initiatives, especially voter registration, because they feared white 
reprisals. In 1953 when the city-parish council voted to raise fares on the city’s buses, it 
unintentionally raised the status o f World War II activists. The fare increase angered 
black bus passengers who made up more than 80 percent o f the system’s riders. 
Although they paid full fare, the African-American men and women who used public 
transportation were forced to sit or stand in the backs o f buses while the front ten seats, 
reserved for whites, remained empty. Following the traditional pattern of race relations, 
the black passengers asked the racial diplomats to intercede with white officials for 
them. After hearing their request, white leaders quickly enacted legislation that ended 
reserved seating but preserved segregation on the city’s buses. Both black and white 
leaders believed the new ordinance was logical, and neither expected any adverse 
reaction to it. Although the new law did not challenge the system of segregation, it set 
off a series of protests that began in June 1953 with a bus drivers’ strike and ended with 
an African-American boycott o f the public transportation system. The boycott, which 
initially united Baton Rouge’s black community, shattered the fragile coalition that 
existed between racial diplomats and World War H activists and perpetuated the pattern 
of protest, compromise, and anger that characterized the city’s civil rights movement.
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The fight over reserved seating began quietly on February 11, 1953, when 
Reverend T. J. Jemison, who usually tried to be an activist and a racial diplomat 
simultaneously, denounced the fare increase at a meeting of the city-parish council and 
asked its members “to take some action to have the bus company allow negro [szc] 
passengers to occupy seats [usually reserved for whites] on buses where there were no 
white passengers.” Although the thirty-two-year-old Jemison was a relative newcomer 
to Baton Rouge, his position as pastor of ML Zion Baptist Church, the city’s largest and 
most prosperous black church, made white leaders take notice. At its February 25 
meeting, the council voted to amend the city’s seating code to allow African Americans 
to sit in the front seats of the buses if they did not occupy the same seat as or sit in front 
of a white passenger. It abolished reserved seating but required African Americans to 
board the buses from back to front and white passengers from front to back. The race 
with the majority of riders determined where the line of segregation began. The 
proposed ordinance would also allow bus drivers to order black or white riders to sit in 
their own sections when seats there became available. The council decided to hold a 
public hearing before taking a final vote but did not advertise it in any o f the city’s 
newspapers. At the sparsely attended hearing, Jemison spoke again. He told the council 
that “the negroes [szc] did not want to raise an issue but that they mainly wanted to 
request that when they pay fifteen cents to ride a bus that they be given a seat.” The 
council passed the new seating law, Ordinance 222, without a dissenting vote and 
ordered it to go into effect on March 19.1
‘Minutes, February 11 ,1953, February 25, 1953, March 11, 1953, all in East 
Baton Rouge City-Parish Council Minute Book, Administrative Building, Baton Rouge,
76
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
White office holders agreed to end reserved seating for several reasons. First, 
allowing the buses to run with vacant seats was simply uneconomical and impractical. 
Buses could carry more passengers on routes running through black neighborhoods if 
African Americans could sit in seats previously reserved for white passengers. Second, 
the existing relationship between racial diplomats and white leaders contributed to the 
enactment of the new law because it allowed white leaders to grant special favors to 
their African-American “friends.” Jemison described his relationship with white leaders 
and their reaction to the proposed ordinance: “I had developed a fine rapport with 
several members of the city council and also the mayor. They were all fair-minded 
people. From the city government, from the mayor, from the city council, we had no 
opposition. We had no opposition in high places.” The dramatic increase in the number 
of black voters from 144 in 1940 to nearly 6,000 in 1952 also gave African-American 
leaders enough political clout to influence the city’s political leaders. In fact, black 
voters had provided the margin of victory for Mayor-President Jesse Webb, Jr., in the 
1952 election, and although he later denied it, he probably backed Ordinance 222 as a 
favor to his black supporters. Finally, the city-parish council believed that since the 
ordinance affected very few whites that there would be no outcry against it.
Although those in “high places” did not object to the new law, they did not 
enforce it. Nor did racial diplomats, who were satisfied with the concession granted to 
them by the white power structure, ask for it to be implemented. For nearly three 
months, the front ten bus seats remained reserved for white passengers, even on routes
Louisiana; “Bus Drivers Strike Over Race Issue,” State-Times, June 15, 1953, 6.
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going through black neighborhoods. In early June, World War II activists brought an 
end to the apathy o f the white leaders and racial diplomats. Although little is known 
about the incident, several World War II activists remember that they demanded action 
after a bus driver m anhandled an unknown African-American woman who attempted to 
occupy one of the front seats. For them, merely having a law on the books was not 
enough. They wanted it enforced. Postal carrier Gus Williams recalled, “the young 
military veterans were incensed.” Willis Reed, the president of the First Ward Voters’ 
League, became the spokesman for the World War II activists. He contacted the 
parish’s political boss and the mayor’s father, Jesse Webb, Sr., and asked for a meeting 
to discuss the lack of enforcement of Ordinance 222. Webb, Sr. had served as the 
parish’s tax assessor for over a decade and held immense power in the parish. Although 
his son occupied the office of mayor, many believed that he controlled the office. 
Although Webb, Sr. agreed to meet with Reed, he made him wait for more than thirty 
minutes in an outer office while he laughed and joked with some of his cronies in the 
inner one. Webb, Sr. finally called him into the inner office, and he made the chief of 
police, Joe Green, listen to Reed’s complaint. The World War n  activist told the men 
about the problems on the buses and outlined the drivers’ brutal treatment o f black 
passengers, especially black women. After listening to his plea, Webb, Sr. turned to the 
chief and told him, “Go up to the [bus] bam and tell those boys, the bus drivers, that 
they [’re] not [officers]. They don’t have any business arresting nobody on the buses.” 
He added that Green’s officers should not arrest anyone unless a fight broke out, and if 
that happened, they should bring in both parties, white and black. Reed believed that 
Webb, Sr. agreed to enforce the ordinance as repayment for the support the First Ward
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Voters League gave his sou in the previous year’s mayoral election. The bus company 
officials heeded Webb, Sr.’s, order because in early June, H. Flynn Cauthem, its 
manager, issued a directive requiring the drivers to comply with Ordinance 222.z
Racial diplomats immediately told the black community about Reed’s 
successful meeting with Webb and the bus company’s directive. They even printed a 
flier describing the ordinance and advising black passengers not to give up their seats 
when ordered to by the drivers. If the police tried to intervene or arrest them, the flier 
told them, “Do not resist arrest. . .  take the officer’s badge number so it can be reported 
to the proper authorities.” Jemison decided to test the bus company’s directive himself. 
‘To show the people,” he recalled, “I immediately went downtown and sat on the front 
seat to ride back” to my church. When the driver ordered him to move, Jemison replied, 
“If you’re talking to me driver, this seat seems strong enough to hold me, so I’m going 
to sit here.” At that point, the driver drove the bus directly to the police station, and an 
officer boarded the bus. The policeman told Jemison, “You can do one of three things. 
You can get your money and get off; you can get up and go to the back [with] the rest 
of the colored folks; or you can go [to jail].” Jemison refused to do any of the three. 
Instead he showed the officer a copy o f the ordinance, and when the policeman said he 
had never heard of it, Jemison replied, “One of the first lessons I learned in civics was
2Gus Williams, interview by Betty Morse, tape recording, August 11, 1983, T. 
Harry Williams Center for Oral History, Louisiana Lower Mississippi Valley 
Collection, Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 30; Reed, 
interview by Marc Sternberg.
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that ignorance [of the law] is no excuse.. . .  The fact that you don’t know it, doesn’t 
mean it’s not a law.” The officer backed down, and Jemison retained his seat.3
Challenges like Jemison’s to their authority angered the drivers. Before the 
ordinance, they controlled seating on the buses. When police officers sided with black 
passengers, the drivers became incensed. They believed that white leaders had 
compromised the principles of white supremacy by enacting Ordinance 222, and they 
wanted to reclaim what their leaders had given away. They knew that if  they complied 
with the law, they would lose one of the things that set them apart from their black 
passengers, white superiority. Under the system of segregation, even the lowest classes 
of whites, including the bus drivers, ranked higher in society than the wealthiest, well- 
educated African Americans. When ordered to comply with Ordinance 222, the drivers 
appealed, through their union, to Mayor Jesse Webb, Jr. He claimed that he did not 
have a vote on the council and could not repeal the law. The mayor advised them to talk 
to the city council. Believing that the ordinance made sense financially and quieted the 
World War activists and their supporters who wanted to end segregation on the buses, 
the council refused either to rescind or to amend the law.4
For the drivers, the final insult came on June 13 when Jemison intervened in an 
argument between a driver and an African-American woman who refused to move to
3Reed, interview by Marc Sternberg; Jemison, interview by Marc Sternberg, 
March 15, 1994,2; Jemison, interview by Roderick Jones, Derrek Vaughn and Michelle 
Johnson, tape recording, June 15, 1995, Williams Center for Oral History, Louisiana 
Lower Mississippi Valley Collection, Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana, 6.
4“Bus Drivers Strike Over Race Issues,” State-Times, June 15, 1953, 1.
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the back of the bus. In an. attempt to get her to give up her front seat, the driver 
summoned a police officer and demanded that he arrest her. When the policeman tried 
to force her to move, Jemison stepped in and told her to remain seated. He assured her 
that the police officer and the bus driver were the ones breaking the law, not her. The 
officer then attempted to arrest Jemison for interfering, but his desk sergeant, fearing 
the reaction of Webb, Sr., ordered him not to detain the young pastor. During the 
confrontation, Cauthem arrived. Jemison told him, “If  I was manager of the bus 
company, I would suspend him [the driver] or fire him.” Cauthem, knowing that his 
driver had indeed violated Ordinance 222, took Jemison’s advice and suspended him / 
The drivers viewed the suspension as the ultimate indignity. Siding with a black 
man, even a well-educated one who served as pastor o f the city’s largest and most 
prosperous African-American church, over a white man was not acceptable under the 
Jim Crow system. The drivers took action. In the early hours of June 15, 1953, all 
ninety-five of them went on strike to protest the suspension of the driver. “The first and 
only issue in the strike is racial segregation,” Roy Finley, secretary-treasurer of the 
drivers’ union told a reporter. “The bus drivers o f Baton Rouge are not striking for any 
personal gain or benefit but are on strike to protect the white bus riders of Baton Rouge 
from being denied transportation in accordance with state law.” The drivers demanded 
that the city council reinstate reserved seating for white passengers.6
5Jemison, interview by Marc Sternberg, March 15, 1994,2-3.
6“Bus Drivers Strike Over Race Issue,” State-Times, June 15, 1953, 1; “City Bus 
Strike Will Continue, Talks Planned,” State-Times, June 16,1953, 1.
81
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The strike angered white leaders because it left approximately 20,000 Baton 
Rougeans, black and white, without any transportation to and from work. Some 
employers provided rides for their employees, especially their housekeepers. Other bus 
riders took taxis or car pooled, but those without access to alternate transportation 
simply missed work. White leaders knew that if  the strike continued Baton Rouge’s 
economy would suffer. They wanted to get the buses rolling again as quickly as 
possible and, at the same time, sought to preserve peaceful race relations. The city 
council’s president pro tem, Frank McConnell, told the drivers that the city would not 
make any concessions to them because “all of the pressure we’re getting is from the
strikers There have been no complaints from the public.” Unlike the drivers, white
leaders did not see the ordinance as a challenge to white supremacy. Rather, they 
viewed it as a practical solution to a simple problem. As Dr. James Wood, Jr., a white 
liberal who later served as a member of the American Friends Service Committee’s 
local advisory board, pointed out in a letter to the editor of the State-Times, ending 
reserved seating provided “maximum utilization of the seats and assure[d] that no 
special privileges pertain[ed] to passengers of either race.” Other moderates believed 
the strike would damage the city’s progressive image. LSU student Peter Balinas 
pronounced Louisiana “a progressive state” and demanded that the bus company fire 
the striking drivers unless they complied with the law. White moderates did not 
understand the drivers’ anger. Because of their social and economic standing, they 
could make concessions to African Americans without threatening the racial balance of 
power in their world, but working class whites could not tolerate any challenges to that
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balance. Any chinks in the annor o f white superiority lowered their status and placed 
them on the same level as African Americans.7
Because the drivers had questioned the validity o f the ordinance, City-Parish 
Attorney Gordon Kean asked the state’s attorney general, Fred LeBlanc, to give his 
opinion on its constitutionality. LeBlanc, a Baton Rougean, ruled that it did indeed 
violate the state’s segregation laws, which required “separate seats and compartments” 
for black and white passengers. His decision convinced the drivers to end their four-day 
strike. Speaking through their attorney, Robert Williams, they declared victory. The city 
council accepted LeBlanc’s opinion and graciously admitted defeat. Councilwoman 
Mildred DuBois conceded, “We are happy to abide by the attorney general’s opinion. 
Anytime that we pass an ordinance that is invalid, we are the first to want to make a 
correction.” Councilman Jack Christian concurred and promised that the council would 
work for “an amicable settlement” that would satisfy all parties. White leaders did not 
want to force the issue or draw too much negative publicity, especially from outside the 
state because they felt any hint of racial disorder would drive prospective industries 
away from Baton Rouge.8
The attorney general’s ruling and the city council’s acceptance of it angered 
African Americans. On the night LeBlanc issued his opinion, more than two hundred
7“Bus Drivers Strike Over Race Issue,” State-Times, June 18, 1953,1; 
“Editorial,” State-Times, June 17, 1953,11; “When People Speak,” State-Times, June 
19, 1953, 5A; “When People Speak;” State-Times, June 18, 1953,2D.
8“Bus Strike Will Continue, Talks Planned,” Morning Advocate, June 19,1953, 
8A; “City Bus Strike Slated to End at Dawn Today,” Morning Advocate, June 19, 1953,
L
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people from around the city met and formed the United Defense League (UDL). 
Although few o f its members rode the buses, the new organization refused to accept a 
return to the degrading system of reserved seating and decided to stage a bus strike of 
their own. UDL members knew that for a boycott against the bus system to be 
successful they had to have the support of the working-class African Americans who 
depended on public transportation to get to and from work. The black working class 
occupied a precarious position in Baton Rouge society. Because, for the most part, they 
depended on whites for employment and credit, any challenge to the system of 
segregation would render them the most vulnerable to white reprisals. According to 
Dupuy Anderson, reserved seating, denied working-class blacks “the privilege of riding 
that bus comfortably after a hard day’s work, even after coming out of the white 
kitchen, tired and sweaty.” The working-class riders wanted to do whatever it took to 
obtain seats on the buses. UDL members knew that for the boycott to be successful they 
needed to provide an alternate form of transportation for the black bus riders. During 
the meeting, Anderson recalled, a “little woman from Georgia asked to speak. She got 
up and gave a very stirring speech.” She said that “she had an old raggedy car, and she 
would run it until it couldn’t run anymore.” Accepting her suggestion, the UDL quickly 
organized a free ride system for black bus passengers. That evening, they secured more 
than one hundred volunteer drivers and cars and arranged with Horatio Thompson, the 
black gas station owner, to purchase fuel at wholesale prices for the free ride 
automobiles.9
9Anderson, interview by Maxine Crump, December 22,1993, 39; “Negroes 
Here Continue Bus Boycott,” Morning Advocate, June 20, 1953,1.
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With the plans for the boycott in place, the UDL faced the problem of getting 
word of the protest out to the African-American community. Early in the evening of 
June 19, the organization asked a local radio station, WLCS, to reserve some air time 
for a special announcement. Between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m., several UDL members 
arrived at the station, and local tailor and World War II veteran, Raymond Scott went 
on air and announced that a bus boycott would begin the following morning. He urged 
all African Americans to stay off the buses. The Morning Advocate reported that he 
“appealed to all Negroes to refuse to ride city buses under the present seating ordinance, 
which he described as unfair to Negroes.” Scott then promised free rides for all 
boycotting black passengers. Fearing white reprisals, UDL members hastily left the 
radio station after Scott’s announcement. “Everybody got into their cars like a bat out of 
hell and went home,” UDL board member Willis Reed recalled. “Well, I didn’t go 
[straight] home. I had to go by my sister’s to borrow a shotgun from my brother-in-law.
I had that shotgun right by my bed. Fortunately, nothing happened.” Fear of white 
retaliation weighed heavily on the minds of UDL leaders. Advocating a mass protest 
abandoned the accepted framework of traditional race relations and opened the racial 
diplomats up to the fury of segregationists. UDL attorney Johnnie Jones received death 
threats from angry whites and offers of money in exchange for dropping out of the 
boycott. Jemison’s fear o f white retaliation grew so intense that he hired armed guards 
to protect him, his family, and his church.10
l0Reed, interview by Marc Sternberg, 7; “City Bus Strike Will Continue, Talks 
Planned,” Morning Advocate, June 19, 1953, 1; Jones, interview, October 2,1993,66- 
69; Jemison, interview by Jones, et al., 16-17; Morris, Origins o f the Civil Rights 
Movement, 19.
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Despite the threats, both physical and economic, African Americans pulled 
together to support the boycott. On June 19,1953, the bus boycott began. That morning, 
several African Americans who went to bed before Scott made his announcement rode 
the buses, but by that afternoon, the boycott was 100 percent effective. Rather than 
riding the buses, boycotting passengers piled into 115 free ride vehicles. This system 
guaranteed the success of the boycott. It provided a steady stream of vehicles to pick up 
and deposit passengers with dispatchers controlling their movement across the city. On 
his way to work, postal worker Gus Williams gave rides to people waiting by the side 
of the road. “It was a time when you saw the black community pull together like I have 
never seen before or since,” he recalled. “Even the thugs on the comer [joined in]. If 
they saw a black get on a bus, they would pull him off.”11
The sense of community created by the boycott grew stronger as thousands 
attended the nightly meetings sponsored by the UDL and held in various locations, first 
in churches and, as the crowds grew larger, in larger venues. Those attending heard 
reports on the status of the boycott given by various UDL officers. Each night, Jemison 
gave the final impassioned speech, prayed with the crowd, and urged members of the 
black community to donate money to support the fiee rides. Donations totaled at least 
$1,000 per meeting and once topped $4,000. Jemison always assured those attending 
that the boycott would continue until black passengers could “sit down when we have 
paid our fares.” Although he never advocated desegregating the buses, many of those
"Morris, Origins o f the Civil Rights Movement, 19; “Negroes Here Continue 
Bus Boycott,” Morning Advocate, June 20, 1953, 1; Williams, interview by Betty 
Morse, 30-31.
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attending the meetings nevertheless believed that integration was the ultimate goal of 
the boycott, and they wanted to continue their protest until they attained i t11
The solidarity of the UDL began to crumble even before the boycott ended. 
Racial diplomats never intended to push for the integration o f the buses, while World 
War II activists and many bus passengers wanted to end the practice of segregated 
seating. “It was not necessarily a federal crime for buses to be segregated.” Jemison 
later recalled. “I didn’t  want to forget my original purpose, to get seats and not 
necessarily end segregation.” He even suggested that the city council create a separate 
bus company for African Americans or charge black passengers who stood a reduced 
fare. When the boycott began, the racial diplomats, along with Jemison, initiated talks 
with members of the city council and representatives of the bus company to work out an 
end to the boycott Moderation characterized the boycott and the talks that ended it. 
Racial diplomats wanted the boycott to be peaceful and did not want to alienate white 
leaders. They therefore urged the African Americans to conduct themselves with pride 
and dignity and enforced their vision o f proper behavior by creating their own “police 
force” to patrol black neighborhoods. The racial diplomats also asked owners of the 
city’s black saloons to close every evening at six p.m., and “ ‘the drunks and winos of 
the black community were not allowed to do their customary drinking in the streets’ ” 
because black leaders feared that drunk boycotters might cause trouble and make white 
leaders pull out of compromise talks. The bar owners willingly complied. At one mass
l2“Over $ 1,000 Is Contributed to Boycott Fund,” Morning Advocate, June 22, 
1953, 1; “BR Negroes May Petition for Separate Bus System,” Morning Advocate, June 
21, 1953, 8A; “New Ordinance on Bus Seating is Kept Secret,” Morning Advocate,
June 23, 1953, 6A.
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meeting, Jemison told the free ride volunteers, “We can’t have liquor on your breath. If 
you do, you’ll have trouble, not with the police but with me!” He also warned African 
Americans not to make spectacles o f themselves but to behave “as gentlemen and 
ladies.” He promised these well-behaved ladies and gentlemen that “through trade 
schools, through colleges, through skilled hands, the Negro is arriving!” Wanting to 
remain on good terms with white leaders and ease their fears about the ultimate goals of 
the African-American protesters, Jemison declared, “We’re not worried about social 
equality; first live with people and social equality will take care o f itself.” World War II 
activists disagreed with Jemison and the racial diplomats. They knew that social 
equality would not just happen. They wanted to enjoy the benefits of American 
citizenship and were prepared to defy both the racial diplomats and the white leaders to 
achieve that goal. These activists saw ending segregation on the buses as a step toward 
achieving first class citizenship and took part in the boycott with that goal in mind.13
Of course, white leaders never intended to establish integrated seating on the 
buses. But they did want to bring a quick end to the boycott, so they met with the racial 
diplomats in secret to hammer out an acceptable compromise. After several days of 
meetings, the two groups of leaders reached an agreement that preserved the spirit of 
Ordinance 222 by requiring African Americans to load the buses from back to front and 
whites from front to back but prohibiting blacks from sitting with or in front of white 
passengers. In a nod to the bus drivers, they agreed to reserve the front two seats for
I3Jemison, interview by Marc Sternberg, October 24,1994, 16; “Baton Rouge 
Negroes May Petition for a Separate Bus System,” Morning Advocate, June 21, 1953,1; 
Morris, Origins o f the Civil Rights Movement, 19; “New Ordinance on Bus Seating is 
Kept Secret,” Morning Advocate, June 23, 1953, 6A.
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white passengers and the long back seat for African Americans. This agreement also 
gave the bus drivers the power to order passengers to give up their seats, and if  the rider 
refused, he or she faced criminal charges and could be sentenced to jail for up to sixty 
days. Fearing both the white and the African-American response to the compromise, the 
leaders decided to keep their deal a secret until members of the city council could 
outline it on the city’s radio stations. The announcement went out over the airwaves 
while several thousand African Americans were gathered at Memorial Stadium for a 
mass meeting. Jemison broke the news of the compromise to them.14
Before telling the black community about the deal, Jemison brought it before the 
UDL executive board to obtain its approval. The Morning Advocate reported that the 
board, “under strong protest,” voted five to three to accept the compromise only if the 
UDL sued the city and the bus company over reserved seating. Although the paper did 
not list the board members, World War II activists, Dupuy Anderson, Raymond Scott, 
and Willis Reed, probably cast the dissenting votes. Jemison received a similar 
reception when he announced the terms of the compromise to the black community at a 
mass meeting. Some accepted it and viewed it as improving conditions on the buses and 
guaranteeing seats for African Americans. The fact that the compromise reserved the 
two front seats for whites and prohibited them from sitting in rows in front o f or in seats 
with white passengers did not bother them. They believed that the compromise marked 
a victory for the African-American community. Others responded with anger when 
Jemison described the compromise. The Morning Advocate reported that “an echoing
14“Bus Fight Settlement is Possible,” Morning Advocate, June 24, 1953, I; “Bus 
Case to be Aired on Radio,” State-Times, June 23, 1953, I.
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oration of voices shouting ‘Stay off! Stay off!’ rose up from the Memorial Stadium,”
and that others shouted, “Walk! Walk!” Jemison told the crowd that he would not force
anyone to ride the buses but declared the boycott over and disbanded the free ride
system. He also ordered African Americans not to attend the next day’s city council
meeting at which the compromise ordinance would be voted on to “avoid friction or
incidents which might introduce violence into the touchy dispute.”13
The sudden compromise took many by surprise. Dupuy Anderson, a UDL
member, heard about it as he ferried boycotters in downtown Baton Rouge. Believing
desegregation to be the goal o f the boycott, the news surprised him. He remembered:
I had been working since early that morning. I had two cars carrying people 
backwards and forwards. At twelve noon, I was on the comer of North
Boulevard and Third Street, where the buses usually make [their] exchange.__
We received word that there had been a compromise. I can’t tell you how I felt. 
We were totally in disagreement [with it, and we asked,] “Who compromised?” 
We knew we had the boycott in control, and we were quite disappointed at the 
compromise.16
Similarly, UDL attorney Johnnie Jones read about it in his morning newspaper. Just as
with Anderson, Jemison’s actions angered him. Both men knew that the boycott was
effective and could be sustained indefinitely. Jones recalled:
Jemison. . .  went down and entered into a compromise with the mayor and the 
city council [agreeing] that they wouldn’t desegregate the buses. They were 
operating within the framework of the law, separate but equal. Jemison thought 
that was right because that was the law. I said, “ No. That’s still not the law.” 
Now, I am his lawyer, and we’re all [in this] together, and there wasn’t any 
animosity between us. It was just that I didn’t agree. And I couldn’t come to
15“Bus Fight Settlement is Possible,” Morning Advocate, June 24, 1953,1; 
“Negroes End Bus Boycott,” Morning Advocate, June 26, 1953, 1.
I6Anderson, interview by Maxine Crump, January 5,1994,11.
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that. I wasn’t going to come to that because, to me, separate but equal was 
wrong.17
Wanting to express their displeasure about the continued segregation o f the city’s buses, 
Jones and his law partner Bruce Bell decided to disobey Jemison’s directive and attend 
the city council meeting.
When they arrived at the meeting, they attempted to write their names on the 
speakers’ list, but white officials refused to allow them to do so. The two men decided 
to speak anyway and muscled their way to the podium. When the cotmcihnen saw them, 
Jones remembered, “Somebody said, ‘They’re out of order. They’ve got no business 
here. They’re not supposed to be here. Arrest them!’ ” The call for their arrest galled 
Jones. He thought, “This is a public meeting, and we don’t have no business there?”
The police went after the two men. Jones, a short, wiry man, managed to escape by 
weaving through the crowd, but the police detained Bell.
Fear of violence permeated the city council meeting. On the night of the 
compromise vote, three hundred whites, including many segregationists, gathered to 
watch the proceedings. Sheriff Bryan Clemmons and Police Chief Joe Green dispatched 
seventy armed deputies and officers to the Municipal Building to keep the peace. The 
show of force proved unnecessary. The council quickly approved the compromise, 
Ordinance 251, and turned to other business. For the most part, the white community, 
including segregationists, accepted the compromise. The new law, despite a concession 
to African Americans, still preserved Jim Crow seating on the buses and allowed the 
drivers to control where black passengers sat. But the compromise marked the last time
17 Jones, interview, October 2, 1993,66
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segregationists quietly accepted a change in the city’s Jim Crow laws. In the years 
following the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board o f Education, they 
adopted a hard line and refused to grant any concessions to African Americans.18
The boycott had crippled the Baton Rouge Bus Company, and the compromise 
did not alleviate the situation. Large numbers of working-class blacks refused to return 
to the buses. Rather than face the indignity of continued segregation, they made other 
arrangements to get to and from their jobs. Those who could car pooled, others walked, 
some obtained rides from their neighbors or employers, and a few purchased their own 
automobiles, hi the days following the boycott, a bus company official lamented, “It’s
very slow___ We haven’t retrieved half of our old customers. Nearly empty buses still
operate.” For the next decade, ridership remained low, forcing the company to increase 
fares and abolish some routes. Even the riders who returned showed their displeasure 
with the compromise. In October 1953, a forty-one-year-old black man, Joe Howard, 
boarded a city bus, sat next to a white man on one of the two front seats reserved for 
white passengers, and refused to move to the back of the bus when ordered to by the 
bus driver. A policeman arrested him, and City Judge Cecil Bankston fined him twenty 
dollars or ten days in jail for violating the bus ordinance.19
l8Ibid., 64-66; “City Council Passes New Bus Ordinance,” Morning Advocate, 
June 25, 1953, 1; “Council Enacts Emergency Ordinance,” State-Times, June 25,1953, 
1.
I9“Bus Boycott is Lifted, Traffic is Subnormal,” State-Times, June 26, 1953, 1; 
“Bus Business is Off as Negroes Resume Riding,” Morning Advocate, June 27, 1953,1; 
“Negro Sentenced for Bus Violation,” State-Times, October 16, 1953, 3B.
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True to the agreement that they made on June 23, the UDL board members sued
the city and the bus company for continuing the practice o f reserved seating, but instead
of pursuing the goals o f the racial diplomats, the UDL’s attorneys, Jones and Bruce
Bell, filed a suit that challenged not reserved seats but segregated city buses. They
claimed that the separation of races on the buses violated the United States Constitution
and the United Nations’ Charter. The men also charged the attorney general with
exceeding his powers and the city council with illegally enacting Ordinance 251 by not
reading it publicly at two consecutive meetings before voting on it. Because they defied
the racial diplomats and attacked segregated seating, Jones and Bell were punished.
When the racial diplomats discovered the content of the suit, they accused die two men
of being insubordinate. Jemison told Jones that he was supposed to follow his
leadership without asking questions. Angered, Jones told Jemison, “You are wasting
your time telling me what not to do I know that this is wrong.” Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, “you can’t have separate but equal,” he added. John G. Lewis,
grandmaster of the Prince Hall Masons and a powerful racial diplomat, also scolded the
men for their defiance. He upbraided the young lawyers for not listening  to the advice
of the community’s traditional leaders and for being too radical. Because Jones and Bell
>
refused to back down, Lewis ordered their senior partner, Leonard Avery, to evict them 
from his office, which was located in the Masonic Temple Building. Avery complied. 
The racial diplomats also removed the men from the boycott case and turned it over to 
Avery and another black attorney, Alex Pitcher, who consulted with the NAACP’s 
attorney, for Louisiana, A. P. Tureaud, Sr. In September 1953, State District Judge
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Charles Holcombe dismissed the bus seating case, and Jemison and the other racial 
diplomats listed as plaintiffs refused to appeal.20
Following the Supreme Court’s 1956 ruling in the Montgomery bus boycott 
case, Cauthem assured white Baton Rougeans that segregation would prevail on the 
city’s buses, and Mayor Jesse Webb, Jr. vowed to the public that the Supreme Court’s 
ruling did not apply to Baton Rouge. Webb died in a plane crash a few days later. 
Because of intense segregationist sentiment in Baton Rouge, his successor, Jack 
Christian, refused to make any changes to the bus seating ordinance without a court 
order. In a speech before the recently-formed local chapter of the Citizens’ Council, he 
even declared that most African Americans in Baton Rouge did not want bus 
integration and claimed that those who did made up a small minority of the population. 
Most blacks, he explained, “would not desire to have a change in their way o f living 
here.” He even boasted o f the city’s good race relations and attributed it to the make-up 
of the black community. “A majority of Baton Rouge Negroes are older, Southern [sic] 
Negroes,” he explained. To a point, Christian’s description was correct. Most o f the 
African Americans with whom he and other white leaders dealt did indeed belong to the 
traditional group of black leaders, but by 1957, the power o f racial diplomats was 
beginning to decline while the influence of the activists was on the rise.21
20 Jones, interview, October 2, 1993, 68-69, 59-61; Alex Pitcher to A. P. 
Tureaud, July 8,1953, APT, box 10, folder 23; “Rule on Phase of Transit Suit,”5'mre- 
Times, September 22, 1953, 1.
2I“Halt Intrastate Bias, City Not Affected,” News Leader, 28 April 1956, 1; 
“Council Appoints Liaison Group on Bus Question,” Morning Advocate, January 3, 
1957, 1; “Says Small Group of Negroes Push Bus Integration,” Morning Advocate, 
February 27,1957,9A.
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Racial diplomats recognized the increasing popularity of World War H activists 
and feared that they would become leaders of the black community and convince the 
black masses to take action against segregation on the buses, thus undercutting the 
diplomat’s own leadership within the community. Jemison and several other racial 
diplomats quickly retained an attorney, Alex Pitcher. They sued Christian, the city, and 
the bus company and demanded an end to the segregation o f public transportation. 
Their suit meandered its way through the court system and withstood constant attacks 
from the city’s attorneys. Only in 1962 did a federal court finally overturn Ordinance 
251 and end segregated seating on the city’s buses.22
The specter of the successful Montgomery bus boycott and Martin Luther King, 
Jr. weighed heavily on the minds of African Americans in Baton Rouge. Realizing that 
their boycott could have brought an end to segregated seating on buses throughout the 
South if  their leaders had not reached a compromise with white leaders, black Baton 
Rougeans, in the decades after the more famous boycott, attempted to intertwine their 
boycott with Montgomery’s to enhance their role in the civil rights movement. Jemison 
equated his decision to sit in the front seat of a bus with Rosa Parks’ actions. He even 
called himself the father of the bus boycott, with Parks as the mother. The fact that the 
compromise he reached with white leaders helped to preserve segregation on the city’s
“ “Negroes Take BR Bus Seating Fight to Courts,” Morning Advocate, February 
5, 1957, I; “City is Seeking Bus Segregation Suit’s Dismissal,” Morning Advocate, 
March 30, 1957, 1; “Baton Rouge Bus Segregation Case is Continued,” Morning 
Advocate, March 28,1958,7C; T. J. Jemison to A. P. Tureaud, February 28, 1960,
APT, box 31, folder 2; “Bus Integration Suit Comes Up Here on Monday,” Morning 
Advocate, October 13, 1960,1; “Bus Segregation Law Overturned,” Morning Advocate, 
April 26, 1962,1.
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buses for nearly a decade after the boycott did not, in his mind, diminish the importance 
of his role in the movement. Black Baton Rougeans also claimed that they played a 
large role in the planning of the Montgomery boycott. In a 1996 Advocate article, 
Jemison, Jones, and Anderson recalled a visit King paid to Baton Rouge before the 
Montgomery boycott even began. All three remembered meeting with King to discuss 
strategy for his city’s impending protest. Jones even described the Plymouth King drove 
and the hat he wore. “It was just the three of us, Reverend Jemison, King, and I,” Jones 
recalled, “We talked about how to organize a boycott. It was before [Rosa] Parks sat.”
In his book, Stride Toward Freedom, King did acknowledge the help he received from 
Jemison in setting up his community’s free ride system. According to King, he and 
Jemison exchanged ideas in a long distance phone call; King admitted that Jemison’s 
“painstaking description of the Baton Rouge experience was invaluable.” King could 
not have visited Baton Rouge before the Montgomery bus boycott began because the 
civil rights leader played no part in the early stages of that protest. In fact, black leaders 
drafted him to head the Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA) after Rosa 
Parks’ arrest. He could not possibly have been in Baton Rouge before the Montgomery 
protest began, but by rearranging the chronology of King’s involvement in the boycott, 
African Americans in Baton Rouge carved a place for themselves in the civil rights 
movement and connected their boycott to the more successful one in Montgomery.23
“ “King’s Legacy,” Advocate, January 15,1996,1; Jemison, interview by Marc 
Sternberg, March 14, 1994,9; Jones, interview, November 13, 1993,2; Martin Luther 
King, Jr., Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story (New York: Harper, 1958) 
75; Branch, Parting the Waters, 136; Morris, Origins o f the Civil Rights Movement, 51.
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While African Americans created a legend out of the Baton Rouge boycott, 
whites barely remembered it and took no pride in the event. Lasting only a week and 
ending in a peaceful compromise, it affected few white Baton Rougeans. White 
moderate, Carlos Spaht, a native Missourian and candidate for governor in 1952, 
remembered the boycott but claimed that it affected neither him nor his law practice. 
Marian Reynard Baun, a native of Illinois and the wife of liberal LSU Law School 
Professor Charles Reynard, echoed Spaht. In a 1998 interview, she recalled the protest 
but added that neither she nor her husband paid much attention to the boycott.24
August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, in Along the Color Line, claimed that the 
Baton Rouge boycott was an isolated incident that had no impact on the boycotts that 
followed, especially on the Montgomery movement. These scholars failed to recognize 
the impact of this protest on communities throughout the South. While the leaders of 
the Montgomery movement did not consult Jemison before their boycott, they 
undoubtedly knew about events in Louisiana’s capital city. The national black press and 
some major white newspapers carried stories about the Baton Rouge protest, and as 
Aldon Morris pointed out in Origins o f the Civil Rights Movement, the news of the 
boycott quickly spread through the black ministerial networks, most notably the 
National Baptist Congress. Jemison’s father served as president of that organization. 
Morris noted that Jemison brought a blueprint of the boycott to the organization’s 1956
24Carlos Spaht, interview by author, tape recording, July 27, 1993, T. Harry 
Williams Center for Oral History, Louisiana Lower Mississippi Valley Collection, 
Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 48-49; Marian Baun, 
interview by author, tape recording, June 6, 1998, T. Harry Williams Center for Oral 
History, Louisiana Lower Mississippi Valley Collection, Louisiana State University 
Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
97
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
convention and shared it with interested ministers and consulted with boycott leaders in 
several southern cities including Tallahassee, Florida and New Orleans.25
In addition to playing an important role in launching the use of direct action to 
challenge segregation, the week-long boycott marked the first time African Americans 
from all segments of the community united to demand changes to Baton Rouge’s Jim 
Crow laws. This cooperation crippled the city’s public transportation system and 
revealed the power that a cohesive black community wielded. Fearing that such unity 
would bring with it racial unrest and violence, white leaders adopted a strategy of using 
the politics of moderation, granting small concessions to racial diplomats to end 
activists’ protests and to drive a wedge between racial diplomats and the activists. With 
each compromise, the chasm between the two groups grew larger, and racial diplomats 
began to lose respect. In 1953, they were the leaders of the black community, but a 
decade later, many African Americans viewed them as sellouts and denounced the deals 
they reached with whites. Each compromise not only diminished the leadership abilities 
of the racial diplomats but increased the discontent of the black community and led the 
city closer to the racial violence that white leaders wanted to avoid.
“ August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, Along the Color Line, Explorations in the 
Black Experience: Essays (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1976), 366; Morris, 
Origins o f the Civil Rights Movement, 25.
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C hapter!
From Boycott to Brown, 1953-1954
The brief period between the June 1953 bus boycott and the Supreme Court’s 
May 1954 Brown decision, which called for school desegregation, marked a dynamic 
period in Baton Rouge’s civil rights movement. From June 1953 through September 
1954, World War II activists launched a series o f direct attacks against the system of 
segregation. They demanded the integration of the city’s public parks and supported an 
attempt to desegregate LSU’s undergraduate programs. After Brown, a group of activist 
parents allowed Johnnie Jones and another black attorney to take their children to a 
white school and to ask the principal to admit them. White leaders feared that these 
unprecedented demands would lead to racial unrest in the city and parish, and they 
turned to the traditional black leaders for help in quieting the activists. Working with 
the racial diplomats, white leaders adopted an outwardly moderate approach but wanted 
to stifle civil rights sentiment in the black community. Although their tactics impeded 
integration, they failed to silence the World War II activists. The activists only 
redoubled their efforts when racial diplomats and white leaders attempted to placate 
them with agreements that fell short of their demands. However the white leaders’ 
strategy proved successful. Using legal maneuvers, they successfully delayed the 
integration of the parks, LSU’s undergraduate program, and the public school system 
for a decade.
In the first o f these three desegregation efforts, World War II activists petitioned 
the Recreation and Parks Commission, in May 1953, to desegregate the parish’s public 
parks. Although separate facilities existed for black and white residents, parks
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designated for whites contained tennis courts, swim m ing pools, softball fields, and golf 
courses. Brooks Park, which was built in 1947 and paid for, in part, by donations from 
the black community, was the only black park with a swimming pool. Other black parks 
possessed none of the amenities of white ones. In their petition, the activists argued that 
since tax dollars financed the parks, African Americans should be allowed to use all of 
them. After receiving the petition, Ralph Hileman, chairman of the Recreation and 
Parks Commission, announced that his organization had initiated a study into the 
feasibility of building a nine-hole golf course for African Americans at Harding Field, 
located near Southern University in the northern part o f the parish. To avoid white 
outcry against the study, the commission also promised to look into building another 
18-hole course for white golfers.1
World War II activists refused to be appeased by the promise to investigate the 
possibility of a golf course, and on September 17, 1953, six activists including Malcolm 
Legarde, who filed the salary equalization suit in the mid 1940s, went to the City Park 
and tried to use the links. Breaking with the traditional pattern of race relations, they did 
not meet with white leaders to discuss their grievances before taking action nor did they 
ask racial diplomats to intercede for them. Instead, when the park operator refused to 
allow them to use the course, they contacted attorneys Bell and Jones and asked them to 
sue to desegregate City Park.
‘“Negroes Ask Use o f Park,” State-Times, September 18, 1953,1; “Confab, on 
Demand of Negroes for Park Use Slated,” State-Times, September 22,1953,6A; 
“Committee Study Started on Issue of Golf Dispute,” State-Times, September 23, 1953, 
1.
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In a letter to both the commissioners and to the City-Parish Council, the two 
lawyers stated that their clients paid taxes to support City Park and should not be denied 
use of it simply because of their race. Shocked, the Recreation and Parks Commission 
demanded a meeting with African-American leaders “to come to an agreement” about 
the park situation. Commission members never met with the six activists who sought 
entry to City Park. Instead, they created a special interracial committee consisting of 
commission members and African Americans to study the issue. They named a group of 
racial diplomats, including Jemison and Baranco, and a few World War H activists to 
the committee and asked the attorney for the six men, Johnnie Jones, to serve on it.2 
Jemison and Baranco announced that the black activists would drop demands to use 
City Park if  white leaders agreed to construct a separate golf course for African 
Americans. The handful of World War n  activists who attended the meeting, including 
Raymond Scott, Bell, and Jones, balked at the men’s offer. “We want these facilities 
now, not tomorrow or the next day or the day after that,” Jones told the white 
leadership. “We want to play now in order to enjoy the money we spend for taxes.” He 
added that his clients would agree to drop their suit only if  the commission adopted a 
plan similar to the one established in New Orleans in 1952 that designated alternating 
days for black and white golfers to use public courses.3
2Although Jemison often acted as an activist, on this issue, he sided with the 
racial diplomats and will be characterized one of them.
3“Negroes Ask Use of Park,” State-Times, September 18, 1953, I; Jones, 
interview, November 13, 1993,60; “United Defense League to Back Move on Parks,” 
State-Times, September 19, 1953, 1; “Name Committee on Dispute Over City Golf 
Course,” State-Times, September 26, 1953, 1; Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 106.
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Whites attending the meeting refused to consider Jones' suggestion. 
Commission member Frank “Tickie” Saia, the general manager o f Sachse Electronics, 
claimed that white golfers would abandon the City Park course if  African Americans 
used it, and, without white golfers, the entire facility would close. Commissioner V. L. 
Roy added that any change in the racial status of the parks would disrupt the city’s 
long-term plans for expansion and improvement. White leaders also tried to discredit 
the activists. According to Johnnie Jones, District Attorney J. St. Clair Favrot, who also 
attended the meeting, told the audience, “Johnnie comes up with all o f these hare­
brained ideas.” John Easterly, a contractor who would later become the leader of the 
Southern Gentlemen, a local segregationist organization formed shortly after Brown, 
condemned the World War U activists and claimed that they wanted to destroy “the 
peace of our community.” Jones recalled that when he outlined his clients’ demands, 
Easterly jumped out o f his seat and shouted,
Listen to that damned nigger. That damned nigger ain’t going to be satisfied 
until they get the whole damned thing. I don’t care what you give them damned
niggers, they ain’t going to ever be satisfied Go outside and look at their
cars. They’ve got cars finer than ours. Follow them niggers home, them niggers 
got finer houses than we got.. . .  What them damned niggers want now is our 
wives, our daughters. That’s what them damned niggers want because they’ve 
got every thing else we got.4
The reaction o f white leaders to the City Park issue stood in direct contrast to 
their response to Jemison’s request that they end reserved seating on the city’s buses. 
Instead of quietly agreeing to set up a plan for African Americans to use the white golf 
course, they refused even to discuss the possibility of designating a day or two a week
^‘Committee Study Started on Issue o f Golf Dispute,” State-Times, September 
23, 1953,1; Jones, interview, October 2,1993,97,104-105.
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for black golfers to use the course. Several factors influenced this decision. First, the 
activists had abandoned the traditional pattern of race relations. Instead of going to the 
white leadership and asking for them to help finance a golf course for African 
Americans, the activists attempted to use facilities at City Park, and, when turned away, 
they contacted a lawyer and threatened to sue to desegregate them. Second, allowing 
African Americans to use the City Park links affected a larger number of upper- and 
middle-class whites than ending reserved seating on the buses had, and white leaders 
knew that this group did not want to share their golf courses with African Americans. 
Finally, even after white leaders agreed to allocate $20,000 to finance and construct a 
course at one of the city ’s black parks, Jones’s clients decided to proceed with their suit. 
As the suit made its way through the federaL courts, the Recreation and Parks 
Commission and the parish’s district attorney used every legal means at their disposal 
to delay the case and hoped that by dragging it out, the plaintiffs would become 
discouraged and drop it. In 1956, the commission even voted to close all parks if  a court 
ordered integration because integration “would seriously retard the social, moral, and 
economic advancement of the state.” The commission’s strategy of legal delays proved 
effective. Nearly a decade passed before a federal judge finally heard the case and 
ordered Baton Rouge’s public parks to integrate.5
5“Name Committee on Dispute Over City Golf Course,” State-Times, September
26, 1953, 1; “Park Use Suit Filed By Negroes,” State-Times, November 18, 1953,1;
“New Deadlines Set for Answers in Park Suit,” Morning Advocate, November 8,1955,
1; “East Baton Rouge Facilities to Stay Segregated,” Morning Advocate, December 2,
1955, 1; “Rec. Facility Desegregation Efforts Planned,” Morning Advocate, August 6,
1963, 8A; “West to Deliberate on Park Integration,” Morning Advocate, April 18,1964,
11 A.
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Meanwhile, the Recreation and Parks Commission went ahead with their 
promise to improve separate facilities. On December 22,1954, the commission opened 
a nine-hole golf course for African Americans in North Baton Rouge, named the J. S. 
Clark Memorial Park. At the dedication ceremony, T. J. Jemison declared, ‘This is 
progress. We are headed in the right direction, and it can be progress for the whole 
community if  we continue to work together in the spirit of brotherhood and love.” Of 
course, the World War H activists viewed the park as a setback to the cause of civil 
rights. Although Jones applauded building a golf course in North Baton Rouge, he 
continued to denounce the fact that it was segregated. He believed that the city’s 
publicly funded parks should be open to all citizens, black and white. T  wanted it 
[Clark Memorial Park] to be for the people of East Baton Rouge Parish,” Jones recalled, 
not just black people. Dupuy Anderson expressed a similar opinion. “They hurriedly 
built a black golf course, nine holes. I objected to that. I was invited to the dedication of 
that, but I did not go. It was a long time before I played golf.”6
Although their agreement with white leaders delayed the integration of the city’s 
parks, the racial diplomats realized that if  they challenged their white counterparts on 
this issue, the black community would receive nothing. Jemison, acting as an activist, 
experienced the wrath of white leaders on June 18, 1953 when he demanded that the 
Louisiana Building Authority (LBA) construct a swimming pool at Southern 
University. He complained that Southern went without a pool while LSU had one of the
^‘Dedication of New Negro Golf Course, Recreation Center is Marked Here,” 
Morning Advocate, December 22,1954, 16B; Jones, interview, October 2, 1993, 106; 
Anderson, interview by Maxine Crump, December 22, 1994,25.
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largest in the nation. Members of the LBA claimed that having a pool at Southern 
would be “too luxurious for Negroes.” Southern President Felton Clark bore the brunt 
of white displeasure for Jemison’s demand. Charles Tooke, a member o f the Senate 
Finance Committee, warned Clark, “In my opinion, if we build the swimming pool, 
your chances of getting other funds from the next legislature are zero.” He also 
reprimanded Jemison. “You are showing a great deal of ingratitude,” Tooke said. “You 
are doing a disservice to your people.” Although he conceded that Southern needed a 
pool, Clark quickly disassociated himself from Jemison and claimed that he knew 
nothing of the minister’s activism. Clark realized that if he sided with Jemison, the 
legislature would cut off Southern’s funding, and he refused to ask the LBA to 
construct a swimming pool because the university could survive without one. It could 
not get by without state money. The board rejected Jemison’s request, and he never 
again directly challenged the white power structure.7
The second major desegregation battle fought during the period between the 
boycott and Brown was over the admission of African Americans to LSU’s 
undergraduate programs. Even after black graduate and law students gained admission 
to LSU, in 1950 and 1951, the university’s undergraduate divisions remained 
segregated. Few Baton Rouge activists played a part in the suit to integrate LSU, but the 
reaction to this desegregation attempt by LSU’s administration, most notably its 
president Troy Middleton, reflected the determination of Baton Rouge’s white 
leadership to maintain peaceful race relations while using the court system to delay the
7“Board Rebukes Negro Leader,” State-Times, June 19,1953, 1.
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admission of black students. In the summer of 1953, seventeen-year-old New Orleans 
high school student, Alexander P. “Alex” Tureaud, Jr., decided that he wanted to attend 
LSU. The son of the state’s leading civil rights attorney, he knew that LSU was the best 
college closest to his home in New Orleans. Although his father did not directly recruit 
him as a plaintiff, he made several trips to the campus, and on one visit, the elder 
Tureaud told his son, “LSU is a wonderful school. Look at these buildings. Look at the 
faculty. We should have some of this. We should be here.”8
In his letter of application, Alex Tureaud stated that he wanted to major in 
liberal arts law, an accelerated course of study that allowed a student to obtain both a 
bachelor’s degree and a law degree in six years. Although a similar major existed at 
Southern University, no students majored in it. In a letter to A. P. Tureaud, Sr.,
Southern Law School Dean A. A. Lenoir stated that LSU’s liberal arts law degree was 
far superior to the one at his school and urged the civil rights attorney to stress the 
differences between the two programs. In early August, the Board of Supervisors 
rejected Tureaud’s application declaring that LSU only admitted black students when 
ordered to by the courts. After this rejection, Tureaud sued on his son’s behalf saying, 
“There is no other institution maintained by the state where the plaintiff can obtain the 
advantages involved in the combination course here nor combine his college and law
8A. P. Tureaud, Jr., interview by Rachel Emanuel-Wallace, tape recording, April 
25,1993, T. Harry Williams Center for Oral History, Louisiana Lower Mississippi 
Valley Collection, Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 2.
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school work to the same extent and on equal level of scholarship and intensity as in the 
school of LSU.”9
Although university officials re lu c ta n tly  accepted the fact that the courts
required them to admit black law and graduate students, they were determined to
prevent any black undergraduates from enrolling. They believed that white Louisianians
would either react violently or pull their children out of LSU’s undergraduate programs.
Troy Middleton expressed the feelings of the majority of whites when he said:
Peaceful behavior is threatened far less by the admission of Negro students to 
the graduate schools than would be the case in undergraduate schools [because 
graduate students are mature]. They have established patterns of behavior and 
spend most of their time studying and do not participate in university activities. 
Undergraduate students are establishing friendships, developing interests in 
extracurricular activities as well as engaging in their studies.
A segregationist attorney W. Scott Wilkinson expressed a similar concern. In a letter to
Board of Supervisors member Lewis Gottleib, he wrote,
It will come to pass that instead of having mature negroes [sic] in the law and 
graduate schools, you will also have a horde of teenage negroes [sic] in the 
undergraduate courses. When that happens, you will find the better people of 
Louisiana sending their boys and girls to Tulane, Newcomb, Centenary, and 
other privately endowed institutions.
Indeed, Tureaud wanted to take part in the social life of LSU. He wanted to make
friends, join a study group, and pledge a fraternity.10
9A. A. Lenoir to A. P Tureaud, July 1953, APT, box 71, folder 15; A. A. Lenoir 
to A. P. Tureaud, August 6,1953, ibid.; Tureaud, interview by Rachel-Emanuel 
Wallace, 2; “Negro Student Seeks Admission to LSU College,” State-Times, August 3, 
1953, 5B; “Rejected Student Sues LSU,” State-Times, August 24, 1953,1.
‘“Affidavit of Troy Middleton, APT, box 7, folder 19; W. Scott Wilkinson to 
Lewis Gottleib, November 10,1955, Robert Kennon Papers, box 4, folder 92, Louisiana 
and Lower Mississippi Valley Collection, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana (hereaftercited as Kennon Papers).
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Ia early September, federal judge Skelly Wright began hearing Tureaud’s case.
Represented by ten lawyers, including ultra-segregationist Leander Perez, LSU
launched an all-out attack against Tureaud. At times, that attack became personal. Alex
Tureaud recalled one incident involving Perez:
He was dressed in a plantation beige outfit with a string tie. He was very
dramatic and also could be very cruel and biting and sarcastic One
statement that he made that I’ll never forget. He pointed to me, and walked in 
my direction, and looked right dead at me, and said, “There sits the only 
ungrateful nigra in the state of Louisiana because we have gone through great 
expense and trouble to build fine black universities in this state. Why is Mr. 
Tureaud not willing to avail himself of this opportunity?” He said it with such 
sarcasm and with such belief it was just very intimidating, and it made me 
angry.
Perez’s arguments held little sway over the judge. On September 11, Wright ruled 
against LSU and ordered Tureaud’s admission saying that although “Louisiana has 
made a bonafide effort to maintain and operate an adequate institution in the Arts and 
Sciences level at Southern University,” it is not equal to LSU. He added that denying 
Alex Tureaud’s admission solely because of his race also violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment."
Although LSU fought Tureaud’s admission, James Reddoch, President 
Middleton’s assistant, noted that school officials “took the position, that if  this is the 
law of the land, then we’re going to operate the university in a way that is consistent 
with the law of the land.” Of course, university officials chose to meet only the 
minimum requirements of the law of the land, and they immediately appealed Wright’s
"Tureaud, interview by Rachel Emanuel-Wallace, 39; “LSU Ordered to Admit 
Negro Undergraduate,” State-Times, September 11,1953, 1.
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ruling, saying that Alex Tureaud’s case should have been heard by a three-judge panel. 
In the meantime, he enrolled at LSU and began attending classes.12
To young Tureaud’s dismay, the university community adopted an unofficial 
policy for dealing with him —  everyone shunned him. ‘Tt was like I didn’t exist,” he 
recalled. “People talked about me as though I was an inanimate object. Nobody sat near 
me. The kids sat all around me. If  I sat in the comer, they would move to the opposite 
side of the room. If I sat in the middle, they would move to the sides.”13
In early November 1953, the Fifth Circuit Court o f Appeals ruled that Skelly 
Wright had indeed exceeded his jurisdiction in ordering Tureaud’s admission. Days 
later, without the court’s permission, LSU canceled his enrollment. His father and LDF 
attorneys asked the Supreme Court to order his readmission. The justices condemned 
the hasty dismissal, but took no action to force the university to reinstate him. In May 
1956, the Supreme Court finally ruled in Tureaud’s case and ordered LSU to admit him 
to the liberal arts law program. Tureaud did not want to return to LSU. At the time, he 
was attending Xavier and majoring in education. University officials refused to allow 
other black undergraduates to enroll. Saying that the court’s decision applied only to 
Tureaud, they simply chose to ignore the fact that Tureaud v. LSU  was a class action 
suit and successfully maintained its segregated undergraduate program until the 
summer of 1964.14
12Reddoch, interview, January 20, 1993,28.
I3Tureaud, interview by Rachel Emanuel-Wallace, 9-12.
14 ‘U.S. Appeals Court Reverse Louisiana State University Decision,”
Pittsburgh Courier, November 7, 1953, 5; “LSU Appeal is Upheld in Negro Case,”
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Because Tureaud’s admission occurred before Brown, white reaction to his 
enrollment differed sharply from the responses of whites in other southern states to the 
admission o f black undergraduates into their universities. White leaders in states such 
as Alabama used delaying tactics similar to LSU’s, but when the federal courts ordered 
them to integrate, they responded with direct defiance. In 1952, a year before Tureaud 
applied for admission to LSU, two women, Autherine Lucy and Pollie Ann Myers 
applied for admission to the University of Alabama as undergraduates. For four years, 
the university’s attorneys used legal maneuvers to delay the court’s decision, but in 
early 1956, a federal judge ordered the admission of the two women. After investigating 
the lives o f Lucy and Myers, the university discovered that Myers, who married and 
gave birth to a child during the intervening four years, had conceived her child before 
the nuptials and refused to admit her because she failed to meet the university’s moral 
standards. They could find no reason to reject Autherine Lucy’s application, and she 
enrolled under a court order February 3, 1956. Lucy attended classes for two days, and 
that night, a riot broke out on the Tuscaloosa campus. When she arrived for class the 
following day, a jeering crowd of approximately 3,000 people met her and threw gravel, 
eggs, and rotting produce at her. University officials attempted to protect her from the 
mob and hid her in the library until the crowd dissipated. That evening, the university’s
State-Times, October 29, 1953, 1; “High Court Says LSU Must Accept A. P. Tureaud, 
Jr.,” Morning Advocate, May 8, 1956, 1.
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board o f trustees voted to suspend Lucy to prevent further violence. Her lawyers sued
for her readmission, but she never returned.15
Less than a year after Tureaud’s suit against LSU, the Supreme Court issued its
landmark ruling in Brown v. Board o f Education, and World War II activists quickly
launched a direct attack against the system of segregation. On September 3,1954,
attorneys Alex Pitcher and Johnnie Jones, at the request of a group of black parents, led
thirty-nine children to Gilmer Wright Elementary, the former Rosenwald school that
blacks helped to build but the board designated as white, and attempted to enroll them.
When Pitcher and Jones arrived with the students, the school’s principal, Lily Taylor,
immediately turned them away saying that the school was for whites only. The
willingness of the parents to allow their children to play a role in this protest reflected
the desire of black parents to secure equality in education for their children. In the early
1950s, these parents formed the North Baton Rouge Civic Association to lobby the
School Board to switch the designation of the school from white to black. The board
ignored their pleas, so they hired Pitcher to represent them. Jones became involved in
the case by chance. One day, he and his father were on the way to his office when
Pitcher flagged him down and asked for his help in preparing a suit against the School
Board. The two men met with a large number of parents at a black church in the Gilmer
Wright neighborhood. Jones remembered,
The church was packed wall-to-wall with blacks. It looked like every black in
that area had come---- We talked at that meeting, and we roused up everybody.
All those people were waiting for somebody who was going to stand up for
i5E. Culpepper Clark, The Schoolhouse Door: Segregation’s Last Stand at the 
University o f Alabama (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 54-90.
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them. Alex and I gave them that confidence. We were there, and there wasn’t 
going to be any backing down. Both o f us had been to the service and had war 
experience. When we gave that speech all of them said, “Let’s march on the 
white school.”16
Shortly after Brown, the NAACP had issued a statement calling for the school 
desegregation and had urged parents from around the state to sue to end the dual school 
system. The organization wanted to coordinate and rank the cases and expected African 
Americans to contact them before proceeding with their suits. Parents in the area 
surrounding Gilmer Wright refused to wait for an outside organization, the NAACP, to 
give them the go-ahead. After the registration attempt at Gilmer Wright, NAACP State 
Secretary Daniel Byrd noted, “East Baton Rouge Parish is way down on the list in 
desegregation attempts.” He added that black parents in the parish had not even filed a 
petition with the NAACP asking for the organization’s assistance. Although Jones and 
Pitcher both belonged to the organization, they had acted independently and did not 
even consult the local NAACP chapter before making the desegregation attempt. Their 
reason for bypassing the organization was simple. Racial diplomats controlled the 
Baton Rouge chapter and would, at the very least, have discouraged them from taking 
such a defiant step. After the incident, Jemison informed white leaders that he played no 
role in the protest and promised that African Americans would not try to enroll at any 
other white schools.17
l6Jones, interview, October 2,1993,26-30; “Negro Group Asks Admission to 
White School,” Morning Advocate, September 4, 1954, 1.
l7“Negro Group Asks Admission to White School,” Morning Advocate, 
September 4, 1954, 1; “Negro Attorney Issues Statement on Registration,” Morning 
Advocate, September 26,1954,13A.
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For openly challenging the parish's separate school system, Jones and Pitcher 
incurred the wrath o f both white leaders and segregationists. The School Board, after 
consulting with the state’s Joint Legislative Committee on Segregation and the parish’s 
district attorney, J. St. Clair Favrot, filed an ethics complaint against the two attorneys 
with the Louisiana Bar Association. The board refused to believe that the black parents 
in this working class neighborhood had hired the attorneys and agreed to allow them to 
lead their children to Gilmer Wright. In its complaint, the board charged the lawyers 
with violating the bar association’s rules against barratry and with fomenting strife. The 
bar association launched a probe into the allegations and called the two men to appear 
before its ethics board.18
The probe into the charges against Jones and Pitcher was little more than an 
attempt to discredit the two men and to bring an end to their outspoken activism. The 
School Board’s attorneys levied inconsistent charges against the black lawyers. They 
accused Jones and Pitcher of approaching the parents in the area surrounding Gilmer 
Wright and convincing them to file a suit to integrate the school. The board’s lawyers 
also claimed that the men took the children to the school without first obtaining parental 
permission. Defense witnesses countered these assertions. They testified that the North 
Baton Rouge Civic League had indeed hired Alex Pitcher and asked him to sue the 
School Board. Ellis Robinson, the guardian of one of the children, testified that he gave 
his nephew permission to take part in the protest. Jones claimed that members of the bar 
association, led by Baton Rouge native and Citizens’ Council member Sargent Pitcher,
18 “Negro Attorney Issues Statement on Registration,” Morning Advocate, 
September 26,1954, 13A.
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tried to intimidate him. Sargent Pitcher and others in the organization promised that if 
he admitted to the charges and apologized for his actions that he would receive a token 
reprimand. If he refused, they would disbar him. Jones refused to accept the offer but 
suspected that Alex Pitcher bowed to their pressure and confessed to the charges. 
Members of the association continued to badger Jones and to try to wrest a confession 
from him. They told him that they believed he had made a mistake by leading the 
children to the school and that he had not considered the implications o f the protest 
before acting. Jones viewed their offer as anything but charitable. The committee 
members wanted him to confess to violations that he had not committed. Their offer 
infuriated him, he recalled. “You call yourselves charitable?” Jones told his accusers. 
“What 1 would consider charitable would be not to havegbrought these charges in the 
first place. What I consider charitable would have been to recommend to the School 
Board to turn this school back over to these people.” After he rejected their offer, the 
members of the committee accused him o f being an “arrogant nigger.” Some of them 
even claimed that he came from the North and was simply faking his southern accent. 
They refused to believe that an African American from Louisiana would openly defy 
them. The segregationist members of the ethics board did everything in their power to 
discredit Jones. They even hired a black man to impersonate him and to ask African 
Americans to take part in a school desegregation suit. One woman whom this man 
approached testified at the hearing. When the prosecuting attorney asked her to look 
around the room and point to Jones, she could not identify him; they then asked her to 
describe him. She claimed that the man who visited her had dark skin and was six feet 
tall and heavyset. Jones, a light-skinned black man, stood approximately five feet five
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inches tall and weighed one hundred twenty-nine pounds. The room burst into laughter 
when the woman completed her description. Even after this embarrassment, Jones’ 
accusers refused to back down. They pointed to him and asked her if  the young civil 
rights attorney was the man who had spoken to her. She declared that he was definitely 
not her visitor. In the end, the ethics board had no choice but to exonerate Jones. His 
accusers could produce no evidence against him. Alex Pitcher, because he signed the 
confession, received a  reprimand and was placed him on probation for six months. He 
retained his license to practice law, however.19
Although the World War II activists dominated the civil rights movement in the 
post-Brown years, the racial diplomats tried desperately to maintain their position of 
leadership in the black community. Seizing upon the success of the World War II 
activists’ voter registration drives of the 1940s, they decided that they could curry favor 
with the city’s black community if they launched a program of their own. In fact, when 
Jemison announced the end of the bus boycott, he promised that the United Defense 
League would work to enfranchise African Americans. Racial diplomats promoted 
voter registration because they believed that would help them to maintain their position 
of leadership within the black community. Voter registration symbolized citizenship for 
African Americans. The quiet acceptance of increased black registration by white 
leaders in the late 1940s convinced the racial diplomats that they could advocate 
enfranchisement without alienating their white patrons. They could also use their
l9“Attomey Says He was Retained by Civic Group,” Morning Advocate, 
December 3, 1954, 1; “Disbarment Case is Taken Under Advisement Here,” Morning 
Advocate, December 4,1954,1; Jones, interview, October 2,1993, 34-39; “The Need 
for Voters,” News Leader, July 23,1955,4B.
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influence as leaders o f the black community to direct blocs of voters to candidates their 
patrons supported. Although activists supported black voter registration, they 
denounced the fact that racial diplomats used the votes o f enfranchised African 
Americans to curry favor with the white leadership. A July 1955 editorial in the News 
Leader, the city’s activist African-American newspaper, denounced the practice. “The 
Negro has grown tired of self-appointed so-called politicians meeting behind closed 
doors telling candidates [about] the votes he can send,” It proclaimed. “Negroes have 
grown tired of some Negro leaders selling them down the river.”20
To encourage African Americans to register, racial diplomats established voter 
registration schools in Several neighborhoods, and several of the city’s ladies’ clubs set 
up schools in churches throughout the city and donated a cash prize to the congregation 
with the largest percentage of registered voters. Racial diplomats also urged teachers to 
register to vote, claiming that it was their duty as leaders of the black com m unity. The 
involvement o f racial diplomats in the voter registration process proved successful. The 
number of black voters increased from 6,700 in 1952 to 8,125 in January 1956, giving 
Baton Rouge one of the highest number of enfranchised African Americans in the 
state.21
20“If We had More Votes,” News Leader, December 3, 1955, 1; “Mt. Calvary B. 
C. Wins in Delta’s Voters Drive,” News Leader, January 7, 1956; Reed, interview, July 
14,1998; “Uncle Toms Must Go,” Weekly Leader, July 12, 1952,4; “Voter 
Registration Picking Up,” News Leader, November 19, 1955, 1.
2l“More Energy for Voters,” News Leader, July 30, 1955,4B; “Negro Voters Up 
50 Percent in Four Years,” Morning Advocate, January 11,1956,1; “Negro Voters 
Increase for Governor’s Race,” News Leader, November 3, 1956,1; “Record 70,000 
Now Registered to Voter in EBR,” Morning Advocate, October 23, 1959, ID.
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When segregationists launched a statewide purge of black: voters in 1956, East 
Baton Rouge Parish did not participate. Their concern for continued industrial 
development guided the white leaders. They feared that if  they took part in the purges 
the city would receive negative attention from the national media. For the community to 
continue to prosper, they needed to uphold the city’s image o f peaceful and progressive 
race relations. Throughout the 1950s, white business leaders worked diligently to 
encourage industrial expansion and described the city as “the hub o f a comparatively 
lucrative metropolitan market.” Chamber o f Commerce President S. G. Henry told the 
citizens of Baton Rouge, “Industry is interested in locating a plant where workers will 
be happy to live.” Workers did not want to reside in communities rife with racial strife. 
U. S. Senator Russell Long, a Baton Rouge resident and son of former Governor Huey 
Long, lauded his community’s record of allowing black registration in a speech 
opposing the Civil Rights Act of 1957. He contended that, without federal interference, 
large numbers o f blacks registered to vote in East Baton Rouge Parish because white 
leaders allowed them to and added that this enfranchisement led to improved conditions 
for the African Americans.22
The period from the end of the bus boycott to the Brown decision marked the 
ascendency of World War II activists as leaders in Baton Rouge’s black community. 
While white leaders still turned to racial diplomats to settle conflicts, African
“ Advertisement, Morning Advocate, October 13, 1954, IB; “Attracting 
Industry,” Morning Advocate, December 9, 1955, 8A; Speech Opposing the Civil 
Rights Bill, ca. 1957, Russell Long Collection, box 556, folder 9, Louisiana Lower 
Mississippi Valley Collection, Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana.
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Americans, such as the parents o f children in North Baton Rouge, turned away from 
these traditional leaders and began looking to the World War II activists when they 
needed help. As Jones said, black people knew that the activists would stand up for 
them and not back down. The six men who filed suit against City Park refused to drop 
their case when the white leaders built Clark Memorial Park. After LSU expelled A. P. 
Tureaud, Jr., black activists continued to demand admission to the university’s 
undergraduate programs. Even an ethics probe into the law practices of Jones and 
Pitcher could not convince the men to abandon their clients and drop their school 
desegregation suit. Although World War n  activists viewed Brown as a victory in their 
fight for equality, the decision almost destroyed the city’s burgeoning civil rights 
movement as it galvanized both the state’s and the city’s segregationist population, 
which quickly seized control of the state government and enacted of series of 
prohibitive state laws aimed at destroying the civil rights movement
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Chapter 4
Rise of Segregationist Sentiment, 1954-1958
While the Brown decision delighted the World War H activists, it served as a 
catalyst for uniting the city’s ultra-segregationists.1 Before Brown, Mayor Jesse Webb, 
the city-parish council, and racial diplomats such as Jemison, Baranco, and the Butler 
brothers, could meet and hammer out compromises to undercut the rising popularity of 
the activists and to prevent protests. After Brown, making any changes to the system of 
segregation, no matter how small, became nearly impossible. In the weeks following 
the ruling, the city’s segregationist population, which lacked cohesion before the 
decision, united and publicly denounced anyone who supported even small changes to 
the system of segregation. They devoted special attention to the issue o f school 
desegregation and believed that if the schools integrated, Baton Rouge as they knew it 
would be destroyed. Baton Rouge attorney Paul G. Borron expressed the 
segregationists’ position on Brown in a letter to Governor Robert F. Kennon. He 
compared the decision to Reconstruction and proclaimed that whites needed to fight it 
with all of their might to preserve the “southern way of life.” He expressed the fear of 
many whites when he claimed that integration would eventually bring mixed classes 
headed by black teachers and warned that white children would learn the “low moral 
standards of the Negro” from black teachers and students. To prevent integration from 
happening, segregationists in Baton Rouge formed three organizations — the Southern
1 As noted in the introduction, most white Baton Rougeans wanted to maintain 
the system of Jim Crow, but the white leaders and the accommodationists refused to 
sacrifice the city’s economic well-being to protect it. Segregationists, on the other hand, 
wanted to preserve the status quo at all costs.
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Gentlemen, the White Citizens’ Council, and the Ku Klux Klan— and launched an all- 
out attack on the civil rights movement.2
Segregationists saw Brown as an attack against both the Constitution of the 
United States and the southern way o f life and believed that Brown and other federally- 
imposed desegregation orders represented a usurpation o f states’ rights. The Jim Crow 
supporters advocated using the doctrine of interposition to block federal court decisions. 
In a decade that saw the escalation o f the Cold War and the red-baiting of 
McCarthyism, the civil rights movement seemed to the segregationists to be a 
communist plot that threatened the very core of southern society. Segregationists 
believed that if  the system of Jim Crow ended, chaos would ensue, and civilization as 
they knew it would be destroyed. They viewed blacks as morally, biologically, and 
culturally inferior and thought that integration would bring miscegenation. In their 
minds, racial mixing would mongrelize the white race. The only way to preserve racial 
purity was by keeping the races completely separate. Although their main goal was to 
prevent school integration, segregationists also worked to stop all forms of social 
interaction between blacks and whites.3
2P. G. Borron, Sr. to Robert F. Kennon, 31 May 1954, Kennon Papers, box 4, 
folder 91; McCarrick, “Louisiana’s Official Resistance,” 3, 14-16; Michael Karlman, 
“How Brown changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis,” Journal o f American 
History, 81 (June 1994): 82-84.
3David Goldfield, Black, White & Southern, 84; Harvard Sitkoff, The Struggle 
for Black Equality 1954-1992, rev. ed. (New York: Hill & Wang, 1991), 25; Dan 
Carter, The Politics o f Rage (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 86-87; Bartley, The 
New South, 199-204; Bartley, The Rise o f Massive Resistance, 135.
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On July 22, 1954, a group of middle class segregationists in East Baton Rouge 
Parish filed articles o f incorporation for the Southern Gentlemen, which became the 
only segregationist organization to operate in Baton Rouge for nearly two years.4 
Although chapters quickly sprang up around the state, the Baton Rouge chapter directed 
their activities, and John Easterly, a resident of the capital city and a concrete 
manufacturer, organized the Baton Rouge chapter and served as the group’s state 
president. The goals o f the Southern Gentlemen were simple. It wanted “to maintain 
segregation in public schools, parks, playgrounds, etc.,” and to insure “the continuation 
of the Southern traditions and customs of our noble forefathers.” Initially, the 
group eschewed violence, but by 1956, Easterly warned that when they exhausted all 
legal means to prevent integration, they would “use other means” to maintain 
segregation and prevent the “mongrelization” of the white race.5
The Southern Gentlemen set up an elaborate initiation process for new 
members. It required anyone interested in joining to submit an application, including 
references, and to list his reasons for wanting to join the organization. A membership 
committee screened all applicants and only admitted the most committed 
segregationists. Although it kept its membership list secret, the Southern Gentlemen’s 
officers and board o f directors quickly became public. While not a part of the city’s 
elite, most belonged to the middle or upper middle class. Out of thirteen identified
4In July 1954, the first chapter of the White Citizens’ Council was formed in 
Indianola, Mississippi.
sSAC, NO to Director, July 6,1955, Southern Gentlemen, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, File 105-38567, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Freedom of Information 
Act Division, Washington, D. C., (hereafter cited as FBI).
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members of the Southern Gentlemen, seven held white collar jobs. Two, L. Norman 
Day and Frank McLavy, served as principals of schools in East Baton Rouge Parish. 
Two others owned their owned businesses. ESSO employed the final two — one as an 
operator and the other as a meter man.6
In 1956, segregationists in Baton Rouge formed a chapter of the Citizens’ 
Council. Organized on May 25, the Baton Rouge Citizens’ Council, with its ties to 
other chapters across the state and the South, subsumed the Southern Gentlemen by the 
end of the decade. The two organizations shared similar goals. Both wanted to maintain 
segregated schools, to preserve white supremacy, and to prevent social interactions 
between blacks and whites. Although, they too, believed in the inferiority of African 
Americans, the Citizens’ Council made greater use of the states’ rights argument than 
the Southern Gentlemen. However, like the SouthemGentlemen, the Citizens* Council 
attracted “respectable segregationists” and often recruited their members from civic 
organizations, such as the Rotary, Lions, and Kiwanis Clubs and the American Legion. 
In fact, most Council members belonged to a higher social class than the Gentlemen. 
The social make-up of the Council can be inferred from its officers and board o f
6Charter, July 26,1954, Southern Gentlemen, FBI, File 105-38567; Bartley, The 
New South, 204. Identifiable members of the Southern Gentlemen included: John 
Easterly, owner of Easterly Concrete; Guy Cobb, building contractor; L. Norman Day, 
principal Prescott Junior High School; Frank McLavy, principal Hollywood School and 
commander of the Veterans of Foreign Wars; Easterly’s sons, John Easterly, Jr., 
supervisor, American National Insurance Company; Mark Easterly, office manager, 
Easterly Concrete; and Ed Easterly, clerk, Ethyl Corporation; William Lee Lawrence, 
agent, American National Insurance Company; Odis J. Lea, collector, State-Times; 
Amo Easterly, accountant, State Auditing Department; Godwin P. Raleigh, claim 
director, Retail Credit; Harold Smith, meter man, Esso; William D. Falconer, operator, 
ESSO. Employment information obtained from: Polk's Greater Baton Rouge City 
Directory, 1956.
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directors. At its first meeting, attorney Jared Y. Sanders, Jr. presided. Sanders belonged 
to the city’s aristocracy and, in 1929, led the impeachment attempt against Huey Long. 
Seventeen worked in professional or white collar positions. Eight held white collar or 
supervisory jobs at either ESSO or Ethyl, six were business owners, and one was a 
student. The occupations of eight could not be determined.7 From its inception, the 
Baton Rouge chapter operated openly and made its meetings and membership lists 
public. To them, the secrecy of the Southern Gentlemen resembled that of the Ku Klux 
Klan. The Council also opened its membership to all like-minded whites and did not 
require them to apply for admission into the group or to submit a list of references.8
7Although the Citizens’ Council submitted its membership list to the Secretary 
of State’s Office, that document could not be located by the author. Members of the 
Citizens’ Council’s Executive Board included: J. Y. Sanders, attorney; Carl Blunck, 
physician; R. O. McCraine, owner, McCraine-McElyea Insurance Agency; Sargent 
Pitcher, attorney; Chester Achord, operator, ESSO; D. H. Alessi, owner, Alessi’s Drive 
Inn; J. B. Alexander, owner of insurance agency and mortgage company; Steve Alford, 
attorney; O. H. Bacon, chief engineer, United Gas Pipeline; R. N. Ball, salesman; Paul 
G. Borron, Sr., attorney; James E. Broome, owner, Broome’s Victoria Drag Store; G. 
Norman David, unknown; L. N. Day, principal Prescott Junior High; W. H. Dickerson, 
foreman, Ethyl; Henry Dimattia, pipe fitter; John M. Foote, unknown; Steve Hester, 
unknown; Dr. W. Keman Irwin, physician, ESSO Medical Association; Thomas Carroll 
Jeter, electrician, Kaiser Aluminum; Dr. Jack R. Jones, owner, Jones and Miller;
Lawson Lott, president, Independent Industrial Workers Association; Dan McDonald, 
supervisor, Ethyl; Leon M. McGraw, operator, ESSO; Charles McKay, supervisor, 
Copolymer Corporation; Frank McLavy, principal, Hollywood School; Tom Moreland, 
student; Russell Nettles, clerk, ESSO; E. C. Newman, unknown; E. H. Noland, 
unknown; Alton W. Odom, unknown; Dr. Ashton Robins, physician; Robert R.
Sanchez, Jr., attorney; Lenton Saratain, attorney; Merritt Shilz, pharmacist; and Sam 
Terito, owner, Samdot Insulations. Employment information obtained from: Polk's 
Greater Baton Rouge City Directory, 1956.
8Neil McMillen, The Citizens ’ Council, 10-11,60,161; Bartley, The New South, 
197-204; Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 191-194; T. Harry Williams, fluey Long: A 
Biography (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), 354; “Citizens’ Council Hold Board 
Meet, Elect Officers,” Morning Advocate* May 25,1956,10D.
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The Ku Klux Klan, the third organization, made a brief appearance in Baton 
Rouge, but it proved short-lived. On May 31, 1956, twenty-three men from the Ku Klux 
Klan o f metropolitan Baton Rouge and the rural areas o f East Baton Rouge Parish 
announced the organization of a local chapter. Unlike the Southern Gentlemen and the 
Citizens’ Council, the Klan drew its membership from the parish’s lower classes. Of the 
twenty-three members, ten worked as plant laborers. Seven of these worked for Ethyl. 
One Klansman owned his own business and another was a meat cutter. Remaining 
members lived in the rural areas of the parish, and their occupations could not be 
ascertained.9 The organization proved unpopular in the parish and even the Southern 
Gentlemen and the Citizens* Council denounced i t  In early December 1956, a 
spokesman for the Klan announced that it planned to dissolve because the members 
discovered that they had “used a name ‘extremely distasteful’ to the public.” A month 
later, six officers and board members officially resigned. While a segment of the group 
may have remained active, Klan activity played only a minor role in Baton Rouge’s 
civil rights movement.10
°Dave Clark, parish resident; M. W. Brown, parish resident; Raymond Dyer, 
meat cutter, Community Cash Grocery; Melvin Cupstid, K aiser Alum inum ; Lonnie 
Cain, parish; Earl Edward Huff, welder, Ethyl; Henry Harless, welder, Ethyl; Alex 
Harrison, helper, Gulf States Utilities; Oscar Land, parish resident; Finnon D. Lewis, 
owner, Lewis Cafe and Service Station; Ralph Martin, pump operator, Ethyl; Herbert 
Moss, parish resident; Larry Oneillion, parish resident; Julian Robinson, mechanic, 
Ethyl; Perry Strickland, parish resident; Eugene Starkey, parish resident; Aubrey 
Rogers, parish resident; Thomas Stogner, guard, Ethyl; Paul Stogner, guard, Ethyl; 
Robert Whittington, operator, Ethyl; Joe R. White, parish resident; Edgar Taylor, parish 
resident. Employment information obtained from Polk’s Greater Baton Rouge City 
Directory, 1956.
l0“Local KKK Group Files Organizational Charter; Denies Burning Cross,” 
Morning Advocate, June 1, 1956, 1; “Ku Klux Klan Files List of Members Here,”
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The Southern Gentlemen, which in the early years after Brawn remained the 
most important of the three, focused most of their attention on preventing the 
integration of the public school system. Representatives attended School Board 
meetings to watch for signs that board members, who belonged to the leadership class, 
were “soft” on segregation. In late August 1955, the organization urged the School 
Board to stop “pussyfooting” around and take a stand against integration. On August 
25, the board had passed a resolution declaring that it would comply with the state’s 
segregation laws but refused to promise that it would continue to maintain separate 
facilities if  a federal court ordered the desegregation of the East Baton Rouge Parish 
school system. Promising to uphold existing segregation laws was not enough for the 
Southern Gentlemen because they knew that the federal courts could declare these 
ordinances unconstitutional and force integration. The state secretary-treasurer o f the 
Southern Gentlemen, William Lawrence, told the board, “We want you to take a stand 
so Negro children won’t show up at white schools.”"
In addition to their preoccupation with the School Board’s commitment to 
segregation, the organization also wanted to insure that the city’s and the state’s elected 
officials firmly opposed integration. The Southern Gentlemen’s interest in the records 
of elected officials became paramount in late 19S5 and early 1956 as Louisianians 
prepared for state and local elections. The organization sent questionnaires to all 
candidates running for office asking if  they believed in states’ rights, supported
Morning Advocate, December 5,1956, 1; “Six Officials of Ku Klux Klan Resign from 
Unit,” Morning Advocate, January 3, 1957,1.
"Report, November 11, 1955, Southern Gentlemen, FBI, File 105-38567.
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segregation, and wanted to maintain separate schools, parks, and public facilities. The 
group then publicized the candidates* answers. Easterly urged whites to vote against 
any candidate who received the majority of black votes in primary elections and 
claimed that these office seekers “promised in some way to let down segregation’* to 
attain African-American support. In previous elections, few Baton Rougeans had cared 
about which candidates blacks supported. In fact, white candidates, such as Jesse Webb, 
had courted black voters.12
Besides targeting white office holders, the Southern Gentlemen also launched an 
attack against the NAACP. In 1955, it reprimanded the East Baton Rouge Parish School 
Board for allowing the NAACP to meet at McKinley High School. Claiming that both 
black and white Baton Rougeans wanted the races to remain segregated, the Southern 
Gentlemen accused the civil rights organization of fomenting discord by trying to 
convince local blacks to push for integration. In fact, racial diplomats controlled the 
Baton Rouge chapter, and it did not publicly participate in any attempts to overthrow 
the system of segregation.13 The School Board refused to give in to the Southern 
Gentlemen’s demands and allowed the NAACP to meet at McKinley, but the 
Gentlemen succeeded in publicizing their view of outside agitators coming into Baton 
Rouge and stirring up the “contented” black masses. In an October 1955 speech, 
Easterly declared that the NAACP wanted racial mixing and miscegenation. He
I2Report, January 20,1956, ibid.
I3The local chapter had provided some assistance to A. P. Tureaud, Sr. in his 
suits against LSU and worked behind the scenes to secure plaintiffs for the Graduate 
and Law School desegregation suits.
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promised that the Southern Gentlemen would fight to maintain segregation at all costs 
and warned politicians not to solicit black votes. He promised, “We are going all out to 
eliminate low white trash who desire the Negro vote” and claimed that those candidates 
for office who solicited black support ranked lower on the despicable scale than “the 
bushwhackers and carpetbaggers who plagued our grandfathers.” Easterly added, 
“Louisiana is a white man’s state,” but expressed a desire to treat African Americans 
fairly. Of course, his definition o f fair treatment required that blacks remain 
segregated.14
Initially, white leaders viewed the actions of the Southern Gentlemen with 
disdain and refused to comply with the group’s demands. When the organization asked 
the city-parish council and the mayor to bar black soldiers taking part in army 
maneuvers near Baton Rouge from entering the city, they declined. Easterly and his 
followers also wrote to army officials and requested that they keep black troops out of 
the city. Angered by this unreasonable request, military officials immediately contacted 
Mayor Jesse Webb, Jr. and demanded an explanation. Knowing that any banishm ent of 
black troops would bring the wrath of the federal government down upon his city,
l4“Continuance of Segregation Aim of Local Group,” Morning Advocate, 
August 24,1954,6B; “Set Southern Gentlemen State Meeting in City,” Morning 
Advocate, October 13, 1955, 1; “Group to Protest NAACP Meeting in Public School,” 
Morning Advocate, March 20,1955,1; “Suggests City be Placed Off Limits to Negro 
Troops,” Morning Advocate, October 24,1955, 1; “Keep Negro Troops Away From 
Capital, Is Demand,” Times-Picayune, October 24,1955,22.
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Webb refused to prevent the soldiers from spending their leave in Baton Rouge but 
warned that these troops would be required to comply with the city’s segregation laws.15
While white leaders in Baton Rouge ignored the demands of segregationists, the 
state legislature embraced them. Unlike other southern states, the Louisiana legislature 
was in session when the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Brown, and both houses 
began frantically to pass bills and propose constitutional amendments in an attempt to 
circumvent the ruling. Governor Robert Kennon called for calm and speculated that 
Brown would have little impact on Louisiana because “the races work together in 
harmony.” The legislature refused to listen to him. On May 21, the House of 
Representatives passed by a margin of eighty-four to three a resolution calling for 
legislative action in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision. Baton Rouge’s 
delegation voted with the majority. Three days later, the Senate concurred. Senator 
Willie Rainach of Claiborne Parish, a state segregationist leader, spoke out in favor of 
the resolution, declaring that Louisiana needed to express its displeasure over Brown. 
Quoting two African Americans from his parish, he declared that black Louisianians 
also disapproved of the ruling and wanted to maintain segregation.16
I5“Suggests City be Placed Off Limits to Negro Troops,” Morning Advocate, 
October 24,1955,1; Unknown to H. A. Belmoont, October 26, 1955, Southern 
Gentlemen, FBI, File 105-38567; CG ARMYFOUR to TAG DEPTAR, October 27, 
1955, Southern Gentlemen, Department of the Army, File 105-38567-9, Department of 
the Army, Freedom of Information Act Division, Fort Meade, Maryland; “Ask Negro 
GI Ban for La. Towns,” Item, October 24,1955,4.
16“Govemor Kennon Says State Has Time to Work on Answers to Decision,” 
Morning Advocate, May 18,1954, 1; “Positive Action on Segregation Asked by 
House,” Morning Advocate, May 21,1954, 1; “Education Committee Gives 
Unanimous Approval to House-Passed Resolution on Segregation,” State-Times, May 
24, 1954,1.
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The legislature did not wait long before taking “positive” action against Brown. 
Within a month of the decision, both houses passed three acts aimed at preserving 
school segregation and established the Joint Legislative Committee on Segregation to 
study integrationist sentiment in the state. The first act proposed a constitutional 
amendment that would allow the legislature to call itself into a special session any time 
a federal court attempted to force Louisiana schools to desegregate. Another bill 
required that the state maintain separate school systems to preserve “peace and good 
order in the state” and denied free textbooks and state-financed free lunches to any 
schools ordered to integrate. Finally, in an attempt to prevent the courts from assigning 
black students to white schools, the legislature placed the responsibility of pupil 
placement on each parish’s school superintendent. The state’s governing body knew 
that none of the state’s sixty-four school superintendents would assign black students to 
white schools. Rainach declared, “A vote for these bills is a vote to preserve our 
southern way o f life. A vote against these bills is an open invitation to the 
carpetbaggers, scalawags, and National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People to integrate our schools.” Segregationists thought that the NAACP solicited 
local support for suits against segregation. Of course, recent historical studies show that 
local people actually pushed the NAACP and other civil rights organizations into 
action. In November 1954, the state’s white electorate approved the constitutional 
amendment by a margin of four-to-one, but Baton Rouge officials, including Jesse
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Webb, Jr. refused to endorse it. Governor Kennon signed the other two bills into law. 
Two years later, the Supreme Court declared all three unconstitutional.17
Segregationists in Baton Rouge and around the state also developed an 
obsession with ending integration at LSU, and the legislature devoted much of its time 
conjuring up laws aimed at removing black students from the state’s flagship university 
and preventing any social or athletic interaction between the races on campus. This 
placed university officials in a precarious position. Although they opposed integration, 
LSU President Troy Middleton, members o f the Board of Supervisors, and high-ranking 
university administrators refused to defy the authority of the federal government by 
restricting the admission of black law and graduate students. But, as members o f the 
white leadership class, they wanted to maintain peace and stability within the 
community, so they could not simply ignore the vocal segregationist segment of the 
population. They realized that angry mobs of segregationists staged protests, similar to 
those that occurred at the University of Alabama in 1956. Such a protest would gamer 
negative publicity for both the university and the city and could hurt the progressive 
image that white leaders tried to maintain. Also, if  it wanted, the segregationist- 
controlled legislature could destroy the university by stripping its funding. Therefore, 
school officials devised a plan for dealing with the segregationists. When a potentially
n“Three Measures on Segregation Passed by House,” Morning Advocate, June 
29, 1954, 1; “Bills on Segregation Win Final Approval,” Morning Advocate, July 1, 
1954, p. 1; “Light Vote Set in State Today on Amendments,” Morning Advocate, 
November 2, 1954, 1; “NAACP Asks Suit be Removed to Federal Court,” Morning 
Advocate, 29 March 1954, 1; Caroll Joseph Dugas, “Dismantling De Jure Segregation 
in Louisiana, 1954-1974" (Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State University, 1989), 184-186; 
McCarrick, “Louisiana’s Official Resistance,” 24.
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controversial racial issue arose, LSU’s administration asked segregationists for their 
advice but usually ignored it. This strategy made the segregationists think that they 
played a role in determining the university’s racial policies.
In August 1954, LSU officials implemented their strategy when a black male 
graduate student asked for permission to swim in the university’s pool. After examining 
the request, the university’s attorneys determined that under the terms o f the federal 
injunction LSU must allow the student to use the pool, but to quiet the inevitable 
protest, they wrote to segregationist lawyers from around the state asking for their legal 
opinions. Each of these attorneys said that the school should prohibit black students 
from using the swimming pool, even if  it meant defying the injunction. W. Scott 
Wilkinson, a Shreveport lawyer, warned that if they allowed African-American students 
to swim, blacks would eventually ask for interracial dances and social functions. He 
also suggested that LSU find unofficial ways to preserve segregation on campus by 
assigning black students to the same dorm rooms and requiring them to eat in 
designated cafeterias. He warned that indiscriminate interaction between African- 
American and white students would earn the contempt of the alum ni and whites 
throughout the state. Leander Perez, one of the state’ s most outspoken segregationists, 
offered one of the more imaginative solutions to the swimming pool problem. He 
suggested that if a federal court ordered its integration that the university should fill it in 
with concrete and put up a plaque proclaiming “another victory for communist 
infiltration.” After receiving replies from various attorneys, Fuller wrote to them and 
informed them that the university would allow black students to use the swimming pool 
because refusing to do so would be a direct violation of the terms of the federal
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injunction. Although they did not agree with Fuller’s decision, the fact that he asked 
their opinions placated the segregationists, who blamed the federal government for the 
racial mixing and not university officials.18
The Southern Gentlemen and other Jim Crow supporters believed that the 
NAACP was responsible for the desegregation of LSU. They held that the organization 
had infiltrated Baton Rouge and stirred up anti-white sentiment in a formerly happy and 
content black population. The NAACP therefore became the prime target of the 
segregationists. On March 1,1956, Louisiana’s Attorney General Fred LeBlanc, a 
Baton Rouge segregationist, with Rainach’s support, filed suit against the civil rights 
organization claiming that it violated the state’s 1924 Fuqua Law that required all 
organizations to file their membership lists with the Secretary of State’s Office. This 
law, which was originally designed to destroy the Ku Klux Klan, had not been enforced 
since the 1920s. The Southern Gentlemen and the Citizens’ Councils immediately 
submitted their lists before the attorney general took action.19 Knowing that 
segregationists would use its rolls to intimidate and persecute its members, the NAACP 
refused to comply with LeBlanc’s order. In response, State Judge Coleman Lindsey of 
Baton Rouge’s Nineteenth Judicial District ordered the organization to submit its 
membership list by the end of 1956. The NAACP immediately appealed Lindsey’s
l8W. Scott Wilkinson to James Fuller, August 19,1954, Board of Supervisors 
Records, drawer 4, box 2, folder 302; Henry Sevier to Taylor, Porter, Brooks, et al., 17 
September 1954, ibid.; Leander Perez to Taylor, Porter, Brooks, et al., September 17, 
1954, ibid.; James Fuller to W. Scott Wilkinson, n. d., ibid.; James Fuller to Robert 
Chandler, August 17, 1954, ibid.
19Unfortunately, copies of those lists could not be located in the records of the 
secretary of state.
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ruling to the Louisiana Supreme Court. The high court upheld the lower court judge's 
decision, and in late April 1956, the Baton Rouge judge issued a permanent injunction 
against the NAACP prohibiting any branch from meeting until it filed a membership list 
with the secretary o f state. Refusing to capitulate to the segregationists' terror tactics, 
NAACP leaders filed an appeal in the federal courts but announced that the 
organization would cease operation in Louisiana until that court issued a ruling. Several 
branches, including those in New Orleans and Lake Charles, filed their membership 
lists before the December 31, 1956 deadline. Baton Rouge’s branch, which was headed 
by racial diplomats, did not submit its membership list. Its president, Dr. C. J. Gilliam, 
an optometrist, stated, “I doubt very much that we will file.” With that, the Baton 
Rouge branch of the NAACP ceased operations and remained inactive for nearly four 
years. However many black Baton Rougeans continued to pay dues to the national 
organization and retained their memberships. Some business, professional, fraternal and 
social organizations even collected NAACP dues and sent the money to the national 
office.20
20“Ask Ban Against the NAACP,” Morning Advocate, March 2,1956,1; 
Clarence Laws to Branch Officers, March 30, 1956, NAACP Papers, New Orleans 
Branch, box 68, Archives Division, Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans, 
New Orleans, Louisiana; Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 196-197; “Says Louisiana 
High Court Must Rule on NAACP,” Morning Advocate, April 5, 1956, 1; “Nullification 
of Injunction is Asked by NAACP,” Morning Advocate, April 5, 1956, 13A; “Supreme 
Court Refuses to Lift Ban on NAACP,” Morning Advocate, April 10,1956, 1; “NAACP 
Permanently Halted from Holding Meetings,” Morning Advocate, April 24,1956, 1; 
Clarence Laws to Branch Heads, May 3,1956, NAACP Papers, New Orleans Branch; 
box 68; “Appellate Court Puts NAACP Case in Federal Court,” Morning Advocate, 
November 27, 1956, I; “NAACP Warned Criminal Charge May Be Filed,” Morning 
Advocate, December 20, 1956,1; “First List of Members Filed by NAACP,” Morning 
Advocate, January 1, 1957, I; “State Officers of NAACP Filed with Martin Here,” 
Morning Advocate, January 5,1957,1; Clarence Laws to Branch Leaders, April 5,
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White leaders in Baton Rouge viewed the enforcement of the Fuqua Law with 
consternation. In a letter to Attorney General LeBlanc, Baton Rouge attorney Fred 
Benton expressed his dismay. He told LeBlanc that he regretted the attorney general's 
decision to sue the NAACP and claimed that suing the group would only serve to stir up 
ill will between the races. White leaders believed that the open attack against the 
NAACP would strengthen the position of World War n  activists within the black 
community and lead to increased demands for integration. They feared that if  the 
activists gained control o f the black community, peaceful race relations would be 
destroyed. With racial diplomats in control, white leaders knew that they could forestall 
desegregation. “In the final analysis,” Benton wrote LeBlanc, “integration does not 
depend either on enactment of a law or the enforcement of a law.. . .  There will be no 
real integration of the races except by mutual consent.” He added that if the state 
handled the issue properly and did not antagonize the black masses, it could prevent 
integration for years. O f course, segregationists refused to listen to Benton and other 
white leaders.21
When the Louisiana legislature convened in 1956, Willie Rainach again seized 
control and passed a v a rie ty  of acts aimed at circumventing Brown and asserting the 
supremacy of state over federal authority. One amendment to the state’s constitution 
blocked integration suits by withdrawing the state’s consent to any lawsuits, except 
those involving contract disputes, against any city, parish, or state agency. The
1956, NAACP Papers, New Orleans Branch, box 68.
2IFred Benton to Fred LeBlanc, n. d., Attorney General’s Papers, box 11, State 
Archives, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
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legislature also passed a law placing all public parks under state authority and voted to 
end compulsory school attendance for school systems ordered to integrate. Emmitt 
Erwin, president of the New Orleans chapter of the Citizens’ Council, applauded the 
segregationist legislative package. He charged that integration grew out of a communist  
plot to overthrow the United States government. John Easterly echoed Erwin’s 
statement, “We want to do this [maintain segregation] in a peaceful way, but we are 
going to stay segregated in Louisiana come hell or high water.”22
Within days, Rainach’s bills breezed through the House and Senate, and Senator 
J. D. DeBlieux of East Baton Rouge Parish provided the only opposition to the 
segregationist legislation. DeBlieux grew up Ouachita Parish, in the northeastern 
portion of Louisiana. The son o f a sharecropper, he moved to Baton Rouge in the mid 
1930s to attend LSU’s Law School. His decision to oppose the segregationist legislative 
package grew out of two things, he later explained: his upbringing and his belief in the 
sanctity of the United States Constitution. As a child his parents taught him to respect 
all people, including African Americans, and even required him to address the black 
sharecroppers who lived nearby as “Miss” or “Mister,” a courtesy almost unheard of at 
that time. Segregationists angrily denounced DeBlieux’s refusal to vote for the 
legislation. Other members o f Baton Rouge’s delegation to the state legislature voted 
for the bills, but none of them proposed any segregationist legislation or sat on any of 
the committees controlled by Rainach. The Southern Gentlemen issued a press release
“ James McCLean, “7-Point Plan on Segregation Due this Week,” Morning 
Advocate, May 20,1956,1; “Delay Vote on Bill to Prohibit Mixed Sports,” Morning 
Advocate, June 27, 1956,1.
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accusing DeBlieux of ignoring the wishes o f his constituents. Other segregationists 
made threatening phone calls to the Baton Rouge senator, and a group of them burned a 
cross on his front lawn. White leaders and liberals, however, sent him letters o f support 
and encouragement.23
Although it passed a variety o f segregationist laws, including one that banned 
television programs that depicted black and white characters as social equals, the 1956 
legislature focused most of its attention on preventing school desegregation and ending 
the court-ordered integration of LSU’s Law and Graduate Schools. In February, the 
Southern Gentlemen and segregationist members of the Board o f Supervisors attempted 
to convince the entire board to ban athletic competition between the LSU and schools 
with black athletes on their teams. The board refused to agree to the self-imposed ban. 
The Southern Gentlemen also asked that LSU tighten its entrance requirements to 
exclude African-American students. President Troy Middleton denounced changing the 
university’s entrance requirements stating, “LSU has repeatedly made it clear it does 
not want Negro students but will at no time resort to subterfuge in the application of 
policies.” He added that black students enrolled under a federal injunction and that he 
and university officials believed in law and order and could not in good conscience 
violate the law. Angered by the board’s refusal to alter its admission policies and to 
adopt a color ban for athletic competitions, the Southern Gentlemen demanded that its
23J. D. DeBlieux, interview by author, tape recording, T. Harry Williams Center 
for Oral History Collection, Louisiana Lower Mississippi Valley Collection, Louisiana 
State University Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; “Interposition Move Approved by 
Senate,” Morning Advocate, May 29,1956,1; “DeBlieux Blasted by Southern 
Gentleman,” Morning Advocate, June 3, 1956, 13C.
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members resign. The organization claimed that their resignation would be “the decent 
thing to do” and would allow the governor to select a new board that would “fulfill the 
wishes of the citizens o f the state.” Southern Gentlemen president John Easterly 
accused African Americans who enrolled at LSU of wanting to cause racial mixing 
rather than obtain an education. He advocated “educating Negroes well enough so that 
they can be sent back to Africa to run their own governments.” Easterly also suggested 
that if LSU continued to admit black students it would be unworthy of the support of 
white Louisianians.24
Frustrated by Middleton and the board, the segregationists remained determined 
to remove African-American students from LSU, even if  it meant defying the federal 
injunction. Therefore, they turned to the legislature, which gladly took up the cause. 
The House and Senate immediately passed a law banning athletic contests between 
teams with players o f different races. Opponents of the measure claimed that the law 
would prevent LSU from competing against universities from areas outside of South 
and would ruin the school’s chances for winning a national championship in football. 
Some segregationists, including Willie Rainach, feared that a law that hurt LSU’s 
chances of being invited to one o f the major bowl games would prevent passage o f the 
legislation because, for many Louisianians, Tiger football took precedence over
24“Segregation Bills Hold Legislature’s Interest,” Morning Advocate, June 13, 
1956, 1; “LSU Board Rejects ‘Color’ Clause, Makes No Change in Entrance 
Requirements,” Morning Advocate, February 19, 1956, 1; “Move to Revive Color Ban 
on Athletics at LSU Killed by Board,” Morning Advocate, April 8,1956, 1; 
“Segregationists Ask LSU Board for Resignation,” Morning Advocate, February 23, 
1956, 1; “Easterly Scores LSU Stand onNegro Question,” Morning Advocate, April 11, 
1956, 6A.
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everything, even segregation. One supporter of the bill, Stewart Slack, a Shreveport 
native and member o f the Board of Supervisors, claimed that African Americans would 
not be satisfied with the integration of athletic competitions. If the state gave in, he 
believed, blacks, who were never satisfied with just a little, would push for integration 
of the grandstands. In the end, the segregationists won, the law passed, and Governor 
Earl Long reluctantly signed i t  Long, though, predicted that the Supreme Court would 
overturn it, which it did in May 1959.25
While some segregationists hesitated to ban mixed athletic contests, they 
eagerly passed laws to tighten LSU’s entrance requirements. One law required all 
students to obtain certificates of eligibility and good moral character signed by their 
high school principals and their parish superintendent of education in order to enroll at 
any of the state’s colleges and universities. LSU, with its integrated Graduate and Law 
Schools, was the primary target of the new law. To prevent principals and 
superintendents from signing certificates for black students attempting to enroll in white 
schools, segregationist legislators passed the Teacher Tenure Act that called for the 
termination of any teacher or school official who advocated integration. In combination,
^ “Rainach to Study Bill Outlawing Mixed Athletics,” Morning Advocate, June 
17, 1956, 1; “Delay Vote on Bill to ProhibitMixed Sports,” Morning Advocate, June 
27, 1956,1; “Long Asks for Views on Athletic Segregation Bill,” Morning Advocate, 
July 16, 1956, 1; “Long Signs Bill to Ban Mixed Athletic Contests in State,” Morning 
Advocate, July 17,1956,1; “High Court Throws Out Law on Mixed Sports,” Morning 
Advocate, May 26,1959, 1.
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these laws prevented African Americans who graduated from a Louisiana high school 
from gaining admission to LSU.26
The university’s administration realized the Supreme Court would overturn the 
law, but Middleton and his advisors complied with it because it applied to all students 
and did not directly violate the injunction requiring the admission of African-American 
graduate and professional students. Although Middleton agreed to ask for certificates o f 
eligibility before admitting new students, he refused to demand that continuing students 
supply them. His decision angered segregationists. They wanted the immediate end to 
integration at LSU and asserted that the new law required all students to submit 
certificates. To insure enforcement o f the law, Rainach and his supporters demanded 
that the district attorneys of the parishes that housed colleges and universities force 
colleges to comply with it. J. St. Clair Favrot, East Baton Rouge Parish’s district 
attorney, refused to bow to segregationist pressure. He decided to let the university 
formulate its own admissions policy for continuing students because he feared that if 
LSU required continuing students to file certificates, the federal courts would overturn 
the law. Favrot supported the end to integration at LSU but wanted to achieve it in a 
way that would generate the least amount of negative publicity for Baton Rouge. 
Nevertheless, the segregationist onslaught against the university continued. Fearing that 
the legislature would slash the university’s funding if  it held out, Middleton and the 
Board o f Supervisors changed the policy and decided to require continuing students to
26“Segregation Bills Okayed by Senate Education Group,” Morning Advocate, 
June 7, 1956, 1; “Appropriation, Segregation Bills Are Signed,” Morning Advocate,
July 11, 1956, 1; “Act 15 of 1956,” Morning Advocate, July 16, 1956,2A.
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submit certificates. Middleton defended the reversal and stated that until the courts 
ruled the law unconstitutional, LSU would comply with it beginning in the spring 
semester o f 1957.27
African-American graduate students and black activists immediately decided to 
test the constitutionality of the law. hi November 1956, Amease Ludley, an African- 
American graduate student at LSU, asked A. P. Tureaud to represent her in her fight 
against the certificate of eligibility requirement. Tureaud set out to prove that although 
the law applied to all students, it discriminated against blacks and prevented them from 
attending LSU because no teacher or school employee would dare sign a certificate for 
a black student for fear of losing his or her job. A graduate of Grambling High School, 
located near Ruston in North Louisiana, Ludley attempted to secure her certificate. 
First, she asked LSU’s registrar’s office for a copy of the eligibility form to send to her 
former principal and superintendent. The office refused to give her one, stating that 
only white students and black students who attended out of state high schools could 
obtain the forms. The only four African Americans attending LSU to file acceptable 
certificates graduated from out-of-state high schools. Undaunted, Ludley proceeded 
without an eligibility form. She wrote to her high school principal, Arthur Smith, and 
asked him to vouch for her good moral character. He replied that he had no eligibility
27“Segregation Bills Okayed by Senate Education Group,” Morning Advocate, 
June 7, 1956, 10D; “Appropriation, Segregation Bills Are Signed,” Morning Advocate, 
July 11, 1956, I; “DAs Plan Stricter Enforcement of Law School Eligibility,” Morning 
Advocate, October 2, 1956,11A; “Favrot Differs from Rainach on Meaning of Law,” 
Morning Advocate, October 12, 1956,1; “LSU to Demand Certificates of All Students,” 
Morning Advocate, October 14, 1956,1; Dugas, “Dismantling De Jure Segregation,” 
146-148.
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forms and added that even if  he had one he would not sign it because “under state law, I 
would lose my job.” He apologized, “I assure you my refusal to sign the certificate is 
not intended to cast an unfavorable reflection against your character. I just cannot take 
the risk of losing my job.” With this evidence in hand, Tureaud filed suit, and in 
January 1957, Federal Judge Herbert Christenberry issued a temporary restraining order 
preventing LSU from requiring the certificates until a federal court ruled on the laws’ 
constitutionality. He ordered the university to admit Ludley and all other black graduate 
students who met the school’s other entrance requirements. Even after the judge’s 
injunction, the number of black graduate students plummeted from eighty-five in the 
spring of 1956 to thirty-seven in the spring o f 1957.28
In January 1957, LSU suspended Ludley claiming that her grades had dropped 
below the required average, and the university’s attorneys asked the judge to dismiss 
the suit because Ludley was the only plaintiff. The judge refused, and Tureaud quickly 
substituted two other plaintiffs, Ruth Mae Johnson of Natchitoches and Audrey Carr 
Robertson of New Orleans. Both women unsuccessfully attempted to obtain certificates 
of eligibility, and in April 1957, Judge J. Skelly Wright of New Orleans, who later 
earned the wrath of segregationists by ordering the integration of Orleans Parish 
schools, declared certificates of eligibility and the Teacher Tenure Act unconstitutional.
28Amease Ludley to A. P. Tureaud, November 15, 1956, APT, box 69, folder 1; 
Arthur Smith to Amease Ludley, November 26, 1956, APT, box 69, folder 1; “Rule Out 
Eligibility Papers,” Morning Advocate, June 18,1957,1; ‘Tour Negroes Give 
Acceptable Papers at LSU,” Morning Advocate, January 24,1957,11A; “LSU Policies 
on Segregation are Spelled Out,” Morning Advocate, September 2, 1956, 1.
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O f course, the state’ s attorney general Jack Gremillion filed an appeal, but the Supreme 
Court upheld the ruling in June 1958.
University officials refused to enforce other segregation laws because they 
directly violated court orders. One required complete segregation on campus. Troy 
Middleton knew that under the court order requiring the admission of black law and 
graduate students the university could not implement this act, but he feared that direct 
defiance o f it would bring the wrath of the Joint Committee down upon himself and the 
university. He turned to the Board of Supervisors for help. He sent its members a list of 
twenty-one questions asking in minute detail how the university should treat black 
students. Their answers became the official policy for desegregation at LSU. Among 
other things, Middleton asked if black students could live in the same dorms, use the 
same restrooms and water fountains, and eat in the same cafeterias as white students. 
The board answered yes. He asked if the silverware black students used should be kept 
separate from that of white students. The board answered no. It decided that all of the 
university’s academic functions would be open to black students but that all social 
aspects of these functions must end. Organizations with black members could not serve 
refreshments at their meetings or hold banquets. When faced with the problem of 
African-American alumni attending homecoming events, the university’s 
Administrative Council decided to inform them o f the new policy by “designating 
someone to take. . .  [them] into a separate room and explain the situation while serving 
refreshments.” The answers to the questions placated the Joint Committee and allowed
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the university to operate within the boundaries o f the federal injunctions. The Supreme 
Court eventually declared all o f these segregation laws unconstitutional.29
Although LSU officials wanted to follow the court’s rulings, they also wanted to 
make it clear to the segregationists that they abhorred integration. In September 1958, 
the Board of Supervisors issued a statement declaring, “This board wishes to point out 
that any Negro student whose enrollment is forced upon the u n iv e rs ity  enters as an 
unwanted matriculant” It added that the presence of black students “served as a  symbol 
of defiance of tradition and customs of this university” and created discord between the 
races “instead of the feeling of mutual respect which both races have had for each other, 
lo these many years.” The university even advised black applicants to apply to Southern 
University’s graduate programs. The State Board of Education had established a 
graduate school at Southern in 1957.30
While the administration proclaimed its support for segregation, many o f the 
university’s professors, especially those from the North and West, did not. State 
legislators feared that these outsiders taught integration in their classrooms and 
attempted to convince young white students to abandon their traditional system o f race 
relations. In July 1956, LSU’s student newspaper, the Reveille, published an editorial
29“LSU Policies on Segregation Spelled Out,” Morning Advocate, September 2, 
1956, 1; Administrative Council Minutes, Office of the President Records, drawer 16, 
box 2, folder 1127.
30“LSU Announces Stronger Stand on Segregation,” Morning Advocate, 
September 14, 1958,1; J. K. Haynes to Daniel Byrd, October 22,1958, Daniel Byrd 
Papers, box 2, folder 13, Amistad Research Center, Tulane University, New Orleans 
(hereafter cited as the Byrd Papers), Louisiana; Arthur Chapital to J. K. Haynes, 
September 1958, NAACP Papers, New Orleans Branch, box 69.
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criticizing the legislature for passing the package o f segregationist acts and immediately 
incurred the wrath o f Willie Rainach and his supporters. He accused integrationist 
professors o f brainwashing the members of the Reveille staff and urged parents to 
contact the university to ask if professors taught integration in their classrooms.
Rainach also demanded that LSU’s administration censor the student newspaper. 
Although some members of the Board of Supervisors wanted to change the paper’s 
editorial policy, the majority believed that such action would violate the students’ First 
Amendment rights. The board’s firm stand on the issue silenced the segregationists, but 
their obsession with the infiltration of integrationist sentiment at LSU continued to 
grow.31
The rise of segregationist sentiment in East Baton Rouge Parish created 
problems for Troy Middleton and other white leaders. They wanted to continue to 
attract new business and industry into the area and believed the segregationists 
threatened the social, economic, and political stability o f Baton Rouge. The Southern 
Gentlemen and the Citizens’ Council tried to convince the white masses that any 
concessions on the issue of segregation would lead to the destruction o f southern 
society, and they charged anyone who advocated changes to the system of Jim Crow 
with being integrationists. White leaders dealt with the segregationists much as they did 
the black activists; they granted minor concessions in an attempt to appease them. In 
1955, the School Board used this policy when it passed the resolution declaring its
3I“Rainach Hits Editorial in Daily Reveille,” Morning Advocate, July 28,1956,
1; “Rainach Urges Reveille Probe,” Morning Advocate, August 2, 1956, 1; “Lake 
Charles Man Heads LSU Board,” Morning Advocate, August 5,1956, 1.
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support for segregated schools but refusing to advocate closing facilities to prevent 
integration. LSU lawyers used a similar tactic when it polled segregationists about 
allowing an African American to swim in the campus’s pool. While these concessions 
temporarily mollified them, the segregationists continued to demand that white leaders 
take stronger stands against integration and, to some degree, succeeded. Although 
Middleton wanted to apply the law requiring certificates o f eligibility only to new 
students, segregationist pressure forced him to ask all students to submit them. The 
policy of appeasement did not destroy segregationist sentiment in Baton Rouge, nor did 
it silence organizations such as the Southern Gentlemen. But, it prevented violence, and 
as riots erupted in Tuscaloosa and federal troops marched in to Little Rock, Baton 
Rouge remained peaceful and continued to grow and prosper.
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Chapter 5
Liberal Opposition to Segregation, 1955-1960
As the segregationists launched their attack on Brown, a new group arrived on 
the scene — the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC). On February 1, 1955, 
the Philadelphia-based group opened a job opportunities office in Baton Rouge and 
launched its Employment on Merit (EOM) Program in the city. In the 1940s, the 
Friends had lobbied for improved working conditions abroad, especially in Asia, but 
had ignored the impact of segregation in the United States. After receiving criticism for 
overlooking the segregation of employees in the South and the wide disparity between 
wages earned by black and white Americans, they decided to create the EOM Program 
to address job discrimination “on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic origin” in the 
United States and opened offices in Chicago, Indianapolis, Dallas, and Greensboro. In 
each location, AFSC representatives met with businessmen and community leaders and 
urged them to end discriminatory hiring practices.
The Friends selected Baton Rouge as one of their target cities for several 
reasons. In the 1950s, the city of 160,000 had become one of the largest industrial 
centers in the Deep South. Besides the existing industries, between 1955 and 1958, 
several national corporations, including U.S. Rubber, Dow, Shell, and Dupont, built 
plants in the community, creating thousands of new jobs. The AFSC wanted the new 
and existing plants to desegregate their workforces, including their professional and 
office staffs. Because these companies operated at a national level but employed 
thousands of local people, both black and white, the Friends thought that they could 
integrate without suffering from segregationist reprisals. The AFSC also saw Baton
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Rouge as an ideal place to challenge workforce segregation because, unlike other Deep 
South communities such as Birmingham, which boasted some industrial development 
but were dominated by rabid segregationists, moderate white leaders ran Baton Rouge. 
They had worked diligently for over a decade to attract business and industry to the 
city, and the Friends believed that officials would accept desegregation of these 
industries’ workforces to keep them in the community.1
In early 1955, the Friends’ national office sent field representative Eugene 
Sutherland to Baton Rouge. Dedicated to the idea of teaching through example, the 
AFSC decided to operate an integrated office in Baton Rouge, although its local 
contacts advised against it. One of Sutherland’s advisors, Milton Vigo, a New 
Orleanian who headed the Louisiana Council on Human Relations, advised him not to 
tell potential landlords of his plan because no one would rent to him if he or she knew 
about the interracial staff. Vigo also encouraged Sutherland to move slowly because the 
city’s white leaders were not ready to make major changes in the system of segregation. 
Because few African Americans wanted to risk the wrath of the white com m unity  by 
accepting a clerical position in an integrated office, Sutherland searched for two months 
before he found a qualified black applicant willing to work as his secretary. On April 
15, 1955, Myrtle Douglas, a Southern University graduate, accepted the job. Two days 
later, the manager of the AFSC’s office building evicted the group. One of the other 
renters in the building, Glen Nordyke, director of the local Boy Scouts, informed
‘Report on Merit Employment Program, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, August 1957, 
AFSC, Community Relations Files, 1957; Baton Rouge Merit Employment Program, 
AFSC, Community Relations Files, 1955; Richard Bennett to Thelma Babbitt, October 
28,1955, AFSC, Community Relations Files, 1955.
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Sutherland that the presence o f a black secretary upset his two female clerical workers. 
One claimed that if her father learned o f the conditions in the AFSC office, he would 
not allow her to work in the building. The other stated that her husband would make her 
quit her job if he feund out about the black secretary. Forced to abandon their office, 
Sutherland and Douglas moved to a building on Government Street in a racially mixed 
neighborhood. Sutherland’s landlord also evicted him from his apartment and told the 
Quaker representative that Baton Rouge was not ready to accept the employment of a 
black secretary in a white office. Sutherland believed that the Southern Gentlemen 
pressured his landlord into forcing him out.2
In fact, when Sutherland opened the Baton Rouge office, the Southern 
Gentlemen had targeted him and anyone who associated with him for harassment. On 
May 12, 1955, two members o f the segregationist group appeared at the AFSC office 
and interrogated Sutherland. One identified himself as a supervisor at Gulf Utilities and 
the other claimed that he worked at ESSO. In his report to his supervisors, Sutherland 
did not name the men. He did relate that they had asked him if he was a southerner by 
birth — he was not — and accused him and the AFSC of hying to stir up trouble 
between the races. The two men quoted the Old Testament to prove that “the Negro 
race had a separate and lowly origin [and was] destined to fulfill the role of chore-boy 
for the white man.” After an hour, they left, but Sutherland encountered one of them 
three days later in the parking lot of the Unitarian Church where he was scheduled to
2Eugene Sutherland to the File, ca. February 1955, AFSC, Baton Rouge 
Employment on Merit Program, South Central Regional Office, 1955; Eugene 
Sutherland to the File, May 10, 1955, ibid.; Eugene Sutherland to the File, June 2,1955, 
ibid.
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give a speech about the EOM Program. Two members o f the Southern Gentlemen, 
along with their president John Easterly, attended the service and asked Sutherland why 
he refused to interview white applicants to work as his secretary. The extent o f the 
segregationists’ hatred of the Friends manifested itself on July 20, 1955, when a 
gunman shot out the windows of their office. In a separate incident on the same night, 
gunmen also shot and injured two African-American graduate students on the LSU 
campus. The incidents so traumatized Douglas that she quit, but Sutherland refused to 
allow the segregationists to intimidate him. The police failed to arrest anyone in the 
shooting incidents, but Sutherland believed that the Southern Gentlemen were 
responsible.3
Determined to carry out the EOM Program, Sutherland began meeting with 
white liberals to plan its implementation. He first contacted Marjorie Longsdorf, one of 
the few Friends in Baton Rouge. Longsdorf was a vocational counselor at Baton Rouge 
High School; her husband Ford worked as an insurance agent and played an active role 
in community affairs. He belonged to the Kiwanis Club and worked with the Boy 
Scouts. Although not a Friend, he supported the EOM Program. The Longsdorfs 
encouraged Sutherland to take a “slow and gradual” approach to changing Baton 
Rouge’s employment practices. They suggested that he contact other white liberals. 
When asked to recommend black leaders with whom the AFSC could work, the 
Longsdorfs urged him to talk to racial diplomats, including B. V. Baranco, Felton 
Clark, and Leo S. Butler. They told him to avoid contact with Jemison because the
3Eugene Sutherland to the File, May 16, 1955, ibid; Confidential Report on Visit 
to Baton Rouge and Austin, October 10 - October 21, 1955, ibid.
149
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
white community perceived him as a “troublemaker” who was actively involved in the 
NAACP and responsible for the 1953 bus boycott Jemison, they argued, was “persona 
non grata in the community at large, and his participation in our program would deter 
many others from cooperating.” In reality, Jemison had acted like a racial diplomat 
during the last stages of the boycott and had negotiated an amicable settlement between 
black and white leaders, hi the 1960s, the white power structure would turn to him 
when problems arose in the African-American community.4
Sutherland met with several other white liberals in an attempt to discover the 
state of race relations in the city, to determine the best course o f action to follow in 
setting up the EOM Program, and to organize a biracial advisory committee to help him 
carry it out. He first met with Rabbi Walter Peiser, a native of Austin, Texas, and a 
twenty-eight year resident of Baton Rouge. Peiser offered advice similar to the 
Longsdorfs’ and told him that only by moving slowly could racial progress be made. 
Reverend William Trice of University Methodist Church showed little interest in the 
AFSC program but offered Sutherland some advice on how to proceed. He suggested 
approaching the large industries first because their top management came from out of 
state and were not bound by the local patterns of race relations. Other religious and 
business leaders echoed Trice’s suggestion. Reverend John Felton o f the First 
Presbyterian Church urged Sutherland to contact the manager of the ESSO plant, Henry 
Voorhies. Felton described Voorhies as “exceptionally able and broad-minded” and 
added that the plant manager “has done more for Baton Rouge than any other single
4Eugene Sutherland to Fay K. Hutchens, February 10, 1955, ibid.
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individual Once ESSO breaks through the color barrier, the First Presbyterian
church will be in a position to follow suit.” Other white liberals agreed that ESSO or 
one of the other national corporations could best initiate racial changes. They blamed 
working-class whites who had moved into the area from rural Louisiana and Mississippi 
for most of the racism in Baton Rouge. Trice described the recent migrants as 
“backwards” and poorly educated. He added, “It will take time to weed out the 
prejudices that flourish in this milieu.” Felton declared this group lacked “a cultural 
background which would ameliorate emotional explosions.” With his interviews with 
liberals complete, Sutherland asked racial diplomat James Cook, Jr., an ESSO 
employee and owner of Cook’s Theater; Melvin Dakin, LSU Law School professor; 
Mary Epperson, wife of LSU Music Professor Gordon Epperson; Edwin Gaskill, a 
research engineer at Allied Chemical Company; Martin Harvey, Southern’s dean of 
students; Jane Rein’l, a community activist; and O. J. Wenzel, former coordinator of the 
Baton Rouge Trade and Industrial Schools, to join the AFSC’s biracial advisory 
committee. All agreed to serve on the committee.5
With the advisory group in place, Sutherland met with three groups of 
employers white business leaders, plant managers, and owners and operators of 
department stores, restaurants, and other small businesses — to discuss implementation 
of the EOM Program. White business leaders declared that Baton Rouge’s economic 
condition far surpassed that of other southern cities. Many feared that the presence of
sIbid.; Eugene Sutherland to the File, Re: Reverend William Trice, June 14,
1955, ibid.; Gene Sutherland to the File, Re: Reverend John Felton, June 14,1955, ibid. 
The quotes attributed to Sutherland’s interviewees come from his written reports to his 
superiors.
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the Friends would make conditions worse for black employees. Executive Director of 
the Chamber of Commerce Opie Shelton claimed that he knew of “no particular 
discrimination practices in employment” He added that black Baton Rougeans earned 
more money than their counterparts in other parts of the country. He attributed much of 
the race’s progress to ESSO and the other plants and refineries. White leaders also 
believed that African Americans were happy with the conditions of their employment 
because they had heard no complaints. Herman Moyse, the senior trust officer of City 
National Bank, told Sutherland that the EOM Program disgusted him and warned him 
not to disturb “the happy state of affairs” in Baton Rouge.6
Sutherland also met with representatives of the city’s plants and refineries and 
discovered that plant officials, fearing that their white employees would strike, were 
reluctant to integrate their workforces. The AFSC representative visited ESSO first. As 
one of the city’s largest employers, ESSO’s workforce in 1955 numbered 7,300, of 
whom approximately 1,100 were black. The plant’s manager, H. J. Voorhies, bragged 
that the local facility operated as an autonomous unit and that he and the other on-site 
administrators “ran the show.” He told Sutherland that the plant’s hiring practices had 
improved conditions for black Baton Rougeans and added that although the plant’s 
black employees worked in unskilled positions, some operated machinery such as 
rubber packing machines and lawn mowers. A few African Americans even headed all­
black work crews in the auxiliary department, which was made up of common laborers.
6Eugene Sutherland to Thelma Babbitt, March 2,1955, AFSC, Employment on 
Merit Program, South Central Regional Office, 1955; Eugene Sutherland to the File, 
April 13,1955, ibid.
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Although they accrued seniority within this department, they could not transfer it to 
other departments. Therefore, if  ESSO lifted all racial barriers and allowed African 
Americans to work in skilled and professional positions, they would lose their seniority. 
When asked about carrying out the Employment on Merit Program, Voorhies stated that 
doing so would hurt the black workers and would lead to layoffs because white workers 
were inherently superior and would take jobs currently reserved for black workers. He 
believed that, with a few exceptions, African Americans “lacked native ability.” The 
plant’s director of Employee Relations echoed Voorhies. He told Sutherland that if  
white and black workers were forced to compete for common laborer positions, the 
African Americans simply would not make the grade. Both men boasted that ESSO 
paid its black workers well and added that they earned higher salaries than most African 
Americans.7
Unlike white liberals who believed that the integration of ESSO’s workforce 
would lead to changes in the community, Voorhies claimed that local customs required 
that his plant maintain separate workforces. He told Sutherland that in Arabia, the 
corporation did not try to “make Americans out of Arabians.” He added that if  he 
changed the plant’s hiring policies, he would offend whites and destroy the good 
relationship that existed between ESSO and the white community. More important, he 
knew that if he filled skilled positions with African Americans, then white workers 
would strike. In fact, when black workers took over the mowing of the plant’s grounds
7Gene Sutherland to the File, May 2,1955, ibid.; Gene Sutherland to the File, 
May 23,1955, ibid.
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from white workers, the white union threatened to strike if  blacks continued to maintain 
the lawn.8
After Voorhies refused to integrate ESSO’s workforce as part of the EOM 
Program, the Committee on Federal Contracts forced him to reconsider. The committee, 
created by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, required industries receiving government 
contracts to have integrated workforces. To retain his facility’s government contracts, 
Voorhies initiated a series of secret meetings with plant officials and representatives o f 
its white and black unions, the Independent Industrial Workers Association Sections 
One (white) and Two (black). After meeting more than twenty times, Voorhies and the 
unions agreed to desegregate portions of the plant’s workforce. The plan allowed black 
workers to move into the helper pool, which had previously been reserved for whites, 
and to be paid $2.26 per hour. At the time, African Americans starting in the auxiliary 
section earned a little over a dollar per hour. Plant officials promised that when black 
workers in the helper pool obtained enough experience, they could enter an apprentice 
program and eventually become skilled workers. This process would take at least four 
years and was limited to only thirty positions. The plan did not address the integration 
of the clerical, technical, or professional staffs. The Committee on Government 
Contracts nevertheless approved ESSO’s hiring agreement in late 1955, but the 
company refused to make the policy change public.9
8Gene Sutherland to the File, June 24, 1955, ibid.
9Gene Sutherland to the File, October 11,1955, AFSC, Visits with Placement 
Directors, South Central Regional Office, 1955.
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According to James Cook, the vice president o f the Independent Industrial 
Workers Second Section Two, the plant required African Americans applying for jobs 
in the helper pool to pass an aptitude test He confidently proclaimed that enough blacks 
would pass the test to fill the thirty available positions. As a racial diplomat, Cook 
viewed the agreement as a victory for black workers even though it preserved 
segregated facilities, including the cafeteria and restrooms. He believed these barriers 
would “wither away” on their own as black workers proved their ability and reliability. 
He and other black union members refused to push the corporation for greater changes, 
and the World War H activists denounced Cook and the other union members for their 
timidity. The activists realized that ESSO officials would never willingly desegregate 
plant facilities or hire African Americans to fill professional positions.10
Although the EOM Program focused its attention on the city’s large 
corporations, it also pursued the desegregation o f other Baton Rouge businesses. 
Sutherland visited several department stores to discuss employment on merit. Store 
managers listened with interest to his description o f the program, but when he asked 
them to hire black store clerks and cashiers, they refused even to consider it. They 
believed that white shoppers would shim their businesses if they hired black 
salespeople. The manager of I. H. Rubenstein claimed that white Baton Rougeans 
“would literally see red at being served by Negroes.” John Stotler, the manager of J. C.
I0Minutes o f the Baton Rouge Employment on Merit Program’s Advisory 
Committee Meeting, November 28,1955, AFSC, Employment on Merit Program, 
South Central Regional Office, 1955; Gene Sutherland to the File, October 19,1955, 
AFSC, Visits With Placement Directors, South Central Regional Program, 1955.
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Penney, said that whites “would refuse to trade with the employer who breaks the 
barrier.”11
Despite its attempts to encourage businesses to integrate their workforces, the 
AFSC accomplished very little during its first year in Baton Rouge. Although ESSO 
agreed to start limited employment on merit, the federal government rather than the 
Friends was the driving force behind its change in hiring practices. Most white Baton 
Rougeans saw the Friends as outside agitators who wanted to convince African 
Americans to demand changes in the system of segregation and to create racial 
animosity in the community. Although white liberals agreed with the goals of the AFSC 
and pledged their support, many were too frightened to play an active role in the city’s 
only interracial organization. With a strong and capable leader, the Friends might have 
been able to serve as a unifying force for white liberals, but Eugene Sutherland 
possessed neither of these characteristics. He hailed from the North, and white Baton 
Rougeans immediately pegged him as an outsider. In addition, he was untidy in 
appearance, disorganized, argumentative, and unwilling to listen to the views of others. 
All of these factors lessened his ability to deal with the hostile environment that he 
encountered in Baton Rouge. Fearing that Sutherland would alienate potential 
supporters, the AFSC placed him on probation, and in 1956, he resigned and left Baton 
Rouge.12
"Gene Sutherland to the File, September 30, 1955, AFSC, Visits with 
Placement Directors, South Central Regional Office, 1955; Gene Sutherland to the File, 
September 7,1930, ibid; Gene Sutherland to the File, September 20, 1955, ibid.
l2The AFSC records do not reveal the reasons for his departure. Richard Bennett 
to Thelma Babbitt, October 28,1955, AFSC, Baton Rouge Employment on Merit
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Still convinced that the EOM program could succeed in Baton Rouge, the AFSC 
replaced Sutherland with Wade Mackie. A native o f North Carolina, Mackie was 
committed to “the brotherhood of man and the dignity and worth of individuals.” He 
believed that all men and women, regardless of race or creed, should be treated equally. 
He even treated those who held different opinions, the segregationists, with respect. 
Mackie possessed the personal and organizational skills necessary to unite white 
liberals, who before his arrival could not agree on a course of action, and to mastermind 
white resistance to segregation. Under his direction, the AFSC’s Baton Rouge program 
flourished.13
Mackie and the Friends remained committed to the EOM program, and ESSO 
remained the key to the AFSC’s plan. Like Sutherland, the Quaker leader met with 
Voorhies and encouraged him to increase the numbers of African Americans hired to 
All non-traditional jobs. The plant manager, however, remained unmoved by— 
Mackie’s pleas. Two years after the agreement between ESSO and the Committee on 
Government Contracts, the only non-traditional jobs open to African Americans were 
the thirty allocated in 1955. Other industries, including Kaiser Aluminum and Ethyl, 
had promised to begin the process of desegregating their workforces, but they promoted 
few blacks to positions usually held by whites. The plant managers defended their 
hiring practices and claimed that no African Americans had applied for “white” 
positions. Mackie believed that they were lying, so he devised a plan to reveal their
Program, South Central Regional Office, 1955.
I3Baton Rouge Employment on Merit Program Report, August 1956, AFSC, 
C o m m u n ity  Relations Files, South Central Regional Office, 1956.
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duplicity. He wanted to ask several o f Southern University’s top graduates to test the 
hiring practices at local plants. High ranking Southern graduates easily obtained jobs 
with national corporations in other parts of the country, and if  the Baton Rouge-based 
plants were truly committed to the EOM program, they would also hire Southern’s top 
scholars. But Mackie was never able to carry out his plan. When Mackie asked 
Southern’s President Felton Clark for help in recruiting the top graduates, he refused. 
Clark feared that if he even associated with Mackie, segregationists in the state 
legislature would destroy the university.14
The responses of Baton Rouge’s white plant and store managers to the EOM 
Program were not unique. In their other forays into the South, the Friends received 
similar reactions. From 1952 to 1956, the AFSC operated an EOM Program in 
Greensboro, North Carolina. There, just as in Baton Rouge, a representative contacted 
the managers of all of the major industries and department stores and asked them to hire 
black workers to fill non-traditional skilled and clerical positions. In every case, the 
managers refused and told the Friends that integration should start with the churches 
and not with the businesses. Despite the liberals’ hopes for leadership from the national 
corporations, they usually conformed to southern racial practices.15
14Baton Rouge Employment on Merit Program Report, August 1956, AFSC, 
Community Relations Files, South Central Regional Office, 1956; Report to the 
American Friends Service Committee’s Regional Committee, AFSC, Baton Rouge 
Employment on Merit Program Reports, South Central Regional Office, 1957; Jean 
Fairfax to Barbara Moffitt, December 11, 1957, ibid.
I5Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights, 34-35.
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Unlike Sutherland who focused his attention almost exclusively on the EOM 
Program, Mackie wanted to attack segregation in other areas o f the Baton Rouge 
community. He met with a variety of church groups to make contacts within the black 
and white communities and organized an interracial ministerial alliance to improve the 
relationship between the races. Mackie believed that the ministers who joined the group 
represented “a segment o f the community, white and Negro, from whom a witness for 
brotherhood and the moral righteousness o f integration must come.” Approximately ten 
ministers joined the new group, hi his reports to his superiors, Mackie never named the 
ten but described them as “liberals caught unprepared by the Supreme Court decision 
[Brown] and left confused and immobilized by the wave o f [segregationist] reaction to 
it.” The ministers who supported integration applauded the alliance, but without the 
AFSC, they would have continued to flounder because they feared the wrath of the 
segregationists. One unidentified minister told Mackie, “We need organization worse 
than any other professional group.” Although their numbers remained small, these 
ministers used their pulpits to denounce segregation and call for social and economic 
equality. Of course, the majority of Baton Rouge’s clergy refused to join the 
organization, and some would not meet with Mackie. The Quaker leader reported that 
one minister, who denied his request for a conference, “feels like a saint while 
maintaining the status quo” and described another as possessing “one of the worst 
attitudes I have encountered, accompanied by a sense o f holiness.” Other ministers
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claimed to support integration, but refused to join the alliance because of their fear of 
reprisals from their congregations and from segregationists.16
While they supported the work of the Friends, many white liberals in Baton 
Rouge sympathized with the plant and retail store managers and wanted the AFSC to go 
slowly. Reverend John Felton refused to consider hiring a black secretary because he 
believed that his congregation would fire him and that segregationists would desecrate 
his church. The General Secretary of the Baton Rouge YMCA, E. B. Davis, declared 
that he supported desegregation but added that he had to keep his feelings under wraps 
because if  they became public, his standing in the community would be jeopardized. 
When he first arrived in Baton Rouge in 1945, he had suggested desegregating some of 
the organization’s activities but received such a negative response from the white 
community that he abandoned the idea. In 1955, the Southern and LSU branches of the 
YMCA asked Davis to use the organization’s Camp Singing Waters for an integrated 
meeting. He refused, saying that if  white parents learned that African Americans had 
slept on the mattresses, they would refuse to send their children to the camp. Despite 
Davis’s refusal, the integrated conference took place at another location, and three years 
later, segregationists forced President Troy Middleton to fire LSU’s YMCA Director 
Hollis Hayward for hosting it. While the national organization of the YMCA supported
l6Baton Rouge Merit Employee Program Report, August 1956, AFSC, 
Community Relations Files, 1956; Report of American Friends Service Committee’s 
Regional Committee, AFSC, Baton Rouge Employment on Merit Program, South 
Central Regional Office, 1957; Baton Rouge Employment on Merit Report, August 
1956, AFSC, Community Relations Files, South Central Regional Office, 1956.
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integration, Baton Rouge’s branches, like those in other southern cities, maintained 
separate facilities until the late 1960s17.
Fear of segregationist reprisals forced many AFSC supporters to abandon the 
organization. Ford Longsdorf urged Sutherland not to move quickly on integration 
because a strong push in that direction would stir up segregationist activity and tarnish 
the images o f AFSC supporters. In 1956, the head of the Friends’ interracial advisory 
committee, Edwin Gaskill, resigned his post because he feared that he would lose his 
job as an engineer at Allied Chemical, that he would suffer an attack by segregationists, 
and that they would ostracize his children at school. A native of Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, Gaskill was a birthright Friend who had moved to Baton Rouge in 
1949.18
Although many liberals, such as Gaskill, feared the segregationists, Wade 
Mackie found a core group of committed supporters who wanted to bring about 
integration, even if it meant a direct confrontation with the Southern Gentlemen and the 
Citizens’ Council. As noted in the previous chapter, the forced integration of Little 
Rock, Arkansas’ Central High School in September, 1957, and the progression of 
desegregation suits against several Louisiana school districts through the courts
I7Gene Sutherland to the File, June 14,1955, AFSC, Baton Rouge Employment 
on Merit Program, South Central Regional Office, 1955; Eugene Sutherland to Thelma 
Babbitt, March 1, 1955, ibid.
l8Gene Sutherland to the File, October 18,1955, ibid.; Eugene Sutherland to 
Thelma Babbitt, February 22, 1955, ibid.; Wade Mackie to the File, August 2,1956, 
AFSC, Baton Rouge Employmenton Merit Program, South Central Regional Office, 
1956; Richard Bennett to Thelma Babbitt, October 28,1955, AFSC, Baton Rouge 
Employment on Merit Program, South Central Regional Office, 1955.
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prompted the legislature to pass a  series o f laws to keep black students out o f the state’s 
white public schools. When the legislature convened in the spring o f 1958, its members, 
led by Rainach, immediately began discussing ways to prevent the integration of 
Louisiana’s schools and decided that if the courts ordered white schools to admit 
African Americans that it would follow Virginia’s plan, which was enacted in 1956, for 
dealing with that situation — it would simply close the public school system and 
replace it with a private one.19
In February 1958, fearing that the legislature would close the public schools if 
the federal courts ordered them to integrate, Mackie turned to the Louisiana Civil 
Liberties Union (LCLU) for help. Although a state chapter had existed for several 
years, in January, 1958, liberals in Baton Rouge first formed a local chapter. Mackie 
contacted the Baton Rouge group’s vice president, Waldo McNeir, an English professor 
at LSU and a longtime southern liberal, and asked him to convince the LCLU to lead 
the fight against the school closing legislation. A recent trip to Europe had bolstered 
McNeir’s commitment to ending segregation. While there, Europeans constantly asked 
him to justify the system of segregation. He realized that he could not offer any reasons 
for maintaining it and returned to Baton Rouge determined to bring an end to Jim Crow. 
After discussing strategy, McNeir and Mackie invited local LCLU members to a 
planning session at the AFSC office. To keep the Quaker leader’s involvement quiet,
I9“Solons Talk Wiping Out Public Schools, Scourge Troop Use,” Morning 
Advocate, September 29, 1957,1; Bartley, The New South, 194-196; Matthew Lassiter 
and Andrew B. Lewis, “Massive Resistance Revisited: Virginia’s White Moderates and 
the Byrd Organization in Virginia,” in The Moderates ’ Dilemma: Massive Resistance 
and School Desegregation in Virginia, Matthew Lassiter and Andrew Lewis, 
(Charlottesville: University ofVirginia Press, 1998), 6-7.
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they sent the invitations on LCLU letterhead. Ten LCLU members attended the March 
25, 1958, meeting and decided to circulate a petition expressing the organization's 
opposition to the proposed school closing law. They worded the petition in such a 
manner that people who wanted to integrate the schools as well as those who supported 
segregation but wanted to maintain the public school system, could sign. The LCLU 
members knew that the number of integrationists was small and wanted to obtain as 
large a number o f signatures as possible. After circulating the petition for only fifteen 
days, the organization had gathered more than six hundred signatures, with one-third 
coming from LCLU members. Sixty-six of the signers taught at LSU.20
On June 1, 1958, the LCLU presented its petition to the House Education 
Committee, and eight days later, at the committee’s public hearing on the school 
closing bills, several liberal and the moderates spoke out against them, including Waldo 
McNeir and Law School Professor Charles Reynard. McNeir’s testimony drew the 
committee’s attention to the LCLU petition. He stressed that the school closing bills 
violated the United States Constitution and would harm all school children if enacted. 
Reynard, an Illinois native and constitutional law expert, was not a member of the 
LCLU but was committed to the cause of ending segregation. A longtime liberal, he had 
been an ardent supporter of Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal and an advocate of 
improving conditions for the country’s poor and working classes. He abhorred the anti­
r e p o r t and Evaluation of Recent Work on Desegregation, June 21, 1958,
AFSC, Baton Rouge Program, South Central Regional Office, 1958; Louisiana Civil
Liberties Union, “Analysis of Part I of the Report o f the Joint Legislative Committee to 
Investigate LSU,” May 28,1959, Charles Reynard Papers in the possession of his 
widow Marian Reynard Baun, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 2 (hereafter cited as Reynard 
Papers).
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integration laws that the legislature passed after Brown, but the lack of white opposition 
before 1958 had kept him quiet. Reynard also feared that he would lose his job at LSU 
if  he denounced the segregationist legislation, but he summoned the courage to speak 
out against closing the public schools to prevent integration. In a letter to his friend and 
colleague Douglas Maggs, a professor of constitutional law at Duke University, he 
explained, “After four years of sitting idly by and watching these measures steamroller 
through the legislature, I finally gathered my courage, threw caution into the wind, and 
appeared yesterday afternoon before the House Education Committee in opposition to 
the bills.” In fact, he used, as the basis for his argument, a statement Maggs made 
before the North Carolina General Assembly when his state considered similar 
legislation in July 1956. In his testimony, Reynard said that the bills under 
consideration were clearly unconstitutional and that he had no doubt that the Supreme 
Court would overturn them. Apart from their unconstitutionality, if enacted, these laws 
would hurt white children more than African-American ones because only white 
schools would close. Since black schools would not be integrated, they would remain 
open.24
In addition to McNeir and Reynard, several other LSU professors testified 
before the house committee, including Edward B. Robert, dean of the College of 
Education, and Irwin L. Forbes, professor of plant pathology. Unlike their liberal co-
24Louisiana Civil Liberties Union, “Analysis o f Part I of the Report o f the Joint 
Legislative Committee to Investigate LSU,” May 28, 1959,2; Charles Reynard to 
Douglas Maggs, June 10, 1958; Statement by Douglas Maggs on Legislation Proposed 
by the North Carolina Advisory Committee on Education, July 24,1956 with Charles 
Reynard’s additions for his testimony before the Louisiana legislature on June 9, 1958. 
All in Reynard Papers.
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workers, Robert and Forbes supported the proposed legislation. Roberts bragged that 
none of his professors signed the LCLU petition. Forbes declared that segregated 
schools were better than integrated ones and demanded that the state’s dual system of 
public education be maintained. He added that Reynard and McNeir represented only a 
small portion of LSU’s faculty. According to him, most professors wanted to maintain 
segregated schools at any cost. Forbes’ assurances held little sway over the legislators. 
The House of Representatives immediately voted 70-0 to call President Middleton and 
the deans of the colleges whose faculty members had signed the petition to appear 
before the JLCS “to answer charges that some LSU faculty members are dispensing 
anti-segregation views in the classroom” and brainwashing students into supporting 
integration. In a letter to Maggs, Reynard joked that he could not be brainwashing his 
students into supporting desegregation because three members of the JLCS had taken 
his constitutional law course while they were in law school.25
The JLCS met on June 10 to ferret out integrationist sentiment at LSU. Like 
Rainach, most of the committee’s members came from the state’s staunchly 
segregationist northern parishes. None came from East Baton Rouge Parish. In his 
opening statement, Rainach set the tone for the hearing. He claimed that the committee 
would seek out those professors who discussed subjects “contrary to the laws of the 
state of Louisiana and to the way of life of our people.” He added that the LCLU and its 
parent organization were pawns of the Communist Party and that their members tricked 
the sixty-six LSU professors into signing the petition. Rainach then called Troy
^“House Orders LSU Officials for Quizzing,” Morning Advocate, June 10, 
1958,1; Charles Reynard to Douglas Maggs, June 10,1958, Reynard Papers.
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Middleton as the JLCS’s first witness. In a prepared statement, Middleton, one of Baton 
Rouge’s most powerful white leaders, declared that he and the university’s 
administrators supported segregation and fought diligently to prevent the integration of 
LSU, but he added, “The university’s position has been to obey the laws o f the state and 
the country.” When the federal courts ordered the school to admit black students, the 
administration complied. He acknowledged that some professors, including Reynard, 
discussed integration in their classes but did so only in courses where the topic had 
some relevancy, such as in constitutional law, political science, history, and sociology. 
Middleton held that few students or faculty members ever talked about integration until 
the JLCS began its hearing. He refused to punish Reynard and McNeir for expressing 
their opposition to the school closing bills because the two men appeared as private 
citizens and not representatives of the university. Reprimanding or firing them for 
expressing their opinions would be, according to him, a violation of their First 
Amendment right to freedom of speech. Middleton repeated that he and the Board of 
Supervisors believed in academic freedom and added that he would not seek out 
integrationist professors on campus.26
Reynard and other LSU professors cheered Middleton’s remarks. In a letter to 
Professor Clyde Summers of Yale’s Law School, Reynard declared that Middleton
“said just enough to handle the situation___ As an old Army man, he never lets the
public forget that he once took an oath to uphold and defend the Constitution. While he
zsMarian Reynard’s notes of the Joint Legislative Committee on Segregation 
Meeting, June 11,1958, Reynard Papers, 1-2; “Committee Okays Bill Creating Super 
Board for Higher Education,” Morning Advocate, June 12,1958, I; “Middleton Says 
No Reds Teaching Classes at LSU,” ibid.
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personally would prefer segregation, he is first and foremost for law and order and will 
serve to uphold the law of the land.” Middleton’s support for academic freedom helped 
to defuse the situation as did the reaction of LSU’s alumni. Although many former 
students wanted to maintain segregation, they believed strongly in academic freedom 
and feared that any attempt to censor freedom of expression would hurt the university’s 
national reputation. Theo Cangelosi, a  Baton Rouge attorney and vice chairman of the 
Alumni Council, denounced the legislative probe even though he declared that his 
views differed from those of the sixty-six professors who signed the petition. The 
council urged its members to contact their legislators and the JLCS to express their 
displeasure with the probe. The professors who spoke out against the acts received only 
a couple of negative responses and nearly one hundred letters, phone calls, and 
telegrams o f support.27
McNeir’s and Reynard’s stand against the state legislature and the subsequent 
support from accommodationists and white leaders ushered in a new era in the civil 
rights movement in Baton Rouge. When they realized that speaking out would bring no 
significant reprisals, more liberals denounced the segregationist agenda put forth by the 
state legislature. As the legislation made its way to the Senate, Mackie once again 
worked behind the scenes to organize the opposition. This time, he asked several 
ministers to appear before the Senate Education Committee. Some longtime AFSC 
supporters, whose names do not appear in his reports to the national office, refused. He
27Charles Reynard to Clyde Summers, June 23,1958, Reynard Papers; ACLU 
Report, Reynard Papers, 3; “Alumni Council Calls on Members to Defend LSU,” 
Morning Advocate, June 10,1958, 1; ACLU Report, Reynard Papers, 8; Charles 
Reynard to A1 and Les Harrison, June 13,1958, Reynard Papers.
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convinced Rabbi Walter Peiser and Methodist minister D. W. Poole to speak out. 
Several months earlier, the state’s Methodist Conference had passed a resolution, which 
received little attention at the time, denouncing the school closing legislation.
Following Mackie’s advice, Poole sent copies o f the resolution to all of the members of 
the state legislature. The Quaker leader also urged all of his media contacts, both local 
and national, to do stories on the resolution and called “influential people” to advise 
Senator J. D. DeBlieux to oppose the school closing laws. None of the liberals who 
spoke out against the bills expected them to be defeated. Rather, they wanted to send a 
message to the public that some Louisianians opposed segregation and hoped to 
convince like-minded people to join their cause. Although the state legislature passed 
the segregation bills and the governor signed them into law, Mackie’s plan to unite the 
liberals and to encourage them publicly to denounce Jim Crow succeeded. By the early 
1960s, the city possessed a significant and vocal liberal population that was, for the 
most part centered around LSU and several o f the city’s Protestant churches and Jewish 
synagogues.28
In 1955, the AFSC had arrived in Baton Rouge determined to carry out its 
Employment on Merit Program. Convinced that the city, with its industrial-based 
economy, would provide the perfect testing-ground for the project, the Friends soon 
discovered that the segregation that characterized southern society was also ingrained in 
the community’s plants and refineries. Managers of ESSO and the other facilities, like
“ Report and Evaluation of Recent Work on Desegregation, June 21,1958, 
AFSC, Baton Rouge Program, South Central Regional Office, 1958; “Segregation 
Measures Okayed as Ministers Protest,” Morning Advocate, June 19,1958,1; 
“Segregation Legislation Finally Passes,’’ibid.
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the white leadership, wanted to maintain a  stable working environment in Baton Rouge 
and refused to upset the balance by forcing their workers to integrate. Only after federal 
intervention did they open traditionally “white” jobs to African Americans. In the late 
1950s, the AFSC abandoned the EOM Program and focused its attention on ending 
segregation. The group believed that economic equality was not possible without social 
equality and directed its field workers in southern communities to focus their attention 
on combating the system o f Jim Crow. In cities such as Atlanta, AFSC representatives 
joined white liberals in the fight to desegregate public schools, lunch counters, and 
public transportation. In Baton Rouge, Mackie used his organizational skills and charm 
to convince liberals to engage in a public battle against segregation. Without Mackie, 
the group would, in all probability, have continued to flounder. In the 1960s, under the 
direction of the Quaker leader, liberals became a powerful force in the fight to 
desegregate public facilities, to end police brutality, and to integrate the public 
schools.29
Garmon, Beneath the Image, 107, 193.
169
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter 6 
Sit-ins, 1960-1961
The 1950s ended with liberals in Baton Rouge and in Louisiana speaking out 
despite threats of violence and intimidation. Although World War II activists continued 
to support the civil rights movement, they took part in no public protests in the years 
following Johnnie Jones’s and Alex Pitcher’s attempt to enroll black students at Gilmer 
Wright. Instead, they used the federal courts to fight for racial equality and believed 
that the only way to obtain racial equality was by working through the framework o f the 
United States Constitution. The 1960s ushered in a new era o f the civil rights movement 
in Baton Rouge and in the South as a whole as a new group o f activists, African- 
American college students, began to challenge the system of segregation through 
protests rather than in the courts.
The student activists came of age during the first stages of the civil rights 
movement and witnessed its pivotal moments, including the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 
the Brown decision, and the Little Rock school desegregation crisis. Most of their 
parents belonged to the upper and middle classes, and ofien with the support of their 
parents, teachers, and peer groups, they began challenging the system of segregation as 
teenagers. Nearly two decades younger than the World War II activists, the student 
activists soon grew impatient with the slow pace of desegregation. Refusing to wait for 
the federal courts to wipe out Jim Crow and disgusted by the state legislature’s attempt 
to undermine federal authority, students at Southern University began using sit-ins, 
marches, and picketing to demand change. Inspired by the wave o f lunch counter sit-ins 
that began in February, I960, when a group of black students in Greensboro, North
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Carolina, sat at a segregated lunch counter and demanded service, eight Southern 
University students followed suit on March 28. The following year, the Congress o f 
Racial Equality (CORE) established a chapter at Southern University and sponsored a 
series of protests. Direct action frightened white Baton Rougeans. Convinced that racial 
unrest was imminent, white leaders turned to the racial diplomats to hammer out 
compromises to silence these young activists. When that failed, they attempted to 
prohibit the students from conducting protests by securing state and federal injunctions 
that forbade CORE from operating in East Baton Rouge Parish. Although white leaders 
managed to maintain peaceful race relations through diplomacy and legal intimidation, 
they failed to silence the student activists. Racial tension in Baton Rouge continued to 
rise.1
On February 1, J.960, four North Carolina Agricultural and Technical College 
students walked into Woolworth’s in Greensboro, North Carolina, sat at the lunch 
counter reserved for whites, and placed an order. When the waitresses refused to serve 
them, they remained seated. The next day, they, along with other students, returned and 
repeated the process. The sit-ins in Greensboro attracted thousands of black and white 
supporters, continued for more than five months, and spurred other black college 
students into action. By the end of I960, sit-ins had occurred in approximately 104 
communities throughout the South, and in many of these places, violence accompanied 
protests.2
‘Laue, Direct Action and Desegregation, 76-79.
2Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights, 61-85; Sitkoff, The Struggle fo r Black 
Equality, 61-87; Martin Oppenheimer, The Sit-in Movement o f1960, Martin Luther
171
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The prospect o f a sit-in in Louisiana convinced the segregationists to take 
action. At a March 6, 1960, state meeting o f the Louisiana Citizens* Council, Senator 
Willie Rainach warned that students at two private black colleges in New Orleans, 
Dillard and Xavier, were attending classes on how to conduct lunch counter sit-ins. 
Rainach told his fellow segregationists that in other states the demonstrations were 
handled locally, but if  necessary to deter protesters, the legislature would strengthen the 
state’s laws against trespassing and disturbing the peace. Nothing could stifle the sit-in 
movement, however. On March 8, approximately two hundred Dillard students picketed 
along a road near campus to protest against segregation, but none took part in lunch 
counter sit-ins. State officials knew that eventually Louisiana college students would 
follow the example of their contemporaries and stage their own protests. On March 15, 
1960, the Louisiana State Board of Education ordered all college presidents under its 
authority to “take disciplinary action against any students involved in incidents that 
would discredit the institution or the state educational system.”3 Because whites took 
part in demonstrations in other southern cities, the board stressed that the policy applied 
to both white and black students. Within days, President Felton Clark called a 
convocation of Southern’s student body and told them that he would expel any student 
taking part in a demonstration. He held a similar meeting with faculty members and
King and the Civil Rights Movement Series, ed. David Garrow (New York: Carlson 
Publishing Company, 1989), xiii, 177-178.
3The State Board of Education oversaw all state-funded colleges and 
universities, vocational and technical schools, and public elementary, middle, and high 
schools. LSU had its own governing body and was not under the direct control of the 
Board of Education. Public Affairs Research Council, Louisiana State Agencies 
Handbook, 1960 (Baton Rouge: Public Affairs Research Council, 1960), 49-51.
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warned them against encouraging students to protest. If any faculty member 
collaborated, Clark added, he would demand their resignation. Rather than deter 
students, Clark’s announcement strengthened their resolve to hold a sit-in o f their own. 
They viewed his warning as a challenge that they could not ignore.4
During February, eight Southern University students began meeting in secret to 
discuss ways to support the Greensboro sit-ins. They discussed several options, 
including raising money to help finance the North Carolina protest and even traveling to 
Greensboro to take part in the sit-ins. Because they had little money, they decided to 
stage a sit-in of their own in Baton Rouge. The group included six men and two women. 
All belonged to the top academic and leadership ranks of the university. Three of them 
— John Johnson, twenty-five of Cullen, Louisiana; Kenneth Johnson, twenty-two of 
Columbia, Mississippi; and Donald Moss, twenty-two ofWinnfield, Louisiana— were 
juniors in the Law School. The others were undergraduates. The only non-southemer in 
the group, Marvin Robinson, hailed from Gary, Indiana. Twenty-year-old Monroe, 
Louisiana, native Janette Hoston majored in psychology, and Jo Ann Morris, the only 
freshman in the group, was from Shreveport. Bacteriology major Felton Valdry was 
twenty-two and came from the small town of Bueche, Louisiana; and Major Johns, a 
theology major was from the Baton Rouge area.5
4“Negroes at Dillard in Protest,” State-Times, March 8, I960,1; “State Board of 
Education Acts to Curb ‘Sit-Downs,” Louisiana Weekly, March 26, 1960, 3; “State 
College Heads Warned on ‘Incidents,’ ” Morning Advocate, March 16, I960,1; Wade 
Mackie to Jean Fairfax, April 6,1960, AFSC, Baton Rouge Program, South Central 
Regional Office, 1960.
5Janette Hoston Harris, interview by author, tape recording, January 9,1994, T. 
Harry Williams Center for Oral History Collection, Louisiana Lower Mississippi Valley
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The eight students came together from a variety o f backgrounds for the same 
reason — to bring an end to segregation. In March I960, Student Government President 
Marvin Robinson was twenty-eight days away from graduating from Southern. An 
education major and a track star, he had a job lined up to work as a coach at his alma 
mater. When the Greensboro sit-ins began, he realized that he could no longer accept 
continued segregation. Other students, inspired by the lunch counter protests, turned to 
Robinson, as student body president, for advice and guidance, and he quickly became 
the leader of Southern’s student activists. Major Johns was one of the most outspoken 
of the group. The theology student was a compelling speaker, a fiery preacher, and fully 
committed to ending segregation. He worked closely with Robinson and helped him 
plan the sit-in. Both Johns and Robinson later became field representatives for CORE. 
Felton Valdry became involved in the sit-in movement when he realized that, after 
graduation from the all-black Southern, where his academic achievements were 
recognized and applauded, he would be faced with the reality that his academic 
achievement meant little in the South’s segregated society. He was black, and whites 
would treat him like a second-class citizen regardless o f his intelligence or skills. 
“Suddenly, I had to deal with what I was being educated for, as opposed to real life,” 
Valdry recalled. John Johnson planned to pursue a career as a country lawyer when he 
became involved in the civil rights movement, and Donald Moss was a married second 
year law student who worked as a graduate counselor on Southern’s personnel staff. “I
Collection, Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 55-56; “Two 
More Arrested in Second ‘Sit-Down’ Incident,” State-Times, March 29, I960,1; “Sit-In 
Students’ Motions Up Here Today,” Morning Advocate, April 29,1960,4A.
174
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
wanted to be free without paying any dues,” Moss said. Although in later years, the fact 
that he had to completely disrupt his life by being arrested and expelled to achieve his 
goal still angered him.6
Morris was a shy, quiet freshman, and the other student activists were puzzled 
by why she became involved in the sit-ins. However, she, too, was inspired by the 
Greensboro demonstrations, and although she rarely spoke, she possessed the strength 
of character to defy white authority and take her place at the lunch counter. The 
daughter of activists, Hoston grew up in Monroe, Louisiana. As a junior high school 
student, she helped her father with a voter registration drive in her hometown. She also 
regularly defied Monroe’s bus segregation laws. “At least once a week during my junior 
and high school days, I was driven to jail by the bus driver because I wouldn’t get in the 
back o f the bus,” she recalled. “Because we would not move, he would drive us to the 
courthouse, [and] call the principal. The principal would call my father, and my father 
would say, ‘Again?’ ” Her activism continued after she graduated from high school and 
enrolled at Southern. Shortly after arriving on the Baton Rouge campus, Hoston led a 
student protest to improve the quality of food on campus. Kenneth Johnson was the 
nephew of Law School Dean A. A. Lenoir, who had supported Alex Tureaud’s 
admission to LSU’s undergraduate program. Unlike Hoston, he did not grow up in an 
activist home, but his parents encouraged him and his siblings to get a college
6“Reunion in D. C. Evokes Bittersweet Memories of Louisiana Sit-In,” The 
Washington Post, May 27,1990, D l; Meier and Rudwick, CORE, 108; “Expelled 
Student Named to NAACP Youth Council,” Louisiana Weekly, May 28, 1960, 1.
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education. “They thought it would lessen the impact o f discrimination. The higher 
educated you were, the less impact that racism could have on you,” Johnson said.7
Although events in Greensboro inspired Kenneth Johnson, John Johnson, and 
Donald Moss, the 19S9 lynching of Mack Charles Parker had already convinced them 
to take action against segregation. Parker, a black man, was suspected of raping a 
pregnant white woman in Poplarville, Mississippi, located near the Louisiana border. 
Although the rape victim picked Parker out o f a line-up, she conceded that his voice 
was different from that of the rapist, and Parker maintained his innocence. But while 
Parker was in jail awaiting trial, a mob of masked men stormed the prison and abducted 
him. Law enforcement authorities later recovered his savagely beaten body floating in 
the Pearl River and arrested the leaders of the mob. A local grand jury refused to indict 
them. At that point, the Justice Department entered the Parker case and brought the 
suspects before a federal grand jury in Mississippi. It too refused to indict them.8
In late February, the eight student activists began meeting to plan their protest. 
The students hosted a rally to show their support for the Greensboro sit-ins and “to get 
the students involved in understanding what the issues were.” The student activists
7“Reimion in D. C. Evokes Bittersweet Memories of Louisiana Sit-In,” The 
Washington Post, May 27, 1990, Dl; Harris, interview, 55-56; Kenneth Johnson, 
interview by author, tape recording, January 11, 1994, T. Harry Williams Center ibr 
Oral History Collection, Louisiana Lower Mississippi Valley Collection, Louisiana 
State University Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 9.
8Johnson, interview, 26-27; “FBI Identifies the Body Found in Pearl River as 
Missing Negro,” Morning Advocate, May 5,1959; ‘Tarker Jury to be Picked Monday,” 
Morning Advocate, January 3,1960,10A; “No Indictments in Parker Case,” Morning 
Advocate, January 15, 1960,1. For a Ml account o f the Mack Charles Parker case see: 
Howard Smead, Blood Justice: The Lynching o f Mack Charles Parker (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1986).
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asked civil rights attorney A. P. Tureaud to be the keynote speaker, telling him that they 
planned to conduct a nonviolent sit-in at a Baton Rouge lunch counter. We “believe it is 
our duty to show our resentment to segregation by actively participating in such a 
movement,” Major Johns explained on behalf o f the group. Tureaud, however, refused 
to appear, so the students asked Jemison to speak. Although he usually sided with the 
racial diplomats, he agreed to appear at the rally. Felton Clark learned about the 
unauthorized meeting several days before it occurred and warned the students that if 
they staged a sit-in, he would expel them. He even phoned Harris’s father and asked 
him to “talk her out of doing anything foolish.” Her father rushed down to Baton 
Rouge, appeared at the rally, which was held in the university’s auditorium, and 
announced his support for the sit-in movement. The rally received no newspaper 
coverage, and little information is available about its scope or content.9
Before the unauthorized meeting, Major Johns wrote to CORE to inform the 
organization that he and several other students would stage a sit-in in Baton Rouge.
“We are planning this demonstration in order to let the southland know that we too are 
impatient with its slow compliance with the Supreme Court’s decisions on segregation.” 
CORE played no role in the Baton Rouge demonstration.10
Boston, interview, 54-56; Major Johns to A. P. Tureaud, March 30, 1960, APT, 
box 11, folder 3; Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 267; Sternberg, ‘Terpetuation, 
Accommodation, and Confrontation,” 92.
l0Major Johns to CORE, March 15, 1960, Congress of Racial Equality Papers, 
Series V, reel 20, Amistad Research Center, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana 
(microfilm).
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Although they told Tureaud and CORE that they would stage a sit-in, the
organizers gave them no details, and the actual plans for the protest, including the date
and location, remained secret. Sit-in organizers even refused to tell the other
participants the date o f the protest because they feared word would leak out “We were
determined to pull it off in secrecy,” recalled Kenneth Johnson. The student leaders
knew that if Felton Clark discovered the time and date of the protest, he would tell the
white leaders and thwart the sit-in. As the day o f the sit-in approached, Hoston and the
other participants sensed that the time was near, and for two days, they dressed in their
best clothes to be ready for the protest. Hoston remembered:
I was on my way to class. 1 was walking with a friend o f mine, and they came to 
me and said, “We need you to come to the men’s dormitory now.” I knew. I said 
to my friend, ‘Take my books, and call my mother if anything happens. Let her 
know that I’m all right.” She said, “What are you going to do?” I said, “Well 
I’m not sure yet, but you’ll hear about it.”11
The leaders decided to target the lunch counter at Kress located in downtown 
Baton Rouge. On March 28, seven of the eight student activists went to the store and 
split into two groups. Fearing that the police would arrest them, the student activists 
selected the eloquent Johns as their spokesman, and he remained on campus while they 
sat-in. After making a purchase in the store, the students walked into the cafeteria. Store 
manager Reynolds Matthews sat at the counter eating his lunch, and Morris and Hoston 
took the seats next to him. The male students occupied seats at intervals along the 
counter. Matthews told them to move to the counter reserved for black customers, but
"Johnson, interview, 24-25; Harris, interview, 28-29,15-16; Report on Sit-Ins 
Continued, Negro Community, April 1960, AFSC, South Central Regional Office, 
1960.
178
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
they refused. The waitress would not take their orders. She told Kenneth Johnson, “You 
know that your mother and your father didn’t teach you-all to act like this, and you’re 
causing trouble for everybody. You-all should leave.” She even threatened to pour 
coffee on him. Johnson simply repeated his order. Some white patrons seated at the 
counter ignored the five students, but a crowd quickly gathered behind them. The 
students believed that the white crowd would attack them. “I remember white people 
coming up behind me with objects in their hands,” said Johnson, “I remember sitting 
there with my hands on the back of my head, covered from behind, so that my skull 
wouldn’t get busted from behind. I couldn’t look back because that would have shown a 
sign of fear. I remember being completely wet, ringing wet from sweat. I was so 
frightened.”12
Chief of Police Shirley Arrighi and Captain Robert Weiner of the Juvenile 
Division arrived within minutes of being called by Matthews. Arrighi asked the 
students either to move to the counter reserved for blacks or to leave the establishment. 
They politely refused, and the chief arrested them for disturbing the peace. A month 
earlier, the mayor, the district and parish attorneys, the sheriff and Arrighi had met and 
decided that any person who took part in a sit-in would be charged with that violation. 
When placed under arrest, the seven stood up and walked quietly to the paddy wagon.13
l2Johnson, interview, 32-34; ‘Two Arrested in Second ‘Sit-Down’ Incident,” 
State-Times, March 29, 1960, 1; Harris, interview, 33-35.
13 Jones, interview, December4,1993,49,43; “Negro Students Arrested Here 
After Sit-Down,” Morning Advocate, March 29,1961,1.
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Once in jail, the students contacted Johnnie Jones and asked him to represent
them. The World War Et activist agreed. Although they preferred to attack segregation
by working within the legal system, the men and women of the World War Q
generation applauded the actions o f the young college students and gave them financial
and moral support after their arrests. In a meeting with Jones and his clients, racial
diplomat Felton Clark, in contrast, castigated the students for their actions and told
them, “When your lawyer [Johnnie Jones] graduated from here,” he told them, “he was
just as militant as you-all, but he didn’t interrupt things.” The student activists had
selected Jones because of his record of fighting against segregation and because they
believed that he truly supported their cause. Kenneth Johnson so admired Jones that he
later became his law clerk. While the students wanted Jones to represent them, racial
diplomats encouraged them to select another lawyer because he was too militant and
too hotheaded. Jones recalled:
Now there were some blacks didn’t want me to be their attorney on that case. 
What the white people call the black leaders, didn’t want me on the case, but 
those . . .  students had their mind made up. They liked what I had been doing...  
. I’d been up to Southern and talked on certain programs and they had been 
watching me all along They knew my record.
The judge presiding over the case, former Attorney General Fred LeBlanc, set the
demonstrators’ bond at $1,500 apiece and ordered them to post it through a licensed
bondsman who required 10 percent to be paid in cash up front. Because these young
men and women represented the best and brightest of the black community and
conducted themselves in a polite, dignified manner, black leaders and World War II
activists, who had the most disposable income, secretly provided the bond money. In
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less than six hours, black leaders raised the $1,050 necessary to secure the release o f the 
arrested students.14
The following day, 3,500 Southern students rallied on behalf of the arrested 
students and vowed to repay the community  leaders and to raise additional money to 
pay the protesters ’ legal fees. The spokesman for the seven jailed activists, Major Johns, 
proclaimed, “No longer can we endure the back door of public places, the denial o f 
equal job opportunities, the right to vote or any privilege granted to a full-time 
citizen.”15
As the rally took place, police arrested nine more Southern students for staging 
sit-ins. Two Baton Rougeans, John Gamer and Vemon Jordan, attempted to desegregate 
the lunch counter at the downtown Sitman’s Drugstore, and seven political science 
majors, including Eddie Charles Brown, the brother of H. Rap Brown who later became 
the president of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), tried to eat at 
the lunch counter at the Greyhound Bus Station.16 The seven well-dressed students 
entered the station in the late afternoon, walked to the white lunch counter, and placed 
their orders. Whites eating at the counter immediately abandoned their seats, but 
approximately fifteen of them milled around and watched the black students. Just as
I4Report on the Sit-Ins Continued, April 1960, AFSC, South Central Regional 
Office, 1960; “Negro Students Arrested Here After Sit-Down,” Morning Advocate, 
March 29, 1960,1.
I5“Two More Arrested in Second ‘Sit-Down’ Incident,” State-Times, March 29, 
1960, 1.
I6The students included Eddie C. Brown, Mack H. Jones, Larry L. Nichols, 
Charles Peabody, Lawrence Hurst, Sandra Ann Jones, and Mary Enola Briscoe. Mack 
Jones came from Fort Worth, Texas, but others were from Baton Rouge.
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they had done the previous day, Police Chief Shirley Arrighi and Captain Robert 
Werner o f the Juvenile Division arrived within minutes o f being called by management 
and ordered the students either to use the black: counter or to leave the premises. The 
students refused, and Werner arrested them. He claimed that their presence in the white 
section of the counter constituted a disturbance o f the peace. A spokesman for the 
group, Mack H. Jones, a twenty-seven-year-old from Fort Worth, Texas, addressed 
reporters as he was being led to the paddy wagons. “We want some human dignity,” he 
said, “You have to do something to let people know you are a man.”17
The nine students arrested on March 29 also asked Johnnie Jones to represent 
them. On the night of their arrest, Jones, Jemison, and an unidentified man went to the 
jail to meet with the students. As they entered the facility, Jemison told the press, “We 
weren’t aware of this at all.” When they departed, Jemison, who usually relished the 
attention, refused to address the media. His reasons for eschewing media attention were 
simple. In addition to wanting to remain in the good graces o f Baton Rouge’s white 
leadership and to maintain his position as a leader o f the black community, Jemison 
also aspired to become president of the National Baptist Convention. Earlier that year, 
Martin Luther King, Jr. and several other activist ministers had formulated a plan to 
overthrow NBC President J. H. Jackson. The pastor o f Olivet Baptist Church in 
Chicago, the conservative Jackson had succeeded Jemison’s father, D. V. Jemison, as 
president of the organization in 1953 and refused to use the NBC to advance the cause
17“ T w o  More Arrested in Second ‘Sit-Down’ Incident,” State-Times, March 29, 
1960, 1; Louisiana v. Mary Briscoe, et al., No. 35,566,19th District Court, Baton 
Rouge, Division A; “Seven More Students Arrested Here,'* Morning Advocate, March 
30, 1960, I; “Jail 16 in La. ‘Sit-Downs,’ ” Louisiana Weekly, April 2, 1960,1.
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of civil rights. King wanted the organization to bolster the movement and believed an 
activist should serve as president. He selected as his candidate Gardner Taylor, who 
preceded T. J. Jemison as pastor of Mt. Zion Baptist Church in Baton Rouge and was 
the pastor o f Concord Baptist Church in Brooklyn, New York. For nearly nine months, 
King and his supporters plotted Jackson’s overthrow and even asked Jemison, who had 
served as secretary of the NBC since 1953, to take part in the coup. Jemison refused 
because he believed that his ambition to head o f the organization would be best served 
by supporting Jackson, who ran the NBC with an iron fist and had purged state 
presidents from the organization for disloyalty. The same goal led him to take a less 
visible role in the Baton Rouge movement. “I felt that my future was not in civil rights 
but in the church,” Jemison later explained.18
The response of the students to their meeting with Jemison, Jones, and the third 
man may have led to the Baptist minister’s silence. Unlike the first group to hold sit-ins, 
these students told the men that they wanted to remain in jail to protest the continuation 
of segregation. Racial diplomats disregarded the wishes of the nine protesters and 
scrambled to raise bail money. Even after the funds became available, the nine refused 
to accept it and chose to remain in jail. On March 31, Thurgood Marshall told the 
Morning Advocate that the NAACP had offered to bail the students out of jail, but they 
refused to accept the money. The students said that “they would not come out until this
l8Branch, Parting the Waters, 335-339; Jemison, interview by Marc Sternberg, 
March 15, 1994,20; “Third Street Boycott by Negroes,” Morning Advocate, March 30, 
1960, 1; “Negroes March Downtown,” State-Times, March 30, 1960, I; Resolution, 
Citizens Committee for Cooperative Action, March 31,1960, CORE Papers, Series V, 
reel 20; Jemison, interview by Marc Sternberg, October 24, 1994, 9.
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is settled,” Marshall explained; “I do not encourage this, but if  they want to do it on 
their own, I’m going to support them.” Marshall and the NAACP took an interest in all 
of the sit-in cases, and the Legal Defense Fund helped local attorneys plan the defenses 
of the student activists. The same could not be said of the racial diplomats. They were 
exasperated to learn the last nine, early advocates o f the “jail-over-bail” strategy that 
characterized the sit-ins and Freedom Rides o f the summer of 1960, wanted to remain 
in the parish prison. “It seems fairly certain that the nine preferred to remain in jail even 
when they were finally released on bond,” Wade Mackie claimed.19
On March 30, approximately 2,000 Southern students staged another rally in 
support of the sit-in participants. It began on campus but ended in a march to downtown 
Baton Rouge, where the group briefly picketed Kress, Sitman’s, and the Greyhound Bus 
Station. The march then culminated on the steps o f the State Capitol. Johns addressed 
them. He recited the Preamble of the Constitution and told those gathered that they 
should work to obtain equality for African Americans. Echoing Abraham Lincoln, he 
proclaimed, “Our nation can’t stand half free and half slave.” After singing several 
hymns, the students quietly made their way back to the campus to attend another mass
19Five sit-in participants in Tallahassee, Florida, first used jail-over-bail in 
February 1960. All members of CORE, their goal was to remain in jail to draw attention 
to the freedom struggle and to convince the black community to become involved in the 
civil rights movement. The Tallahassee jail-in led to a community-wide boycott of 
downtown department stores. ‘Two More Arrested in Second ‘Sit-Down’ Incident,” 
State-Times, March 29, 1960,1; “Seven More Arrested Students Arrested Here,” 
Morning Advocate, March 30 1960,1; “Jail 16 in La. ‘Sit-Downs,’ ” Louisiana Weekly, 
April 2, I960, 1; “Dr. Clark Warns of Arrests,” Morning Advocate, April 3,1960,1; 
Report on Sit-Ins (Continued), Negro Community, ca. April 11, I960, AFSC, Baton 
Rouge Program Reports, South Central Regional Office, 1960; Meier and Rudwick, 
CORE, 102-107.
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meeting. Robinson and Moss, both o f whom took part in the Kress sit-in, headed the 
second gathering and urged the student body to boycott classes for the rest o f the day.20
Unlike other university presidents whose students participated in sit-ins, Felton 
Clark refused to back the protesters. On March 28, Clark was in Washington, D. C., 
attending a conference, and the Dean of Men Ulysses S. Jones served as the acting 
president. In defiance o f the State Board of Education’s automatic expulsion rule, Jones 
even allowed the Kress students to return to class until the administration conducted an 
inquiry. “We’ve got to satisfy the board of education, the students, and the community. 
We don’t want to hurt anyone,” he told the Morning Advocate. Jones hedged on 
expelling the Kress protesters because they were the university’s top students and all 
came from “fine backgrounds.”21
When Clark returned from Washington, he abandoned Jones’ moderate position. 
Concerned about the white reaction to the protests, he issued a statement promising to 
take disciplinary action against “all students who fail to attend classes or who violate 
university regulations, ordinances of the city and parish, or the laws of the state of 
Louisiana.” On March 30, Clark met with the demonstrators and black leaders, 
including Louisiana Education Association President and longtime activist J. K.
Haynes, for about five hours, and then expelled the student leaders. Haynes recalled:
20“Negroes March Downtown; Grand Jury Begins Inquiry,” State-Times, March 
30, I960, 1.
2I“Negro Students Arrested Here After Sit-Down,” Morning Advocate, March 
29, 1960,1; “Seven More Students Arrested Here,” Morning Advocate, March 30, 
1960, 1; ‘Two More Arrested in Second ‘Sit-Down’ Incident,” State-Times, March 29, 
1960,1.
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They must have had three thousand students on the grounds in front of that
building waiting___ Water came out of my eyes to see these brilliant students
leave. When they announced it to  the students out on the yard, there was crying, 
and when the nine students left in A. A. Lenior’s station wagon, these students 
were hanging on to the station wagon and crying. It was quite an emotional 
thing.
The expulsion of the protest leaders outraged many African Americans. On March 31, 
about half of the school’s 4,900 students attempted to resign in protest, but the dean o f 
students refused to let any of them withdraw without parental approval. The 
administration knew that only a few parents would allow their children to drop out o f 
school and abandon their education. Clark also asked supportive members of Southern’s 
alumni to intercede. On April 2, the alumni association met with the student body. The 
group’s secretary, Corrine Maybuce, the daughter of an ESSO employee, had driven an 
automobile for the free ride system during the bus boycott She urged the students to 
remain in school and told them that Clark was simply complying with the State Board 
of Education’s order. She told the students that they had placed Clark “in a tough spot” 
She added that because of Clark’s willingness to comply with the board, the university 
would carry on despite the demonstrations.22
At a mass meeting held on the outskirts of campus, the expelled protesters 
encouraged the 4,000 students present to resign for the university. They could not meet 
on campus because the administration barred the sit-in leaders from the school’s
“ “Negroes March Downtown; Grand Jury Begins Inquiry,” State-Times, March
30,1960, 1; Haynes, interview by Miranda Kombert; “Mass Resignation Begun at 
Southern After Suspensions,” State-Times, March 31,1960,1; “Leader Asks Southern 
U. Student Body to Quit School,” Morning Advocate, April 1,1960, 1; ‘Ted-Up 
Students Abandon SU in Droves,” Louisiana Weekly, April 9,1960,1; “Dr. Clark 
Warns o f Arrests,” Morning Advocate, April 3,1960,1; Maybuce, interview by 
Jacqueline Holmes.
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grounds. Major Johns urged the students to leave Southern University until Clark 
rescinded the expulsions and permitted students to take part in boycotts, sit-ins, and 
picketing. Robinson encouraged those attending to embrace the principles of passive 
resistance to combat segregation. He chided the older members o f the black community, 
especially the racial diplomats, for not taking any action against segregation even 
though they wanted equality. He claimed that they failed to act for three reasons, “One, 
they are either too scared or they haven’t got enough sense, or two they’re making more 
profit from segregation than they would from integration. . .  or three, they’re lying.”23 
In an attempt to ease tensions on campus, Clark and other members of the 
administration met with the Kress protesters to discuss ways to prevent a full-scale 
walkout. For six and a half hours, 3,000 students waited outside while their leaders and 
Clark hammered out a deal. The details of their six-hour meeting remain sketchy, but 
the student activists agreed to leave Baton Rouge in exchange from a promise by the 
administration not to expel any other students. The leaders then called a meeting of the 
student body and encouraged them to remain in school “to carry on the fight for our 
cause.” Donald Moss pleaded with the students to keep fighting and added that their 
display of solidarity in the walkouts would always be a threat “to anything that doesn’t 
stand for democracy and human rights.”24
“ “Leader Asks Whole Southern U. Student Body to Quit School,” Morning 
Advocate, April 1, 1960,1.
24“Leaders Ask Students to Leave Southern U.,” State-Times, April 2, 1960, 1; 
Major Johns, “Baton Rouge: Higher Education Southern Style,” copy o f article 
provided by Janette Harris, place of publication unknown.
187
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The reaction of the black community, especially the racial diplomats, to the sit- 
ins, the marches, and the mass meetings ranged from lukewarm to hostile. Racial 
diplomats gave the students very little support. Although they wanted to end 
segregation, they believed that the best way to do so was by negotiating with white 
leaders for change. Racial diplomats feared that the militancy o f the student activists 
would alienate the white leadership and upset their efforts to end segregation. Leading 
diplomat Leo Butler refused to become involved with the student protests because he 
“did not agree with the students and did not identify with their cause.” Wade Mackie 
claimed that these members of the black community were “poorly prepared” for the sit- 
ins. In fact, when Clark expelled the leaders, none of the racial diplomats offered to take 
them in. Some rented rooms at the Lincoln Hotel, but as large numbers of students left 
the university in protest, the rooms quickly filled up. CORE representative James 
McCain, who was sent to observe the Baton Rouge sit-ins, feared that the “chaotic 
conditions” at the hotel would lead to violence and asked Mackie to persuade some 
black leaders to help find housing for the students or provide money for them to return 
home. Mackie turned to a well-respected activist, J. K. Haynes, and a racial diplomat, 
John G. Lewis, for help. Before this, Lewis had no involvement with the student 
activists, but he feared that if large numbers of angry students were allowed to remain 
in Baton Rouge, violence would erupt and the peace and stability of the community 
would be shattered. Haynes and Lewis, both revered in the black community, found 
lodging for the students.25
“ Report on Sit-ins (Continued), ca. April 11, 1960, AFSC, Baton Rouge 
Program Reports, South Central Regional Office, 1960; Buell, “The Politics of
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Most blacks shared the racial diplomats’ belief that student activism would lead 
to violence. They thought that if they publicly supported the students they would suffer 
white reprisals. Nevertheless, on March 29, Jemison called fora boycott of downtown 
stores during the upcoming Easter season but did little to promote it. The following day, 
few African Americans complied, and the boycott died. Jemison even tried to form a 
Citizens’ Committee for Cooperative Action (CCCA) to support the sit-ins, but the 
organization did little to help the students or perpetuate the protests.26
A few members of the black community, however, denounced Clark’s actions.
A group of Southern alumni from across the country claimed that expulsion was too 
harsh a punishment and called for the readmission of the students. Other African 
Americans castigated Clark for not backing the students and claimed that college 
presidents throughout the South had stood up to the white power structure and refused 
to expel sit-in participants. The state’s largest African-American newspaper, the 
Louisiana Weekly, declared that Clark should have resigned rather than comply with the 
Board of Education’s expulsion decree.27
In the end, approximately 5 percent of Southern’s 4,900 students resigned, and 
the expelled demonstrators transferred to other universities. Calm returned to the 
campus. A state district court convicted the protesters of disturbing the peace and
Frustration,” 134.
26“Third Street Boycott by Negroes,” Morning Advocate, March 30,1960, 1; 
“Negroes March Downtown,” State-Times, March 30,1960, 1.
^ “Reinstatement for 18 SU Expelled Students Sought,” Louisiana Weekly, April
16,1960, 1; “Penalty for Students Too Severe,” Louisiana Weekly, April 23, 1960.
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sentenced each of them to four months in jail. Refusing to accept the jail term, the 
students’ lawyer Johnnie Jones, assisted by Tureaud and LDF attorneys Thurgood 
Marshall and Jack Greenberg, appealed the case to the U. S. Supreme Court. In 
December 1961, the justices issued their decision in Gamer v. Louisiana. Speaking for 
the majority, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote that the records of the case “contain no 
evidence to support a finding that these petitioners disturbed the peace.” He added that 
their convictions violated their right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Although civil rights leaders viewed Gamer as a victory, it changed very 
little in Baton Rouge.28
The white community’s reaction to the sit-ins followed the pattern that 
developed in the 1950s. White leaders wanted to maintain peaceful race relations. 
Unlike white officials in Nashville who, on March 15 , allowed segregationists to attack 
protesters with “rocks, fists, and lighted cigarettes,” Baton Rouge’s white leaders 
preferred to adopt a peaceful approach for dealing with the student activists. The 
response o f Mayor-President Christian, District Attorney Favrot, and Chief Arrighi 
foreshadowed the white response to massive civil rights protests in Albany, Georgia, 
that began in November 1961. White leaders in both communities did not arrest sit-in 
participants for violating segregation laws, which were subject to legal attack, but 
instead jailed them for violating laws aimed at maintaining public order, i.e., disturbing 
the peace and trespassing. Police officers in both communities also refrained from using
“ “High Court Gets Sit-In Appeals,” State-Times, January 4, 1961,1; “First Sit- 
In Appeals Reach Supreme Court from BR Negro Cases,” Morning Advocate, January 
4, 1961, 1; Gamer etal. v Louisiana, 368 S. Ct. 157 (United States Supreme Court, 
1961).
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violence against the protesters and protected them from segregationists bent on doing 
harm to them. Immediately following the Kress sit-ins, Favrot, after consulting with 
Mayor-President Jack Christian, announced, “Those jeering crowds and fighting back 
and so forth in several cities . . .  we won’t  put up with that for one minute.” He added 
that city officials would not tolerate violence from either whites or blacks. When the 
Southern students marched to the State Capitol on March 30, Christian urged all Baton 
Rougeans to stay away from the area and let law enforcement officials handle the 
situation. Both men knew that if  segregationists showed up at the rally, violence would 
ensue, so they allowed the students to meet on the steps of the State Capitol but 
surrounded them with officers. If any trouble occurred, they could immediately step in 
and quash it. The white leaders allowed the students to march and hold rallies because 
they believed that if  they cracked down on them, the black community, which for the 
most part did not support the students, would be drawn into the movement. Therefore, 
the city’s politicians and business leaders wanted to bring a quick end to protests but 
without allowing violence to erupt.29
White leaders decided that the only way to stop the sit-ins was to expel the 
student activists. “As far as the state board is concerned, we have some very firm, strict 
rules about people who get mixed up in affairs with the police,” said State Board of 
Education President Joseph Davies of Arabi, Louisiana, a small town located near New
“ ‘Two More Arrested in Second ‘Sit-Down’ Incident,” State-Times, March 29, 
1960,1; “Negroes March Downtown; Grand Jury Begins Inquiry,” State-Times, March 
30, 1960,1; Branch, Parting the Waters, 279, 527-561; “Let’s Keep Our 
Heads,” Morning Advocate, March 31, 1960, 1; Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 217; 
“Negroes March Downtown; Grand Jury Begins Inquiry,” State-Times, March 30,1960, 
1.
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Orleans. Clark wanted to protect Southern, so he complied with the board’s orders. He 
feared that the university would suffer if  he defied the Board of Education’s directive. 
In addition to ridding Baton Rouge o f the student activists, this strategy also diverted 
the attention of the Southern student body away from the sit-ins and toward their 
student leaders. The activists hoped that the sit-in movement in Baton Rouge would 
continue beyond their arrests. But their punishment at the hands of the administration 
shifted student anger away from the system of segregation and toward Felton Clark.
The expelled activists lamented this change in focus but were powerless to stop it.30
While white leaders wanted to end the protests quickly, the city’s liberals tried 
to help the demonstrators. As always, Wade Mackie stood at the forefront of this group. 
Although he knew nothing of the students’ sit-in plans beforehand, he immediately took 
up their cause when the demonstrations began. He also served as a liaison between 
CORE representative James McCain and the city’s black community. When Southern 
expelled the eighteen students, Mackie, who knew Clark quite well, rebuked him for 
putting Louisiana’s segregation laws above the basic human rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution. He asked Clark if there was a limit on what the Board of Education could 
get him to do. In addition to working with the black community during the sit-ins, 
Mackie also collected $150 from LSU faculty members and students who supported the 
sit-ins but feared segregationist reprisals if they spoke out.31
30“Resume Classes at Southern U.,” State-Times, April 5, 1960, 1; Report on 
Baton Rouge, La., Sit-in Demonstrations, ca. April 11, 1960, AFSC, Baton Rouge 
Program Reports, South Central Regional Office, 1960.
3’Wade Mackie to Felton Clark, April 19,1960, AFSC, Employment on Merit, 
South Central Regional Office, 1960; Final Report of Sit-In Effects, May 9, 1960, ibid.
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Segregationists, unwilling to accept the possibility that Baton Rouge blacks 
were unhappy with the reigning racial order, accused outside agitators of fomenting the 
protests. After the Kress demonstration, Louisiana Governor Earl Long expressed 
confusion. “I don’t think that the colored people o f this state have anything 
fundamentally to complain about,” he told the press. He claimed that the “good colored 
people” were obtaining bad advice from the NAACP and other groups and urged 
dissatisfied African Americans to go back to Africa. Other segregationists believed that 
outside forces convinced the Southern students to demonstrate but described them in 
more nefarious terms. At an April 1 meeting of the Citizens' Council, its executive 
council declared that communist front groups such as the NAACP, the ACLU, and 
CORE brainwashed the students and used them as part o f their “well organized and 
carefully laid out plan to harass and intimidate the officials and white citizens of our 
city.” It also claimed that the student demonstrators came from other parts of the 
country when, in fact, only a couple of them, Marvin Robinson and Kenneth Johnson, 
were from other states. “There had been no previous incidents of provocation to explain 
their actions,” said the executive council. “Their alleged grievances are the same old 
shopworn complaints of the professional Negro agitators.” On March 29, an 
unidentified group of segregationists burned a cross in the front yard of a home in 
Southern Heights, an upperclass African-American neighborhood located near the black 
campus. The same night university officials found an effigy o f a Southern University 
student hanging from a lamp post on LSU’s campus, hi addition to these two incidents, 
a group of white youths picketed outside of the Greyhound Bus Station on March 30
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and carried signed declaring, “If  you don’t  like it here, go back to Africa” and “Go 
Home, Sambo.”32
Although the March 1960 sit-ins failed to end lunch counter segregation in 
Baton Rouge, they had a lasting impact on the city’s civil rights movement. The fact 
that Clark and the racial diplomats .acceded to the white leaders’ demand that the 
student activists be expelled intensified the feeling of distrust between the student 
activists and the racial diplomats. The young students saw the older leaders as pawns of 
whites. Racial diplomats viewed the students as hotheaded troublemakers who, if  
allowed to continue their protests, would destroy their own hard-earned relationship 
with white leaders. They believed that white leaders would never capitulate to the 
demands of the marchers or demonstrators but would agree to make gradual changes to 
the system of segregation if  approached through the traditional lines of communication. 
Their fears proved well-founded. Concerned about the police department’s long 
tradition of brutality against black suspects, racial diplomats, in March I960, asked the 
city-parish council to hire black policemen. They approached Frank McConnell, 
president pro tern of the council and asked him to bring the proposal up for a vote. On 
March 23, McConnell introduced the measure, and council members agreed to consider 
it at a special meeting to be held on March 30, two days after the sit-ins. Five racial 
diplomats, including Acie Belton and Fred Levy, who had served as a United Defense 
League officer in 1953, went to the meeting and claimed that the city needed black
32“Long Suggests That Dissatisfied Negroes Leave,” Morning Advocate, March 
29, 1960, 1; “2 Councils Say Youth’s Brainwashed,” State-Times, April 1,1960, 1; 
“Negroes March Downtown; Grand Jury Begins Inquiry,” State-Times, March 30, 1960, 
1.
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officers because they could enforce the law better in African-American neighborhoods 
than white officers. They added that cities throughout the South and in neighboring 
parishes employed black policemen with great success. Mayor Christian told the racial 
diplomats, “I have heard nothing tonight that makes me feel that we need Negro 
policemen and certainly not in light of what is happening in Baton Rouge.” Councilman 
Robert Breazeale made it even clearer that the student activists' actions directly 
affected the council’s decision to vote against hiring black officers. He claimed that 
through their actions, the students showed that they had no concern for doing what was 
best for the black community and displayed “a lack of awareness of civil 
responsibility.” Black Baton Rougeans “must earn the rights they are now demanding,” 
Breazeale added.33
For a year and a half following the 1960 sit-ins, Southern’s student body staged 
no protests; racial diplomats and the white leaders concluded that the demonstrations 
were over. During that time crucial changes occurred in Baton Rouge, hi the summer of 
1960, the city-parish held elections for mayor-president, council members and district 
attorney, and several African Americans entered the race. Most of them were World 
War II activists, including Dupuy Anderson who ran for mayor-president and Johnnie 
Jones who campaigned for district attorney. The incumbent district attorney, J. St. Clair 
Favrot, decided not to seek reelection. In 1960, East Baton Rouge Parish had 64, 215 
white voters and 10,288 black voters, and although they did not win, African-American
33“Council Conducts Hush-Hush Meeting on Sewer Program,” Morning 
Advocate, March 24,1960, 1; “Negro Policemen Request Goes to Council Today,” 
Morning Advocate, March 30, 1960, 1; “Policeman Plan by Negroes is Rejected,” State- 
Times, March 31, 1960,1.
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candidates did well in the primacy election. Dupuy Anderson finished fourth in a field 
of seven and garnered 5,751 votes. Christian, the front runner, received 19,365 votes. 
Johnnie Jones came in sixth in a field o f seven, but 6,556 African Americans cast their 
ballots for him. The frontrunner Lawrence Uter, with 12,358, made it into a runoff with 
Sargent Pitcher, one of the founding members of the Citizens’ Council. Pitcher used 
race to defeat Uter. He bragged about his support for segregation and urged white 
citizens to vote en masse because the “NAACP bloc vote” would surely go to his 
opponent. In the August 27 runoff election, Pitcher’s race-baiting paid off. He soundly 
defeated his opponent. Race-baiting played no part in the mayoral election, however; all 
candidates, except for Anderson, announced their support for segregation. Jack 
Christian, whose campaign focused on maintaining the city-parish system of 
government, handily defeated his opponent, A. T. “Apple” Sanders. Because white 
leaders continued to control the police and sheriff’s departments, law enforcement’s 
reaction to civil rights protests remained virtually unchanged. Maintaining the peace 
remained foremost in their minds. Pitcher, however, handled the cases o f demonstrators 
who had been arrested. He always asked for exorbitant bails for civil rights activists, 
often increased the charges against them after they were jailed, and asked judges to 
impose long prison sentences for the men and women who challenged the system of 
segregation. Because Pitcher’s actions were not violent and attracted very little negative 
national publicity, white leaders embraced his methods for dealing with jailed 
activists.34
34“65% of Demos Go to Polls in EBR Vote,” Morning Advocate, July 27, I960,
1; “Christian, Sanders to Run Off; Uter, Pitcher in Race for D.A,” Morning Advocate,
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Undaunted by the city’s new segregationist district attorney, student activists 
regrouped in October 1961 and formed the Baton Rouge chapter o f CORE.35 Led by 
Southern undergraduates, Ronnie Moore, Weldon Rougeau, and Patricia Tate, the 
organization planned an attack against segregated facilities and discriminatory hiring 
practices in downtown department stores. Wanting to forge alliances with World War II 
activists and other like-minded adults, the local CORE organizers met with African- 
American ministers and leaders of several black organizations. They garnered some 
support from FOCUS, a new organization dedicated to increasing voter registration. 
Both racial diplomats and World War II activists, including Raymond Scott, Johnnie 
Jones, and Dupuy Anderson, initially joined FOCUS, but the activists quickly became 
frustrated by the conservatism of the racial diplomats and abandoned it in early 1962 to 
reorganize the Baton Rouge branch o f the NAACP.36
July 24, 1960, 1; “Pitcher Pledges Stiff Handling of Gaming Cases,” Morning 
Advocate, August 8, 1960, 8A; “Pitcher Gives Campaign Talks to Two Groups,” 
Morning Advocate, August 28, I960, 2A; “Pitcher Issues Statement Here for DA. 
Runoff,” Morning Advocate, July 26, 1960, 5B.
35Although CORE played an important role in the civil rights movement, few 
studies are devoted to the organization. CORE, by August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, 
was one o f the first studies of the organization and is still the only book-length 
treatment o f the organization. In it, the authors discuss CORE’S involvement in Baton 
Rouge. James Farmer, who was one o f the founding members of CORE and served as 
its director during the civil rights movement, in his autobiography Lay Bare the Heart: 
An Autobiography o f the Civil Rights Movement (New York: Arbor House, 1985) 
provides a first-hand account of the formation of the organization and o f its role in the 
freedom struggle. Other works, Fairclough’s Race and Democracy, and Kim Lacy 
Rogers’s, Righteous Lives: Narratives o f the New Orleans Civil Rights Movement (New 
York: New York University Press, 1993) discuss CORE in Louisiana.
36Meier and Rudwick, CORE, 166; Dave Dennis to Marvin Rich, November 25, 
1961, CORE Papers, Series V, reel 20.
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With support from some black adults in hand, CORE held high hopes for its 
Baton Rouge chapter and assigned field secretary David Dennis to work with the newly 
formed group. A veteran of the 1960 Freedom Rides, Dennis came from the Shreveport 
area where his father worked as a sharecropper. As a student at Dillard University in 
New Orleans, he joined the New Orleans chapter of CORE in early 1960. In November 
1961, Dennis told the national office, “The Baton Rouge CORE group [with a 
membership o f sixty-five] looks very good, at the present time.”37
Under the direction of Dennis and Moore, the organization decided to begin its 
protests in December 1961 by staging a series of hit-and-run lunch counter sit-ins. 
Before the protests began, white leaders —  especially downtown business owners and 
operators, the Chamber of Commerce, and city officials who supported industrialization 
and economic expansion decided to ignore these sit-ins. White leaders believed that if 
the protesters remained free, the marches and mass meetings of the previous year could 
be prevented. To preserve the peace, store managers instructed their employees to 
ignore the protesters when they sat-in. Managers refused to call the police. Without 
being asked to intervene, law enforcement officials could not arrest the sit-in 
participants. The city’s newspapers, which were owned by the Manship family, 
relegated all accounts of the protests to the back pages. Charles and Douglas Manship 
owned one television station, one radio station, and the city’s two newspapers. Both 
men belonged to the white leadership class and worked for Baton Rouge’s economic 
growth. In 1963, Doug Manship served as the president of the Chamber o f Commerce.
37Ibid.
198
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The practice o f ignoring or burying news o f protest was not unique to Baton Rouge. 
Other southern industrial and business centers used similar tactics to prevent racial 
violence or avoid unfavorable national attention. In June 1960, white newspapers and 
merchants in Houston adopted a similar media blackout to avoid racial conflict over an 
attempt to desegregate lunch counters. On December 5, Baton Rouge CORE members 
staged the first o f their sit-ins at Kress and McCrary’s. Much to their disappointment, 
their protests received very little publicity. Waiters at both counters ignored them, and 
the police were not called. The students left after a few minutes.38
In addition to conducting the hit-and-run sit-ins, Ronnie Moore phoned store 
managers to ask them to desegregate their lunch counters and to hire black salespeople, 
but failed to reach them. Their secretaries told Moore that the managers were either out 
of town or too busy to take his calls. At that point, he sent letters to twelve downtown 
department stores warning them that unless they desegregated their lunch counters and 
hired African Americans to work as sales clerks and cashiers, the organization would 
conduct more sit-ins and also picket and boycott their businesses.39
38Weldon Rougeau to Gordon R. Carey, December 4,1961, CORE Papers, 
Series V, reel 20; “Baton Rouge is Named CORE ‘Mix’ Target,” Morning Advocate, 
December 3, 1961, 6B; “Negroes Test Two Downtown Lunch Counters,” State-Times, 
December 5, 1961, 8A; “CORE Claims Two ‘Eat-Run’ Minus Success,” Morning 
Advocate, December 10, 1961,8G; “7 Negro Sit-In Demonstrators Ignored Here,” 
Morning Advocate, December 6, 1961, 8B; Thomas Cole, Wo Color is My Kind: The 
Life ofEldrewey Stems and the Integration o f Houston (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1997), 36-57.
39The stores included: Kress, Goudchaux's, Woolworth, Welch & Levy, 
McCrory’s, Sears, Holmes, Three Sisters, J. C. Penney, Rosenfield’s, Shopper’s Fair, 
and Montgomery W ard. “CORE Gives Notice on 12 BR Merchants,” State-Times, 
December 7, 1961,7F; “CORE Issues Ultimatum to 12 BR Stores,” Morning Advocate, 
December 8, 1961,12C.
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In addition to CORE’S protests, the managers faced the possibility of a white 
boycott o f their businesses. The city’s segregationist population promised to retaliate 
against any store that capitulated to CORE’S demands. Some segregationists urged the 
managers to “fire all Negroes” if  a picket line formed outside of their businesses or if 
student activists followed through with their threatened boycott W. H. Rutledge of 
Shreveport, the executive director of the Citizens’ Councils of Louisiana, issued a 
warning to Baton Rouge merchants. If they caved into CORE’S demands, then whites 
would boycott their businesses. Unsure how to respond to the threatened boycotts, the 
store managers met with city officials and decided that in order to avoid possible 
segregationist-inspired violence they would ignore CORE’S demands.40
On December 11, the same day the Supreme Court handed down its decision in 
Gamer, CORE staged a series of sit-ins at the businesses to which Moore had written. 
Two groups of Southern students held separate sit-ins at Kress’s lunch counter. The first 
group, made up of two men and two women, sat at the counter for thirty minutes, and 
following the prescribed rules for dealing with such protests, the waitresses ignored 
them. In the afternoon, fifteen student activists, ten women and five men, tried a 
different approach. They filled all of the stools at the black lunch counter. Each ordered 
a drink and remained seated for two hours, effectively shutting down the counter. Still, 
the management refused to call the police. In addition to sending the nineteen students 
to Kress, CORE deployed twelve members to McCrory’s and ten to Woolworth’s to sit 
in at their lunch counters. Employees at both stores ignored them. When questioned by
40Ibid.
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reporters about his inaction, Police Chief Wingate White replied that the city-parish 
attorney advised him that he had no authority to arrest the protestors unless they refused 
to leave when asked to by store managers. Even then, he could arrest the demonstrators 
only if the businesses requested assistance. The only way he could arrest the students 
was if  they took their protests out o f the businesses and into the streets.41
The refusal of store managers to call the police frustrated CORE leaders. They 
needed publicity for their cause, and the best way to gamer the attention of the press, 
especially the national press, was through mass arrests. CORE realized that white 
leaders would never agree to end segregation without being forced to do so by the 
federal government. The organization knew from experience that protests and arrests 
galvanized the black communities, as well as white liberals, and spurred many of its 
members into action.
To achieve mass participation and to attract media attention, CORE stepped up 
its protests. On December 10, members of the organization began handing out fliers 
calling for African Americans to boycott the twelve downtown stores. The broadsides 
pleaded, “Use your dollar as a weapon against segregation,” and told the black 
population, “Freedom is not a gift, but freedom is a merit that is acquired only through 
determination and sacrifice.. . .  The evil of segregation can be conquered through 
SELECTIVE BUYING.” In addition to asking the black community to take part in the 
boycott, on December 13, approximately one hundred student activists picketed the
4I“Four Negroes Ignored at Kress Counter,” Morning Advocate, December 12, 
1961, 1 IB; “New Sit-Ins Ignored at BR Lunch Counters,” State-Times, December 12, 
1961,10A.
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downtown stores. The police ordered the protesters to disperse but arrested no one. 
Once again, the newspapers kept the story off the front pages. By moving their protests 
out of privately-owned businesses onto the public streets and sidewalks, the student 
activists made white leaders uneasy. The leaders feared that segregationists would 
attack protesters if  they allowed African Americans to continue their picketing. When 
sit-ins occurred inside buildings, the participants were afforded some protection from 
potential attacks. However, outside, they would attract the public’s attention and would 
draw crowds o f angry white onlookers, leaving them vulnerable to attack. After the 
December 13 picketing, Pitcher, Kean, White, and Sheriff Bryan Clemmons issued a 
statement warning that anyone blocking a street or sidewalk while taking part in a 
demonstration would be arrested and prosecuted for violating a state statute against 
disturbing the peace and for criminal mischief. They also encouraged all citizens, black 
and white, to “ignore the agitation advocated by CORE.”42
The following day, a group o f student activists tested the resolve o f city officials 
by picketing the twelve downtown stores. Twenty-five student activists marched 
outside of these businesses for about a minute and a half before police officers arrested 
them. District Judge Fred A. Blanche, Jr. set their bonds at $1,500 each. Adopting the 
tactics o f remaining in jail in lieu o f bail that John Gamer and the others who 
participated in the second wave o f sit-ins in March 1960 had employed and that
42Summary of Testimony of Ronnie Moore, Committee of Inquiry, May 25, 
1962, CORE Papers, Series V, reell7; CORE Fliers, Lawyers Constitutional Defense 
Committee Papers, reel 17, Amistad Research Center, Tulane University, New Orleans, 
Louisiana (microfilm); “CORE Pickets Dispersed by Police Request,” State-Times, 
December 13,1961,12A; “EBR Officials Warn Against Demonstrations,” Morning 
Advocate, December 14, 1961, 1.
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Freedom Riders had used the previous summer to fill the jails in Mississippi, the 
activists refused to post bail and remained in jail.43
On December 15, Ronnie Moore drove a sound truck around Southern’s campus 
urging the students to take part in a march to downtown Baton Rouge. Moore rented the 
same equipment used by politicians and kept the volume on medium. Nevertheless, 
sheriff’s deputy arrested him for illegal use of a sound truck and for violating the city’s 
anti-noise ordinance.44
Approximately 4,000 young African Americans crowded into the streets outside 
of the parish prison to show their support for the jailed students. Since Moore was in 
jail, Reverend B. Elton Cox, a CORE field secretary from High Point, North Carolina, 
led the demonstration. He told Chief White and Sheriff Clemmons that he planned to 
lead the crowd in singing and prayer and then give a brief address. He promised that the 
program would take less than half an hour. Chief White told Cox that he would allow 
him to speak for seven minutes but no longer. At that point, 350 city policemen and 
sheriff’s deputies surrounded the courthouse. This massive force included the entire 
police department armed with revolvers, riot guns, submachine guns, and tear gas. The 
city’s two police dogs were also on hand.45
“ Summary of Testimony of Weldon Rougeau, Committee of Inquiry, May 25, 
1962, CORE Papers, Series V, reel 17; “23 Negroes Arrested for Demonstration,” 
State-Times, December 14,1961, 1; “Negro Pickets of Stores Sill Held in Jail,” 
December 15, 1961, 1.
“ Moore Testimony, CORE Inquiry, CORE Papers, Series V, reel 17.
“ Statement of Facts, Cox v. Louisiana, Lawyers Constitutional Defense 
Committee Papers, reel 17; “Tear Gas is Used as Negro Groups March Downtown,” 
State-Times, December 15, 1961,1.
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The demonstration started peacefully with the crowd reciting the Pledge of 
Allegiance and the Lord’s Prayer. Cox denounced the arrest of the twenty-three young 
men and women and told the rally’s participants that the Bill of Rights guaranteed the 
right of every American, black or white, to take part in peaceful protests. He urged the 
marchers to be brave in the face of white opposition. “If we go to jail, we will go 
without bail,” he proclaimed. “If they give us tear gas, we will take it and fall 
honorably.” Cox concluded his speech by asking the marchers to disperse and to 
conduct an hour-long sit-in at the twelve department stores. During his speech, a group 
of approximately 200 whites heckled him. As the rally started to break up, the jailed 
picketers sang, “Oh students, don’t you weep. Don’t you mourn,” and the crowd of 
students cheered.
At that point, Clemmons panicked. Using a bull horn, he ordered the students to 
disperse. The State-Times reported that the sheriff told the students, “We have given 
you the opportunity to demonstrate here, but now you are creating a disturbance. This is 
all — now break it up.” Without warning, the officers fired tear gas into the crowd. The 
students scattered but attempted to reassemble. The officers fired another volley of tear 
gas and used their night sticks and police dogs to prevent them from regrouping. The 
next day, Police Inspector Rufus S. Trigg tried to ease the racial tension that erupted 
after the melee by denying that law enforcement officers used physical force to subdue 
the crowd. He told the Morning Advocate, "Never was anybody touched by a  hand, fist, 
nightstick or any other instrument at the disposal of the police.” Cox told a different 
story. He said that police unleashed their dogs on some of the fleeing students and beat 
others with night sticks. Although the reaction of Clemmons and his deputies ran
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counter to the white leaders’ desire to maintain peace, the sheriff apparently feared that 
the jeering crowd of segregationists would attack the marchers and cause a full-scale 
riot in the heart o f downtown Baton Rouge.
Despite Clemmons’ efforts, a group o f marchers escaped the tear gas and 
crowded onto the sidewalks of Third Street, the hub of downtown commerce, and began 
to picket the stores that lined the street. Some even tried to stage sit-ins at McCrory’s, 
Kress, and Rosenfield’s, but the stores closed their lunch counters to prevent protests. 
Two hours after the march, the protest ended, and the students returned to campus. The 
police did not immediately arrest any of the protesters. Perhaps they feared that the 
wholesale arrest of march participants would lead to more demonstrations.46
Instead, they waited several hours before making any arrests. In the early 
evening of December 15, Cox, unable to walk because a tear gas shell had injured his 
ankle, was scheduled to meet with students at a North Baton Rouge church to discuss 
further action. When he arrived, several deputies were on hand to arrest him. They 
charged him with conspiring to riot and inciting a riot. Judge LeBlanc set his bond at 
$ 1,500. When CORE’S main office offered to pay Cox’s bail, the judge raised it to 
$4,000, then to $6,000, and finally to $8,000. However, he eventually dropped it back 
down to $6,000. With help from CORE’S national office, Cox bonded out of jail on 
December 27, 1961. The same day, law enforcement officials arrested fifty others,
46“Tear Gas is Used as Negro Groups March Downtown,” State-Times,
December 15, 1961,1; “50 Negroes Jailed as Tear Gas is Used,” Morning Advocate, 
December 14,1961, 1; Statement of Facts, Car v. Louisiana, "Lawyers Constitutional 
Defense Committee, reel 17; Committee of Inquiry, May 25, 1962, CORE Papers,
Series V, reel 17; “Police ‘Tear Gas’ Non-Violent Students,” Louisiana Weekly, 
December 23, 1961, 1.
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mostly Southern students, in connection with the march. They charged the four students 
who were in the sound truck with Moore with illegal use of a loud speaker. Sixteen 
others were charged with simple obstruction of a highway. Five went to jail for 
vagrancy and another eighteen for illegal picketing.47
The jailed activists received harsh treatment in prison. Cox spent his entire ten 
days in solitary confinement and was not given his mail. Clemmons justified this 
isolation by claiming that “he [Coxj had the company of another nearby.” The sheriff 
added that he separated the CORE leader from the other black prisoners for his own 
safety because some o f them did not share Cox’s “sentiments.” He did admit that he 
believed Cox would stir up the other jailed demonstrators. The sheriff refused to give 
the North Carolina minister his mail because most of it came from CORE. Weldon 
Rougeau spent twenty-one days in jail before posting bond, as did Ronnie Moore. 
Moore, along with Jerome Smith and Dave Dennis, who was jailed on the first day of 
picketing, claimed that their jailers beat them. “[The] jail atmosphere was hostile,” said 
Moore, “I was denied consultation with ministers, mail, and use of the telephone. After 
making three requests in one day to see a doctor, 1 was slaoped and choked.” Smith was 
beaten for asking a guard to retrieve a receipt that he had forgotten in the pocket of his 
pants. His injuries were so severe that the prison sent him to Charity Hospital in New
47“Board of Education Issues Warning to Negro Students,” State-Times, 
December 16,1961,1; “Open Letter to the Citizens o f Baton Rouge,” Morning 
Advocate, December 20, 1961,3C; “Board of Education Issues Warning to Negro 
Student,” State-Times, December 16* 1961,1; “Calm Returns to City Mall in Wake of 
Demonstrations,” Morning Advocate, December 17,1961,1.
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Orleans for treatment. Dennis received a beating when he asked to meet with the 
warden to discuss the brutal treatment o f the other two men.48
In addition to using the criminal justice system to silence the jailed CORE 
members, white leaders took steps to destroy student activism at Southern. On 
December 16, the State Board of Education issued a directive ordering the immediate 
suspension o f any student arrested or jailed and forbade students who lived on campus 
from taking part in demonstrations not sanctioned by the university. Board of Education 
President Robert Curry of Shreveport declared that any student disobeying the rule 
would be expelled. To prevent the type of mass rallies that followed the March 1960 sit- 
ins, Felton Clark closed the campus for the Christmas holidays three days early. He also 
postponed taking any action against the jailed students until after the holiday.49
On December 20, FOCUS took out an advertisement in the city’s white papers 
in support o f the students. More than fifty African Americans, including World War II 
activists and racial diplomats, signed the ad which proclaimed, “We are interested in 
Baton Rouge, its growth and development, concerned with our youth, and disturbed and 
embarrassed about the image that Baton Rouge has created and communicated to the 
world.” The organization added that the arrest of students for taking part in a peaceful 
assembly violated their constitutional rights. The signers added that all African
'““CORE Official to Continue Protest Fast,” Morning Advocate, December 28, 
1961,10C; ‘TBI Probing BR Beatings,” Louisiana Weekly, June 13, 1962,1; 
Testimony of B. Elton Cox, Weldon Rougeau, & Ronnie Moore, Committee of Inquiry, 
May 25,1962, CORE Papers, Series V, reell7.
49“Board of Education Issues Warning to Negro Students,” State-Times, 
December 16, 1961,1.
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Americans wanted segregation to end. Although they disagreed with the methods 
employed by the student activists, the racial diplomats shared their goal o f ending 
segregation; they continued to think that the best way to accomplish this goal was 
through negotiations with white leaders. And, in fact, the ad called for Mayor-President 
Christian to marshal the city-parish’s resources, including LSU and Southern, business 
and industry leaders, and “people of sufficient foresight, forethought, goodwill and 
integrity to take immediate steps toward progress.” They called for “people with pride 
and dignity” to step forward to form a biracial committee that would “be entrusted with 
the duty of proposing a solution to the problems o f our community.” Putting their 
names on this advertisement allowed the racial diplomats to maintain their image as 
leaders of the black community to both African Americans and to white leaders. 
Notably absent from the list of signers and silent throughout the crisis was T. J. 
Jemison.50
After failing to prevent mass demonstrations, white leaders immediately called 
for calm, blamed the unrest on outside agitators, and instructed Pitcher to ask district, 
state, and federal judges to issue a restraining order against COKE that banned the 
organization from East Baton Rouge Parish. The previous year, a judge took a similar 
action against the group’s New Orleans branch after it launched a series of lunch 
counter sit-ins. Pitcher’s petition claimed that CORE represented a threat to public 
peace and security by “sponsoring, financing, and encouraging people to foment 
violence, to promote breaches of the peace, and other violations of the law.” Three state
s0“An Open Letter to the Citizens of Baton Rouge,” Morning Advocate, 
December 20, 1961,3C.
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judges C. A. Barnett, Fred Blanche, and Fred LeBIanc readily agreed to the ban. 
Federal Judge E. Gordon West, one of President John F. Kennedy’s appointees, also 
approved the petition.51 These injunctions crippled CORE and forced the national office 
to direct its attention away from Baton Rogue and toward the rural parishes surrounding 
the city. Local CORE leaders reluctantly complied. Their spokesman, D’Army Bailey 
had announced, “We feel it is our duty as law-abiding American students to adhere to 
the specifications set forth in the injunction.” Bailey attended Southern and majored in 
political science. He added that suspension o f protests did not signal a retreat but 
reaffirmed CORE’S belief in the federal system of justice.52
In addition to the CORE ban, white leaders took other steps to keep outside 
agitators out of Baton Rouge. At the December 16 meeting of the Louisiana Board of 
Education, Louis Doherty, a member of the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 
presented a petition signed by a dozen local residents asking the board to screen 
applications submitted by out-of-state students to tax-supported colleges and 
universities. Obviously, Doherty and the petition’s signers believed that students from 
other states stirred up Southern’s otherwise “happy” student body and convinced them 
to protest. Yet of the seventy Southern students arrested in December 1961, eight came 
from other parts of the country, and only two o f them were from the North — one from 
Kansas and the other from Illinois. The other six were from South Carolina, Texas, and
SIKennedy named West, a Baton Rougean and an ardent segregationist, to the 
post to curry favor with Louisiana Senator Russell Long.
52“Federal, State Judiciary Sign Orders to Ban Demonstrations,” Morning 
Advocate, December 16, 1961,1; “Calm Returns to City Mall in Wake of 
Demonstrations,” Morning Advocate, December 17, 1961, 1.
209
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Arkansas. Although the vast majority o f the protesters were from Louisiana, only eight 
were Baton Rouge natives. The small number of local students among the activists can 
be attributed to several factors. Most o f them lived at home with their parents and not 
on campus, the stronghold o f the student activists. Few parents, most of whom worked 
for white employers and relied on white bankers and businessmen for credit, would 
allow their children to take part in these types of public protests.53
Segregationists believed that outside agitators were behind the CORE 
demonstrations. In a letter to the editor o f the Morning Advocate, one segregationist 
accused CORE representatives of being “paid agitators. . .  [with] no intentions of 
trying to improve any situation. Their only motive is exploitative for either financial 
gain or political motives.” He also charged FOCUS with using “pressure tactics” to 
force the mayor and other white leaders to form a biracial committee. Another writer 
declared that the police should “use more tear gas, more police dogs, larger night sticks, 
and whatever arms are required to protect the rights of our citizens to use the sidewalks 
and streets and to shop and carry on business in peace.” He added, “Our community has 
always enjoyed wonderful race relations until outside agitators came into this area and 
created problems of tension.”54
Although a few segregationists wrote hostile letters to the city’s newspapers, 
none resorted to violence, cross burnings, or bombings. Instead, they allowed Pitcher to
S3“Board o f Education Issues Warning to Negro Students,” State-Times, 
December 16, 1961,1; “Negro Pickets o f Stores Still Held in Jail,” Morning Advocate, 
December 15, 1961,1.
54“When Readers Speak,” Morning Advocate, December 23, 1961,12A.
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use the power of his office to silence the demands of the civil rights activists and to 
prevent further demonstrations. Perhaps their strategy would have worked if the Baton 
Rouge civil rights movement had been stirred up by outside agitators, but in reality, the 
discontent of local people drove the movement. After the banishment of CORE, local 
activists continued to picket, march, and to demand an end to segregation.
As the students returned to Southern in January 1962, Felton Clark met with 
Pitcher and convinced him to drop the charges against sixty-six o f the jailed student 
protesters. Charges remained against seven student leaders. The sixty-six were released 
from prison in time to take their final examinations. The rules governing state colleges 
stated that no student “involved in a case of police action, which has not been resolved 
in an acceptable legal form” could remain in school, but Clark declared that he allowed 
the sixty-six to return school because they were “no longer embroiled in legal 
proceedings.” Clark added that the seven leaders did not fall into this category because 
they still had charges pending against them. When the fall semester resumed in mid- 
January, Southern’s disciplinary board expelled the seven leaders, including Ronnie 
Moore, Patricia Tate, and Weldon Rougeau. While Clark could expel a small number of 
“agitators” with impunity, he could not eject seventy-three without incurring the wrath 
of parents, alumni, and Baton Rouge’s black community, especially the World War II 
activists. Like all racial diplomats, he needed to appease both the black and white 
communities, and he believed that securing the release of sixty-six followers and
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allowing them to take their finals while expelling the seven leaders satisfied both
sides.55
For Southern’s student body, seven expulsions were too many. To show their 
support for Moore and the others, approximately one thousand students held a prayer 
vigil outside of Clark’s home. The following day, Clark expelled an eighth student, 
D’Army Bailey, who organized the vigil. Citing a “continuous disturbance by a 
segment of students,” he closed Southern on January 18 and ordered all students off the 
campus by 5 p jn . He believed that his action would prevent the type o f mass rallies that 
had followed expulsion of the student activists in 1960. Clark also announced that all 
students would have to apply for admission for the spring semester. While he could not 
suspend all of the student activists, the process of reapplying would allow the 
administration to weed out anyone suspected of being an agitator.s6
As the 5:00 p.m. deadline approached, few students remained on campus.
Ronnie Moore, who spent most of January 18 in downtown Baton Rouge preparing for 
his arraignment, returned to Southern at 4:50 to pack up his belongings. He quickly 
gathered his property and met with Weldon Rougeau in front of the gymnasium at 5:20. 
As the two prepared to leave, they stopped to talk to six students who were about to do 
the same. Before they could depart, a university official spotted them, alerted a sheriffs
55“Southem University Plans to Resume Classes Jan. 29,” State-Times, January
20.1962, 1; “Southern Bars Seven Student Demonstrators,” Morning Advocate, January
18.1962, 1.
56“Southem University Plans to Resume Classes Jan. 29,” State-Times, January
20.1962, 1; “Southern to ‘Purge’ the Entire Student Body,” Louisiana Weekly, January
27.1962, 1; “Southern Bars Seven Student Demonstrators,” Morning Advocate, January
18.1962, 1.
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deputy who had been cruising the campus, and asked him to arrest the CORE leaders. 
The deputy charged them with criminal trespass and disturbing the peace.57
Moore’s and Rougeau’s arrest and imprisonment reflected Pitcher’s zero- 
tolerance approach for dealing with civil rights activists. He requested and received 
exorbitantly high bonds, $31,000 for each. While in parish prison, their jailors 
attempted to break their resolve by isolating the CORE activists from the general prison 
population and holding them in a seven feet by seven feet cell, where they remained for 
forty-eight days. For much of that time, the warden refused to give them mail or let 
them make phone calls and allowed them to shower only twice a week. Pitcher cracked 
down so heavily on CORE leaders because he and the majority o f white Baton 
Rougeans believed that these “outsiders” were responsible for all civil rights activity in 
the city. They reasoned that this harsh treatment would convince other activists to leave 
the city, and then the movement would die.58
CORE immediately denounced the closure of Southern and the expulsion of the 
eight activists. On January 19, the organization’s national'director James Farmer 
telegraphed Clark and urged him to reconsider his decision to expel the student leaders 
and to require all students to submit applications for readmission. Farmer stated,
57“Southem Closed as Anti-Segregation Protests Continue,” Morning Advocate, 
January 19, 1962, 1; “No Word Given on Re-Opening of Southern University,” State- 
Times, January 19, 1962, 1; Testimony of Moore and Rougeau, Committee of Inquiry, 
May 25, 1962, CORE Papers, Series V, reel 17; “Harassment, Vandalism Cited in SU 
Closure,” Morning Advocate, January 21,1962,1.
58Testimony of Moore and Rougeau, Committee of Inquiry, May 25,1962,. 
CORE Papers, Series V, reel 17.
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Public funds supporting Southern University come from Negro as well as white 
citizens and must not be used to compel acquiescence to Jim Crow. A state 
university may not be free to support the current fight for equality but it is 
unopposed only at the price of rejection by an enraged people whom it purports 
to serve.
In addition to writing to Clark, Farmer also sent a telegram to President John F. 
Kennedy telling him about the situation at Southern and urging him to cut off federal 
funds for higher education in Louisiana because the State Board o f Education 
appropriated federal funds on a segregated basis with white universities receiving 
approximately $110.90 per student and black universities receiving $5.80 per student 
In addition to the telegrams sent by Farmer, Patricia Tate, the Baton Rouge chapter’s 
secretary, and Cox sent a letter to all of Southern’s faculty and administrators asking 
them to support the student activists and their demands for ending segregation. While 
Farmer’s pleas to Clark and Kennedy fell upon deaf ears, the letter to the faculty 
garnered some support for the students. On January 24, 1962, history professor Adolph 
Reed wrote to Clark and denounced his actions. Reed told Clark that the university 
“must learn to live with sit-ins.” He likened the Southern president to Nazi Adolph 
Eichmann and stated that both contended “that there is no administrative alternative to 
carrying out the evil designs o f perpetrators . . .  o f an evil social system.” He added that 
if Clark stood up to the Board of Education, the faculty would support him. Reed called 
the police patrols on campus a “disgusting spectacle” and told Clark, “These students 
are not criminals for protesting globally accepted concepts of injustice and human 
degradation.” In late January, 102 o f Southern’s 300 faculty members signed a petition 
expressing their support for the student demonstrators. It stated, “We are opposed to 
racial segregation and discrimination and feel there is a need for constructive
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reappraisal of the present policy regarding student participation in such protests,” the 
signers declared. Clark refused to comment on the faculty petition or to readmit 
expelled students.59
When registration opened on January 25, three of the eight expelled CORE 
leaders, Thomas Peete and Willie Bradford of Shreveport and D’Army Bailey of 
Memphis, Tennessee, attempted to enroll, but officials rejected their applications. Dean 
of Men Ulysses Jones charged them with trespassing and asked security guards to 
escort them off the campus. In addition to denying entry to the three, Southern rejected 
the applications of forty others who took part in the December demonstrations. Fearing 
more protests because of the rejections, Clark warned the student body, “The university 
is not an organization for social action like other similar institutions, its primary 
function is formal education.” He added that any student who disrupted that function 
would be punished. Clark’s statement failed to silence the protesters. On Saturday, 
January 27, approximately three hundred students gathered on the outskirts of campus 
to listen to Bailey and several other speakers. Bailey urged the crowd to boycott classes 
the following Monday to protest the expulsion of the student leaders. He told the crowd, 
“We failed in ‘60, we’re at that same point now. It’s an issue as to whether this 
movement shall fail or whether it shall succeed. If it means closing Southern
59James Farmer to Felton Clark, January 19,1962, CORE Papers, Series V, reel 
20; James Farmer to John F. Kennedy, January 19,1962, CORE Papers, Series V, reel 
17; Patricia Tate and B. Elton Cox to Administration and Faculty Members, January 22, 
1962, CORE papers, Series V, reel 20; Adolph Reed to Felton Clark, January 24,1962, 
NAACP Papers, Group III, box E7, folder 3; “Southern Profs Ask Reappraisal of Policy 
Here,” Morning Advocate, January 29, 1962,1 ; “Classes are Normal at Southern 
University,” State-Times, January 2 9 ,1 9 6 2 ,1 .
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University, then, hell, let’s close i t” To drive the point home, Bailey introduced Marvin 
Robinson, one o f the leaders of the 1960 sit-ins. Robinson told the crowd, “We left off
at this point in 1960 and we made a drastic mistake. We began to listen and to
adhere to . . .  the rules o f an evil system.” He urged the students to stand firm in their 
support of their banished leaders. Bailey’s and Robinson’s pleas had little impact. When 
the university reopened on January 29, the majority o f students returned to class.60
Those who continued to call for a boycott received harsh treatment from 
university officials. Dion Diamond, a field secretary for the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and a native of Petersburg, Virginia, claimed that he 
wanted to transfer to Southern and urged the students to walk out of their classes to 
support the cause. Clark asked police officers to arrest Diamond. They complied and 
charged him with interfering with a lawful assembly, unlawful assembly, and vagrancy. 
Judge LeBlanc set his bail at $6,000. Diamond’s attorney, Johnnie Jones, asked him to 
lower it, but the judge refused. The SNCC member remained in jail, and on March 8, 
Pitcher added the charge o f criminal anarchy to the counts against him. He claimed that 
Diamond encouraged Southern students “to hold unruly and unauthorized 
demonstration which would foreseeably alarm and disturb the public.” Criminal 
anarchy quickly became Pitcher’s favorite charge to levy against civil rights activists.
On February 12, he added it to the counts against the jailed Ronnie Moore, claiming
“ “Mass Meet Staged near Southern U,” State-Times, January 27,1962, I; 
“Negroes Ousted from Southern Urge Boycott,” Morning Advocate, January 28, 1962, 
1; “Classes are Normal at Southern U,” State-Times, January 29,1962,1.
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that the CORE leader “advocated opposition to the government in Louisiana by 
unlawful means.” Because o f this new charge, Moore’s bond increased to $12,500.61
Whites’ fears of outside agitators stirring up the local black population became 
so intense in early 1962 that law enforcement officers targeted all civil rights activists 
as potential troublemakers. On February 17, two SNCC leaders, Charles McDew and 
Robert Zellner, who were passing through Baton Rouge, tried to visit Diamond in jail. 
When they arrived, the pair asked to see their friend, but a guard denied their request 
saying that black prisoners could not receive visitors that day. The men then asked if 
they could leave books and cigarettes for Diamond, and the guard assured the two men 
that they could. McDew and Zellner, who were waiting for a bus, rushed out to 
purchase some items for Diamond. When they returned to the parish prison to drop 
them off, a d e p u ty  arrested them on suspicion of vagrancy even though the two had bus 
tickets and two hundred dollars in cash. Four days later, Pitcher charged them with 
criminal anarchy, and a judge set their bond at $7,000 each. While in Baton Rouge, 
neither man urged the local population to protest. In fact, they had little contact with the 
black community. In the eyes of the Baton Rouge police, however, their membership in 
SNCC and the fact that the white Zellner traveled with the African-American McDew 
meant that they advocate^ practiced, and taught “opposition to the government of the 
state of Louisiana by unlawful means.” Until SNCC bailed them out, the men spent
6I“Southem Campus Quiet After Trespassing,” Morning Advocate, February 2, 
1962,12A; “Sixth Charge Against Negro is Filed Here,” Morning Advocate, March 9, 
1962,4A; “Habeas Corpus Hearing Delayed in Diamond Case,” Morning Advocate, 
March 10,1962,2A.
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thirteen days in solitary confinement for traveling to Baton Rouge and attempting to 
visit a friend in jail.62
White leaders and segregationists applauded the arrest o f Zellner and McDew 
and supported closing the university, expelling the activists, and requiring all students 
to reapply for admission. A Morning Advocate editorial called Clark’s actions “unusual 
and dramatic” but added “practically all Baton Rougeans o f both races” backed him in 
his efforts “to get the student body back on track, eliminate disturbing influences, and 
protect the institution, the greatest o f its kind in the country, from the damage it might 
suffer through continued agitation and confusion.” Calling them “extremists,” the paper 
claimed that the students cared little about whether they destroyed ‘Valuable 
institutions” in their efforts to “force conformity with their opinions and attitudes on 
others.”63
White liberals, on the other hand, opposed Clark’s actions. On January 21, the 
ACLU’s Executive Director Patrick Malin of New York and LCLU President David 
Dover o f New Orleans sent telegrams to Clark, Governor Jimmie Davis, and State 
Board of Education President William Dodd and told them “students who demonstrate 
against segregation merit no discipline.” Wade Mackie and the AFSC also tried to help
“ “Sixth Charge Against Negro is Filed Here,” Morning Advocate, March 9, 
1962,4A; “Habeas Corpus Hearing Delayed in Diamond Case,” Morning Advocate, 
March 10, 1962,2A; Summary o f Testimony of Charles McDew, Committee of 
Inquiry, May 25,1962, CORE Papers, Series V, reel 17; “Reverend B. E. Cox Gains 
Freedom on $7,125 Bond,” Morning Advocate, February 13, 1962,1; “March 9 Trial 
Set for Negro Boycott Leader,” Morning Advocate, February 14, 1962,14B.
“ “Pressure on Southern University,” Morning Advocate, January 23,1962,4A; 
“Civil Liberties Protests SU Closure,” Morning Advocate, January 22, 1962,10A.
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the student activists. He told his superiors, “I could have helped some —  if I had been 
asked,” but no one asked. When the police arrested Zellner and McDew, Mackie 
arranged for a Methodist minister to visit Zellner, whose father was a Methodist 
minister. He also tried to convince the two men to work with the LCLU’s legal team, 
but both refused. They preferred to retain a black attorney.64
The direct action phase o f the civil rights movement in which protesters 
consciously broke the city’s segregation laws, picketed, marched, and proudly went to 
jail and refused bail confounded racial diplomats. The student activists failed to abide 
by the rules of traditional race relations and, unlike the World War II activists, refused 
to work within the state’s and the nation’s legal systems. While racial diplomats wanted 
to end segregation, their methods were in direct contrast to the students. They believed 
that the only way whites would agree to grant African Americans equality was if blacks 
approached them with deference and asked for small changes to the system of 
segregation. Although they did not directly take part in the protests, World War II 
activists supported the student activists. On January 27,1962, Dupuy Anderson urged 
Southern students to boycott classes until university officials readmitted the expelled 
leaders. Johnnie Jones also backed the arrested CORE members and served as their 
attorney.65
When B. Elton Cox’s trial began in January 1962, Jones demanded that Judge 
Fred LeBlanc desegregate the courtroom and stated, “This case is one where the
64 Wade Mackie to Jean Fairfax, Report on Arrests of Representatives, April 16, 
1962, AFSC, Baton Rouge Correspondence, South Central Regional Office, 1963.
“ “Negroes Ousted from Southern,” Morning Advocate, January 28,1962,1.
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defendant is being charged for the protest o f racial segregation and within the 
courthouse itself segregation is being practiced.’* Interest in Cox*s trial ran high in the 
African-American community, and 127 people quickly filled the seats in the black 
section of the courtroom, and more than 200 waited in the hallway to hear news about 
the trial. Captain Herman Thompson of the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriffs Office 
testified that the crowd remained in the hallway and grew so thick that he and his 
colleagues could not clear a pathway. At that point, he called the fire marshals and 
dispersed the crowd. Only eight white spectators attended the trial. In light o f this, 
Jones asked Judge LeBlanc to allow interested African Americans to sit in the vacant 
seats reserved for whites. District Attorney Pitcher strongly objected to this proposal, 
and Judge LeBlanc concurred, saying that segregation “has been the practice and 
custom in the East Baton Rouge Parish Courthouse for many, many years.” He bragged 
that several years earlier he had generously ordered half of the seats reserved for whites 
to be assigned to African-American spectators. LeBlanc called Jones’ desegregation 
demand “self-serving” and ordered the trial to continue. Just as it had done during the 
December sit-ins, the press ignored Jones’ calls to integrate the courtroom. LeBlanc 
found Cox guilty of disturbing the peace, obstructing a public sidewalk, and 
demonstrating near a public building and sentenced him to a one year and nine months 
in jail and fined him $5,700. A month after Cox’s conviction, Jones resigned from the 
case because CORE failed to pay the $7,180 it owed him in attorney’s fees and 
expenditures that he incurred while representing Cox and the other jailed protesters.
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Within months, the tiff between Jones and CORE blew over, and he resumed his 
representation of the jailed activist66
Cox’s conviction ended CORE’S involvement in Baton Rouge. Although 
individual members remained in the city and continued to work to fight segregation, the 
expulsion o f the student activists and law enforcement’s zero-tolerance policy for 
agitators paralyzed the local CORE chapter, and the organization shifted its attention 
away from Baton Rouge toward the rural parishes surrounding the city. Clark’s harsh 
treatment o f protesters destroyed not just CORE but student activism at Southern for the 
next six years. Yet the sit-ins of March, 1960, and December, 1961, had a lasting 
impact on the civil rights movement both nationally and locally. Cox’s case made its 
way to the Supreme Court and led to a ruling that protected the right of protesters to 
stage peaceful public demonstrations. Locally, CORE’S activities compelled other civil 
rights activists to take action, most notably a group of working-class men and women 
who wanted to bring an immediate end to segregation and were willing to risk their 
economic well-being and physical safety to achieve their goals.
^ “Negroes Ousted from Southern,” Morning Advocate, January 28,1962, 1; 
Cox v. Louisiana, 41,199- 42,202, Criminal Section, 19th Judicial District Court, Parish 
of East Baton Rouge, State of Louisiana (1962); “CORE Official Found Guilty,” 
Morning Advocate, February 1,1962, 1; Johnnie Jones to Lois Elie, March 1, 1962, 
CORE Papers, Series V, reel 17.
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Chapter 7
Desegregating the Public Schools, 1956-1969
In 1956, two years after Johnnie Jones and Alex Pitcher attempted to register 
black students at Gilmer Wright m 1954, black parents filed a school desegregation suit 
for East Baton Rouge Parish — Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board. In the 
face of threatened integration, the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board adopted a 
policy o f using the court system to delay a decision on Davis. After four years of 
continuances and appeals, A. P. Tureaud, the parents’ attorney, asked the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals to issue a ruling in the case, but Judge J. Skelly Wright refused to rule 
on Davis until the Orleans Parish school desegregation suit had been settled. The 
integration of New Orleans’s schools created a segregationist backlash that threatened 
to destroy public education in Louisiana. In Baton Rouge, the fight over school 
desegregation pitted white leaders and accommodationists against the Citizens’ Council 
and its supporters. Segregationists wanted to close the public schools if  ordered to 
desegregate, and white leaders and their supporters wanted to keep them open. From 
1960 to 1963, white Baton Rougeans struggled to agree on integration. Throughout the 
period, black parents wanted one thing — to obtain a good education for their children.
White leaders realized that the federal courts would eventually order them to 
integrate the East Baton Rouge Parish public school system but wanted to delay the 
inevitable as long as possible. The nervous School Board sought to appease African 
Americans and to convince them to withdraw the suit. In 1959, its members considered 
changing the designation of Gilmer Wright, the elementary school that black parents 
had raised money to build but was designated for whites, from white to black.
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Superintendent Robert Aerteker proposed the conversion to the board and claimed that 
the white population in the neighborhood surrounding the school had declined 
significantly in the 1950s while the number o f African Americans had risen. As a result, 
approximately 160 black children had to attend a facility three miles away while Gilmer 
Wright went underutilized Aerteker warned the board that integration would cause 
tremendous problems and might lead to a mass exodus of black students to white 
schools. He implied that giving Gilmer Wright back to the black community might 
appease the black parents. “Unless we take constructive steps now,” he warned the 
board, “you will come to us later asking why we didn’t let you know of possible 
changes in the area.” White parents, however, appeared before the board and strongly 
denounced Aerteker’s proposal. They claimed that a change in designation would lower 
their property values and charged that “the NAACP and communists” were behind the 
proposal. Because of the white outcry against the plan, the board postponed taking 
action on the proposal for over a year. In light of white opposition, School Board 
members could not support a move that favored African Americans for fear that the 
Southern Gentlemen and the Citizens’ Council would label them segregationists and 
ruin their political careers.1
When Tureaud made his arguments before Federal Judge J. Skelly Wright in 
early 1960, he claimed that his clients originally sought legal redress after the School 
Board took Gilmer Wright away from them. Tureaud also announced that African-
1 Minutes, East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, December 17,1959; “Gilmer 
Wright Patrons Protest Possible Change,” Morning Advocate, December 17, 1959, 1; 
‘Tempers Fly at Meet o f EBR School on Possible Change,” Morning Advocate, 
December 18,1959, 1.
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American parents from the neighborhood surrounding Gilmer Wright initially retained 
an attorney, Pitcher, to get their school back. Attorney General Jack Gremillion asked 
Tureaud if his clients would drop their case if the School Board changed the 
designation. The civil rights attorney replied that they would not. Gremillion claimed 
that NAACP attorneys came to Baton Rouge and convinced black parents to sue. 
Whites throughout the South levied similar charges against all school desegregation 
suits because they believed that their black populations would not take such action on 
their own. Tureaud countered that the plaintiffs contacted an attorney and not vice 
versa.2
In 1956, a large number of activists in East Baton Rouge Parish wanted to be a 
party to the suit. Working with J. K. Haynes, Tureaud carefully selected the most 
committed ones. The two men refused to allow several o f the parents to act as plaintiffs, 
one because he could easily be intimidated, another for being untrustworthy, still 
another because the man’s wife was “consumed by fear,” and a final man for being an 
alcoholic and receiving treatment in a mental institution. Tureaud and Haynes wanted 
the plaintiffs to be upstanding citizens because they knew that the School Board’s 
attorneys would investigate their backgrounds and use any flaws that they found as 
ammunition against them. Seven individuals made the final cut: Clifford Davis, Sr., 
Richard Payne, Frank White, Louis Moncliffe, Mrs. Bernice Williams, Walter 
Williams, and M. F. Moss. Their children ranged from elementary to high school age.3
2“Federal Court Hears Suit on BR Integration,” State-Times, March 14,1960, 1; 
“EBR Area Integration Suits Argued,” Morning Advocate, March 15, I960,1.
3J. K. Haynes to A. P. Tureaud, March 30,1960, APT Papers, box 29, folder 23.
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On April 29,1960, Wright ruled in favor o f Davis, et al. Following the “all 
deliberate speed” clause o f Brown, he ordered the School Board to submit a 
desegregation plan but refused to set a date for compliance, thus allowing the board to 
drag out the process for several years. Instead of working on the desegregation plan, the 
School Board decided to fight the ruling “all the way to the Supreme Court.” East Baton 
Rouge Parish District Attorney J. St. Clair Favrot told the Morning Advocate, “I intend 
to exhaust every legal remedy available to the School Board.”4
Nineteen sixty marked the watershed in the Louisiana school desegregation 
process. On May 16, Judge Wright ordered racial mixing to begin in New Orleans at the 
beginning o f the 1960-1961 school year. That ruling set off an unprecedented wave of 
segregationist sentiment both in the state and in Baton Rouge. In the summer of 1960, 
Governor Jimmie Davis, who had run for election the previous year on a segregationist 
platform, created a sovereignty commission to direct the state’s official segregation 
policy. He appointed as its chairman arch-segregationist Willie Rainach, who had run 
for governor in 1960, but after his loss in the primary supported Davis. Along with the 
state legislature and Attorney General Gremillion, the Louisiana Sovereignty 
Commission searched for ways to avoid school desegregation. The legislature even 
gave Davis the authority to close all state schools if the courts ordered any of them to
4“EBR, St. Helena Schools Ordered to Desegregate by Federal Judge Wright,” 
State-Times, April 30, 1960, I; “Judgement Favors Negroes in EBR, St. Helena Suits 
for School Desegregation,” Morning Advocate, April 30, 1960, 1; ‘Tight to Highest 
Court is Vowed on Desegregation,” Morning Advocate, May 1, 1960, 12A.
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admit black students, but the governor promised to keep the schools open and 
segregated.5
The prospect o f destroying the public school system produced opposition in 
Baton Rouge from a group of moderate white businessmen and professionals who 
supported segregation but refused either to defy the federal courts or to destroy the 
public school system to preserve it. They counseled submission to federal authority not 
defiance. These accommodationists shared many characteristics with Baton Rouge’ s 
white leaders. They belonged to the city’s upper and middle classes, held professional 
positions, and were, for the most part, well educated, but for accommodationists, school 
desegregation was the only issue that prompted them to speak out. The 
accommodationists initially lacked an organization through which to take a firm stand 
against the segregationists. In the summer of I960, Wade Mackie learned that several 
women who either worked at LSU or were married to LSU professors wanted to 
organize and to lobby the legislature and the School Board to comply with the federal 
court’s desegregation order. “Their goal is a strictly defensive one — save the schools,” 
Mackie told his supervisors. He helped them form a new group, the Organization for 
Public Education (OPEN). Although the women accepted Mackie’s help, they wanted 
to avoid any public association with the AFSC. Its members believed that being tied to 
the liberal organization would imply that they supported integration and would hurt 
their standing in the community. As a liberal, Mackie wanted complete integration, but 
he was also practical. He realized liberals and black activists alone could not achieve
sFariclough, Race and Democracy, 235-236.
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this goal; white resistance to total desegregation was simply too strong. Mackie 
believed that by cultivating allies, even those who supported segregation but balked at 
dismantling the public system to maintain it, the liberals’ and activists’ dream of an 
integrated school system would be realized. Without Mackie, the eight women who 
formed the foundation for OPEN would probably have remained unorganized. Under 
the Quaker leader’s direction, OPEN’s membership grew from 8 to approximately 175 
in a few months. It drew its membership, consisting of both men and women, from the 
ranks of business owners, professionals, and LSU faculty and staff members.6
Even as he helped accommodationists form OPEN, Mackie worked with liberals 
in their fight to attain complete integration. He encouraged liberal rabbis and ministers 
publicly to condemn segregation. The city’s two rabbis Marvin Reznikoff and Walter 
Peiser and several liberal Protestant ministers also denounced school closing from the 
pulpit. On September 4, J. P. Woodland, a minister at Broadmoor Methodist Chinch, 
preached a sermon in which he declared that closing the schools would be disastrous for 
the state of Louisiana. In an October 2, 1960, sermon at University Baptist Church, J. 
Bruce Evans declared that segregation created hate in the human heart and proclaimed 
that the only way to end this hatred and heal the hearts of countless southerners was 
through integration. He realized that his stance would not be well-received by his 
congregation and told them that he feared their rejection. Nevertheless, his conscience
6Annual Report, October 17, 1960, AFSC, Baton Rouge Program Reports, 
South Central Regional Office, 1960; Wade Mackie to Garnet Guild, August 10,1960, 
AFSC, Baton Rouge Program School Desegregation Correspondence, South Central 
Regional Office, 1960; "Ad Contends School Group not Spontaneous,” Morning 
Advocate, August 16,1960, 13A.
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would not allow him to remain silent on the issue. Declaring their support for 
integration placed these ministers in a  precarious position because they served at the 
pleasure of their congregations and could be removed.7 Despite the threat of a loss of 
their pulpits, a group o f liberal Baton Rouge ministers issued a statement urging 
Governor Davis “not to interrupt, restrict, or abandon public education in Louisiana.” 
They also asked like-minded individuals to contact the governor and voice their support 
for maintaining  the public school system.8
As the deadline for integration of the Orleans Parish public school system 
approached, the state legislature, called into a special session by Davis, passed a series 
of acts aimed at preventing desegregation. As soon as the governor signed them into 
law, Wright declared them unconstitutional. With the threat o f school closings a 
probability, OPEN began lobbying Davis and the legislature and asking them to comply 
with Wright’s desegregation order. On November 4, Leslie M. Addison, the 
organization’s chairman, sent a letter to Davis urging him to allow the Orleans Parish 
Schools to desegregate under the terms of the state’s pupil placement law, which
7Methodist ministers were not as vulnerable as those from other Protestant 
denominations because the were appointed by a bishop rather than hired directly by the 
congregation.
8Wade Mackie to Garnet Guild, August 10, 1960, AFSC, Baton Rouge Program, 
South Central Regional Office, 1960; “BR Minister Warns Against School Closing,” 
Morning Advocate, September 5, 1960, 8A; Bruce Evans, “Christianity and 
Segregation,” October 2, I960, J. Bruce Evans Collection, folder Civil Rights in Baton 
Rouge 1957-1960, Louisiana Lower Mississippi Valley Collection, Louisiana State 
University Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; “BR Clergymen Group Urges School 
Closure,” Morning Advocate, August 21, 1960,1 (The headline refers to a 
segregationist group formed in opposition to the liberal ministers, but the article also 
discusses the ministers’ declaration.).
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required blacks to apply for transfer to white schools and set up seventeen criteria for 
school boards to follow in approving their requests. He told the governor that several 
states including North and South Carolina, Arkansas, Texas, Florida, and Tennessee 
used similar laws to “integrate” their schools without incurring the wrath o f the federal 
government. Addsion pointed out that the number o f African-American children 
admitted to white schools could be limited through legal means, such as creating a set 
of criteria that would prevent most black students from transferring to integrated 
schools. On November 5, OPEN members, along with two dozen like-minded men and 
women from New Orleans, held a demonstration at the State Capitol to urge Davis and 
the legislature not to close the public schools. The same day, a. Morning Advocate 
editorial claimed that life would go on if the schools closed, but progress would come to 
a halt:
Even a temporary closing in the schools in one of our larger cities, to say 
nothing of throughout the state, would mean a year but to thousands of students, 
a year of progress, a year of learning that could never be recaptured. The loss of 
this inevitable time, the shock to business and industry, the strain on parents and 
children, would be a very high price to pay for a victory which would in fact be 
a defeat.
In short, closing the public schools would not only be bad for business, it would also 
hurt both black and white children in East Baton Rouge Parish.9
Although they wanted to preserve segregation if possible, white leaders in East 
Baton Rouge Parish also supported maintaining the public school system. In a
9Fairc lough, Race and Democracy, 237-241; “OPEN Letter to Governor Davis 
Hits School Closure Plan,” Morning Advocate, November4,1960,4F; Fairclough,
Race and Democracy, 239; “Groups Opposing Closure,” Morning Advocate, November 
4, 1960, 1; “The Schools Must Be Kept Open,” Morning Advocate, November 6, 1960, 
4B.
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November 1960 poll, the majority o f School Board members declared that they wanted 
open schools, even if  it meant allowing integration. One member, John Sheppard stated, 
“I am absolutely opposed to closing schools. I would prefer them open and segregated, 
naturally.” Ben Peabody also expressed support for maintaining segregation but added, 
“I would not want to see the schools closed. It would hurt too many people.” Mrs. John 
E. Coxe echoed the two men and declared that closing the schools would hurt the 
children and deprive them o f educational opportunities.10
While white leaders and accommodationists expressed their support for the 
public school system, segregationists adamantly demanded that the schools be closed. 
The Citizens’ Council supported Davis’s and the legislature’s stand against integration, 
and letters from Baton Rouge segregationists flooded the office of Senator Russell 
Long. A World War II veteran declared that in a democracy, the majority ruled but 
added that minority rule in the form of school desegregation was turning the country 
into a dictatorship. One constituent railed against the Supreme Court and demanded that 
Long do something to reestablish Louisiana’s sovereignty. Another urged him to “use 
every effort possible to prevent the great tragedy of integration that is being forced upon 
us by the dictators that we have in government.” A fourth voter wrote, “You surely 
know the majority of the people do not want their children to go to school with negroes
10“Members of the Board Favor Open Schools,” Morning Advocate, November 
11,1960,1.
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\sic\” Dozens more constituents echoed these four and pleaded with Long to do 
everything in his power to restore Louisiana's sovereignty.11
Yet Long and other elected officials could do nothing to prevent the integration 
of the Orleans Parish school system. The reaction of white New Orleanians to 
desegregation appalled white leaders, accommodationists, and white liberals in Baton 
Rouge. On November 14, as the four little African-American girls made their way to 
the New Orleans elementary schools for the first time, white crowds gathered to jeer at 
them. The mob became violent on November 15 when a group of angry whites went on 
a rampage in downtown New Orleans, throwing rocks and bottles at African Americans 
riding in buses and cars. The police used fire hoses to disperse the crowd, hi an appeal 
for an end to the violence, Mayor deLesseps Morrison told New Orleanians that this 
type of unrest could damage the city's image “as a thriving center of commerce and 
industry.” His appeal fell on deaf ears, and, every morning, huge crowds of 
segregationists gathered outside the two elementary schools “to taunt, shove, heckle, 
threaten, [and] spit at” the young black students and the small number of white ones 
who remained enrolled in these schools. Most white parents had withdrawn their 
children from the integrated schools immediately following the desegregation order. 
Throughout the crisis, photographs and newsreels of angry whites shouting at the young 
black girls made their way into the national press, and many compared New Orleans’
“Wesley Stewart, Jr. to Russell Long, November 15,1960; J. D. Passons to 
Russell Long, November 16,1960; Clyde Wilson to Russell Long, November 16,1960; 
Robert Weble to Russell Long, November 16,1960; Ed Armistead to Russell Long, 
November 18, I960; Milner Michel to Russell Long, November 23, 1960; James Ware 
to Russell Long, December 1, 1960. All in Long Papers, box 357, folder 12.
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integration battle with Little Rock’s. White leaders and accommodationists in Baton 
Rouge wanted to avoid this type o f negative publicity when their schools integrated. In 
the late 1950s, the city had suffered an economic downturn when the nation entered a 
recession, and new plant construction and the expansion of existing facilities had 
stopped. Business leaders feared that if  school desegregation in East Baton Rouge 
Parish mimicked that in New Orleans or Little Rock, then the city would suffer 
permanent economic damage.12
Fearing that school desegregation in East Baton Rouge Parish was imminent, in 
December 1960 the School Board voted five to two to make Gilmer Wright a black 
school. Although white property owners in the neighborhood complained about the 
conversion, board members refused to reconsider their decision. Longtime board 
member, Mrs. John Coxe, the wife of the former state superintendent of education, 
argued that with the school desegregation suit pending, the board could not defend 
busing African-American children out o f the neighborhood to a substandard black 
school miles away from their homes. Throughout the desegregation process, Coxe 
allied with the white leaders and always chose compromise and compliance with federal 
court rulings over conflict and open defiance.13
12Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 245-247; Morton Inger, Politics and Reality 
in an American City: The New Orleans School Desegregation Crisis o f I960 (Madison: 
Center for Urban Education, 1969), 51-53; Garnet Guild to Steve Cary and Barbara 
Moffitt, June 13, 1960, AFSC, Baton Rouge Program Correspondence, South Central 
Regional Office, 1960.
13Minutes, December 15,1960, East Baton Rouge Parish School Board. “Gilmer 
Wright to Become Negro School Next Fall,” Morning Advocate, December 16,1960,1.
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While segregationists in New Orleans protested against integration, their 
counterparts in Baton Rouge turned their attention to silencing Baton Rouge’s white 
liberals. In December I960, ardent segregationist Senator Wendell Harris, who had 
earlier that year defeated liberal J. D. DeBlieux to become Baton Rouge’s state senator, 
as well as East Baton Rouge Parish State Representatives A. T. “Apple” Sanders and 
Eugene McGehee, received a letter from LSU English Professor Waldo McNeir, who in 
1958 had testified before the House Education Committee against shutting down the 
public school system to prevent integration. In it, he denounced the legislature’s actions 
during the New Orleans School desegregation crisis and called the marathon special 
sessions “a disgrace and national scandal.” On January 13, 1961, the House Education 
Committee passed a resolution condemning McNeir and launching a probe into un- 
American activities at LSU. The resolution charged that the professor made “scurrilous, 
unwarranted, and unproven statements which constitutes an attack on the character, 
integrity, and good intentions of the legislature.” The committee also threatened to strip 
twenty-five million dollars from the university’s budget “until such time as the 
legislature shall be assured that all due and proper action as is necessary has been taken 
by the proper authorities at Louisiana State University to insure its operation and 
administration in accordance with the policies enunciated in the Constitution and the 
laws of the state.”14
14Joint Legislative Committee on Un-American Activities, The Case o f Dr. 
Waldo McNeir (Baton Rouge: State of Louisiana, 1961), “Un-American Activities Probe 
at LSU Approved by Solons in Vote Today,” State-Times, December 15,1960,1.
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The threat of a huge budget cut and an investigation into un-American activities 
threw university officials into a panic. LSU supporters in the legislature abandoned the 
budget cut before it made its way out of the committee, but segregation leaders 
overrode opposition and rammed through legislation to allow the Joint Commission on 
Un-American Activities to conduct a search for “subversive elements” at LSU. 
Members of the legislature with strong ties to LSU wanted to spare the university the 
bad publicity of the probe and allow Troy Middleton to handle the situation internally. 
Ultra-segregationists in the legislature, such as Representatives Welbom Jack and Frank 
Falco from Caddo Parish, publicly declared that because McNeir advocated integration 
that he also espoused com m unism. They even claimed that the English professor used 
his position to brainwash his students. Senator Harris, a member of the Sovereignty 
Committee and father of an LSU student who was in one o f McNeir’s classes, shouted 
during the debate that the professor was a threat and that the Sovereignty Commission 
possessed information about subversive elements at LSU “that would turn your hair.”
He added that LSU would be derelict if it failed to remove McNeir.15
The un-American activities probe left LSU’s administration little choice but to 
ask McNeir to leave. Citing the fact that the English professor had written his letter 
upon university stationary, on December 20, Dean of Arts and Sciences Cecil Taylor 
asked him to resign for “the good of the university.” McNeir refused, but in a meeting
15“$60,000 Sought for LSU Probe,” State-Times, December 16, 1960,1; “Solons 
Approve Un-American Probe at LSU,” Morning Advocate, December 16,1960,1. 
Unfortunately, a gap from the mid 1950s through the mid 1960s exists in the Office of 
the President’s Papers, so no archival sources of Middleton’s response to the charges 
against McNeir could be located.
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with Middleton, he learned that the president planned to charge him with bringing 
discredit to the university and teaching integration in his classes if  he remained at LSU. 
Although many faculty members supported him, McNeir ultimately left the university 
because of “certain outside threats and inside pressures that seemed to me to endanger 
the welfare o f LSU.”16
Accommodationists supported McNeir. hi a letter to the state legislature, 
Addison, the president of OPEN, denounced the legislature’s actions and added that 
although his organization did not agree with McNeir’s position on segregation, it 
backed McNeir’s First Amendment right to freedom of speech. In addition to OPEN’s 
support, more than 700 LSU students signed a petition declaring their belief in freedom 
of speech and their displeasure with the legislative probe. Wade Mackie, a close friend 
of McNeir, wanted the faculty to issue a statement condemning the legislation and 
supporting the principles of both academic freedom and freedom o f speech. The Quaker 
leader met with several faculty members and circulated a petition condemning the 
“atmosphere o f fear” created by the un-American activities probe and obtained 152 
signatures. Fearing that they would suffer retribution if the petition became public, the 
signers wanted to keep its existence quiet. Mackie disregarded them and leaked the 
petition to the press. He bragged, “It hit the front page.” Although the petition did little 
to stop the probe, it forced the LSU Board of Supervisors to pass a resolution 
supporting academic freedom and stating that the university could not punish a faculty
l6December 1960-1961 Report, AFSC, Baton Rouge Program, South Central 
Regional Office, 1960; “McNeir Quits Post; Charges Pressure,” State-Times, January 4, 
1961,1; “McNeir Resigns, Cites Pressure, Outside Threats,” Morning Advocate,
January 5,1961, 1.
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member acting as an individual and not as a university employee from exercising his or 
her freedom of speech. In the end, the Un-American Activities Committee reported that 
although his views were “repugnant,” McNeir was not a communist.17
While the battle over the desegregation of the Orleans Parish school system 
marked the high point of segregationist power in Louisiana, the McNeir probe ushered 
in the beginning of its decline. During the frenzied fight to prevent integration, white 
moderates realized that segregationists were fanatical and would sacrifice the state’s 
educational and economic well-being to preserve the system o f Jim Crow. When the 
Un-American Activities Committee finally released its report in May 1961, moderate 
members of the state legislature denounced it, something that would have brought 
immediate ostracism and meant political death only two years earlier.18
Segregationists were far from broken, however. After the McNeir incident, they 
launched an attack against white liberals, especially ministers, who called for 
desegregation. In January 1961, Wade Mackie began receiving phone calls every fifteen 
to twenty minutes. The caller would always hang up. When the AFSC held meetings,
l7“Un-American Activities Probe at LSU Approved by Solons in Vote Today,” 
State-Times, December 15,1960,1; “LSU Students Hit Probe,” State-Times, December 
21, 1960, 1; December 1960 - January 1961 Report, AFSC, Baton Rouge Program, 
South Central Regional Office, I960; “117 LSU Faculty Members Protest ‘Free 
Atmosphere,’ ” Morning Advocate, January 7,1961, 1; “117 Faculty Members Rap 
‘Atmosphere of Fear,’ ” State-Times, January 7,1961, 1; “LSU Board States Academic 
Freedom Policy at Meeting,” Morning Advocate, January 8, 1961, 1; “Board Restates 
Policy on Academic Freedom,” State-Times, January 9,1961,7B; “More LSU Faculty 
Hit Probe,” State-Times, January 11,1961,6B; “35 More Faculty Petition La. 
Legislature,” Morning Advocate, January 11, 1961,1.
^“Legislative Probers Say McNeir is Not Involved in Un-American Activities,” 
Morning Advocate, May 9, 1961,1.
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segregationists made their way through the parking lot writing down license plate 
numbers and snapping photographs of people attending the meetings. A day or two after 
the gatherings, investigators from the district attorney’s office and the chief of police 
went to the AFSC office and asked Mackie’s secretary to identify the people in the 
snapshots. She refused. When Mackie asked District Attorney Pitcher about the request, 
he claimed that he wanted to identify the people in the pictures to protect them.19
In late February, Mackie began to suspect that segregationists had tapped his 
phones when they began quoting his private conversations back to him, and in May 
1961, he received confirmation that segregationists had placed wire taps on his home 
and office phones. They had also tapped Rabbi Marvin ReznikofFs line. On May 29, 
Garnet Guild of the AFSC South Central Regional Office established guidelines for 
phoning Mackie. “There is no good reason for tipping the DA off to everything we 
might want to plan,” he told AFSC members. In July 1961, Mackie and Rabbi 
Reznikoff contacted United States Attorney M. Hepburn Many and reported the 
suspected tapping. Many directed the men to Chandler Josey, “Southern Bell super 
sleuth,” who sent a team of investigators to check Mackie’s lines. They found a tap on 
the AFSC office phone and traced it to an empty apartment nearby. When the phone 
company discovered the tap on the AFSC line, the FBI joined the investigation. On 
August 23, Mackie discovered a bug on his home phone and traced it to the home of his 
neighbor, Jack Rogers, a Baton Rouge attorney and a segregationist who represented 
both the legislature’s Un-American Activities Committee and the American Legion’s
I9Wade Mackie to Garnet Guild, September 19,1961, AFSC, Baton Rouge 
Program, South Central Regional Office, 1961.
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Un-American Activity Committee. Charles Reynard, who, in 1958, had testified against 
school closing before the House Education Committee, and his wife lived near Mackie 
and Rogers and saw the crude wire connecting their homes. Mackie even joked about 
“the extra ‘togetherness’ ” of his immediate neighborhood. In December 1961, the 
Justice Department charged three prominent Baton Rougeans, Senator Wendell Harris, 
businessman Leon Patterson, and private detective Lawrence Hall, with wiretapping 
and disseminating information garnered from the taps. Although their motives for the 
taps never became public, Mackie suspected that Harris, Patterson, and Hall wanted to 
harass and intimidate white liberals and force them to abandon the cause of school 
desegregation.20
In addition to their war on white liberals, segregationists in state government 
also aimed their sights on the white leaders. Fearing that the School Board would refuse 
to close the parish’s schools if ordered by the federal courts to integrate, the legislature 
devised a plan to pack the board with segregationist members. On January 30, 1961, the 
State-Times asked board members if they would support closing the schools to avoid 
desegregation. Two members, Ben Peabody and Wally Wells, stated that they wanted to 
keep the schools open. “I would say the majority of people want to keep schools open, 
even if it means token integration,” Wells said. “I want to abide by the wishes of the 
majority of my people.” Peabody vowed that the board would develop a desegregation 
plan that would satisfy the federal courts. The other five members refused to answer the
20Gamet Guild to Jean Fairfax, May 29,1961, AFSC, Baton Rouge Program, 
South Central Regional Office, 1961; Wade Mackie to M. Hepbum Many, July 19,
1961, ibid.; Wade Mackie to Garnet Guild, September 19,1961, ibid; “Three BR Men 
Plead Innocent of Wiretapping,” Morning Advocate, January 18,1962,1.
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paper's questions, but from their voting records, the State-Times concluded that two 
members, Winston McVea and T. H. Harris, would vote to close the schools. Two 
others, Pat Collier and Mrs. John Coxe, would oppose closure. The final member, John 
White, Jr., had taken office only several weeks earlier, and the paper refused to 
speculate on how he would vote.21
In early February, the court of appeals upheld Wright’s ruling in the East Baton 
Rouge Parish desegregation case, and segregationists in the legislature sprang into 
action. As Attorney General Jack Gremillion and District Attorney Sargent Pitcher 
planned a further appeal, one of Baton Rouge's segregationist representatives, “Apple” 
Sanders, introduced an emergency bill to add four additional members, to be appointed 
by Governor Davis, to the Baton Rouge School Board. Their appointment would insure 
a segregationist majority on the board and a vote to close the schools. The parish’s 
moderate representative, Eugene McGehee, refused to cosponsor the bill and declared, 
“I know nothing that the School Board of the parish o f East Baton Rouge has done 
which would justify action as drastic as ‘packing' o f the School Board.” He added that 
if the legislature wanted to add members to the board, then it should allow the voters to 
select them. Of course, polls showed that most East Baton Rougeans wanted open 
schools even if it meant integrating them. On February 17, the House voted seventy- 
nine to fourteen to add four members to the board. Although segregationists won by a 
large margin, the fact that fourteen members voted against the bill was significant 
From 1956 until the McNeir case in late 1960, nearly every piece of segregationist
2I“Believes School Board in EBR Against Any School Closure,” State-Times, 
January 30,1961.
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legislation passed with a unanimous vote, and any member who voted against the 
majority was described as “soft” on segregation. On February 20, Davis, after 
consulting with Sanders and Harris, chose the four new members: Lewis Doherty n, a 
fifty-five-year-old businessman and Citizens’ Council member; I. M. Shelton, the 
thirty-nine-year-old president o f Shel-Boze, Inc.; forty-year-old Levy Chaney, a 
patrolman for Ethyl’s security department; and Charles S. Davis, a lab technician at 
Humble Oil (ESSO).22
The five existing board members passed a resolution denouncing the packing 
scheme, and three of them incurred the wrath of the segregationists. Coxe received 
threatening phone calls warning her that she would die before the next School Board 
meeting. Klansmen made appearances at the homes o f Peabody and Collier, and 
segregationists phoned Peabody’s home and harassed his thirteen-year-old son. The 
angry board member challenged the man who phoned his son to meet him face-to-face. 
“Our only crime was voting that resolution opposing packing our board with people the 
voters had no chance to elect,” Peabody told the Morning Advocate, “We’ve reached
22“Seek Rehearing in Integration Ruling in EBR,” State-Times, February 10, 
1961, I; “State to Seek Rehearing in EBR, St. Helena,” Morning Advocate, February 
11, 1961; “Court of Appeals Upholds Integration Order in EBR,” Morning Advocate, 
February 10,1961,1; “Plan Would Let Governor Davis ‘Pack’ EBR School 
Board,” Morning Advocate, February 16,1961, 1; “House to Vote Today on Bill to 
‘Pack’ School Board Here,” Morning Advocate, February 17, 1961,1; “Local Option 
School Plan Voted in House,” State-Times, February 17,1961,1; “BR Board Bill,” 
State-Times, February 18,1961, 1; “Davis Names Four to Serve on EBR Board,” 
Morning Advocate, February 21,1961,1; Minutes, February 17, 1960, East Baton 
Rouge Parish School Board.
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the point that if you dare question anything this legislature does your family stands to
suffer.”23
The new board members wasted no time in asserting their dominance. At the 
March 9 meeting, they rammed through a resolution to send two board members, two 
staff members, and a representative from the district attorney’s office to Virginia to 
study that state’s pupil placement law and its private school cooperatives.24 On the trip, 
the group visited Prince Edward County, which in 1959 had closed its public school 
rather than submit to court-ordered integration and created a network of private schools 
for white students. The county also closed all black schools but refused to create a 
private school system for them. After touring Prince Edward County’s private schools, 
White remarked, “The key to the whole situation is the determination of the citizens of 
the county to have a private school system.” In response to the trip, accommodationists 
and liberals denounced the plan and pointed out that the “private” schools in Virginia 
operated under substandard conditions.25
23“EBR Board Hits Bill,” State-Times, February 18,1961, 1; “BR School Trio 
Become Target of Abuse, Threat,” Morning Advocate, February 24, 1961,1.
24Baton Rouge’s delegation included Sargent Pitcher, Assistant School 
Superintendent Robert Aerteker, Assistant Secondary Schools Supervisor John 
Fitzpatrick, and board members White and Doherty.
“ Minutes, March 9,1961, East Baton Rouge Parish School Board; “EBR 
Delegation Begins Virginia Schools Tour,” Morning Advocate, April 11, 1961, 1; “EBR 
Delegation Continues Tour o f Va. Schools,” Morning Advocate, April 12, 1961,1; 
“OPEN Criticizes Virginia Private Program,’’ibid.; “EBR Officials Get Data from Va.,” 
Morning Advocate, April 13,1961, I; “Pitcher Praises Citizens’ Stand in Virginia,” 
Morning Advocate, April 14,1961,1; “Doherty Inspects Front Royal, Va., Private 
School,” ibid.; Jean Fairfax to Wade Mackie, April 24,961, AFSC, Baton Rouge 
Program, Southern Program, 1961.
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While segregationists supported dismantling the public school system to prevent
integration, white parents in East Baton Rouge Parish were split on the issue, hi 1961,
several Parent-Teacher Associations (PTA) discussed and voted on resolutions either to
oppose or to support school closure. The PTA of Highland School, in a sprawling
middle- to upper-class neighborhood near the LSU campus, was the first to vote on the
issue. Native Baton Rougean Mary Benton Kenyon was one of the most outspoken
advocates for keeping the schools open. The wifo o f an attorney and a former public
school teacher, Kenyon had ties to Baton Rouge society. She grew up in the city and
graduated from Baton Rouge High School. As a student at LSU, she played an active
role in student government and served as president of her sorority, Chi Omega. In the
late 1950s, Kenyon taught school, and when the board began improving conditions at
black facilities, she recalled, “Some of my colleagues were objecting to the fact that 85
percent of the funds that year were going to the black schools.” Kenyon added, “I, of
course, was very proud that the black schools were beginning to be brought to the level
of the white schools.” When the state legislature threatened to close the public schools
to avoid integration, Kenyon took action. On March 1,1961, she and other members of
the Highland School PTA debated a resolution to support open schools. After more than
three hours of debate, which included two unsuccessful attempts to table the resolution
and the departure of fifty members, the organization voted by secret ballot 112 to 8 in
favor of the declaration. Kenyon recalled:
I observed in my PTA that those people [who supported the resolution] had 
some awareness o f what they said and did impacting how people might think in 
the future in the state or how people might think in the future in town. Some of 
them knew that this was a moment for them to stand up and speak and be
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counted. At that time, that was considered a very way out statement. . .  by the 
anti-Negro forces.
The fifty members o f the Highland School PTA who walked out o f the March 1
meeting declared that votes that occurred after they left were invalid, and in a meeting
of their own, voted to rescind the resolution and named twenty delegates to the
upcoming state PTA meeting. They asked the supporters o f open schools to withdraw
their delegates. On April 19, the two factions met and hammered out a compromise that
technically rescinded the resolution and replaced it with one that declared the group’s
support for maintaining the school system. The resolution fell short of advocating open
schools. Kenyon described the second vote:
Apparently, it was considered important enough so that the forces on the other 
side really got to steam-rolling and a recall was called for in our PTA. On the 
night of the vote, we lost a few votes. The opposition called for an open ballot 
and I thought, “How undemocratic.” They knew that many of the people in that 
room would not be able to [publicly vote for open schools]. The guy that sold 
gasoline and the druggist, all these people couldn’t  possibly vote their 
conscience in an open ballot. That was the kind o f tactics that were considered 
okay to keep our voice from being heard. I was disappointed, but, at the same 
time, I felt that we maybe lost that battle but we won the war, and I think that we 
did.
Kenyon believed that others voted against the resolution “because they really 
couldn’t see the PTA moving out of the cookie making role.”26
“ “Highland PTA Favors Open Schools After Teachers, Opponents Stage 
Walkout,” Morning Advocate, March 2,1961, 1; “Highland PTA Faction Selects 20 
Delegates for State Convention,” Morning Advocate, April 18, 1961,6B; ‘‘Highland 
PTA Reverses on Resolution to Urge Keeping Public Education,” Morning Advocate, 
April 20, 1961,1; Martha Mikell, interview by author, tape recording, May 25, 1996, T. 
Harry Williams Center for Oral History Collection, Louisiana Lower Mississippi Valley 
Collection, Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Mary Benton 
Kenyon, interview by Shirley Marvin, tape recording, December 10, 1982, YWCA Oral 
History Collection, East Baton Rouge Parish Library, Centroplex Branch, Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana.
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The PTAs in lower class neighborhoods encountered no dissension. All o f their 
members denounced integration. The Glen Oaks High School PTA voted, without 
debate, to support segregation even if it meant dismantling the public school system. 
Nearly three hundred parents at Belfair School invited Representative Welbom Jack of 
Caddo Parish, one of the state’s leading segregationists, to attend their meeting. Jack 
warned the parents to begin organizing cooperative schools because “you’re gonna be 
next to receive an integration order.” A resolution by the parents of children attending 
White Hills Elementary School read, God “in his infinite wisdom created white and 
Negro races with different traits, characteristics, and abilities” and when whites and 
blacks were “forced to mix disastrous results followed.” They urged Davis, the 
legislature, and the School Board to adopt any means necessary to prevent integration.27
The Davis board members agreed with the segregationist parents and attempted 
to remove white leaders from positions of power within the school system. In June 
1961, Superintendent of East Baton Rouge Public School System Lloyd Funchess 
incurred the wrath of the Davis faction by denouncing the addition of the new board 
members. A native Louisianian, Funchess moved to Baton Rouge in 1925 to attend 
LSU where he eventually earned three degrees. In 1955, the School Board appointed 
him superintendent The segregationist board members charged that Funchess refused 
to cooperate with them on “budget matters and segregationist questions” and asked him 
to resign. When he refused, the segregationist majority voted to oust him and named
27“Glen Oaks High PTA Reaffirms for Segregation,” Morning Advocate, March 
14, 1961,5A; “Segregation Resolution Wins Unanimous Approval at Belfair School 
Meet,” Morning Advocate, March 17, 1961, IOC; “White Hills School Group Opposes 
Mixing of Races,” Morning Advocate, March 28,1961,5A.
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former school principal Lloyd Lindsey as his replacement. An angry Funchess sued to 
retain his position. Supporting his segregationist friends, District Attorney Pitcher filed 
a motion saying that Funchess had illegally occupied the position since 1957, when the 
board renewed his contract, because he failed to take the oath of office. In response, 
Funchess’s attorney administered the oath of office to his client on June 30 and, to 
prevent Lindsey from taking over, Funchess locked himself into his office and refused 
to leave. Pitcher warned the School Board staff that if they helped Funchess, he would 
charge them with “adhesion to a usurper.” Despite the order to leave the position, 
Funchess continued to operate as superintendent and on July 3 sent out notices and an 
agenda for the upcoming board meeting. Pitcher promised to arrest him if he attended. 
The board canceled the meeting, and when it met on July 13, it voted six to five to bar 
Funchess’s pay checks. The vote reflected the influence o f the Davis members. Without 
them, the board would have voted to pay Funchess. In late July, Judge Fred Blanche 
ruled in Funchess’s favor and ordered the board and Lindsey to allow him to fulfill his 
duties. Days later, a state court of appeals ruled in his favor. The board gave up and 
allowed Funchess to retain his job.28
“ Minutes, June 8,1961, East Baton Rouge Parish School Board; “School Head 
Under Pressure to Quit,” State-Times, June 1, 1961, 1; “School Board Gives No Hint of 
Ouster Move,” Morning Advocate, June 2, 1961,1; “Funchess Denies Charge That He 
Has Held Up Budget,” Morning Advocate, June 3, 1961; “Say BR School Case Worries 
Governor; Statement Issued,” State-Times, June 5, 1961, 1; “Board Expected to Oust 
Funchess,” State-Times, June, 7,1961,1; “Criticism Continues Here Against EBR 
School Head,” Morning Advocate, June 8, 1961,1; “School Board Drops Funchess,” 
State-Times, June 9, 1961, 1; “Board Decided as Expected to Oust Funchess,” Morning 
Advocate, June 9,1961,1; “Lloyd Lindsey Named School Superintendent,” State- 
Times, June 13,1961, 1; “Board Picks Lindsey a Superintendent, Complications Seen,” 
Morning Advocate, June 14,1961,1; Minutes, June 13,1961, East Baton Rouge Parish 
School Board; “Funchess Enters Lawsuit on Ouster,” Morning Advocate; June 17,
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In March 1961, Wade Mackie, along with Rabbi Reznikoff, Reverend Irvin 
Cheney of Broadmoor Baptist and other members of the Baton Rouge Ministerial 
Association, began working on an affirmation of religious principles and obtained the 
signatures of fifty-three ministers of various faiths. On April 10, they published their 
statement in the city’s newspapers. It denounced discrimination and proclaimed that 
God created “all men in his own image with equal dignity and worth, giving no 
superiority to any one race or group of people.” The ministers also announced their 
support for freedom of speech and an end to prejudice, character assassination, verbal 
threats, and violence. They called for maintaining the public school system equally for 
all under the law and an end to racial discrimination.29
Segregationists immediately denounced the resolution and launched an attack 
against the fifty-three ministers. In letters to the editor o f the Morning Advocate, they 
urged the ministers to stay out of secular affairs and claimed that the Bible supported 
segregation and not integration. One writer declared that the ministers wanted to 
destroy both Louisiana and the South. “The Negro has not required sufficient self- 
control to warrant the removal of all restraint,” he proclaimed. He also charged that
1961, 1; “Funchess Defies DA, Board; Slate Hearing,” State-Times, July 1,1961, 1; 
“Dr. Funchess Takes Oath,” Morning Advocate, July 1, 1961, 1; “Funchess and Staff 
Spend Day at Office,” State-Times, July 3,1961, I; “Funchess Will Attend Meet as 
Superintendent,” Morning Advocate, July 4, 1961, 1; “School Board Lacking Agenda, 
Cancels Meet,” Morning Advocate, July 7,1961, 1; “School Board Acts to Bar Any 
Checks to Funchess,” Morning Advocate, July 14, 1961, 1; “Court Rules for Funchess,” 
Morning Advocate, July 27, 1961, 1; “Appeal Court Upholds Rule for Funchess,” 
Morning Advocate, August 8, 1961, 1.
29“53 Local Ministers Hit Discrimination, Affirm Basic Religious Tenets,” 
Morning Advocate, May 7, 1961,1.
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African Americans were indolent, lacked inhibitions, and could not support themselves. 
Another reader called the fifty-three ministers confused. Not content merely to 
denounce the signers in the newspapers, segregationists formed the East Baton Rouge 
Parish Laymen’s Association. The new organization called the ministers “agitators” and 
endorsed the segregationists’ policy of maintaining separate schools even if it meant 
destroying the public school system. When the group held its first public meeting, 
nearly five hundred people from various religious backgrounds attended.30
Several of the fifty-three ministers suffered severe reprisals from segregationists 
and their own congregations. Reverend Irvin Cheney, whose phone conversations with 
Mackie had been taped and played back to “ultraconservative, white segregationists in 
the Southern Baptist churches,” was questioned by the board of deacons o f his church 
after the affirmation appeared. He wrote a cryptic letter to Mackie on June 22 resigning 
his membership in the Ministerial Fellowship and asking to be removed from the AFSC 
mailing list. He noted, “The whole thing has hurt me greatly.. . .  Some of the 
conversations on tape indicate very strongly an attempt by you to manipulate the 
feelings of some of the ministers.” Mackie tried to contact him but discovered that he 
resigned his post at Broadmoor Baptist Chinch. Before leaving, Cheney denounced the 
AFSC. ‘T do not consider myself an integrationist in the usual sense,” he told his 
congregation, “I deplore agitation, the force and the effort for total, forced integration 
just for the sake of integration. I cannot really identify myself with either group of
30“Letters to Editor,” Morning Advocate, May 11, 1961,12B, May 12,1961,
12A; “Laymen’s Group Organizing Here, Opposes Ministers’ Move to Racial 
Question,” Morning Advocate, May 23,1961,1; “500 OK Laymen’s Unit Here to 
Uphold Racial Segregation in Churches,” Morning Advocate, May 23, 1961, 10A.
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extremists and especially do I resent those from outside who come into our midst and 
force the issue.” Bruce Evans’s wife, Ann, who worked as a math teacher at Baton 
Rouge High School, lost her job because of his activism. Undaunted by the firing,
Bruce Evans continued to denounce segregation from the pulpit, and in April 1963, he 
resigned from the staff of University Baptist Church under duress and founded 
Fellowship Baptist Church, the city’s first ecumenical and racially integrated church.31
The school desegregation hysteria that led to the packing o f the East Baton 
Rouge Parish School Board, the wiretapping of liberals, and the flurry o f PTA 
resolutions was premature. A year after Wright’s battle with Governor Davis and the 
state legislature, President John F. Kennedy appointed the beleaguered judge to the U.S. 
District Court o f Appeals in Washington, D.C., as a reward for his unfaltering support 
for Brown. The Baton Rouge school desegregation case then fell to Kennedy appointee 
and segregationist, E. Gordon West, Russell Long’s law partner. A polar opposite of 
Wright, West adopted a policy of delaying school desegregation as long as possible. So 
committed was West to maintaining segregated schools that at one point the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals reprimanded him for delaying implementation of Brown. In
31 Wade Mackie to Jean Fairfax, July 31,1961, AFSC, Baton Rouge Program, 
South Central Regional Office, 1961; Wade Mackie to Garnet Guild, September 19, 
1961, ibid.; Read by the Minister to the Membership of the Broadmoor Baptist Church, 
June 18, 1961, J. Bruce Evans Collection, folder Civil Rights 1961-A; “School Board 
Refuses to Hire Wife of Pastor,” Morning Advocate, September 2,1961,1; “Minister’s 
Wife Gives Reaction to the Board,” Morning Advocate, September 4,1961; Sum m ary  
of Civil Rights Involvement, J. Bruce Evans Papers, folder Civil Rights 1961-A.
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the East Baton Rouge case, West nevertheless successfully stalled integration for nearly 
two years.32
Although the delay prevented the immediate desegregation of East Baton Rouge 
Parish’s public school system, it also gave the community a cooling-off period after the 
tension-filled months o f the New Orleans school desegregation crisis. Eleven 
accommodationist lawyers, including former judge and candidate for governor Carlos 
Spaht, Victor Sachse, and H. Payne Breazle, even filed a  brief with Judge West in 
March 1962 asking that he delay any discussion on Davis until after the July 28 School 
Board election. West granted their request. These lawyers knew that if  the 
segregationist-packed School Board received a desegregation order trouble would 
follow and that, in all probability, the city would be dragged into a New Orleans-like 
confrontation between state and federal authority.33
In the primary elections held in the summer of 1962, the issues of school 
desegregation and the packing of the School Board by Governor Jimmie Davis 
dominated the campaign, hi a crowded field of eighteen, three o f the four Davis 
appointees, I. M. Shelton, Chaney Calmes, and Charles Davis, ran for their seats on the 
School Board. The final member Lewis Doherty did not seek election. Shelton, Calmes, 
and Davis were the most outspoken supporters o f maintaining the dual system of 
education in the field of eighteen candidates. Running for a four-year term from Ward
32Rogers, Righteous Lives, 100; Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts, 250; Frank 
T. Reed and Lucy McGough, Let Them Be Judged: The Judicial Integration o f the Deep 
South (Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1978), 162-167.
“ “Attorneys Seek School Mixing Decision Delay,” Morning Advocate, March 
10, 1962, 1.
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One, Shelton pledged his undying support for segregation and promised to resist court- 
ordered integration.34 ‘Tor me to tell you that I advocate or would willingly accept 
integration, would, in my opinion, tell you that I believe in retarding our school growth 
and degrading our entire system,” stated Benny Brannon, who was seeking a two-year 
term from the Ward One. The Baton Rouge native worked as an instrument technician 
at Humble Oil (ESSO) and promised that the only way he would submit to integration 
was at gunpoint “I am unalterably opposed to any sort of integration of the races and 
will do everything in my power to oppose it” said Calmes. Charles Davis denounced 
federal intervention in local affairs and promised to resist even token desegregation.35
Other candidates took a more moderate approach to the issue. A longtime board 
member from the first ward, Ben Peabody, promised to act in the best interest of the 
community. “I do not favor closing the schools,” he stated. “My primary interest is in 
the best education possible for all children of East Baton Rouge Parish.” The 
community-minded Peabody held positions of leadership in several civic organizations 
including the Chamber of Commerce and the United Givers Fund. Most other 
candidates shared Peabody’s concern for the well-being o f the community, but because
^Members of the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board were elected to 
staggered terms ranging from two to six years. Candidates for the board ran in three 
wards. Ward One included the city of Baton Rouge. African Americans held the 
majority in six of its fifty-three precincts. Ward Two encompassed the suburban areas 
in the northern part of the parish, including Scotlandville, Baker and Zachary. Out of 
the sixteen precincts, two held black majorities. Whites dominated the rural Ward 
Three, and African Americans made up a tiny portion of the voters. “Rockhold, Furr 
Win Local Races” Morning Advocate, September 2,1962,1.
35“Vote for #40,” Morning Advocate, July 26,1962, 12B; “School Board 
Candidate In Statement,” Morning Advocate, June 19,1962,3A; “23 Candidates Seek 
Judgeship,” Morning Advocate, July 26,1962, 10A.
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they did not possess his constituency, they proclaimed their support for segregation. But 
unlike the Davis appointees, they did not promise to support it at all costs. W. Harry 
Perkins, another candidate from the first ward, came out in favor of separate but equal 
facilities but added that he possessed the ability to “cooperate with others.” By stressing 
his willingness to “cooperate with others,” this active member o f various civic 
organizations implied that he was moderate on the issue of segregation and would not 
vote openly to defy federal authority. Irving Boudreaux, a car salesman running for a 
seat from the suburban Ward Two, also advocated moderation. “I am for equal but 
separate school facilities and further convinced that at the present time the mixing of 
the races can only produce ill-feeling and bitterness between the two groups and that for 
the peace and harmony of our community the schools should be operated on their 
present segregated basis,” stated Boudreaux. Like Perkins, however, he refused to 
advocate closing the schools to preserve segregation.36
Two African-American candidates, Dupuy Anderson and Acie Belton, also 
sought seats on the board. Calling the schools “an integral part of socially desirable 
change,” Anderson, a World War II activist, said he wanted to use the schools to erase 
bigotry. Racial diplomat Acie Belton issued a more moderate statement. “I am certain 
that due to my training and experience in working with people, when elected to the 
School Board, I will be able to work with other members to the best interest of our 
system.” Unlike Anderson, he did not call for the integration of the schools or ask that
36**23 Candidates Seek Judgeship,” Morning Advocate, July 26, 1962, 10A;“Ben 
Peabody Gives Statement for Re-Election,” Morning Advocate, July 15,1962,4A; “I.
R. Boudreaux Seeks Election,” Morning Advocate, May 27, 1962,12A.
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they be used to eliminate bigotry. Instead he informed voters, both black and white, of 
his history o f working “others,” i.e., whites, and his willingness to continue the practice. 
Belton would not demand; he would negotiate.37
While the issue of school desegregation dominated the rhetoric of the 
candidates, the local papers denounced the Davis board members and urged Baton 
Rougeans to vote them out of office. “Some candidates may try to make it appear that 
segregation is the chief issue. It is not,” proclaimed a Morning Advocate editorial. 
“There is not an integrationist on the Baton Rouge board, and there is no chance of one 
being elected this time. The issue is not integration. It is another no less important issue, 
home rule.” The paper went on to suggest a slate of candidates, which included 
Peabody and the other more moderate candidates.38
Baton Rouge voters followed the Morning Advocate's advice and ousted two of 
the three Davis board members, Calmes and Davis, in the primary. Calmes lost his seat 
to Boudreaux; James Randall Goodwin, a staunch segregationist, defeated Davis for the 
Ward Three seat. In Ward One, Shelton ran second to civil engineer Lloyd Rockhold, 
who favored segregation but would not vote to close the public schools. Because neither 
received a majority, the two men made it to the run-off election where Rockhold 
received 12,632 votes and Shelton 9,184. The other seats in Ward One went to 
moderate candidates. Brannon lost to Naylor Cragin, an officer at a Baton Rouge
37‘D . H. Anderson Gives Statement on Candidacy,” Morning Advocate, July 19, 
1962, 5D.
38“Unpack the School Board,” Morning Advocate, July 22,1962,4B; 
‘‘Recommendations for School Board,” Morning Advocate, July 24, 1962,2A; “For 
Local Government,” Morning Advocate, July 27, 1962,2A.
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savings and loan company, and Peabody and Perkins won the two six-year seats. In 
Ward Two, Acie Belton received enough votes to make it into the runoff election, 
marking the first time an African-American candidate enjoyed such success. In the 
September 2 election, however, he lost to the moderate A. T. Furr, 2,441 votes to 5,696 
votes. The School Board election demonstrated the support of the majority of whites for 
moderation and indicated their desire to maintain the peace and stability o f their 
community even if  it meant desegregating the public school system.39
Several months before the School Board election, the Baton Rouge branch of 
the NAACP, which had been dormant since 1956, reorganized, and its members elected 
Reverend Arthur Jelks as their president An African Methodist Episcopal (A.M.E.) 
minister, Jelks moved to Baton Rouge from Elkhart, Indiana, in late 1961; before that, 
he had lived in several cities in the Midwest. In these communities, including Baton 
Rouge, he quickly became a civil rights Leader.40 On August 8, 1962, Jelks presented a 
resolution to the School Board requesting immediate integration. He warned that if he 
received no response, the NAACP would launch a series of demonstrations to demand 
the admission of black students to white schools. When the board failed to act, Jelks 
went to the school system’s office and tried to enroll his daughter, Patricia, in the white
39“23 Candidates Seek Judgeship,” Morning Advocate, July 26, 1962, 10A; 
“School Posts at Stake in Area Voting,” State-Times, July 28,1962,1; “Five School 
Board Places Filled,” Morning Advocate, July 29,1962,1; “How East Baton Rouge 
Voted,” Morning Advocate, July 29,1962, 6A; "5 Win EBR School Posts; Factors in 
Race are Viewed,” State-Times, July 30,1962,1; “Rockhold, Furr Win Local Races,” 
Morning Advocate, September 2,1962,1; “Lear, Furr, Rockhold Win in EBR,” State- 
Times, September 3, 1962,1.
40The reorganization of the NAACP will be discussed in greater detail in the 
following chapter.
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Baton Rouge Junior High School. Assistant Superintendent Aerteker gave Jelks the 
transfer form and promised that the minister’s request would be forwarded to the board 
for consideration. As he left the office, Jelks told Aerteker that other African-American 
parents would follow suit Segregationists immediately labeled Jelks as an outside 
agitator and a troublemaker. Assistant District Attorney John Ward told the Morning 
Advocate that Jelks moved to Louisiana from Indiana, “where he promoted the same 
kind of activity by harassing the city government and starting sit-in movements in 
taverns, restaurants, etc.” Ward added, “Perhaps we should not refer to the Reverend 
Jelks as merely an outside agitator, but instead should more properly refer to him as a 
roving outside agitator.” He charged that Jelks came to Baton Rouge with the sole 
purpose of reorganizing the local branch of the NAACP “on a more militant basis along 
the lines adopted by the Congress of Racial Equality.”41
In late August, the board rejected Jelks’ transfer request. In response, the civil 
rights leader and his daughter went to Baton Rouge Junior High and attempted to 
register. The school’s principal, Robert L. Smith, met them at the door and refused to 
let them enter. Jelks warned the white community that the NAACP would sponsor 
demonstrations and sit-ins until the school system integrated. When classes began on 
September 3, a group of black parents, including Jelks, went to several schools and 
attempted to enroll their children. The police department dispatched several officers to
4I“School Board Indicates ‘Wait’ in Integration,” Morning Advocate, August 9, 
1962; Gloster Current to Roy Wilkins, et al., August 9, 1962, NAACP Papers, Group 
HI, box C52, folder 10; “Negro Seeking to Enroll Girl in White School,” Morning 
Advocate, August 10, 1963, 8A; “Any School Integration Move Termed Premature, 
Improper,” Morning Advocate, August 11,1962,3A.
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Baton Rouge Junior High as a crowd of angry white women gathered to watch the 
integration attempt The women shouted at Jelks* party and followed the group to its 
next stop, Fairfields Elementary. As it moved to the second school on Jelks’ list, the 
white crowd grew to more than one hundred, but police held the shouting crowd at bay. 
From Fairfields, the African Americans went to Baton Rouge High School where 
school officials turned them away. The same day, NAACP members began staging sit- 
ins at downtown lunch counters.42
Along with demonstrations, Jelks and the local branch of the NAACP pursued 
legal action against the board. The failure of the courts to force the East Baton Rouge 
Parish School Board to submit a desegregation plan angered NAACP members, and 
they demanded that their attorneys push the case forward. In January 1963, the Baton 
Rouge branch of the NAACP sent a resolution to the national office demanding action 
by LDF lawyers, especially A. P. Tureaud. Field Director for Louisiana Gloster Current 
warned NAACP chairman Roy Wilkins, “Reverend Jelks has led a continuing crusade 
for freedom. Such a fearless fighter and the good people of Baton Rouge who are
42“BR Negro Girl Denied Entry in White School,” Morning Advocate, August 
31, 1962, 5B; “Local NAACP Head Claims He’ll Sue Board,” Morning Advocate, 
September 1, 1962, 1; Gloster Current to Jesse DeVore, September 6, 1962, NAACP 
Papers, Group HI, box C52, folder 10; “New School Year Opens for 60,000,” State- 
Times, September 4, 1962,1; Johnnie Jones to Norman Amaker, September 11, 1962, 
APT, box 29, folder 24; “Crowd Jeers at Mixing Try by Negroes,” Morning Advocate, 
September 5, 1962, 1; “Sit-In Flurries Follow Attempt at Enrollment,” State-Times, 
September 5,1962,2C; Clarence Laws to NAACP Leaders, September 18,1962, 
NAACP Papers, New Orleans Branch, box 73.
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backing him should have action.” Heeding Current’s warning, Tureaud filed a motion in 
February asking Judge West to order the School Board to submit a desegregation plan.43
Because the desegregation of East Baton Rouge Parish’s public schools began 
nearly a decade after Brown, white leaders and accommodationists could draw on the 
integration experiences of other southern cities. They knew that they wanted to avoid 
the types o f confrontation and defiance that occurred in Little Rock and New Orleans. 
Although the Davis-packed School Board had flirted with implementing the Virginia 
Plan in 1961, all of those board members had been defeated in the 1962 election, and in 
1963 the new board members refused to dismantle the school system to preserve 
segregation.44 For the accommodationists and white leaders in Baton Rouge, 
dismantling the school system was unacceptable because it would harm the city’s 
economy. With the defeat of the Davis members in the 1962 elections, white leaders 
again controlled the School Board and began looking to other southern cities for a 
desegregation model and after careful examination decided that they wanted to emulate 
Atlanta. Calling itself “the city too busy to hate,” Atlanta was the embodiment o f a New 
South city. Its residents embraced progress and economic expansion and viewed 
themselves as progressive and unfettered by the region’s prejudices. By the 1960s, 
Atlanta was the South’s leading transportation and business center. Just as in Baton
43GIoster Current to Roy Wilkins, January 17, 1963, NAACP Papers, Group HI, 
box A102, folder 4.
44The Virginia Plan dismantled the public school system and replaced it with a 
series o f publicly funded private schools for white children. The state and school 
districts provided grants for white children to attend these “private” schools. With the 
closure, no public schools existed for black children.
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Rouge, white leaders wanted to avoid racial violence because of the economic damage 
that it might cause. In 1957, citizens of Atlanta elected William Hartsfield as their 
mayor, and after the election, he proclaimed, “The people o f Atlanta don’t  want 
Atlanta’s growth and prosperity stopped by racial controversy.” He added, “Our aim in 
life is to make no business, no industry, no educational or social organization ashamed 
of the dateline ‘Atlanta.’ ” Like Atlanta residents, Baton Rougeans want to avoid racial 
violence because of the economic damage that it might cause.45
In late1962, a group of prominent white leaders and accommodationists, mostly 
wealthy businessmen and attorneys, created an unofficial, behind-the-scenes biracial 
committee to discuss ways to desegregate the school system peacefully. Wade Mackie 
and the AFSC asked Doug Manship, who besides owning WBRZ, a local television 
station, also served as president o f the Chamber of Commerce, to meet with a group of 
African Americans to discuss desegregation. Manship agreed to meet with them if 
Mackie allowed him to approve the list of attendees. Again, the traditional pattern of 
race relations took over. Manship wanted to insure that the African Americans with 
whom he met were community “leaders,” i.e. racial diplomats. Knowing that Manship 
would refuse to meet with “troublemakers,” Mackie selected a group of prominent 
racial diplomats and World War H activists to serve on the committee. “All of these 
people are college graduates and have demonstrated their own leadership in the 
community,” Mackie reported. They included J. K. Haynes, John G. Lewis, Leon
45Bayor, Race and the Shaping, 223, xv, 30-31; Alton Hornsby, Jr., “Black 
Public Education in Atlanta,” 22; Lassiter and Lewis, “Massive Resistance Revisited,” 
in The Moderates ’ Dilemma, 1-10; Harmon, Beneath the Image, vii-viii, 45-47.
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Netterville, B. V. Baranco, Horatio Thompson, Acie Belton, Dupuy Anderson, Johnnie 
Jones, James Cook, and the Reverend W. T. Handy. Manship agreed to meet with the 
men on February 10,. 1963, and after the meeting, invited other prominent white leaders 
and accommodationists to join the group. This unofficial biracial committee wanted its 
existence to remain secret, but some African-American members, most notably Johnnie 
Jones, criticized this approach and wanted the group to go public. After a few months of 
secret meetings, Jones could no longer tolerate the secrecy and leaked information 
about the group and its discussions to Reverend Jelks. Because he broke the vow of 
silence, the committee expelled Jones.46
None of the white members on the committee wanted integration, Mackie 
reported, ‘They were iust opposed to disintegration.” The unofficial biracial committee 
asked Judge West for a meeting, and because it boasted so many prominent members, 
he complied.47 Committee members and the judge discussed the East Baton Rouge 
school desegregation plan, and West promised to approve a plan that would drag out 
integration but would be acceptable to the Supreme Court.48
46“Manship Assumes President’s Office at Chamber of Commerce,” Morning 
Advocate, October 12,1962, 1; Notes on Advisory Committee Meeting, November 13, 
1962, AFSC, Civil Rights Division — Baton Rouge Office, South Central Regional 
Program, 1962; Wade Mackie and Yvonne Coleman to Garnet Guild and Peter 
Lippman, February 20, 1963, AFSC, Baton Rouge Program— Reports, South Central 
Regional Program, 1963; Comprehensive Report, November 4, 1963, AFSC, Civil 
Rights Division Baton Rouge Office, South Central Regional Program, 1964.
47Although the date of the meeting is unclear, it probably took place in March or 
April 1963.
^Comprehensive Report, November 4,1963, AFSC, Civil Rights Division -  
Baton Rouge Office, Southern Program, 1963; Wade Mackie to Barbara Moffett,
January 28,1963, ibid.; Wade Mackie and Yvonne Coleman to Garnet Guild and Peter
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On March 5, 1963, West reluctantly ordered the East Baton Rouge Parish 
School Board to submit a desegregation plan and told the spectators that he viewed 
Brown “as one of the truly regrettable decisions o f all time.” He also claimed that 
school desegregation brought “discontent and chaos to previously peaceful 
communities.” West added that the black leaders, i.e., racial diplomats, helped to insure 
the long delay in the Davis case because they “exercised restraint despite the proddings 
and agitation of outside elements.” Finally, West lamented the fact that Brown required 
him to order the desegregation of the East Baton Rouge Parish public schools and 
claimed that he resisted issuing the order “as long as feasiblely possible.”49
To prevent segregationists from influencing the white masses, Manship and 
other members of the biracial committee drafted a petition in support of open schools 
and peaceful desegregation. Prominent attorney B. B. Taylor circulated it among his 
friends, which included the most prominent Baton Rouge residents. Mackie noted that 
Taylor obtained signatures from people who had played no role in the desegregation 
debate and added that most of the signers were “pretty strong segregationists.” Taylor 
refused to allow OPEN members, liberal ministers, or African Americans to sign. The 
committee believed that by getting the signatures o f prominent citizens, they would
Lippman, May 7,1963, AFSC, Baton Rouge Program Reports, South Central Regional 
Office, 1963; Wade Mackie to Garnet Guild and Jean Fairfax, April 10, 1963, AFSC, 
Civil Rights Division Baton Rouge Office, Southern Program, 1963.
^ “Desegregation Plan Deadline Set for July 5,” Morning Advocate, March 6, 
1962, 1; Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, U. S. District Court Eastern 
District of La., No. 1662; “Desegregation Plan for EBR Schools Asked,” Morning 
Advocate, March 2, 1963, 1; E. Gordon West to Russell Long, March 6, 1963, Long 
Papers, box 558, folder 8.
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diffuse the segregationist threat. “We believed they would either be overwhelmed or 
attack hardest those that were known to be segregationists and had deserted their ranks 
to sign the declaration for financial reasons. This would likely backfire on the 
segregationists.” On April 4, one month after West ordered the East Baton Rouge 
Parish School Board to submit a desegregation plan by July, the committee made its 
petition public. It urged compliance with the court order and warned that if  the School 
Board failed to present an acceptable desegregation plan, then the federal government 
would impose a far more comprehensive one on the people of East Baton Rouge Parish. 
“We believe that an acceptable plan, prepared by our own well-informed School Board, 
would be less disturbing to our community than a plan provided by the court” The 
social prominence of the signers silenced the segregationists, and the School Board 
faced no white opposition as it formulated and submitted a plan to West.s0
With Manship at its helm, the Chamber of Commerce also issued a public 
statement calling for peaceful desegregation. Citing its commitment to maintaining the 
community’s welfare and economic prosperity, the chamber warned that both could be 
“seriously damaged by incidents, disorder, and violence.” Manship’s Morning Advocate 
echoed the warning. “In the nation’s financial center, talk once again is being heard of a 
new wave of plant expansion by large industries that brought about the industrial 
growth in the Baton Rouge area. . .  after World War n.” This expansion could “help 
Baton Rouge achieve its apparent destiny as one of the South’s major industrial cities,”
S0Minutes, March 7, 1963, East Baton Rouge Parish School Board; “School 
Integration ‘Declaration’ Goes Into Board Records,” Morning Advocate, April 5, 1963, 
1.
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the editorial added. “Those who will decide on the location o f new plants, or as it may 
be on the expansion of existing plants will be guided by many factors. But not the least 
important factor will be the wisdom and efficiency with which Baton Rouge handles its 
current problems.” The threat o f economic reprisals convinced all but the staunchest o f 
segregationists that peaceful desegregation was the best option.51
Unwilling to take on the Chamber of Commerce, the petition’s signers turned on 
African-Americans. They charged that outside agitators, most notably Arthur Jelks, had 
forced the judge to issue the ruling. School Board member A. T. Furr complained, “a 
vast majority of the local negroes [sic] have only passing interest and some are as 
opposed to integration as the white people.” In reality, the so-called outside agitators 
played almost no role in pushing for school desegregation. Jelks had moved to Baton 
Rouge from Indiana, but local people sued and served as the plaintiffs.52
Although the School Board agreed to submit a desegregation plan by July, it 
wanted to delay its implementation for another year. To insure that black students 
would continue to attend segregated schools in the fall of 1963, the board sent out 
student-assignment cards for the 1963-1964 school year in May and gave parents only 
until the end of the month to submit their transfer requests. The board would not 
consider any request after this deadline. Because the board had yet to present its
5I“Chamber Chiefs Ask Integration Be Peaceful,” Morning Advocate, March 21, 
1963, 1; “Baton Rouge at a Turning Point,” Morning Advocate, April 4,1963,2A; 
Ralph Dreger, interview by Betty Morse, tape recording, July 12,1983, T. Harry 
Williams Center for Oral History Collection, Louisiana Lower Mississippi Valley 
Collection, Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 22.
S2A. T. Furr to Russell Long, March 12, 1963, Long Papers, box 558, folder 8.
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desegregation plan to West, African-American parents did not know which grade the 
board would integrate first and therefore could not submit transfer requests to integrated 
schools. Jelks urged parents not to sign the assignment cards because their signatures 
would indicate that they accepted the segregated school assignments. On May 9, a 
group of black leaders, including racial diplomats Jemison and Leo Butler, World War 
EL activists Scott and Anderson, and Jelks sent a letter to the School Board members 
asking them to rescind the transfer request deadline. Claiming that the assignment 
letters “had a near explosive force in the Negro community,’* Mackie contacted 
Manship, warned him of the danger of violence, and urged him to convince the School 
Board to withdraw the assignments until after the desegregation plan was made public. 
He gave Manship the choice of either convincing the board to reconsider the 
assignment deadline or spending time building a bomb shelter because without a 
reversal, violence was imminent. Although Manship’s role in the process is 
undocumented, the School Board postponed the assignment deadline.53
On June 27, 1963, the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board finally presented 
its plan to the public and promised to comply with the court order beginning in 
September 1964. Based on Atlanta’s plan, Baton Rouge’s desegregation plan called for 
integration to begin in the twelfth grade and to add an additional grade level each year.
It also set up sixteen rules for placement, including intelligence, a good home 
environment, and good morals. Whites applauded the plan, but the NAACP denounced
53“Negroes Urged Not to Sign School Forms,” Morning Advocate, May 7, 1963, 
IOC; Community Relations Program, School Desegregation Emphasis, ca. May 1963, 
AFSC, Baton Rouge Program, South Central Regional Office, 1963.
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it and filed an official protest with West. It argued that desegregation should begin 
immediately and should proceed faster than one grade per year. The NAACP’s lawyers 
also denounced the sixteen rules for transfer saying that the board would use them to 
keep the number o f black students in white schools to a m in im u m . They also asked 
West to begin the desegregation process with the first grade rather than the twelfth since 
young students would have fewer problems with integration than older ones. Younger 
children would be more accepting of each other because their racial prejudices had not 
yet become set. In addition, school pride and friendships tied seniors to their schools, 
and the NAACP feared that few o f these well-established teenagers would want to 
move to white schools. Despite the NAACP’s protest, on July 18, West accepted the 
Baton Rouge plan with one exception. He ordered the board to implement it 
immediately.54
With the plan in place, African Americans scrambled to find seniors willing to
transfer to white schools. A student at Southern Laboratory School, Freya Anderson,
Dupuy’s daughter, recognized the board’s ploy:
I knew that Baton Rouge was going to start with the senior year because they 
knew that if  they started with the senior year they’d have fewer kids wanting to 
go. They wouldn’t get any athletes because they couldn’t come in and get on the 
teams. It was just planned that way. I knew all along that they were going to 
start with the twelfth grade year, I was just hoping and praying they wouldn’t. 
Then when they made the decision, I knew I had to go. It wasn’t any if, ands, or
^Minutes, June 27, 1963, East Baton Rouge Parish School Board; “School 
Board Would Start Mixing in 1964,” Morning Advocate, February 28, 1963,1; 
‘NAACP is Protesting Mixing Plan,” Morning Advocate, July 9, 1963, 1; “EBR School 
Mixing Plan is Defended,” Morning Advocate, July 17,1963, 1; “Judge Orders EBR 
School Mix in Fall,” Morning Advocate, July 18, 1963, 1; Comprehensive Report, 
November 4,1963, AFSC, Civil Rights Division Baton Rouge Office, South Central 
Regional Office, 1964.
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buts about it, I just had to go. After I made my decision, I figured the best thing 
to was to get some more black students to come with me, so I wouldn’t be out 
there alone.
Lending his support to the NAACP, Mackie and a group of World War H activists,
including Johnnie Jones, Raymond Scott, and Dupuy Anderson, quickly contacted the
parish’s black high schools and asked the principals to provide lists of students who fit
the board’s criteria.55 One principal quickly complied. Others took much longer, and
some never submitted their lists. The head o f one schooL even went on an unscheduled
vacation when he discovered that the men were looking for potential transfers, and his
assistant principal, when pressured, provided a phony list. Mackie and the black leaders
sent students on the list and their parents letters asking them to consider applying for a
transfer. Freya Anderson recalled:
Most of them [the students] wanted to do it. Their parents were apprehensi ve; 
they were afraid, which was natural. “How were they going to get to school? 
How were they going to be protected on the campuses? What would they be 
able to do in the schools as far as participation activities and those kinds of 
things?” We had meetings with Daddy and Raymond and Johnnie Jones and a 
white guy who was a Quaker named Wade Mackie. Wade was real nice and 
worked with us. They all helped us get through it, and they talked to the parents 
and convinced them to let their kids go. We all wanted to go.
Anderson, Jones, Mackie, and Scott even asked local ministers to encourage high
school seniors in their congregations to consider transferring. “The ministers were never
in our minds as a major resource for the kind of work that we were required to do,”
Mackie noted, “but we had hopefully expected they would be able to give us a much
needed assist.” When the recruiters approached the black ministers to ask for help,
“miraculously, all of the leading ministers were out of town.” Even without the help of
ssMackie was the only white person involved in the transfer process.
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the ministers, Mackie and the black leaders convinced thirty-eight students to apply for 
transfer. Thirteen more students filled out applications, but their parents refused to sign 
them.1
On August 8, Superintendent Lloyd Lindsey, who, in 1962, had succeeded 
Superintendent Funchess when he willingly resigned from his position, began 
reviewing the applications and assessing the students’ qualifications. Two weeks later, 
he accepted twenty-eight requests. The rejected applicants, according to him, failed to 
meet the educational requirements for transfer. A student rejected for not meeting these 
standards, Oliver Mack, was the top student in his class at McKinley High School. 
Mack’s parents, along with those of eight others, Lindsey rejected appealed, but the 
superintendent refused to reconsider. Mackie noted that the number of qualified 
applicants angered the superintendent because he intended to allow only three or four 
black students to enroll in white schools. Because so many qualified candidates applied, 
however, he could not justify rejecting most of them. Lindsey later lambasted the black 
principals who gave Mackie and the other men lists of students. Yet the number of 
African Americans allowed to enroll in white schools was minuscule when compared to 
the entire school enrollment, hi 1963, the East Baton Rouge Parish school system 
contained approximately 52,600 students. Twenty-one thousand o f them were black.
‘Comprehensive Report, November 4, 1963, AFSC, Civil Rights Division 
Baton Rouge Office, Southern Program, 1964; Freya Anderson Rivers, interview by 
Maxine Crump, tape recording, July 16,1993, T. Harry Williams Center for Oral 
History, Louisiana Lower Mississippi Valley Collection, Louisiana State University 
Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 29-30.
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More than. 2,300 students parish-wide were seniors, but only twenty-eight blacks would 
go to white schools. No whites would attend black schools.53
As the African Americans students prepared to enter the four designated high 
schools — Baton Rouge, Lee, Istrouma, and Glen Oaks —  white leaders, 
accommodationists, and segregationists called for calm. Lindsey even asked white 
parents and citizens to stay away from the four campuses for the first week of classes to 
prevent large, angry crowds from gathering outside the schools. On September 2, 
Catholic and Protestant clergymen urged their congregations to help maintain “peace 
and tranquility” in both the city and the parish.54
Remarkably, arch-segregationists in Baton Rouge heeded the warnings o f Baton 
Rouge businessmen and quietly, albeit grudgingly, accepted integration. In a public 
statement, Citizens’ Council member and District Attorney Sargent Pitcher claimed, 
that if  the board refused to comply with West’s order, “we would have forced 
integration at the point of bayonets.” He called for his fellow segregationists to remain
53Minutes, January 20,1962, East Baton Rouge Parish School Board; Minutes, 
February 22, 1962, ibid.; “Lindsey to Assign Negroes to Schools,” Morning Advocate, 
August 9,1963,1; “28 Negroes Pass Screening Tests to EBR. Schools,” Morning 
Advocate, August 20,1963, 1; “Negro Pupils Accept Transfers to White Schools,” 
Morning Advocate, August 24,1963, 1; “28 Negro Transferees Registered,” Morning 
Advocate, August 29,1963,1; Oliver Mack, interview by author, tape recording, July 
29,1993, T. Harry Williams Center for Oral History Collection, Louisiana Lower 
Mississippi Valley Collection, Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana, 1-7; Comprehensive Report, November 4,1963, AFSC, Civil Rights 
Division, Southern Program, 1964; Johnnie Jones to A. P. Tureaud, August 28, 1963, 
APT, box 29, folder 24; “EBR Schools Desegregate Today,” Morning Advocate, 
September 3, 1963, 1.
54“Lindsey Appeals for Orderly EBR School Opening,” Morning Advocate, 
August 31,1963, 1.
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calm because the whole community would suffer if Baton Rouge became another Little 
Rock. “Our forefathers lived through and defeated Reconstruction,” he told his 
supporters and added that they could do the same with school desegregation. The 
Citizens’ Council did urge high school teachers to treat their black students like 
interlopers — “Do not call on him to recite, answer his questions briefly, discourage 
him from participating in extracurricular events.” The organization also warned the 
teachers that African Americans would select the friendliest, most personable students 
for transfer and told them to resist their charm because, “If  a Negro integrationist is 
welcomed, then he has gone far towards winning the school integration battle. As long 
as he is a willing tool o f evil forces, he should be treated in such a manner.” But, like 
Pitcher, the Citizens’ Council never advocated violence or staged protests outside the 
city’s schools to prevent integration.55
On September 3, 1963, East Baton Rouge Parish’s public schools desegregated 
peacefully. As television cameras rolled and newspaper photographers made snapshots, 
the twenty-eight black students arrived at their new schools by taxi and entered the 
buildings without the intervention of the law enforcement officers and FBI agents who 
stood outside the buildings waiting to protect them. The principals of the four high 
schools reported that the white students ignored the African Americans, but the day 
passed without incident. White Baton Rougeans congratulated themselves on their 
restraint. The incident-free desegregation caught the nation’s attention and brought
" “Integration Plan Given Board Bow,” Morning Advocate, July 19,1963,1; 
Baton Rouge Citizens’ Council to High School Teachers, n.d., APT, box 30, folder 5.
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praise to the city and parish. On September 17, the “Huntley-Brinkley Report” devoted 
seven minutes of air-time to the parish’s peaceful desegregation.56
Although the process of school desegregation occurred peacefully, conditions in 
the schools for the pioneering students were horrid. Taking the Citizens’ Council’s 
advice, teachers ignored their black pupils. Some white students followed their 
teachers’ examples. At Lee High, white students even formed a club, Don’t  Admit They 
Exist (DATE). By the end of the school year, African-American students showed the 
strain of the abuse. On April 22,1964, Velma Hunter, a Baton Rouge High student, 
snapped. As she and five of her African-American classmates ate lunch near the 
teachers’ table, a white male student walked up to her, accused her of bad-mouthing 
him, and dumped his food on her. In response, she threw a plate at him, and it broke 
over h]£ head. School officials suspended the male student for throwing his food on her 
and suspended Hunter for cursing the boy.57
Many members of the black community supported the students, and some even 
donated money to ease the financial burden on the parents of the twenty-eight 
transferees. Despite their misery at the integrated high schools, several of these 
students, including Freya Anderson and Murphy F. Bell, sued and won admission to
56“EBR Schools Open on Tuesday,” State-Times, September 2, 1962, 1; “BR 
Schools Admit Negroes Without Incident,” State-Times, September 3,1963; “No Major 
Incidents As Negroes Attend BRHigh Schools,” Morning Advocate, September 4,
1963, 1; ‘Trouble Free School Mixing Draws Praise,” Morning Advocate, September 5, 
1963, 1; “TV Program Praises BR’s Peaceful Mixing,” Morning Advocate, September 
18, 1963, 7B.
57Walt Barton, “Around the Capitol,” Fall 1963, Russell Long Collection, box 
360, folder 28; Wade Mackie to Seymour Samet, AFSC, Civil Rights Division — Baton 
Rouge, South Central Regional Office, 1964.
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LSU’s undergraduate program and began taking classes there in the summer of 1964. 
The university’s administration realized that opposition to the suit was fruitless and, 
when Judge West ordered the school to admit the black students, LSU did not appeal 
his decision.58
The second group of African Americans to attend integrated high schools fared 
worse than the first twenty-eight. Fearing that even more qualified black students would 
want to move to white schools, the School Board limited the time for their parents to 
apply for transfer to five days. Although the superintendent required parents to submit 
the forms in person at the School Board office, some black principals and teachers told 
them to bring the forms to them. Fearing for their jobs, African-American teachers even 
discouraged their students from transferring to white schools.59
Fifty-seven black students enrolled in white schools for the 1964-1965 school 
year. The reaction of white students and school officials to the increased number of 
African Americans became more severe. One white student tried to run down three 
black ones as they walked home from school. He barely missed them. The police 
refused to charge the teenager although he admitted intentionally trying to hit the black 
youths. At another school, a white boy tossed his food in the face of an African- 
American girl. The principal expelled the young woman even though she did not
58Program Evaluations, AFSC, Baton Rouge Program —  Reports, South Central 
Regional Office, 1964.
59Wade Mackie to Garnet Guild, April 24,1964, AFSC, Baton Rouge Program, 
South Central Regional Office, 1964.
269
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
retaliate. School officials at Glen Oaks High School singled out the black students at 
student assemblies by requiring them to sit together on the front row.60
The tokenism that characterized the desegregation of East Baton Rouge Parish’s 
public school system and the abuse of the students disturbed the city’s black population. 
In 1964, African-American parents petitioned the School Board and asked for 
immediate and complete desegregation. The board refused, so the parents asked Judge 
West to order full integration. He sided with the board, and for the rest of the decade, 
the parish’s public schools remained virtually segregated. Although East Baton Rouge 
Parish allowed a few black students to transfer to white schools, it maintained a dual 
system of education. The School Board began discussing the creation o f a unified one 
only in 1969 when the Fifth Circuit Court o f Appeals began ordering neighboring 
parishes to dismantle their dual systems. In an attempt to control the conversion to a 
single school system without making any real changes to the existing one, the School 
Board appointed a biracial committee to find a way to “preserve the school system and 
at the same time convert public schools to a unitary system.” In 1969, NAACP 
President D’Orsay Bryant and Regional Vice President Alphonso Potter sued seeking 
immediate integration of the entire school system. Members of this biracial committee 
urged Johnnie Jones, attorney for the two NAACP officers, not to pursue the suit and to 
allow them to reach a desegregation agreement among themselves. Jones, who had 
always been an opponent of these types of biracial committees, refused and proceeded
^ ‘School Integration is Reported Quiet,” Morning Advocate, August 29,1964, 
13A; Wade Mackie to Norman Amaker, December 11 1964, AFSC, Baton Rouge 
Program, South Central Regional Office, 1964.
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with the suit. On January 16,1970, Judge West ruled the unification of East Baton 
Rouge Parish’s public schools to be complete by August 31. Although it ordered the 
creation of a unitary school system, West’s decision did not bring completely integrated 
schools to East Baton Rouge Parish. In the three decades following West’s ruling, most 
of the parish’s schools remained racially segregated. Through a series o f court orders 
and consent decrees, the School Board attempted to force integration but only 
succeeded in creating white flight and the founding o f private and parochial schools 
throughout the parish. The board tried to lure white students back into the public school 
system and, at the same time, advance integration by placing magnet schools in black 
neighborhoods, but failed to convince large numbers o f white parents to send their 
children to these inner city schools. In the end the 1962 compromise was a victory for 
the white leaders and accommodationists. It preserved peaceful race relations in the 
parish, prevented the segregationists from closing the city’s schools to prevent 
integration, and, for all intents and purposes, maintained a publicly-funded dual system 
of education. Forty-three years after it was filed, Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish 
School Board remains active, and school desegregation remains incomplete.61
6IDaniel Byrd to Norman Amaker, October 13,1964, APT, box 29, folder 25; 
“HEW Ruling to Increase BR Students,” Morning Advocate, August 3,1969, 1; “EBR 
Biracial Group Gingerly Airs Goals,” Morning Advocate, January 6, 1970,1; “EBR 
School Mixing May be Sought in Motion File Today,” Morning Advocate, January 16, 
1970,6C; “Desegregation is Ordered for EBR by Next August 31,” Morning Advocate, 
January 17,1970,1.
271
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter 8 
Working-class Activists, 1962-1964
The protests over school desegregation in 1962 marked the emergence o f a new 
group of civil rights protesters — working-class activists. Led by Arthur Jelks, the 
NAACP pushed the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board into implementing a school 
desegregation plan. The working-class activists rose to the forefront o f the movement 
just as the World War II and student activists were being persecuted by District 
Attorney Pitcher and CORE was being banned from the city. In early 1962, they 
launched a series of protests against segregation and because of their efforts, the civil 
rights movement in Baton Rouge escalated. Unlike the student and World War II 
activists who were well educated and, for the most part, came from middle- and upper- 
class backgrounds, few working-class activists possessed more than a high school 
education; most worked in menial jobs and had very little disposable income. Also 
unlike earlier activists and especially CORE members, working-class activists 
abandoned the principles of nonviolence and fought back when faced with police 
brutality and threats from segregationists. Their goals also differed from the student and 
World War II activists in that they sought economic equality in addition to social 
equality. The working-class activists had very little in common with the middle- and 
upper-class racial diplomats and clashed not only with white leaders and segregationists 
but also with the black leadership. The radicalism of the working class activists created 
an atmosphere of racial discord and led to a series of violent clashes between protesters, 
their opponents, and the police.
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Both World War II and student activists attempted to reorganize the Baton 
Rouge chapter of the NAACP following a Supreme Court ruling in February, 1960, that 
overturned the 1956 state ban on the organization, but they could not meet the national 
office’s minimum of fifty members required to reactivate the chapter. Racial diplomats, 
who had controlled the NAACP in the 1940s and 1950s, refused to take part in bringing 
the chapter back because white leaders and segregationists believed that the 
organization was attempting to foment discontent within Baton Rouge’s black 
population. The savvy negotiators knew that, in order to maintain their relationships 
with white leaders and continue to work to improve conditions for African Americans, 
they could not reactivate the local chapter. Instead, they joined FOCUS. Unlike civil 
rights organizations such as the NAACP and CORE, FOCUS refused to take part in 
protests and worked to increase voter registration, lobbied white leaders to employ 
African Americans in public agencies, and attempted to convince local hospitals to 
admit black doctors to their staffs.1
In early 1962, NAACP officials finally succeeded in reactivating the local 
branch. On February 27, more than one hundred African Americans gathered at Green 
Chapel African Methodist Episcopal (A.M.E.) Church to elect officers for the new 
group. To the surprise of the racial diplomats, who, to maintain their stature in the 
community attended the first meetings of the newly organized branch and were 
accustomed to serving as officers of organizations, the members elected Reverend
lDonald T. Moss to Herbert Wright, May 30,1960, NAACP Papers, Group HI, 
box C52, folder 10; Lucille Black to C. J. Gilliam, October 25,1961, ibid.; A. P. 
Tureaud to Dorothea Combre, April 4, 1962, APT, box 11, folder 7.
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Arthur Jelks as president. Unlike past presidents o f the Baton Rouge branch, such as 
Benjamin Stanley and T. J. Jemison, he was not well-educated and served as pastor of a 
church with a predominately working-class congregation. Jelks and the working-class 
members o f the NAACP shared many of the goals o f the student activists. Both groups 
wanted an immediate end to segregated public facilities and increased employment 
opportunities for African Americans, and neither wanted to spend decades fighting for 
equal rights in the federal court system. Yet the two groups differed significantly. 
Working-class activists were, for the most part, older than the student activists and were 
not well-educated. Most had families, lived paycheck to paycheck, and worked for 
white employers. The reprisals that they faced for taking part in the protests were 
harsher than those faced by the students. For example, Leo Hamilton, a machinist, lost 
several jobs because of his activism. His son, Leo Charles Hamilton recalled, “He 
marched and did that kind of stuff, as much as he could and keep jobs. You know, you 
hack people off, you lose your job.” Although Southern expelled student activists, many 
continued their education at northern colleges and universities. Another difference 
proved especially important. Although both groups used the methods of protest, sit-ins, 
marches, and picketing, the working-class activists were not bound by the principles of 
nonviolence. When confronted by segregationists and hostile police officers, they often 
fought back.2
2Gloster Current to Mr. Moon, February 28,1962, NAACP Papers, Group HI, 
box C52, folder 10; “NAACP Organizational Meeting Slated Here,” Morning Advocate, 
February 27,1962, 13A; “Reverend A. Jelks Will Head BR NAACP Chapter,” Morning 
Advocate, March 1,1962,4A
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The differences between the working-class activists and the racial diplomats 
were even more striking. Initially, the racial diplomats tried to appease the working- 
class activists in the organization by proclaiming their support for “the welfare of the 
underprivileged” but did little to help working-class blacks. At the organization’s April 
3 meeting, Jemison called for white officials to hire African-American policemen in 
order to help curb juvenile delinquency in the black community. Even when talking to 
members of his own race, Jemison spoke in the language of racial diplomats. He 
addressed the white fear of black youths and reasoned that black police officers would 
be better able to control these young troublemakers than white officers. By taking such 
action, Jemison added, white leaders would be following the example o f the nearby 
communities o f Port Allen and Hammond. In contrast, at the same meeting, Jelks 
announced that he had sent telegrams to Governor Davis and Mayor-President Christian 
and asked for a meeting to discuss an end to segregation. Unlike Jemison who rationally 
pointed out to whites the benefits to integration, Jelks warned them, “We can have 
peace and tranquility, or we can have the battle of Baton Rouge.” Jelks’ ultimatum 
angered racial diplomats, who complained to the NAACP’s national office. The 
national leaders urged the fiery minister to clear all correspondence with his branch’s 
executive committee, upon which several racial diplomats sat. Jelks ignored the advice 
and continued to press white officials to bring an immediate end to segregation. In early 
May, he told white leaders that “the ‘new Negro’ is here to stay.”3
3“Local NAACP Meet Stresses Negro’s Rights,” Morning Advocate, April 4, 
1962, 14A; Gloster Current to Arthur Jelks, April 16, 1962, NAACP Papers, Group m , 
box C52, folder 10; “Local NAACP Meeting Set Tuesday Night,” Morning Advocate, 
May 1,1962, 7A.
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Under Jelks* leadership the Baton Rouge branch became the driving force 
behind the city* s civil rights movement In August 1962, the NAACP launched the 
campaign, discussed in the previous chapter, to integrate the East Baton Rouge Parish 
School System. On August 2, Jelks announced that the organization would hold a rally 
in support of school desegregation and planned to invite Martin Luther King, Jr. to 
speak. The threat of King’s visiting the community frightened white leaders because 
they knew that a demonstration would accompany his visit and that national attention 
would be focused on the city. Attorney General Jack Gremillion warned, “Anyone who 
seeks to stir up the emotions of our people by mass demonstrations, the purpose of 
which is to induce violence, will be prosecuted to the fullest extent o f the law.”4
While Gremillion threatened to prosecute agitators, District Attorney Sargent 
Pitcher adopted a more direct approach. Fearing that Jelks would mobilize the black 
community in the same way CORE Field Secretary B. Elton Cox had done in leading 
1961 march to downtown Baton Rouge, and the student activists had done in organizing 
the Southern University demonstrations, Pitcher placed Jelks and several other NAACP 
members under surveillance and targeted them for arrest. Jelks believed that Pitcher 
tapped his phones and placed him under twenty-four hour police surveillance.5
Pitcher’s fears became a reality when a group of working-class activists staged 
sit-ins at several downtown lunch counters. One group of eight young women entered
4“Local NAACP Will Discuss Desegregation,” Morning Advocate, August 7, 
1962, 14B; “NAACP Slates Mass Meeting Here Sunday,” Morning Advocate, August
11, 1962,2A.
s“Negro Seeking to Enroll Girl in White School,” Morning Advocate, August 
10, 1962, 8A.
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McCrary’s lunch counter, sat in the white section, and waited to be served. In response, 
the food department's manager, F. J. Bertrand, closed the area. The eight remained 
seated even after he turned off the lights. At Montgomery Ward’s counter, another 
group of African Americans placed a take-out order, but instead of leaving, they sat in 
an area reserved for white customers. Fearing that the incident would harm her 
business, the manager, Dorothy Bush, told the press that the black customers tricked her 
and added, “We didn’t feed them deliberately.” Jelks promised that these sit-ins marked 
the beginning of a larger campaign for desegregation push and claimed that the NAACP 
would pick up where the banned CORE left off.6
District Attorney Pitcher and white leaders feared that he might be right and 
decided that the best way to prevent larger demonstrations was by silencing Jelks. The 
district attorney thought that with Jelks out of the picture, the local movement would 
crumble. When the NAACP met on the evening of September 4, Pitcher sent several 
informants to the meeting to gather “evidence” against Jelks and Cox, who was free on 
bond from his 1961 arrest and speaking at the meeting. Using the information gleaned 
from these spies, Pitcher accused the two men of slandering him and several local 
judges. In their speeches, the two men bad accused the district attorney of encouraging 
several judges to hand down rulings that favored the prosecution in civil rights cases. 
Cox had also informed the crowd that one of his fellow prisoners in the East Baton 
Rouge Parish jail told him that Pitcher accepted $3,000 from a prisoner in exchange for
6“Crowd Jeers in Mixing Try by Negroes,” Morning Advocate, September 5, 
1962, 1; “Hit-and-Run Negro Sit-Ins Reported Here,” State-Times, September 4, 1962, 
10A; “Sit-In Flurries Follow Attempts at Enrollment,” State-Times, September 5, 1962, 
2C.
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a lenient sentence. Within days, a grand jury convened and indicted Jelks and Cox on 
charges o f defamation of character. The indictment claimed that the two men had 
exposed the district attorney “to hatred, contempt, and ridicule” and deprived him “of 
the benefit of public confidence and social intercourse.” Ironically, Pitcher committed 
the very same offenses in his public statements about Cox, Jelks, and other civil rights 
leaders.7
Judge Fred LeBIanc immediately issued bench warrants for both men and set 
their bonds at $10,000 each. Ronnie Moore and Patricia Tate, two CORE officers who 
remained in Baton Rouge and both o f whom attended the September 4 meeting, offered 
to testify for Jelks and Cox. Pitcher and the grand jury refused to hear them. At that 
point, Moore and Tate issued a public statement denouncing both the district attorney 
and the grand jury. They claimed that East Baton Rouge Parish officials “have used 
every un-American and unethical tactic to maintain segregation, whereas civil rights 
leaders are intimidated by parish officials through criminal prosecutions, incarcerations, 
and violent cross burnings.” Moore and Tate continued, “Members of the White 
Citizens’ Councils, KKK, and other similar organizations are not prosecuted.” Within 
days, the grand jury indicted Moore and Tate, too, on the charge of defamation of 
character. Judge LeBIanc set their bonds at $5,000 each.8
7B. Elton Cox’s Speech, September4,1962, Lawyer’s Constitutional Defense 
League Papers, box 17; Indictment, B. Elton Cox and Arthur Jelks, CORE Papers,
Series V, reel 17.
8“Grand Jurors to Probe BR Meet Comments,” Morning Advocate, September 7, 
1962, 8B; “Negro Ministers are Indicted in Defamations,” Morning Advocate, 
September 8, 1962, 1; “Defamation and Kidnaping Indictments Filed by Jury,” State- 
Times, September 8,1962, 1; Injunction, Patricia Tate and Ronnie Moore, Lawyers
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Johnnie Jones represented Jelks and asked a prominent, but unnamed, black 
businessman to post bond for his client. The man, a racial diplomat, refused because he 
believed that Jelks and the three others were militant troublemakers who were actually 
hurting the advancement of African Americans. Unable to raise the bond locally, Jones 
asked the NAACP’s national office for help. The civil rights attorney wanted to secure 
the bail money before Jelks surrendered to the police because he believed that his client 
would suffer abuse at the hands of his jailers if allowed to remain in prison. Jones 
hoped to keep this plan a secret, but Jelks leaked it to members o f the press to gain 
media attention for the cause. When police officials learned o f the plan, they decided to 
make the activist’s arrest a media event As Jelks, Jones, and Clarence Laws, the 
NAACP’s field secretary for Louisiana, walked into the bondsman’s office, policemen 
arrested the minister. Laws later complained that the police treated Jelks like a common 
criminal and added that “newsreels [and] pictures were made o f the entire proceeding as 
the sheriff, district attorney, and senior law inforcement [sic] officers tried to get into 
the act.” Even though he suffered the humiliation of a public arrest, Jelks was released 
on bond, which was paid for by the NAACP, and succeeded in calling attention to 
continued segregation in East Baton Rouge Parish.9
Constitutional Defense League Papers, box 17; “Pair Indicted in Defaming of Grand 
Jury,” Morning Advocate, September 15, 1962, 1; “Book Pair Indicted in Defamation,” 
State-Times, September 15,1962,1; "Negro Woman Indicted Turns Self In,” Morning 
Advocate, September 16,1962, 1.
telephone Report by Clarence Laws, September 12,1962, NAACP Papers, 
Group Efi, boxC52, folder 10; Roy Wilkins to Richard McClain, September 11,1962, 
ibid.; “Jelks is Free After Posting $10,000 Bond,” Morning Advocate, September 11, 
1962, 1; “Jelks Free on Bond in Defamation,” State-Times, September 11, 1962,1.
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Instead o f destroying the movement, die arrests of the four civil rights activists
actually strengthened it. When Cox went on trial in November 1962, Jelks and the
NAACP demanded the desegregation of all public facilities in the courthouse, including
the courtroom, restrooms, lunch counters, and water fountains. Acting as Cox’s
attorney, Johnnie Jones asked Judge LeBIanc to end segregated seating in the
courtroom. LeBIanc denied the request and twice ordered Jelks to move when he sat in
the white section o f the room. Jelks complied when LeBIanc threatened him with
contempt of court. The following day, November 29, two members o f the NAACP’s
Youth Council, McArthur Triplett and Joe Lewis Smith staged a sit-in in the
courthouse’s lunch room. Police quickly arrested them. The same day, three women
Pearl George, Willie Lee Harris, and Laura Harris took even more drastic action.
They entered the courtroom and found no empty seats in the black section, so they sat
on the front row o f the nearly vacant white section. The bailiff ordered them to move,
the women refused, and LeBIanc asked them to leave the courtroom or be charged with
contempt George recalled:
We said we were going to leave. When I walked to go out that door, something
struck m e I was thinking about the things that I  had been deprived of for
being black, and I thought about my child, who I knew was going to be 
deprived. I remembered that song “I Ain’t  Going to Let Nobody Turn Me 
Around,” and I went back. The three o f us went back and we sit down. The 
bailiff came back again. He said, ‘T m  going to have to ask you-all to leave 
again.” I told him I wasn’t  leaving.
George’s response shocked the African Americans who had gathered for Cox’s trial. 
According to hen
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At this time, blacks were standing up on their feet because this is the first time 
that a black woman had ever talked up to a  white judge. This was something 
unusual. Because, if  a black man tried to speak up for himself, you know, they 
would beat him; they would humiliate him. I says, “Well, if I ’m going to die, let 
me die fer something. That black folks would enjoy some of the things that I 
couldn’t enjoy.” I stood there, and I told him that if  he would let me go back 
again, I’d sit on the side that was all white. I said, “Judge LeBIanc, you’re 
talking about justice in the courtroom, and you’re telling me just because my 
skin is black that I have a certain side to sit on.” I said, “There’s no vacant seats 
to sit over there.” He say, “Stand up against the wall like the rest o f them.” I told 
him, “Not on your life.” He says, “You’re telling me, that if I let you go, that 
you wouldn’t leave the courtroom.” I say, “I’m telling you, if  you let me go, I’ll 
sit on the white side.”
LeBIanc immediately charged George and the other women with contempt of court and
asked the bailiff to arrest them. When questioned by the judge, all three claimed that
they took this action to make life better for their children. “I was thinking about my
little girl at home,” George recalled, “She had been deprived, and I was tired of it.”
Laura Harris testified, “I know it wouldn’t help myself, but I know it would help my
children some day. That’s why I sit there.” LeBIanc found all three women guilty of
contempt of court, fined each $100, and sentenced them to ten days in jail. When they
refused to pay their fines, he increased their jail time to thirty days. Arresting these
three mothers heightened racial tension in Baton Rouge and strengthened the resolve of
the working-class activists to fight segregation. At the same time, it widened the gulf
between them and the racial diplomats. No black leader spoke out in support of the
women or used his or her influence with white leaders to secure their release. Instead,
they allowed the women to remain in jail.10
I0Gloster Current to Robert Carter, November 29,1962, NAACP Papers, Group 
m , box C52, folder 10; George v. Clemmons, December 3,1962, NAACP Papers, 
Group 5, box 53; Opposition to Application fo r Bail, ibid.; Pearl George, interview by 
unknown, tape recording, January 7,1983, YWCA Collection, East Baton Rouge Public
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All three women came from working-class families and all were mothers. Willie 
Lee Harris, the mother of six children ranging  from five to sixteen, belonged to the 
NAACP. Laura Harris had five children ranging in age from fourteen to three and lived 
a few blocks away from George. She also belonged to the NAACP. In the years 
following this incident, Pearl George became one o f the city’s most outspoken working- 
class activists and headed the local NAACP Youth Council. A widow and the mother of 
one child, the twenty-six-year-old George grew up without a father. As the second of 
four children, she and her older sister took care o f their younger siblings while their 
mother worked two jobs. Although their mother encouraged them to get an education, 
George and her sister had to stay at home with the younger children, so they divided 
their school days. One attended classes in the morning and the other in the afternoon. 
George and her husband married shortly before he left for the Korean conflict where he 
was killed, leaving her to raise their daughter alone. As a child, George recognized the 
inequalities that existed between the races but did not become involved in the civil 
rights movement until her daughter was five or six years old and began asking questions 
about the existence of segregated facilities. Around that same time, the CORE sit-ins 
began and Reverend Jelks moved to Baton Rouge. Realizing that Jelks was a civil rights 
activist, she began attending services at his church and asked him how she could 
become involved in the movement “At that time, you couldn’t get black ministers” to 
take part in civil rights demonstrations, she recalled. “I don’t know if they was afraid at
Library, Centroplex Branch, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
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that time or they just wasn’t concerned.” Jelks invited her to an NAACP meeting, and 
she soon became an active member o f the organization.11
The actions of Pearl George, Willie Harris, and Laura Harris confounded white 
leaders. Until this point, the majority o f activists belonged to the black middle class and 
the intelligentsia. White leaders believed that these two groups represented a small 
portion o f the city’s black comm unity  and did not reflect the views o f the black working 
class — the men and women who mowed their lawns, cleaned their homes, and cooked 
their meals. They convinced themselves that the black masses were content with the 
system of segregation and would never strike out against it unless duped into it by 
outside agitators. Initially, white leaders tried to paint the three working-class women as 
patsies o f the NAACP. During the trial o f George and the Harrises, Sargent Pitcher 
implied that their attorney, Johnnie Jones, and Jelks conned the women into sitting in 
the white section of the courtroom. According to the district attorney, Jones and the 
NAACP wanted to use their arrest as a test case that they would appeal to the Supreme 
Court. Pitcher also questioned the honesty of the women and claimed that Jones told 
them to use their children to gain sympathy from the court and the public. By describing 
these working-class women as pawns, white leaders underestimated their commitment 
to ending segregation. They also erred in believing that by arresting a few of these 
lower-class protesters, imposing astronomically high bails and fines, and jailing them
1 [La. NAACP Leader Fights Jim Crow in Courthouse, November 30,1962, 
NAACP Papers, Group HI, box C52, folder 10; George v. Clemmons, November 29, 
1962 - December 3, 1962, NAACP Papers, Group V, box 53; Pearl George, interview 
by unknown.
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when they could not pay the fines, that they could discourage others from taking part in 
the civil rights movement.12
After the arrest of the three women, Cox’s trial began. The following day, a jury 
found him guilty, and LeBIanc offered to release him on a $5,000 bond pending his 
sentencing. Cox declined the bail and chose to remain in jail to draw attention to the 
racial injustice that existed in Baton Rouge. But after the violent clash over the 
desegregation of the University of Mississippi that had occurred two months earlier and 
the previous year’s mass arrests in Albany, Georgia, the imprisonment of one man 
attracted very little attention outside of Baton Rouge.13 CORE officials in Louisiana 
urged the national office to use a “total saturation” campaign to get word o f Cox’s 
imprisonment out. They called the case a “true horror story” that needed to be brought 
to the attention o f the press, but the national office did little to publicize the young 
minister’s plight. Cox, who suffered from chronic health problems, grew ill in jail while 
his sacrifice went unnoticed.14
The arrests of George, Jelks, and the others in the fall of 1962 invigorated the 
working-class activists, however. “The white folks would put these types o f charges on 
you so you could stay in jail, so they could try and discourage you from participating 
again,” said George, “but the more that they would try to make it hard or discourage
l2George v. Clemmons, NAACP Papers, Group V, box 53.
l3Taylor Branch’s Parting the Waters provides a good description for both
events.
I4Robert Collins, et al. to Marvin Rich, January 25, 1963, Lawyers 
Constitutional Defense League Papers, box 17; Jones, interview, October 2, 1993,87- 
90.
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me, the more determination I had. It got to be something good. I needed to have a white 
man trying to discourage me.” On October 2, five African-American women staged sit- 
ins in the cafeterias of two local hospitals — the Baton Rouge General and Our Lady of 
the Lake. Cafeteria workers refused to serve them at both locations, but at the Lake, the 
activists refused to leave when they were denied service. The women purchased food 
and drinks from vending machines, brought them into the cafeteria, and ate at a table 
reserved for whites. In response, hospital officials closed the cafeteria and sent its white 
customers to a dining facility used by student nurses.1S
In addition to bringing their own meals into the cafeteria, this new breed of 
activists also lengthened their sit-ins. Whereas the previous year Southern students 
affiliated with CORE had staged a series of hit-and-run sit-ins that lasted only a few 
minutes, NAACP members occupied seats at white lunch counters for hours at a time. 
On October 5, for example, seven young African Americans occupied two booths in the 
white section of McCrory’s lunch counter for two hours and twenty minutes after 
employees refused to serve them.16
The division within the black community grew as the working-class activists 
intensified their protests and became more confrontational, and by early 1963, only a 
few racial diplomats remained in the NAACP. Like the white leaders and the 
segregationists, the director of branches, Gloster Current, reported to National NAACP
lsPearl George, interview by unknown; “Sit-In Attempts at Hospital Apparently 
Fail,” Morning Advocate, October 3,1962,9A.
l6“Negroes Try Sit-In But Aren’t  Served,” Morning Advocate, October6,1962,
6B.
285
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
President Roy Wilkins, the racial diplomats viewed Jelks as “an outside agitator, a 
militant Negro, and not socially acceptable.” Yet this “socially unacceptable” minister 
quickly rose to a position of prominence in the black community. Current recognized 
the animosity that the racial diplomats had toward Jelks and the working-class activists. 
“These groups [including FOCUS], it would appear, do attempt to minimize the 
NAACP’s effectiveness,” he stated, and “have opposed the reorganization of the 
branch.” Current believed that the rift between the elite and working-class African 
Americans could not be repaired. Although he admitted that Jelks was “a loose-tongued 
individual, impetuous, overly sensitive, and difficult,” Current told Wilkins that they 
could not remove him because “he has the support of the common people in Baton 
Rouge, and they are the only ones apparently concerned with effecting fundamental 
change in the status quo.” Current claimed that the racial diplomats openly thwarted 
what they viewed as “militant activity” to “maintain the peace and tranquility of the 
community.”17
White leaders shared the racial diplomats’ low opinion o f Jelks and wanted to 
prevent him and his followers from engaging in “militant” activities. They believed that 
if Jelks abandoned his civil rights activities or left Baton Rouge, the resolve of the 
working-class activists would crumble and peaceful race relations would return. When 
Jelks and the NAACP initiated a voter registration drive in early 1963, white leaders 
saw an opportunity to oust the civil rights leader. Although white officials in East Baton 
Rouge Parish allowed African Americans who could pass a literacy test to register, the
17Gloster Current to Roy Wilkins, April 25,1963, NAACP Papers, Group HI, 
box C52, folder 11.
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test prevented the majority of working-class blacks, who were for the most part poorly 
educated, from voting. Many African Americans who could read and write refused to 
register because they believed they would suffer economic retribution from whites. A 
black domestic told Jelks that her employer would fire her if  she took part in a 
registration drive because “voting was white folks’ business.” The principal of one of 
the city’s black schools also discouraged teachers from voting. When the NAACP 
president asked black ministers to announce the drive and to solicit volunteers for the 
registration school, he received no cooperation from them. To advertise the drive, Jelks 
decided to hold a voter registration rally on April 5 and invited James Meredith to 
speak. White leaders feared that the controversial Ole Miss student would radicalize the 
city’s black population, which would lead to increased protests. They also worried that 
Meredith’s presence would antagonize the segregationists, already up in arms over the 
African Americans’ demands for school desegregation, which might lead to white 
violence.18
To the relief of white leaders and racial diplomats, Meredith did not appear at 
the rally. Jelks and other activists, including Willis Reed, claimed that racial diplomats 
working with white leaders phoned the Ole Miss student and canceled his appearance. 
Jelks told Jack Minnis of the Southern Regional Conference (SRC) that:
“One o f the big Baptist preachers” [undoubtedly Jemison] got in touch with “a 
big mason”[John G. Lewis] who, in turn, contacted “a big NAACP lawyer in 
New Orleans” [Tureaud]. The purpose of all of this maneuvering was to get the 
lawyer to use the influence he had with Meredith (this influence being based
l8“Meredith Says Impersonators Taking Calls,” Morning Advocate, April 5, 
1963, 1; Jack Minnis to Wiley Branton, August 23, 1963, Southern Regional 
Conference Papers, Series VI, reel 176, file 153 (microfilm).
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upon the fact that the lawyer had met Meredith through Mrs. Motley19) to 
persuade Meredith not to appear at April 5 mass meeting.
The preacher added that racial diplomats such as Jemison and Lewis had “a vested
interest in things remaining as they are, because of business and professional interests.”
He also hinted that white leaders used dossiers of improper behavior to blackmail the
racial diplomats into compliance. While Jelks and other activists charged that the racial
diplomats canceled Meredith’s appearance, the city’s white newspapers claimed that the
young activist never received the invitation because white students in his dormitory
intercepted Jelks’ call, impersonated Meredith, and accepted the speaking invitation.
Although neither the activists nor the white leaders mentioned it, Meredith may have
canceled the speaking engagement himself. The Ole Miss student could have withdrawn
for any o f these reasons, but of paramount importance is the fact that working-class
activists were convinced that racial diplomats in conjunction with white leaders
sabotaged the rally. Their belief in the duplicity of black leaders created further
animosity and distrust between the two groups.20
In the end, Meredith did not attend the rally but sent Mississippi NAACP leader
Medgar Evers as a replacement. To white leaders, Evers was no better than Meredith,
and they remained firm in their resolve to prevent the rally from taking place. On the
evening of the rally, police officers stopped Evers for a traffic violation as he entered
East Baton Rouge Parish and detained him for several hours, making him extremely late
l9NAACP Legal Defense Fund attorney Constance Baker Motley.
20“Meredith Says Impersonators Taking Calls,” Morning Advocate, April 5,
1963, 1; Reed, interview, July 14,1998; Jack Minnis to Wiley Branton, August 23,
1963, Southern Regional Conference Papers, Series VI, reel 176, file 153.
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for the meeting. By the time he arrived, only a few of the most committed NAACP 
members remained. White leaders also prevented Jelks from making an appearance. 
When he left his home that evening, police arrested him on a bench warrant for failure 
to answer a summons to appear in court earlier that day for a hearing on a traffic 
citation that he received in March21. Jelks spent the night in jail and was released on a 
$500 bond the next morning. On the April 6, he received his summons in the mail. The 
NAACP and Jelks believed that local police and the postal service had orchestrated the 
delay in delivery. They charged that mail carriers held the summons, which bore an 
April 1 postmark. In a letter to Postmaster General J. Edward Day, Roy Wilkins 
claimed that Jelks’ mail had been interfered with several times and asked him to 
conduct an investigation into the incident. After an investigation, a postal inspector 
ruled that the summons had been accidentally misdirected.22
Segregationists shared the racial diplomats’ and white leaders’ belief that Jelks 
was an outside agitator, and they also wanted to drive him out of Baton Rouge. Their 
methods were more violent and more overt than those of the black and white leaders. 
On April 14, an arsonist burned down Jelks’ church. Initially, the fire marshal intimated 
that he believed that the minister set the fire to attract sympathy to his cause, but a
21On March 18, a Baton Rouge police officer ticketed Jelks for passing a vehicle 
in an intersection. He pled innocent on March 29, and the judge told him to await a 
summons to appear in court
22Medgar Evers was assassinated two months after his appearance in Baton 
Rouge. “Baton Rouge Integration Chief Arrested Before Meeting,” Morning Advocate, 
April 6,1963,7A; Arthur Jelks to Roy Wilkins, April 11,1963, NAACP Papers, Group 
HI, box C52, folder 11; Gloster Current to Roy Wilkins, April 25,1963, ibid.; H. B. 
Montague to Roy Wilkins, May 3, 1963, ibid.; Jack Minnis to Wiley Branton, August 
23, 1963, Southern Regional Conference Papers, Series VI, reel 176, file 153.
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thorough investigation proved this theory wrong. The culprit, most likely a 
segregationist, was never caught. The fire destroyed Green’s Chapel, and the working- 
class congregation could not raise enough money to rebuild their church. Jelks and the 
church’s officers asked local lending agencies for loans only to be turned down by each 
one. Loan officers told them that the Citizens’ Council and the Ku Klux Klan 
threatened to boycott any institution that aided Jelks and his congregation.23
Just as with the other attempts to destroy the movement, the fire only 
strengthened it. In late April, Gloster Current urged the Baton Rouge chapter to 
intensify its attack on the segregation o f lunch counters, public facilities, and public 
transportation. He also urged the working-class activists to invite the racial diplomats to 
take part in the protests but added that they should not trust these black leaders or allow 
them to take over their program. Current claimed that, if  united, the black community 
could successfully wipe out segregation. In May 1963, the activists, following the 
national officer’s advice, stepped up their protests. White leaders realized that Jelks and 
the working-class activists would not back down in the face o f intimidation.24
When Jelks demanded that Mayor-President Jack Christian create a biracial 
committee composed of working-class activists and white leaders and give it the 
responsibility of bringing a quick end to segregation, the mayor and council complied 
but named racial diplomats and a couple of World War II activists to serve on it. White
“ Arthur Jelks to Roy Wilkins, April 19, 1963, NAACP Papers, Group III, box 
C52, folder 11; Arthur Jelks to Robert F. Kennedy, April 19, 1963, ibid.; Gloster 
Current to Roy Wilkins, April 25 1963, ibid.; Delors Green to National Office, n.d., 
ibid.
24Gloster Current to Arthur Jelks, April 29,1963, ibid.
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leaders considered these African Americans safe. For years, all of them had worked 
with the white elite to maintain, peace and stability in Baton Rouge25. The committee 
consisted o f fifteen white members and fifteen black ones. All of the appointees 
belonged to the city’s middle and upper classes and most were businessmen, plant 
employees, ministers, or professionals. Established by a decree of the city-parish 
council, the Committee on Community Relations met in secret and reported directly to 
the mayor-president. The NAACP denounced the composition of the committee and 
claimed that most of the black members were Uncle Toms. Jelks even released a public 
statement declaring that, other than Dupuy Anderson, the members of the committee 
“did not represent any real Negro leadership.” Fearing that the composition of the 
biracial committee would further divide the black community, Clarence Laws, the 
NAACP field secretary for Louisiana, called a meeting of the Baton Rouge chapter’s 
officers and convinced them to refrain from “public criticism or derogatory statements 
against Negro leaders or the Mayor.” The group also promised as a good faith gesture to
“ Black members of the Biracial Committee included: Leon Netterville, vice 
president of Southern; Horatio Thompson, owner of Horatio’s Auto Parts; Raymond 
Scott, owner of Scott the Tailor’s; Joseph Dyer, a dentist; Dr. B. V. Baranco; John G. 
Lewis, owner of the Fraternal Press; James C. Cook, Humble (ESSO) Oil employee and 
owner of Cook’s Theater; T. J. Jemison, Reverend W. T. Handy of St. Mark’s 
Episcopal Church; Dupuy Anderson; Acie Belton, Humble Oil employee; John Hatcher, 
a dray contractor; Reverend L. L. Haynes, pastor of Wesley Methodist Church; Calvin 
Washington, Humble Oil employee; and Reverend E. D. Billoups, pastor of Second 
Baptist Church. White members included: James L. Winfree, an executive with Gulf
Oil Company; Charles Thibaut, Jr., Tom Collins, Frank Craig, and Carlos Spaht, all 
attorneys; William J. Hughes, Jr, an architect; Reverend Sam flushing of Istrouma 
Baptist Church; Joe Kavanaugh, counsel in the Attorney General’s office; A. A. 
Breeden, owner of Breeden’s Tractor Company; Dr. Henry Jolly; Millard Jackson and 
Thompson Cannon, Humble Oil employees; Melvin Stephens, Solvay Chemicals 
employee; Dr. Sherman Slaughter, and Fred Frey, former LSU dean of students.
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refrain from any protests for thirty days. I f  the biracial committee made no progress, 
then the demonstrations would resume.26
When Jelks went to trial for the March 1963 traffic violation in early June, the 
NAACP again demanded that the judge completely desegregate the Municipal 
Building, including lunch counters, courtrooms, restrooms, and water fountains. When 
the judge refused to do so, they staged a sit-in at the courthouse’s lunch counter, hi 
response to their demands and the sit-ins that followed, Mayor Christian, taking the 
advice o f the biracial committee, ordered the desegregation o f the Municipal Building’s 
water fountains and restrooms and of the courtrooms. To keep blacks and whites from 
actually drinking from the same fountains, the city mounted paper cup dispensers 
beside them. The committee also urged the mayor and the council to hire black police 
officers; they complied but allowed African-American officers to patrol only in black 
neighborhoods and arrest black suspects. This legal action did not stop the 
demonstrations.27
The operator of the courthouse’s coffee shop, Sam Passaro, who happened to be 
blind, shared Pitcher’s opposition to the mayor’s desegregation order. He claimed that 
the presence o f black customers upset his white patrons and added that he would 
continue to deny services to all African Americans. Passaro contended that he had the
“ Minutes of Special Meeting, March 28, 1963, East Baton Rouge Parish City- 
Parish Council; “Chairmen of Bi-Racial Body Named,” Morning Advocate, June 1, 
1963, 1; Buell, “The Politics of Frustration,” 136-137; Clarence Laws to Gloster 
Current, May 31, 1963, NAACP Papers, Group IH, box C52, folder 11.
27“Jelks, NAACP Ask Injunction Go, Payment,” Morning Advocate, June 3, 
1963, 9D; “2 BR Buildings Mark First Day of Integration,” Morning Advocate, June 8, 
1963, 10A.
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right “to refuse service to anyone whose tone o f voice indicated —  [that] they might
cause his business trouble.” He asked Judge Coleman Lindsey to issue a temporary
restraining order against the NAACP and to order Jelks and the NAACP to pay him
$5,000 for humiliating him by staging a sit-in at his counter. At 2:30 p jn. on July 22,
Judge Lindsey complied and issued a restraining order forbidding Jelks and the NAACP
from holding sit-ins or demonstrations at Passaro’s counter. Thirty minutes later, Pearl
George and two men entered the shop and sat at a table. The men left after a couple of
minutes but George remained. She recalled:
I was sitting in the coffee shop, reading a paper, first time a black had ever tried 
to enter into the coffee shop. You could stand at the door and order what you 
wanted, and somebody would bring it to you. But you could not go in and sit 
down and eat like white folks could. There was a black lady [working] there 
then, I guess I could understand her. It was her job to tell the white man that I 
was there, that I had bought a paper and a Hershey Bar candy. I was sitting at 
one of the tables eating it. When I walked in the coffee shop was full, he 
(Passaro] waited on me. She whispered and told him that I was black. He said, 
“If  there’s any colored people in here sitting to the tables, I will have to ask you 
to leave.” I didn’t answer. So, he buzzed for the deputies. The deputies came in. 
He [the deputy] told the proprietor, “You will have to ask her to leave in my 
presence.” The proprietor told me, “I told you colored people ain’t allowed to 
eat in here. You will have to leave.”
Police arrested her for disturbing the peace and LeBlanc set her bond at $1,500. The
same day, an unidentified woman staged a sit-in at a coffee shop in the Municipal
Building. Police did not arrest her, but the manager immediately closed for the day.28
The sit-ins at the courthouse and the Municipal Building marked the beginning
of a series of protests. On July 23, thirty African Americans, including Pearl George,
attempted to use the swimming pool at City Park. Thirty minutes before the protesters
28“Negroes Seek Service at BR Coffee Shops,” Morning Advocate, July 23, 
1963,12C; Pearl George, interview by unknown.
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arrived, the police received an anonymous call telling them of the pending 
desegregation attempt. Police Chief Wingate White immediately notified the Recreation 
and Parks Commission and went, along with a contingency o f policemen, to the scene. 
Pearl George believed that an informant who attended a planning session the previous 
evening called authorities. “When we got to the City Park, there were sheriffs 
department, city police, state police,” she recalled, “They was there with their guns and 
billy clubs waiting to receive us and ask where we were going as we walked into the 
City Park, and I told them that we was going to swim.” The group of African 
Americans, including George’s daughter and several other children, rushed Robert 
Clanton, a lifeguard posted at the entrance of the pool house, and went into the locker 
area. Chief White and Captain Leslie Font arrested two of the men who had pushed 
passed Clanton, twenty-one-year-old Sam Green and twenty-one-year-old Richard 
Thompson. They charged both with disturbing the peace and simple battery. Then, the 
officers moved the protesters out o f the building. Once outside, the activists became 
unruly. When the paddy wagon arrived to take Green and Thompson to jail, the activists 
rushed it and pulled the doors open. Green attempted to escape, and the officers pushed 
him back inside. At that point, White engaged in a shouting match with the protesters. 
White told George, “You better be glad that it was I who came to arrest you-all because 
if it was [anyone else], Gilbert’s [the black funeral home] would have picked you up.” 
She replied, “I’ll tell you one damned thing. You know Rabenhorst [the white funeral 
home] is riding too.” Unlike the student activists, George refused to be bound by the 
principal of nonviolence. “I believed an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth,” she said, 
“I believed that if  I turned my left cheek, you were going to slap me on the right one.
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Either you was going to die, or I was going to die.” The officers arrested three more 
demonstrators, including George, and charged them with disturbing the peace, simple 
battery, and resisting arrest. Their bonds ranged from $3,000 to $6,000.The biracial 
committee met on July 23 but did not discuss the battle at the swimming pool. The 
following day, Jelks and a small group of NAACP members picketed outside the City 
Park Clubhouse. Several of them carried signs that read, ‘The Biracial Committee is 
Sleeping on Our Rights.”29
Six months later, the five arrested at the pool stood trial in a state district court. 
Their attorney Johnnie Jones tried to argue that they were protesting against the 
continued segregation of the city’s publicly funded parks and recreation system. Judge 
Jess Johnson refused to listen to the argument and told Jones, “No one objects to a 
demonstration, —  but to walk into a place where admission is charged and manhandle 
an attendant is not a demonstration.” Chief White testified that if the five had purchased 
tickets to use the pool, he and Font would not have prevented them from entering the 
facility. Of course, the city’s segregation laws prevented George and the others from 
paying for their admissions. Johnson found the five guilty and sentenced them to jail 
terms ranging from ninety days to six months and ordered them to pay fines ranging 
from $100 to $250. George received the six-month sentence.30
“ “Negro Group Tries to Mix Pool in Park,” Morning Advocate, July 24, 1963,
1; Pearl George, interview by unknown; “Mayor, Law Officers Pledge Action on any 
Mob Violence,” State-Times, July 24,1963, 1; ‘Tickets Appear at City Park Again 
Thursday,” Morning Advocate, July 26,1963, 6C.
3°«pive Negroes at Swim-In Convicted,” Morning Advocate, January 8, 1964, 1; 
“Supreme Court Holds Negroes’ Sentences Valid,” Morning Advocate, May 2,1964, 1; 
Pearl George, interview by unknown; Johnnie Jones to Robert Carter, July 24, 1963,
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Ia response to the biracial committee’s refusal to take any action after the 
swimming pool incident, the NAACP asked U. S. District Judge E. Gordon West for a 
hearing on the 1953 park desegregation suit. The renewed interest in the park suit 
stemmed not only from the swimming pool arrests but also from a federal court ruling 
the previous week that desegregated New Orleans’s public parks. Jelks promised that 
picketing of the park would continue until either the court or the biracial committee 
allowed all people to use these publicly funded facilities, hi February 1964, the 
Supreme Court overturned a Louisiana law requiring segregation of public park 
facilities. As a segregationist, West delayed his decision as long as possible because he 
knew that legal precedents required him to desegregate these facilities. In April 1964, 
the attorney handling the case, Johnnie Jones, complained about the delay and filed a 
renewal motion for a summary judgement. West chastised him, “As soon as I can get to 
it, I will get to it.”31
On May 7, the Recreation and Parks Commission, knowing that West would 
eventually order the desegregation of the public pool at City Park, decided to close it 
rather than allow black and white children to swim together. The commission wanted to 
prevent more demonstrations and claimed that the decision to close the pool was a 
financial one. According to Eugene Young, superintendent of the parks, it never made a 
profit and, in fact, usually ran a deficit. Yet the anticipated loss for 1964 was in line
NAACP Papers, Group V, boxB3, folder Correspondence: Carter, Robert (Joh-Joy), 
1957-1963.
31“Rec. Facility Desegregation Efforts Planned,” Morning Advocate, August 6, 
1963, 8A; “West to Deliberate on Park Integration,” Morning Advocate, April 18,1964, 
11 A.
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with those of previous years. Commission Chairman William McGehee promised that 
the group would look into leasing the pool out to a  private company, which would have 
removed it from public control and would have allowed African Americans to be 
excluded even if  West issued a desegregation order. On May 18, West ordered the 
Recreation Commission to integrate its facilities but added that there was “no legal 
obligation or duty on the part of the city or parish to provide or operate recreational 
facilities.” Following the judge’s advice, the commission decided to fill in the pool at 
City Park rather than allow black and white children to swim together.32
The day after West’s ruling, three African Americans attempted to play golf at 
one o f the city’s white courses. Park employees refused to allow them to do so and 
stated that until the commission received official notification of West’s decision, the 
facilities would remain segregated. Six days later, park officials turned away four black 
golfers at another course, again pending receipt o f the court order. Although West 
suggested that the city-parish abolish its public park system, the commission decided to 
comply with his ruling. On May 27, park facilities, except for the swimming pools, 
desegregated without incident when several black golfers used two white courses.33
32“BR Swim Pools To Stay Closed,” State-Times, May 7,1964,1; “EBR Plans 
to Keep Public Pools Closed,” Morning Advocate, May 8,1964,1; “EBR Parish Pool 
Closing Is Confirmed,” Morning Advocate, May 10, 1964,1; “Recreational Area in 
City Desegregated,” Morning Advocate, May 19, 1964, 1.
33“Three Negroes Apply to Play at City Park,” Morning Advocate, May 20,
1964, 14B; “Four Negroes Turned Away at Webb Park,” Morning Advocate, May 26, 
1964,12C; “Anti-Mixing Move Killed by BREC,” Morning Advocate, May 23,1964,
1; “Park Facilities Here Integrate Without Alarm,” Morning Advocate, May 28, 1964,1.
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Although the biracial committee played little role in bringing about park 
desegregation, it successfully negotiated the end to segregation at other facilities. With 
the intervention of committee members, twelve downtown stores desegregated their 
lunch counters without any fanfare. When Pearl George and several others attempted to 
take part in the first integration attempt, they discovered that in the deal worked out 
between the committee and the managers, Southern students were the only African 
Americans allowed to participate in the initial desegregation o f the counters. George 
was indignant, so the manager told her to call her leader, Reverend Jemison. She told 
the manager, “Reverend Jemison do not lead me. I lead myself.” George believed that 
the biracial committee selected the Southern students to desegregate the counters 
because they belonged to the black elite. Although George bristled at the involvement 
of the biracial committee in lunch counter desegregation, without its intervention, these 
businesses would have remained segregated.34
With lunch counter desegregation achieved, working-class activists turned their 
attention to obtaining economic equality. They wanted to open up jobs traditionally 
reserved for whites, such as cashiers and store clerks, and to obtain higher wages for 
black workers. In October 1963, Pearl George and a group of African Americans 
demanded that white-owned grocery stores in black neighborhoods hire black workers. 
When the owners refused, George and her supporters picketed these businesses. Their 
protests often ended in violence. On October 3, a group o f young picketers threw rocks
^ “Lunch Counters at 12 Major BR Sites Integrated,” Morning Advocate, August 
7,1963, 7A; “Negroes Picket Downtown BR Wednesday,” Morning Advocate, August 
8, 1963, IOC; Pearl George, interview by unknown.
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and bottles at a city bus. Three weeks later, protesters fought with segregationists who 
taunted them as they marched.35
In February 1964, the biracial committee attacked another vestige o f segregation 
when members reached an agreement with local hospitals to allow black doctors to 
have hospital privileges, but stipulated that they could only treat black patients. This 
change did little for working-class African Americans who could not afford to pay for 
health care and relied on the state’s charity hospital system to meet their medical 
needs.36
Through its efforts, the biracial committee achieved not only desegregation of 
downtown lunch counters and hospital privileges for black doctors but also convinced 
the mayor to hire black police officers and to desegregate restrooms, lunch counters, 
and water fountains in the Municipal Building. Yet, the biracial committee and its 
composition concerned World War II activists. Although some, such as Dupuy 
Anderson and Raymond Scott, served on the committee, others wanted to abolish it. 
Johnnie Jones denounced the committee’s secrecy and declared that if  voters elected a 
black man to the city-parish council “the necessity of a biracial committee that meets 
behind closed doors, not responsible to the people, will be eliminated.”37
35“Negroes Throw Bricks Through Bus Windows,” Morning Advocate, October 
3, 1963,1 IF; “Negroes Picket White-Operated Grocery Stores,” Morning Advocate, 
October 10, 1963, 8C; “Negroes Create Ugly Scene in Front of BR Food Store,” 
Morning Advocate, October 20,1963,5C.
36“Plan to Admit Negro Doctors,” Morning Advocate, February 24, 1964,1.
37“ Jones Gives Statement in Council Race,” Morning Advocate, June 28,1964,
11 A.
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Segregationists also denounced the biracial committee and resented the secrecy 
surrounding it. The committee met in private and reported directly to Mayor Christian, 
who kept its recommendations, even those he implemented, confidential. When the 
committee negotiated the admission of black doctors to the staffs o f white hospitals, for 
example, it made no public statement. In fact, the city’s newspapers discovered the 
existence of the changes only when unnamed committee members leaked the 
information to the press. This shroud of secrecy may have made the interaction between 
committee members easier, but it also allowed segregationists to engage in wild 
speculation about its activities. Segregationists circulated a rumor that the committee 
created the August 1963 school integration plan. when, in reality, it played no role in the 
process. In February 1964, a frustrated city-parish council demanded that the mayor 
report on the body’s activities. Christian outlined the group’s accomplishments and 
commended its members for their work in “maintaining the ‘proper image’ for Baton 
Rouge.” Two months later, the biracial committee met in an executive session with the 
mayor and the council for nearly two hours and convinced a majority of council 
members that it should remain active.38
Controversy surrounding the committee did not end with the council’s vote, hi 
fact, Councilman Robert T. “Bobby” Clegg issued a statement following the meeting to 
express his opposition to the committee. He noted that he had voted against the 
formation of the group and continued to oppose it because he believed it violated the
38“Council Looks at Biracial Responsibility,” Morning Advocate, February 24, 
1964, 1; “Council Backs Its Bi-Racial Group’s Work;” Morning Advocate, April 2, 
1964,1.
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constitutional rights o f white Baton Rougeans and created a “knife at the throat 
atmosphere.”39
The biracial committee became a dominant issue in the!964 mayoral election. 
Four candidates challenged Jack Christian for mayor Woodrow W. “Woody” Dumas a 
twelve-year member of the city-parish council and salesman for Commercial Steel 
Building & Metal Company; L. W. “Puna” Eaton, owner o f L. W. Eaton Construction 
Company; Mike Safer, owner o f Mike Safer Scrap Metals, Co.; and Ossie Brown, an 
attorney. Christian, Dumas and Eaton supported the biracial committee and believed 
that it helped to maintain peace. ‘Tor fourteen months this community has been without 
racial conflict largely through the efforts of those individuals serving on this 
committee,” Christian said. “The committee has served as a medium of communication 
so essential to peaceful relations in the community.” Dumas also congratulated the 
group for maintaining peaceful race relations in Baton Rouge and stated, “I believe that 
recent occurrences of racial violence in neighboring states have manifested the wisdom 
of maintaining the lines of communication between the races on a local basis, thus 
blocking the pressures of foreign irritant sources.” Dumas believed that before the 
creation o f the committee “the responsible Negro leaders in this community were losing 
their following to a certain Reverend Jelks.” Although he recognized the effectiveness 
of the committee, he denounced the secrecy surrounding it and promised that, unlike 
Christian, he would issue M l reports on the biracial group's activities. Eaton also called 
for the activities of the committee to be made public but vowed to maintain the group in
39“Councilman Clegg Still Against Bi-Racial Group,” Morning Advocate, April 
8, 1964, 11A.
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order “to prevent violence, bloodshed, or any discord in our community.” Mike Safer 
denounced the committee and claimed that race relations in Baton Rouge remained 
peaceful because the mayor and the council “gave our rights away in May 1963" when 
they created the biracial body. Brown denounced the secrecy surrounding the 
committee but refused to take a stand on the issue.40
Although segregationists denounced the biracial body, the voters of East Baton 
Rouge Parish supported it, and, in the July 26 primary, gave the most votes to the 
group’s most ardent supporters Dumas and Christian. The councilman received 15,101 
votes to the mayor’s 13,841. In fact, the role played by Christian in creating the 
committee and his willingness to carry out the group’s recommendation pleased the 
majority of black voters, and their 3,143 votes secured him a spot in the runoff. The 
four other candidates combined garnered only 1,886 African-American votes. However, 
the support of blacks did little to help Christian in the August 29 election and, in fact, 
probably helped to secure Dumas’ victory.41
The new mayor encountered a racial situation that differed from that o f his 
predecessor. On July 2,1964, President Lyndon Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act 
into law. It removed the legal basis for segregation inmost public accommodations and
^ “Candidates for Mayor-President Answer Questions,” Morning Advocate, July 
17, 1964,5B; “Christian, Dumas Defend Formation of Biracial Group,” Morning 
Advocate, August 4, 1964,10A; “Mayor’s Race Quickens; Talks by Candidates 
Heighten Pace,” Morning Advocate, July 10,1964, 5B.
41“Primary Election to Attract EBR Voters Tomorrow,” State-Times, July 24, 
1964, 1; “State, City Go to Polls Today, See Normal Vote,” State-Times, July 25,1964, 
1; “Dumas and Christian in Runoff,” Morning Advocate, July 26, 1964,1; “Christian, 
Dumas Get Ready for Second Primaiy Struggle,” State-Times, July 27,1964, 1;
“Dumas Defeats Christian,” Morning Advocate, August 30, 1964,1.
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proved to be a turning point for the movement in Baton Rouge and in other southern 
cities. In New Orleans, black patrons received service at one of the French Quarter’s 
most famous landmarks, the Cafe du Monde. In Birmingham, African Americans 
quietly desegregated white theaters, restaurants, and lunch counters. Baton Rouge was 
no different. Several restaurants served black diners, and a local hotel even allowed an 
African-American man to have a drink in its lounge. Yet, in Baton Rouge as in all these 
communities, resistence to integration remained strong. Segregationists viewed the 
Civil Rights Act as a violation of the sovereignty of the states as outlined in the 
Constitution and believed that a business owner had the right to select his or her 
clientele. Several Baton Rouge restaurant owners defied the new law and continued 
refusing to serve black customers.42
On July 6, Jelks led one of the successful integration attempts. He and two 
women, Betty Wilson and Cordelia Antoine, went to the State Capitol’s segregated 
cafeteria to test the Civil Rights Act. Fearing the reaction of segregationists, the civil 
rights activist phoned local FBI Agent Elmer Litchfield, who later became sheriff of 
East Baton Rouge Parish, the cafeteria’s manager, and Superintendent of State Police 
Thomas Burbank to advise them of his plans. Knowing that African-American patrons 
were on the way, the manager told his employees to treat Jelks and the women like their 
white customers. The three activists entered the establishment, selected and paid for 
their food without incident, and made their way into the dining area. When they sat, all 
but one of the sixty white patrons in the dining room stood up and left. Ultra
42“Negroes Try Rights Law in Louisiana,” Morning Advocate, July 4, 1964,1; 
“Atlanta Negroes Meet in Opposition,” ibid.
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segregationist Leander Perez happened to be eating lunch when the three African 
Americans arrived, and led the white exodus, stood in the doorway and shouted, 
“Paging Texas Turncoat Lyndon Johnson’s federal marshals. Paging Batface Bobby 
Kennedy’s federal marshals — you know damned well they are here.” Jelks and his 
dining companions ate their meals while the white crowd of mostly state government 
employees taunted them from the doorway. When they finished, the three walked out of 
the restaurant and through the crowd single file to avoid contact with anyone. As they 
left, an unidentified white man punched Jelks, but with the help of State Police 
Superintendent Burbank, the three walked to their car with no further incidents.43
Believing that Perez stirred up the crowd and egged on the man who attacked 
him, Jelks sued the segregationist leader. The suit accomplished something that three 
years of police harassment had not — it forced Jelks to leave Baton Rouge. Perez 
refused to let Jelks go unpunished for being so ‘‘uppity” and began a six-month 
undocumented campaign of terror against the civil rights leader. In February 1965, a 
frazzled Jelks abruptly left Baton Rouge because of “pressure from the whites” and 
because his superiors in the A.M.E. church feared that Perez would have him killed. He 
later dropped his suit against Perez.44
43Thomas Burbank’s Statement, NAACP Papers, Group V, box 53, folder Jelks 
v. Perez, General Case Material; Arthur Jelks’ affidavit, ibid.; Peter Teachout to Robert 
Carter, July 17, 1964, ibid.; Lydia Venton’s Statement, ibid.; “Negro Mixing Cafeteria 
Gets Socked in Jaws,” Morning Advocate, July 7,1964,11A.
“ Gioster Current to Reverend Bishop Joseph Gomez, February 4, 1965, 
NAACP Papers, Group in , box C52, folder 11; Arthur Jelks to Barbara Morris, April 2, 
1965, NAACP Papers, Group V, box 53, folder Jelks v. Perez General Material.
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Jelks’ departure left the working-class activists without a powerful leader and 
for the next three years, the group floundered. Many of these civil rights advocates, 
including Pearl George, left the NAACP when the organization’s national office refused 
to finance the defenses o f the five arrested in the swimming pool protest o f 1963.
Others abandoned the group because they suspected that an informant had infiltrated it 
and was passing on protest information to white leaders. In addition, the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 changed the nature o f the movement. 
The two acts accomplished the primary goals of civil rights activists — the 
desegregation of public accommodations and the ability to register to vote. Although 
pockets of resistance to both laws remained in Baton Rouge, the acts allowed the 
working-class activists to shift their attention away from the legal barriers that 
preserved segregation and to focus on the economic barriers that prevented them from 
attaining full citizenship.45
From 1962 until the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, working class 
activists dominated the civil rights movement in Baton Rouge. While they failed to 
achieve their goal of complete equality, their unrelenting protests and refusal to back 
down forced white leaders to address their demands. Fearing that the working-class 
activists would convince the black masses to rise up in protest and thereby shatter the 
stability of the Baton Rouge community, white leaders tried to undercut their authority 
in the African-American community. When Jelks asked Mayor Christian to create a 
biracial committee, he complied but appointed racial diplomats to it. Although working-
45Arthur Jelks to Lucille Black, August 21, 1964, NAACP Papers, Group HI, 
box C52, folder 11.
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class activists denounced it, the committee made some concrete changes to the system 
of segregation in Baton Rouge. In 1963, it secured the hiring o f black police officers, 
something blacks had been asking for since the mid 1950s. Before the passage o f the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the biracial committee also negotiated the desegregation of 
downtown lunch counters and convinced the mayor to desegregate facilities in the 
Municipal Building. Although these gains seemed small to the working-class activists, 
they mollified the majority African Americans and prevented the types o f mass 
demonstrations and violence that occurred in 1963 in Birmingham.
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Chapter 9
Black Power and the End of the Movement, 1965-1972
Although the Civil Rights Act o f 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
granted African Americans in the South full citizenship and improved conditions for 
black Baton Rougeans, these laws could not end racism or eliminate the economic 
disparity that existed between the black and white populations. They did change the 
nature o f the civil rights movement in Baton Rouge, however. In the late-1960s, for 
many African Americans, especially the World War II activists, the movement was 
over. Although they realized that serious problems remained in their community, they 
believed that working within the system could solve the remaining racial problems. At 
the same time, two new groups o f activists appeared. One consisted of angry, young 
working-class African Americans from inner-city neighborhoods and the other was 
composed of Black Power activists who attended Southern University. Like the older 
working-class activists, the young members of this group were poorly educated and 
lacked the skills to find well-paying jobs. United in frustration over the continuing 
racism that plagued Baton Rouge, they responded to racially-charged situations, such as 
the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., with violence. Preaching racial separatism 
and pride, the Black Power activists from Southern also advocated using violence to 
empower African-Americans. Often the rhetoric of the Black Power advocates 
influenced the young working-class activists and led to violent confrontations between 
them and the white community.
White leaders feared both groups of young African Americans and believed that 
they would cause race riots and shatter the community’s peace and stability if  allowed
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to go unchecked. After more than three decades o f using compromise and arresting 
activists to defuse civil rights demonstrations, white leaders discovered that their time- 
proven strategy no longer worked.1 The divisions within the black community and the 
inability of whites to deal with the new groups o f activists became apparent in the late 
1960s when, on several occasions, white police officers, who were known for their 
racism and brutality, shot and killed black suspects. While all African Americans 
condemned the use o f deadly force, they reacted differently. Black leaders turned to 
traditional methods o f protest. They staged marches, rallies, and picketing and 
negotiated with white leaders to change police practices. The young activists took part 
in the leaders’ mass protests, but afterward, mobs of them ran through the streets 
attacking whites and burning down buildings. White leaders responded to the violence 
with massive force and sent in large contingents of policemen, sheriffs’ deputies, and 
the National Guard to subdue the violence. By the early 1970s, this combination of 
rioting answered by massive force so heightened racial tension within the city that 
large-scale rioting became all but inevitable.
The divisions within the black community that characterized the civil rights 
movement grew deeper in the years following the Civil and Voting Rights Acts. With 
Jelks’s departure, the Baton Rouge chapter o f the NAACP collapsed. From 1964 until
1Other New South cities that, like Baton Rouge, worked diligently to avoid 
confrontation and violence during the 1950s and 1960s experienced similar increases in 
Black Power activism and racial discord in the late-1960s and eariy-1970s. In Tampa, 
Florida, frustration and anger over job discrimination and poverty led to a riot in a black 
neighborhood near the downtown business district. It began when a white police officer 
shot an unarmed black robbery suspect. For more on the Tampa riot see: Steven F. 
Lawson, “From Sit-In to Race Riot: Businessmen, Blacks and the Pursuit of 
Moderation,” in Southern Businessmen, Jacoway and Colburn, eds., 257-281.
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1967, very little organized civil rights activity occurred in Baton Rouge. In April 1966, 
the NAACP’s State Conference declared the Baton Rouge branch dormant. Gloster 
Current even came to the city to discuss reorganization with black leaders but found no 
one interested. Racial diplomats refused to join the organization because of the 
reputation for activism the branch had earned under Jelks’ leadership, and working 
class activists distrusted the national office, which, in 1963, had refused to pay for the 
defenses of Pearl George and the other activists arrested in their attempt to desegregate 
City Park’s pool. In 1967, NAACP Field Director for Louisiana Harvey Britton tried 
again to reorganize the Baton Rouge chapter and like Current failed. He discovered that 
many African Americans in the city were happy with the status quo, especially the 
racial diplomats and the World War n  activists, and refused to join the revived NAACP 
chapter. “Baton Rouge, like any other capital city, tends to offer more opportunities for 
employment, recreation, and other social events which fastens a false sense of 
accomplishments among its Negro citizenry,” Britton explained. In late 1967, though, 
he finally convinced nineteen people to join the organization. They launched a 
membership drive and, optimistically, set their goal at 5,000. The drive added only a 
few new members, and Britton blamed the insurmountable division between the “Negro 
leadership,” meaning the racial diplomats, and the “grass-roots leadership,” meaning 
working-class activists, along with the subterfuge o f white leaders for the failure. When 
Britton tried to open an office in Baton Rouge, the local utility and telephone 
companies doubled their security deposits. In the end, only a little more than one 
hundred African Americans joined the NAACP. The field director held out little hope 
for the branch’s sustained success. Britton’s fears were unfounded. When Pearl George
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decided to return to her role as Youth Chapter advisor, other working-class activists 
renewed their memberships.2
In the late 1960s, working-class activism was centered in the Eden Park area of 
Baton Rouge. One of the poorest sections of the city, the neighborhood suffered from 
high crime, drainage and sewerage problems, and rampant unemployment. Frustrated 
by these conditions, a group of residents in the summer o f 1968 presented Mayor 
Woody Dumas with a list o f grievances.3 Unlike his predecessor Jack Christian, who 
allowed the biracial committee to study the problems o f the black community before he 
took a public stand on them, Dumas examined the complaints himself. After looking 
them over, the mayor commented, “It is unfortunate we let some of these things 
continue until someone tries to make a fuss.” He forwarded the petition to the biracial 
committee and demanded that it submit its recommendations for improving conditions 
in Eden Park the following week. After receiving the committee’s report, Dumas gave it
2Gloster Current to Murphy Bell, April 1,1966, Papers of the NAACP Field 
Director, hereafter cited as Field Director’s Papers, box 1, folder 3, Amistad Research 
Center, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana; Monthly Report, March 20, 1967, 
Field Director’s Papers, box 2, folder 3; Harvey Britton to Members of the Executive 
Board, March 22,1967, ibid.; Harvey Britton to Emmitt Douglas, March 27, 1967, 
ibid.; Monthly Report, March 27, 1967, Field Director’s Papers, box 2, folder 4; 
Monthly Report, June 14,1967, Field Director’s Papers, box 2, folder 7; Supplementary 
Monthly Report, July 2,1967, Field Director’s Papers, box 2, folder 9.
3Having witnessed the devastating riots in northern and western cities, Dumas 
wanted to prevent this type o f violence from erupting in Baton Rouge. The mayor knew 
that such an incident would devastate the city’s economy and would discourage large 
industries from building plants and refineries in their area. Dumas adopted a pragmatic 
approach in dealing with the demands for racial equality. For information on riots in 
large industrial cities see: Gerald Home, Fire This Time: The Watts Uprising and the. 
1960s (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1995) and Sidney Fine, Violence in 
the Model City (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1989).
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to the city-parish council for consideration. The body promised to discuss improving 
drainage, housing, recreational facilities, street lights, and sidewalks and to attempt to 
provide more jobs for Eden Park residents. Dumas immediately increased the police 
patrols in the crime-riddled neighborhood and ordered the Department o f Public Works 
to hire black workers. The council also contacted the Recreation and Parks Commission 
and asked that body to improve the recreational facilities in the poverty-stricken 
neighborhood. Dumas did not take these actions because he sympathized with the 
residents of Eden Park or because he wanted to improve conditions in a poor 
neighborhood. Rather, he acted to prevent a racial uprising in a ghetto. He told the City- 
Parish Council, “We’re not going to make the same mistake they made in Detroit.” 
Dumas believed that maintaining peace and harmony required that white and black 
leaders deal with the complaints of civil rights activists at a conference table rather than 
on the streets.4
In the summer of 1967, young working-class activists tested Dumas’ resolve to 
use negotiations to deal with the racial problems when African Americans from 
Bogalusa staged a march from their community to Baton Rouge. Sponsored by the 
Bogalusa Civic and Voters’ League, marchers demanded improved education and 
increased voter education. The group also announced that Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) Chairman H. Rap Brown, one of the nation’s most 
outspoken Black Power activists, would appear at its rally on the steps of the State 
Capitol at the culmination of the march. Bom and raised in Baton Rouge, Brown was
4“Council Meets Monday Over Negro Grievances,” State-Times, August 5,
1967,4B; “Negro Gripes Laid on Line,” State-Times, August 8, 1967, 1.
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the son of a refinery worker and attended Southern University before becoming 
involved in the civil rights movement in the early 1960s. He became a full-time SNCC 
worker in 1966 and soon after became chairman of the organization. Brown recognized 
the plight of working-class African Americans and told them that the only way to seize 
power was by force. Brown’s and SNCC’s pro-working class rhetoric proved popular in 
Baton Rouge’s poor neighborhoods, as it did in communities across the country. On 
July 24, police in Maryland arrested Brown for inciting a riot in Cambridge in which 
protesters burned a school. The day before, he had told African Americans attending the 
Maryland rally, “If this town don’t come around, this town should be burned down!” 
Fearing that he would express a similar sentiment at the State Capitol rally, Governor 
John McKeithen threatened to arrest the young activist if  he used incendiary language 
in his speech. Refusing to be intimidated by McKeithen, Brown replied, “I didn’t make 
the laws, neither did black people in this country. If  the laws defeat my purpose, why 
should I conform to them?” Justice Department officials, fearing that Brown’s arrest in 
Baton Rouge would lead to a riot, arrested him in New York a couple of days before the 
Baton Rouge rally and charged him with carrying a weapon on a flight from New York 
to New Orleans/ A federal judge set his bond at $25,000. Because he could not raise 
bail, Brown missed the rally.6
sFedetal law prohibited anyone under indictment from transporting a weapon 
across state lines.
6Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 412-414; Claybome Carson, In Struggle: 
SNCC and the Black Awakening o f the 1960s (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1981), 252-257; “H. Rap Brown Arrives for Sunday Rally,” State-Times, August 17, 
1967,4A; “Brown Held, Can’t Post High Bond,” State-Times, August 19,1967, 1, 
“March Nears City Limits After ‘Hot’ Friday Walk,” Morning Advocate, August 19,
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Even without Brown there, white leaders feared that the Bogalusa to Baton 
Rouge march would heighten racial tensions in the city and urged all residents to stay 
home on the day of the rally. Dumas told his constituents, “Ignore any marchers or 
similar intruders in our community. If we are to continue to run our community, then 
we must do so with proper responsibility.” The mayor promised that police officers 
would arrest anyone, regardless o f race, who violated the law. Committed to preserving 
the peace, he also promised that violence would not be tolerated, and in the hours 
following the civil rights rally and the Ku Klux Klan meeting that followed it, 
policemen confiscated weapons from whites traveling into or driving near Eden Park. 
They detained one man for possession of an M-16 semiautomatic rifle, several pistols, 
and approximately nine boxes of ammunition. Because Louisiana law allowed citizens 
to carry unconcealed weapons in their cars, officers did not charge any o f the armed 
men, and the police department returned the weapons the next day . The fact that 
officers prevented them from entering Eden Park remained significant. In southern 
cities dominated by segregationists, law enforcement officials took few, if  any, 
precautions, to prevent violence and sometimes even encouraged it.7
Despite their best efforts, white leaders in Baton Rouge could not prevent 
violence from erupting in Eden Park. After the rally, a dozen fires broke out, six of 
them started by fire bombs. White-owned businesses were the primary targets for those 
who started the fires, but none caused major damage. Although they failed to capture
1967, 1.
7“Police Integration Order Withdrawn,” State-Times, August 15,1967, 1.
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the arsonists, police arrested eleven young black men ranging in age from eighteen to 
thirty-three: seven for vagrancy, one for obscenity, another for carrying a concealed 
weapon, and two for disorderly conduct. One of those arrested was Walter Leon 
Jenkins, also known as “Big Black Billy Brooks,” a twenty-six-year-old Houston 
native. The young activist attracted the attention of law enforcement officers when he 
disrupted the rally at the Capitol by shouting Black Power slogans. Later, when 
violence erupted in Eden Park, he grabbed a black policeman and prevented him from 
calling headquarters when a group o f young African Americans smashed the windows 
of a white-owned grocery store. Police arrested him and charged him with inciting 
arson, simple battery of a police officer, and intimidating a police officer. After his 
arrest, the city’s newspapers reported that Jenkins came to Louisiana in 1965 as a field 
worker for CORE and took part in demonstrations in the Baton Rouge area.8 Despite the 
fires, the following day, white leaders applauded the law-abiding citizens of Baton 
Rouge for their restraint and sense of civic responsibility. The city’s peaceful facade, 
however, hid the anger and discontent that young African Americans felt.9
The working-class activism, inspired by the Black Power activism of SNCC and 
CORE, that led to the fire bombing of Eden Park businesses created division and 
distrust within the black community. Fearing that the violent tactics of the young
8In the mid 1960s, CORE abandoned the principles o f passive resistance and 
nonviolence and embraced Black Power. Meier and Rudwick, CORE, 374.
9“Tense Weekend Ends with Fire Bombs in City,” State-Times, August 21,
1967, 1; ‘Tire Bombs Fly in the City After Racially Hot Day,” Morning Advocate, 
August 21, 1967, 1; “Interracial Help Invited by Dumas,” Morning Advocate, July 22, 
1967, 1; “City Quiet in Wake of Incidents,” State-Times, August 22,1967, 1; “Walter 
Jenkins Pleads Innocent to 3 Counts,” State-Times, August 23, 1977, 12A.
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protesters would alienate the white leadership and make further racial progress 
impossible, the racial diplomats attempted to unite the black community by creating a 
coalition o f various organizations from around the city and parish. On February 19, 
1968, representatives from twenty churches and organizations met at Mount Zion 
Baptist Church to “disseminate information relative to employment, civic activities, and 
political action.” The chairman of the meeting, Acie Belton, claimed that until the black 
community united nothing could be accomplished. Suspicious o f the racial diplomats’ 
motives, the Black Power activists questioned their sincerity. One claimed that for the 
new organization to truly represent the community, it would have to include young 
people and not just “respected” people. Another asked what the new group would do for 
the black community other than coordinate. At a March 4 meeting, the new 
organization crumbled. Nearly one hundred African Americans attended, but the 
divisions within the black community were so deep that they could not even agree on a 
name for their group.10
As the split between older African Americans and the young working-class 
activists widened, segregationist sentiment in the city intensified. On March 8, three 
off-duty police officers brandished their weapons at a group of NAACP picketers 
outside Ancona’s Grocery Store, a white-owned business in a predominately black 
neighborhood. The three off-duty policemen, who were not in their uniforms, went into 
the store to purchase beer; on their way out, they flashed their weapons after
l0“Negro Church Leaders, Delegates Meet to Form Parish-wide Organization,” 
Morning Advocate, February 20,1968, 11C; “Meet to Organize BR Negroes is Bogged 
Down in Bickering,” Morning Advocate, March 5, 1968, 8C.
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exchanging a few angry words with the leader of the protesters, Pearl George. Ten 
minutes later, the three drove by, jeered at the picketers, and made insulting gestures. 
George immediately called the sheriffs department to report the incident, and while the 
deputies were taking the African Americans’ statements, the men returned. Deputies 
pulled them over, took their guns, and drove off with the men in the back of their squad 
car. George and the others later discovered that their tormenters were policemen. The 
sheriffs department refused to give the activists their names. Sheriff Clemmons 
referred the activists to Chief Bauer, and he sent them to Pitcher. The district attorney 
would not allow George and the demonstrators to press charges against the men. To 
ease racial tension, Bauer did suspend the officers but then allowed them to return to 
work after a few days11.
Angered by the racism of the police officers and the failure of white officials to 
respond to their complaints, Pearl George and other NAACP officials demanded a 
meeting with the mayor, the chief of police, and several councilmen to submit a list of 
complaints. In a two-and-a-half hour meeting, the African Americans charged that 
policemen harassed members of the black community, used derogatory language when 
talking to them, searched all African Americans near crime scenes, even if they were 
not suspects, and unsnapped their holsters and rested their hands on their guns while 
questioning black suspects. Chief of Police Eddie Bauer defended his officers and said 
that unsnapping the holster was standard operating procedure for his policemen.
1‘“Local Grocery is Picketed by City NAACP,” Morning Advocate, March 8, 
1968, 6A; “Baton Rouge Officers Get Suspension,” Morning Advocate, March 18,
1968, 1.
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Although he defended his officers, Bauer recognized that segregationist sentiment 
within the police department heightened racial tension. He told the NAACP 
representatives that a newly implemented community relations program taught officers 
how to deal with the city’s minority population and added that he had transferred the 
more racist officers out of black neighborhoods.12
On April 4,1968, the discontent o f African Americans rose to a fever-pitch 
following Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination, and his death led to a rise in Black 
Power sentiment at Southern. On April 6, approximately 1,500 black students marched 
from Southern University to the State Capitol. When they reached the ESSO refinery, 
they turned their thumbs down and demanded that the company set up an equal 
opportunity hiring program. Although they claimed to be advocates of nonviolence 
several students warned that if whites continued to oppress African Americans, a race 
riot was inevitable. “We are moving from nonviolence and civil disobedience to 
guerilla warfare and civil rebellion,” warned student leader Jodie Bibbens. “If Lester 
Maddox could get to be governor of Georgia by waving an ax handle I should be able to 
get to be governor of Louisiana by beating up some honkies.” He promised that if  white 
policemen shot and killed protesters in Baton Rouge, like they did in Orangeburg,
South Carolina, then the students would respond with “10 Detroits.” An unidentified 
student tore up his draft card claiming, “I refuse to fight for this society. . .  where 
private property is worth more than human life.” Another student leader, Sam Mims,
t2“Negro Leaders List Problems, Warn that Violence Could Come,” Morning 
Advocate, March 15,1968,1 ID.
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claimed that the marchers went to the Capitol to express their ‘‘dissatisfaction with the 
white government structure and especially over the death of Martin Luther King.’*13
In the months and years following the assassination, the black university became 
a stronghold for Black Power activism. The students abandoned King’s principles of 
nonviolence and passive resistance and advocated the use of force to express their 
discontent with the current state of race relations. They also gave up the idea o f an 
integrated society that earlier student activists had advocated and touted black 
nationalism. Black Power activists wanted “cultural and political autonomy for black 
communities” and urged African Americans to reclaim their history and cultural 
identity. They also refused to work with whites who, to them, were the enemy. For 
older African Americans, Black Power separatism rejected the civil rights movement, 
and many of them denounced the young activists and their tactics. 14
In response to the April 6 march and rising Black Power sentiment on campus, 
President Felton Clark attempted to follow the precedents that he set during the student 
protests of the early 1960s; he closed the campus and ordered the students to clear out. 
His tactics had worked earlier in the decade because the student body feared the 
consequences o f continued defiance. They witnessed the arrest and expulsion o f their 
leaders and refused to risk the consequences o f taking part in protests after the “cooling 
off periods” created by Clark. However, the student activists of the late 1960s refused to 
allow Southern’s administration to destroy their movement. Although they left campus
I3“Capitol Rally Climaxes Day o f Marching in BR,” Morning Advocate, April 6, 
1968, 1.
I4Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 382; Carson, fn Struggle, 215-220.
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as ordered, the student activists returned to school poised to carry on their fight for 
equality.15
Besides intensifying Black Power sentiment at Southern, King’s death also 
angered the young working-class activists, who responded to the assassination with 
violence. On April 7, in separate incidents, several of them threw six fire bombs at 
buildings in Scotlandville and tossed bricks and Molotov cocktails at white-owned 
businesses in Baton Rouge. On April 8, city officials received reports that African 
Americans were planning a riot, so Dumas ordered a “voluntary” curfew to go into 
effect at dusk. Chief Bauer and Sheriff Clemmons sent patrols to black neighborhoods 
to insure that all businesses, especially bars and liquor stores, complied with the 
mayor’s order. Bauer even asked his officers to give him a list of any businesses that 
refused to close. When he received it, the chief immediately phoned the proprietors and 
convinced them to shut down voluntarily. Despite the curfew, several protesters threw 
fire bombs, but no large scale rioting occurred.16
Segregationist sentiment also manifested itself following King’s assassination. 
Racist whites threatened George, and on April 11, someone fired shots into her home.
l5“Capitol Rally Climaxes in Day of Marching,” Morning Advocate, April 6, 
1968, 1.
i6“BR March Sparked by King’s Death,” State-Times, April 5,1968, 1; 
“Louisiana Negroes React,” Morning Advocate, April 5, 1968,1; “Memorial Rites 
Slated for King at St. Joseph’s,” Morning Advocate, April 6, 1968, 1; “Service Here 
Fills Cathedral,” Morning Advocate, April 8, 1968, 1; "M. L. King Ecumenical Rites 
Held,” State-Times, April 8,1968,1; “Parish in Curfew, Peaceful Monday,” Morning 
Advocate, April 9,1968, 1; “Fires Quenched; Rains Come,” ibid.; “Semi-Curfew Makes 
City Quiet,” Morning Advocate, April 10,1968,1.
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Fearing that a segregationist’s bullet would injure or kill George, Chief Bauer gave her 
twenty-four-hour police protection.17
Just as King’s death escalated racial tension in Baton Rouge, it also increased 
interracial cooperation. On April 6, an integrated group of LSU students staged a 
peaceful march from the campus to the Capitol, and religious leaders held an interracial, 
ecumenical service at St. Joseph’s Catholic Cathedral. Following the assassination, 
white liberals began to play a more active role in the civil rights movement On the day 
after King’s murder, white students at LSU attempted to lower to half mast the flag 
flying over the Parade Ground, only to be thwarted by the school’s administration. They 
also formed an interracial organization — the Martin Luther King Action Movement 
(MLKAM) — to work for increased integration both on and off campus. Its members 
took part in voter registration drives and lobbied LSU officials to recruit black athletes, 
especially football and basketball players. A month after King’s death, the MLKAM 
sent interracial groups to desegregate several bars near the campus that students 
frequented. All of the businesses refused to serve them.18
Perhaps the most substantial instance of interracial cooperation came in the 
summer of 1968, when black businessman Joe Delpit ran for a seat on the City-Parish
l7“4 Shots Fired at Home of NAACP Official,” Morning Advocate, April 12, 
1968, 9A; Monthly Report, April 15,1968, Field Director’s Papers.
18“LA Flags Fly at Half Mast, But Not Without Controversy,” Morning 
Advocate, April 6,1968, 1; “Mixed LSU Student Units Denied Service in 8 
Bars,” Morning Advocate, May 15 1968,5A; John McNeese, interview by author, July 
15, 1992, tape recording, T. Harry Williams Center for Oral History Collection, 
Louisiana Lower Mississippi Valley Collection, Louisiana State University Libraries, 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 38-50; Leo Hamilton, interview, August 21,1993,43-48.
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Council. Liberals, accommodationists, and white leaders supported him and publicly
urged whites to vote for him. In an August 14,1968, advertisement, his white
supporters declared that since blacks made up one-third o f the city’s population, they
deserved representation on the council.19
Delpit was a candidate whom both whites and blacks could support As a
member o f the biracial committee, a business owner, a civic leader, and “a voice of
progress within the framework of law and order,” he fit the white community’s
definition o f a black leader and, at the same time, actively campaigned for the white
vote. Yet Delpit attracted support from the black community as well. He spoke out for
improved conditions and increased job opportunities for residents of Baton Rouge’s
inner city neighborhoods. He described himself as a logical choice for councilman. “As
a businessman and a lifelong resident o f Baton Rouge,” Delpit declared, “I have a
personal investment in the city, and I have established a reputation o f fiscal integrity
and civic consciousness.” He told potential voters that he could serve as a liaison
between the black and white communities and advocated maintaining continuous
industrial expansion. He stated:
Large industries are increasingly concerned with the manner in which local 
governments deal with the problems of race and urbanization.. . .  As a 
businessman, I am familiar with the interests of commercial enterprise. I know 
if we are to “sell” industry on the potential of our city, then we must be united in 
our efforts to improve the environment of Baton Rouge.
19“White Voters Support a Negro Candidate,” Morning Advocate, August 14, 
1968,13A; “75,000 People Need One Voice,” State-Times, August 16, 1968, 17A 
(advertisement).
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Delpit’s message o f stability and harmony proved attractive to whites, who had been 
saying the same thing for two decades, and in the primary, he received 12,230 votes, 
running second in a field of seven. Although segregationists described Delpit’s success 
as a testament to the power o f the “Negro Bloc Vote,” whites cast 8,149 o f the votes 
that made him a close second in the race. He easily won a spot on the council in the 
September runoff.20
Delpit’s election brought with it advances for black Baton Rougeans and 
convinced many World War II activists to abandon the movement because these 
advances marked the fulfillment of the last of the goals that they had established in 
1945. After Delpit’s election, white officials began appointing African Americans to 
jobs in city-parish government In February 1969, the Recreation and Parks 
Commission named Willie Spooner as its first black member. A racial diplomat, 
Spooner worked as a school teacher and a coach in East Baton Rouge Parish and held a 
bachelor’s degree from Southern and a master’s from the University o f Wisconsin. He 
belonged to the Prince Hall Masons and the Negro Chamber o f Commerce and had 
played an active role in the recreation commission’s youth programs. White leaders also 
received praise from African Americans for another appointment hi early 1969, the 
City-Parish Council hired Johnnie Jones as an assistant city-parish attorney. By making
20Ibid.; “Council Candidates Release Formal Campaign Statements,” Morning 
Advocate, July 18, 1968,7C; “50-60% BR Voter Turnout Expected,” State-Times, 
August 17, 1968, 1; “Council Seats Garnered,” Morning Advocate, August 18, 1968, 1; 
“Dumas Wins Demo Mayor Race Easily,” State-Times, August 19,1968,1; “BR 
Negroes Utilize Vote-Splitting Techniques to Make Power Effective,” Morning 
Advocate, August 21, 1968,6C; “Councilmen in Runoff Lose,” Morning Advocate, 
September 29, 1968, 1; “Over 12,000 Voters Support Negro Candidate,” Morning 
Advocate, September 27,1968, 9B.
322
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
him a public employee, however, white leaders consciously and effectively silenced one 
of the community’s most vocal and well-respected civil rights activists. Nevertheless, 
after Delpit’s election and Jones’s appointment, most African Americans believed that 
they now had a voice in city-parish government and abandoned marches and 
demonstrations to work within the system for change.21
As white and black leaders formed alliances, the harassment o f civil rights 
activists by segregationists intensified in early 1969 when the NAACP, still under the 
control o f the working-class activists, launched a “total community action program.” 
The organization called for boycotts and picketing o f all businesses that refused to hire 
black employees. In February, NAACP President Joseph Melanson announced that 
African Americans would boycott Schlitz Beer, the Beer Industry League, and A. & P. 
Supermarkets for discriminating against African-American distributors. Because of the 
threat of economic reprisals, George F. Brown of the League phoned NAACP 
Executive Board Member J. J. Sims, a local bar owner with a criminal record, to ask for 
a meeting. Sims and Melanson met with Brown once. Melanson, Sims recalled, told 
him that the encounter seemed like a setup and refused to meet with Brown again. 
However, the beer industry representative badgered the NAACP president and Sims 
into getting together another time. At that meeting, Brown handed Sims a paper bag 
filled with $ 12,000 and told him to use the money to buy enough votes on the NAACP 
executive board to cancel the boycott. Shortly after the exchange, the police arrested
2I“Willie Spooner Named to Recreation and Park Commission by Council,” 
News Leader, March 2, 1969, 1; “Council to Meet Saturday to Choose Parish 
Attorney,” Morning Advocate March 1,1969,9C; “Keogh is Given Job as Parish 
Attorney,” Morning Advocate, March 2,1969, 1.
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Sims and Melanson and charged them with extortion. The warrants for their arrest had 
been written before Sims even received the money. Several days later, a grand jury also 
indicted Pearl George for taking part in the scheme.22
Although Sims did indeed accept the $12,000, members of the Baton Rouge 
NAACP immediately suspected a set up. Emmitt Douglas believed that Pitcher and the 
police department used Sims to entrap Melanson and to discredit the NAACP. Gloster 
Current hypothesized that Pitcher pressured Sims into taking part in the extortion 
scheme. Showing his disdain for the working-class activists who dominated the Baton 
Rouge branch, Current added that he doubted George played any role in the plot 
because of “her militancy and limited intelligence.”23
The arrests of the NAACP officials divided the activists and moderate black 
leaders, which included racial diplomats and World War II activists. The executive 
board, which was more conservative than Melanson, named Dr. D’Orsay Bryant, a local 
gynecologist, as his replacement. Over Current’s objection, the board obtained evidence 
in the extortion case from District Attorney Pitcher before voting seven to six not to pay 
for Melanson’s legal representation but to fond George’s defense if she used an attorney
“ Harvey Britton to Joseph Melanson, February 3, 1969, Field Director’s Papers, 
box 5, folder 7; “NAACP Working to Help Get Jobs in Local Area,” News Leader, 
February 9, 1969, 1.
“ Chronological Report of Events Leading to the Baton Rouge Grand Jury’s 
Indictment of Three Officers o f the Baton Rouge NAACP for Extortion, Field 
Director’s Papers, box 34, folder 7; Minutes of the Baton Rouge Branch, February 28, 
1969, ibid.; “NAACP Officials in BR Arrested on Extortion Charge, Released on 
Bond,” News Leader, March 2, 1969,1; Minutes of the Baton Rouge Chapter, March
13,1969, Field Director’s Papers, box 34, folder 7; Monthly Report, March 13,1969, 
Field Director’s Papers, box 35, folder 8.
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of its choice. She refused. The board believed that, although the ousted president 
probably did not take part in the plan, he knew about it beforehand.24
Days after the NAACP extortion scandal, Black Power activists and racial 
diplomats clashed on the campus o f Southern University. On April 1, students staged a 
sit-in in the office of the Dean of Student Affairs Martin Harvey. They presented him 
with a list o f demands that included, besides his own resignation, repairing campus 
streets and naming them after African Americans, improving the physical plant, and 
ending compulsory ROTC. Unlike LSU, which operated under the direction of an 
autonomous board of supervisors made up of members who, for the most part, 
possessed strong ties to the university, the State Board of Education, composed entirely 
of white political appointees, controlled Southern. It rarely had the best interest of the 
university at heart. For the Black Power activists, having a white-controlled body in 
charge of an African-American institution was unacceptable, and they demanded that 
blacks, preferably those who agreed with their ideology, should govern the university. 
Southern’s President Leon Netterville, who had replaced Felton Clark after his 
retirement in 1968, attributed the tension on his campus to a combination of anti- 
Vietnam War sentiment and a frustration with the current state o f race relations in 
Baton Rouge.25
24“NAACP Officers Held in Jail in BR Following Extortion Indictment,” March 
16, 1969, News Leader, 1; Gloster Current to Emmitt Douglas, March 25,1969, Field 
Director’s Papers, box 35, folder 8.
25Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 429-431; “SU Students Abandon Sit-In 
With Naming of Interim Group,” Morning Advocate, April 2, 1969,9A.
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The anger o f the students rose to the surface on May 12 when two false rumors 
about white violence against African Americans circulated around campus. One 
claimed that police officers had arrested an African-American picketer for firing a gun 
into the air. The second rumor alleged that a white man had assaulted a black girl in a 
local cafe. Although false, both rumors sent Southern’s student body into an uproar. 
They seized control of the campus and built a barricade across its entrance. Netterville 
called the sheriffs department and asked it to remove the barricade. Fearing that 
violence would erupt, the sheriff immediately dispatched deputies to Southern. When 
they arrived, the furious students hurled rocks at the deputies. In response, the officers 
threw tear gas canisters into the crowd. Following this show of force, the students 
agreed to meet with sheriffs officials to discuss a peaceful end to the confrontation. 
During the meeting, deputies removed the barricades, but the conference did little to 
ease racial tensions on campus. In fact, while Black Power leaders and the deputies met, 
three hundred students and law enforcement officers engaged in a face-off at the 
campus’ entrance. Fearing that a full-scale riot might break out, Governor John 
McKeithen sent in the National Guard and called the state legislature into a special 
session to allocate $100,000 to reinforce security at Southern.26
McKeithen even went to Southern to talk to students and promised to address 
their concerns. While there he also warned them that he would not allow Southern’s
26“Southem Univ. Students Demonstrate on Campus, Prexy Gives 
Statement,” News Leader, May 18, 1969,1; Monthly Report, May 19, 1969, Field 
Director’s Papers, box 6, folder 5; John Morris, “Students Barricade SU Campus,” 
Morning Advocate, May 12, 1969,4A; “SU Unrest Blamed on Untrue Rumors,” 
Morning Advocate, May 13,1969, 1.
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students to imitate their counterparts at Cornell, where black students had seized control 
of a campus building. Because of the massive force amassed against them, the students 
called off their protests and returned to classes. McKeithen made some token 
improvements to Southern’s campus, including resurfacing some streets on campus and 
erecting highway signs directing motorists to the university. State officials, however, 
continued to ignore the real needs of the university, which included faculty pay raises 
and funds for the repair and construction of buildings on campus. The governor’s 
interest in Southern soon waned, but the anger and frustration of the Black Power 
activists remained.27
In the summer of 1969, the fury of the young activists resurfaced when police 
officers shot and killed two young black crime suspects. Even African Americans who 
usually opposed the activists were incensed by the deaths of the young suspects, and 
their deaths united the black community. Baton Rouge’s police department had a long 
history of racism and brutality, and white officers had harassed most African 
Americans, even racial diplomats. As noted in chapter one, during World War n, 
policemen chased a suspect into a drugstore owned by black leaders, Leo and George 
Butler, and beat and arrested several people. World War n  activist, Dupuy Anderson 
was a frequent target of policemen. Because his wife looked white, officers frequently
27Anderson, interview by Maxine Crump, December 8, 1993, 16-18; Jones, 
interview, December 4, 1993, 110-115; “Calm is Restored on Campus o f SU,” Morning 
Advocate, Maiy 15, 1969, 1; “Calm Prevails at SU After Governor Meet,” Morning 
Advocate, May 15,1969,1; Cushing Strout and David I. Grossvogel, eds., Divided We 
Stand: Reflections on the Crisis at Cornell (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, hie., 
1970), 15-41; “Governor McKeithen Tours Southern University,” Morning Advocate, 
May 20,1969, 10A.
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stopped the two of them when they traveled together. Once, a member o f the force even 
arrested Anderson for talking to her. Law enforcement officials also harassed other 
activists. They frequently stopped Johnnie Jones for traffic violations that he did not 
commit and used the same ploy against Jelks. hi the late 1960s, the brutality of the 
city’s white police officers had increased dramatically. No longer were officers merely 
harassing African Americans; they were also killing them. Beginning in 1967, officers 
shot and killed at least one young black male suspect each year. This increase in 
violence marked the last stand for organized segregation in Baton Rouge. The police 
force was the final area in which white leaders had made no concessions to African 
Americans. Although in 1963 they agreed to hire black officers, the mayor and the city- 
parish council required that the police force be internally segregated. Whites had white 
partners, and blacks had black ones. In addition, city officials prohibited African 
Americans from patrolling in white neighborhoods and from arresting white suspects. 
Moreover, the police force was one o f the few remaining areas within the white 
establishment dominated by segregationists. The presence of racist officers in the 
department undercut the interracial cooperation that was developing in Baton Rouge.28
Following the first incident of deadly force in 1967, Mayor-President Woody 
Dumas attempted to appease African Americans who were angered by the fact that the 
officer shot an unarmed suspect in the back. He consulted with the biracial committee 
and then ordered the integration of patrol cars and promised to transfer black officers to 
the motorcycle squad. Dumas feared that the types of riots that occurred in Detroit and
“ Supplementary Monthly Report, July 2, 1967, Field Director’s Papers, box 2, 
folder 9; Harvey Britton to Gloster Current, July 26,1967, ibid.;
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Newark earlier that year would take place in Baton Rouge, if  the police force remained 
segregated. By having integrated patrols, “there will be less chance for inflammatory 
situations and charges of police brutality,” he contended. Dumas hoped that the 
integration o f the patrol cars and the motorcycle units would “give some of the [black] 
members o f the biracial committee more stature with their people” and would keep “the 
leadership of that community in responsible hands.” In 1967, the police force employed 
12 African-American officers and 259 whites. Therefore, the desegregation order would 
only affect a few white policemen, and Dumas promised that the pairing of blacks and 
whites would be voluntary.29
White officers immediately denounced the mayor’s decree and threatened to 
resign if  ordered to partner with African Americans. “We are already integrated,” one 
white policeman complained. “What more do they want? Where will this stop?”
Another argued that if  patrols were integrated, recruiting new officers would be 
difficult. Segregationist reaction paralleled that of the officers; a group o f 
segregationists formed the Baton Rouge Support Your Local Police Committee. The 
organization’s chairman, M. A. “Mike” Tassin, claimed that Dumas’s order grew out of 
the demands of a “prejudiced, illegally constituted, appointed biracial committee.” He 
accused the mayor of ordering police officers not to arrest African-American protesters 
because he feared their arrests might incite a rio t Segregationists also flooded city 
council members with angry phone calls. In response, Councilman Robert T. Clegg 
issued a statement declaring that the mayor’s order was an administrative decision and
^ “Mixing Moves Bared,” State-Times, August 12,1967.
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had not received the council’s approval. Faced with police and segregationist 
opposition, Dumas rescinded his decree.30
The mayor’s refusal to follow through with the police desegregation order 
naturally angered the black: community, but it also drew a negative response from white 
liberals. Two organizations, the Council on Human Relations and the Louisiana Chapter 
of the American Civil Liberties Union (LCLU) stepped in to fill the void left by 
departure of the AFSC. After the passage of the Civil and Voting Right Act, the 
American Friends Service Committee shifted its attention away from the civil rights 
movement and launched an anti-Vietnam war protest. First organized in the mid 1950s, 
the Baton Rouge chapter o f the Council on Human Relations worked behind the scenes 
until the mid 1960s, when its members accompanied African Americans as they 
attempted to desegregate several local restaurants. After taking a stand on the school 
desegregation issue in the late 1950s, the LCLU had floundered after the departure of 
McNeir. In the mid 1960s, the organization elected LSU English Professor Herbert 
Rothschild as its president, and he revitalized the group. Under him, the LCLU took 
part not only in civil rights activities but also pushed for an end to the war in Vietnam.
In early 1968, Rothschild warned Dumas that if he failed to end police brutality and 
racism within the police department racial violence would erupt in the city. He 
complained that white officers used “widespread, undisguised racial prejudice” in
30“Mayor Restudying Integration Order,” State-Times, August 14,1967,1; 
“Police Mixing Moves Bared,” State-Times, August 12,1967, I; “Chairman Calls 
Special Meet of BR Police,” State-Times, August 16, 1967,1 IF; “Mayor Restudying 
Integration Order,” State-Times, August 14,1967,1.
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dealing with black citizens and addressed them as “nigger” and “boy.” He warned the 
mayor that this continued humiliation would lead to violence.31
The possibility o f a race riot in Baton Rouge intensified in early 1968 when 
police officers shot A. C. Scott in the head for resisting arrest. Scott happened to be 
kneeling on his front porch and surrendering when the policeman shot him. A grand 
jury cleared the officer o f all wrongdoing, and he returned to active duty. In another 
incident, police stopped John Lee Jackson, forced him out of his car, handcuffed him, 
and sprayed him with mace for being “drunk and wild.” Yet the police report stated that 
Jackson was sober at the time of his arrest The LCLU urged Dumas to investigate these 
incidents, to hire more black officers, and to establish a zero-tolerance policy regarding 
the use of derogatory terms when addressing African Americans. The NAACP also 
complained to the mayor and the city council about police practices and described 
Baton Rouge as “one of the most segregated cities in the state.” Its members held that 
the community's racist police force targeted African Americans for brutal treatment and 
arrest even if  there was no proof that they had committed a crime.32
The LCLU’s charges brought no changes in police policy, and, in the summer of 
1969, the NAACP asked Police Chief Eddie Bauer to remove white officers from beats 
in black neighborhoods until African Americans could either patrol white areas of the
3‘Williams, interview by Glenda Stevens; Herbert Rothschild to W. W. Dumas, 
ca. February 1968, American Civil Liberties Union Papers, box 3, Louisiana Lower 
Mississippi Valley Collection, Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana (hereafter cited as ACLU Papers).
32Herbert Rothschild to Eddie Bauer, February 15, 1968, ibid.; Press Release, 
n.d., Field Director’s Papers, box 42, folder 8.
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city or partner with whites. Bauer ignored its demand. On June 30, the organisation 
again asked Dumas and Bauer to end “lily white” patrols. Again, the city dismissed the 
request. The refusal of white leaders to address the racism of white officers and the 
internal segregation of the police force coincided with another fatal shooting of a young 
black burglary suspect by white officers. The policeman who fired the shots claimed 
Lionel Hughes, a twenty-year-old, ran when they ordered him to stop. One officer shot 
him twice in the back. After the shooting, they discovered that he held a knife in his 
hand. Hughes was about fifty feet from the officers when he fell, but the policemen 
claimed that they feared the suspect would throw the knife at them if  they failed to act 
Bauer refused to suspend the officer who shot Hughes despite Councilman Delpit’s 
warning that the incident created unrest in the black community. On July 23, an all- 
white grand jury failed to indict the shooter. The verdict angered the black community  
and heightened racial tensions in the city.33
Most African Americans, regardless of social class, had, at some time, been 
harassed by the police, and they wanted city officials to reform the force. On July 25, 
two days after the grand jury ruling, a police officer shot and killed still another black 
burglary suspect, seventeen-year-old James Oliney, as he attempted to flee. As in the 
Hughes incident, officers shot the young suspect in the back. Chief of Detectives J. O.
33Harvey Britton to Joseph Melanson, February 3,1969, ibid.; “NAACP Leader 
Requests Change by City Police,” News Leader, July 4,1969, 1; “NAACP Asks 
Integration of Police Force,” Morning Advocate, July 8, 1969,4A; “BR Suspect Fatally 
Shot by Police,” Morning Advocate, July 7,1969,1; “Police, Doctor Agree on Shot,” 
State-Times, July 8, 1969, 1; “Delpit Asks Council Study of Shooting,” Morning 
Advocate, July 10,1969,1; “Officer Unable to Give Answer,” State-Times, July 9,
1969, 1; “Jury Doesn’t Indict Here in Slaying,” Morning Advocate, July 24,1969,1.
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Dunigan claimed that Oliney, who had a knife in his hand, made an 180-degree turn as 
he attempted to slash the officer who shot him.34 The day after Oliney’s death, a group 
of young African Americans picketed the police station, while older members of the 
community, including racial diplomats and World War II activists, planned to take part 
in a NAACP-sponsored protest march to the city hall. Fearing that violence would 
erupt, Woody Dumas immediately met with the biracial committee and Emmitt 
Douglas, the NAACP’s State Conference president, to discuss the situation. The mayor 
urged all Baton Rougeans to remain calm and promised to keep the police away from 
the march that would go from the grounds of McKinley High School, the site of the 
shooting, to the Municipal Building for a rally. When the marchers reached the city 
hall, Douglas addressed them. He called for equal justice for African Americans and 
urged the black citizens of Baton Rouge to protect themselves against police attacks. 
D’Orsay Bryant told the crowd that the NAACP eschewed violence, but the next 
speaker, twenty-two-year-old Jerry Johnson, voiced a different opinion. “It’s hot 
today,” Johnson told the crowd, “but tonight it’s gonna be a little hotter.. . .  I’m sure 
gonna fill my coke bottle with gasoline.” Bryant later admitted that he asked Johnson to 
speak to show Dumas and Bauer the extent of the anger and frustration among young 
blacks.35
34“Officer Kills Young Negro Dining Chase,” Morning Advocate, July 26, 1969,
1.
3S“Negroes Hold Protest Rally, Picket Police,” State-Times, July 27, 1969, I; 
“Negroes Picket BR Police,” Morning Advocate, July 27, 1969,1.
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The impassioned speeches fueled the already considerable anger o f the young 
working-class activists over the police shootings. As the meeting broke up, a group of 
them headed to the downtown business district and began attacking the white people 
that they encountered. One group even fired shots at a car carrying five whites. Another 
small mob pulled a delivery man out of his truck when he stopped to let them cross the 
street. They kicked and punched him and stole $25 from his wallet. Others beat two 
pedestrians on Third Street, sending both men to the hospital. After dark, three major 
fires broke out One destroyed a department store in the heart of a black 
neighborhood.36
Dumas, in an attempt to forestall full-scale rioting, declared a state o f 
emergency and ordered a strict curfew to begin at dusk. Governor McKeithen mobilized 
the National Guard and sent more than seven hundred guardsmen with bayonet-tipped 
rifles to patrol the streets o f Baton Rouge. The mayor also turned to black and white 
leaders for help. He asked Pat Collier, the president o f the Chamber of Commerce, and 
T. J. Jemison to appear on television to appeal for calm. Collier begged the white 
community to remain calm and enjoyed some success. He assured businessmen and 
plant managers that city and state officials would protect their properties and quickly 
reestablish law and order. Dumas believed that Jemison could convince the angry 
youths to stop rioting, but the Black Power activists viewed Jemison as an Uncle Tom 
and refused to listen to him. When the spots began running, some activists made
36Ibid.
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threatening phone calls to him. Fearing that the callers would harm the minister, Dumas 
stopped running the advertisements.37
Young African Americans not only refused to listen to Jemison’s pleas; they 
ignored the curfew. A crowd of several hundred gathered near the burning department 
store at 9 p.m., hours after the curfew began, but scattered when police arrived. That 
evening, officers arrested fifty curfew violators ranging in age from seventeen to thirty- 
two. They also arrested Jerry Johnson and charged him with inciting a riot.38
The next day, Douglas blamed Dumas for the violence. He claimed that the 
mayor promised to suspend the policeman but then backed down. The NAACP state 
president added that in his July 29 meeting with Dumas and the two other black leaders, 
he agreed to attempt to quiet the black community in exchange for a promise that Bauer 
would suspend the officer. By backing away from his vow, Douglas added, Dumas 
proved to African-American activists that white leaders could not be trusted to keep 
their word and that the police had free rein to kill black suspects.39
After two nights o f curfew and unrest, calm returned to the city, and McKeithen 
sent the National Guard home. Racial tension remained high, however. In a statement to
37“Whites Beaten on Third Street,” Morning Advocate, July 31,1969, 1; “Guard, 
Lawmen Patrol City in Strict Curfew,” Morning Advocate, August 1, 1969, 1; “Curfew 
is Continued by Dumas,” State-Times, August 1, 1969, 1; “Curfew is Lifted, Guard Go 
Home,” State-Times, August 2, 1969, 1; “BR Returns to Normal Saturday,” Morning 
Advocate, August 3, 1969, 1.
38Ibid.; “City is Quieter as Second Night of Curfew Ends,” Morning Advocate, 
August 2,1969,1.
39“Curfew is Lifted, Guard Go Home,” State-Times, August 2, 1969,1; “City is 
Quieter As Second Night o f Curfew Ends,” Morning Advocate, August 2, 1969, 1.
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the Morning Advocate, Joe Delpit blamed Dumas and the police for the unrest He 
claimed that much of the anger arose from the wholesale arrest o f African Americans 
for violating the curfew and told the paper that officers even arrested blacks who were 
sitting on their front porches or standing in their own yards for being out after dark. 
Dining the state of emergency, the councilman had created a citizens’ patrol, and he 
bragged that his group helped to keep the number of arrests down by convincing 
policemen to release some detainees.40
While African Americans condemned the actions of the police officers, many 
whites, especially segregationists, supported them. More than eight hundred whites 
signed a petition that claimed pandemonium would prevail if  the officers were not 
allowed to do their jobs. “We believe that local police officers are our first and last line 
of defense against crime, anarchy, and insurrection,” the petition read. “A strong, 
armed, and independent local police force is an impassible barrier to the advance of 
communism.”41
The refusal of white leaders to address the police force’s problems bolstered the 
view of the black community. On August 5, the NAACP threatened to launch a 
selective buying campaign aimed at white-owned businesses throughout the city unless 
Bauer and white leaders immediately suspended the officer who shot Oliney, dropped 
the charges against Johnson, and transferred segregationist officers out of black
40“BR Returns to Normal Saturday,” Morning Advocate, August 3,1969.
41“Criminals Must be Punished or Anarchy Will Prevail,” Morning Advocate, 
September 2,1969,18A.
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neighborhoods.42 The NAACP also called for an end to police brutality and better 
training of officers. Its president D’Orsay Bryant urged African Americans to purchase 
only the bare necessities from white merchants. He promised that young blacks would 
patrol business districts to “remind” African Americans to comply with the campaign. 
He warned whites that, “The embers of unrest still smolder here, awaiting only another 
slaying incident or similarly provocative catalyst to ignite them.”43
Dumas condemned the selective buying campaign. “I was rather disappointed in 
the NAACP move. I felt people were working rather closely together. The progress of 
race relations in this city has been terrific,” he told his constituents. He cited Delpit’s 
election and Jones’ appointment as examples of this progress and added that during his 
term the city parish had employed 451 black workers —  103 as garbage men. Dumas 
condemned the NAACP for placing economic pressure on the city’s merchants when he 
and Chief Bauer were responsible for the police force. Dumas apparently did not 
understand that appointing a few upper- and middle-class blacks to civil boards and 
hiring a few hundred black workers meant little to a community terrorized by racist 
policemen. The continued refusal of Dumas and Bauer to take any action against the
42The NAACP named one of the police officers that they wanted removed from 
patrols in black neighborhoods — Uniform Patrol Division head Major R. S. Trigg, Jr. 
Bryant referred to Trigg as the “catalyst which fires the seed of racism within the police 
department”
43“Negro Group is Launching ‘Selective Buying’ Here,” Morning Advocate, 
August 6, 1969,1; “NAACP Asks Negroes to Cut Buying,” State-Times, August 6, 
1969, 1; D’Orsay Bryant to Friend, August 8,1969, Field Director’s Papers, box 34, 
folder 7.
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offending officers kept the racial tension in the city high and the black community 
united.44
The selective buying campaign and the grand jury investigation into Oliney’s 
death both began on August 6. Approximately 150 picketers gathered outside Church’s 
Fried Chicken in an African-American neighborhood near the LSU campus. When 
officers tried to break it up, picketers responded with violence. One picketer hit a 
policeman and others threw rocks and a piece of lumber at his partners. To prevent a 
riot, Bauer ordered his officers to leave the area without arresting their attackers, but 
later he sent a large, heavily armed group into the area to break up the protest The 
NAACP’s selective buying campaign was incredibly effective. Within a week, the 
economic pressure forced two white-owned grocery stores in black neighborhoods to 
close. “I’ve had it. I haven’t done a penny’s worth of business in two days,” declared 
Edward Haley, the owner of one o f the businesses. The other owner claimed that black 
militants intimidated his customers and kept them away from his store.45
Because of the selective buying campaign and its threat to the city’s economy, 
accommodationists again stepped into the civil rights melee. On August 7, more than 
one hundred business and professional leaders represented by banker Charles McCoy 
met with Dumas to discuss ways to end the campaign and to ease racial tension. They 
also issued a public statement calling for the return of law and order. The
44“Negro Group is Launching ‘Selective’ Buying Here,” Morning Advocate, 
August 6, 1969,1.
45“No Arrests Follow Confrontation Here,” Morning Advocate, August 7, 1969, 
1; “Racial Difficulties Still Simmer in BR,” State-Times, August 7 , 1969,1; “Boycott 
Closes White-Owned Groceries Here,” Morning Advocate, August 10, 1969, 8A.
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accommodationists declared their support for the police department but denounced the 
racism and police brutality perpetrated by some o f its officers. “Every man who is on a 
police force has the duty to comply with the law and respect the rights of every person 
with whom he deals without regard o f race or color,” the statement read.46
White liberals soundly condemned the actions of the police and called for 
sweeping reforms. They wanted African Americans to enjoy the same treatment and 
opportunities enjoyed by white citizens, hi a statement issued on the same day as that of 
the accommodationists, the Council on Human Relations, with its one hundred fifty 
members, proclaimed, “We wish to express our deep convictions that the lives of black 
persons are sacred, and that we cannot endorse the unnecessary taking o f life in the 
defense of property.” The statement added that the police could enforce the law without 
using deadly force. The Council also circulated a petition that declared, “The safety of 
our city depends, not only on the presence of the police, but also upon their self- 
discipline and sense of justice. It is our conviction that the city government must 
recognize in a public and official way the common humanity of our citizens.” Five 
hundred black and white Baton Rougeans signed the statement, and an integrated group, 
which included LSU professor and Council on Human Relations member Paul Bums 
and African-American minister Charles Smith, presented the petition to Dumas 47
46“BR Leaders Cite Rights of Citizens,” State-Times, August 7, 1969, I; 
“Picketing Now Shows Slowdown,” Morning Advocate, August 8, 1969, 1.
47Dreger, interview by Betty Morse, 13; “Citizens File an Open Letter,” Morning 
Advocate, August 9,1969,9A.
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Segregationists, in contrast, again expressed their unwavering support for the 
police department. On August 11, twenty members of Citizens for Law and Order met 
with Dumas. Its president, Charles Macmurdo, told the mayor that his group wanted the 
police to enforce the law and to be given complete authority to carry out their duties. He 
claimed that a “communist-inspired plan to disarm the police”and to demoralize police 
officers existed in Baton Rouge. He added that the so-called communist plan used 
charges of police brutality to undermine the authority of the city’s law enforcement 
agencies.48
On August 12, the grand jury hearing the case against Oliney’s killer refused to 
indict the officer. Instead, at District Attorney Pitcher’s request, it handed down an 
indictment against Emmitt Douglas for inciting a riot Douglas’ indictment harkened 
back to the district attorney’s early 1960s policy of using the legal system to persecute 
activists. D’Orsay Bryant called the charge, “a cold, calculated political move on the 
part of Sargent Pitcher.” In fact the district attorney did carefully craft the charge 
against Douglas and in it claimed that the activist’s speech at the July 31 rally set off a 
chain of events that culminated in rioting, arson, the selective buying campaign, and the 
death of a picketer.49 To support the charges against Douglas, Pitcher alleged that the
48“Law, Order To Be First, Says Dumas,” Morning Advocate, August 12, 1969, 
1; “BR Lawmen Agree to Remain on Duty,” State-Times, August 11,1969,1.
49On August 9, a group of young picketers attacked a sixty-seven-year-old black 
man, Louis Mosely, for refusing to take part in the selective buying campaign. During 
the attack, Mosely fired a round from his .22 caliber pistol and killed one of his 
attackers. “Facility Here is Connected to Picketing,” Morning Advocate, August 10, 
1969,1; “21-Year-Old Youth Shot to Death in Picketing,” News Leader, August 17, 
1969,I.
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NAACP leader told the crowd, “I have been preaching peace for eleven years. I no 
longer preach peace. We want an eye for an eye, a life for a life. Go out and do your 
thing.” At the time of the rally, none o f the city’s newspapers reported this incendiary 
statement. Douglas condemned the grand jury and Pitcher: “I believe the indictment 
coming from an all-white jury is not worth the paper its written on.” He added that the 
July 31 rally was peaceful and recalled that to help prevent violence, he had confiscated 
nineteen knives and four pistols from participants. In 1971, a state court convicted 
Douglas, despite testimony by white and black witnesses who declared that the civil 
rights leader worked for peace and not violence, hi the end, Judge Donovan Parker 
fined him $350 and gave him a three month-suspended sentence. Jerry Johnson, who 
had called for violence at the July 31 rally, received a six-month jail term.50
Pitcher’s prosecution of Douglas further antagonized the city’s black population 
but also strengthened the ties between moderate blacks and white liberals. In 1969 
moderate activists and white liberals circulated a recall petition to remove Pitcher from 
office. “This has been a wonderful experience for me. This is the first time we have 
been able to get the white community concerned about the role it should play,” Douglas 
said. “More intelligent whites are expressing themselves.” These “intelligent” whites 
for the most part belonged to the Council on Human Relations and the LCLU. The
50“Officers Freed in BR Killing; Negro Indicted,” Morning Advocate, August
19,1969, 1; “NAACP President Indicted by BR Grand Jury, Denies Charge o f Inciting 
Riot,” News Leader, August 24,1969, 1; Summer Report, June 14 - September 15,
1969, Field Director’s Papers, box 7, folder 2; “Sentencing of NAACP Head Douglas 
Delayed by Judge,” News Leader, June 13, 1971, 1; “State NAACP President if Given a 
Suspended Sentence,” News Leader, June 20,1971,1.
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recall petition failed to gamer enough signatures to oust the district attorney, but it 
succeeded in strengthening the alliance between moderate blacks and liberals.51
After the grand jury ruling against Douglas in August 1969, Dumas took an 
even harder line against the Black Power activists. “Police officers no longer will take 
abuse and vilification horn anyone. If  there are any doubts in your mind that I don’t 
mean what I say, just try me,” he announced. The city’s only African-American 
newspaper, the News Leader, reported that Dumas threatened to shoot anyone caught 
looting. On the night of the grand jury ruling, police officers stopped a black doctor on 
his way to the hospital to answer an emergency call. They aimed their guns at the 
physician and “subjected him to a humiliating search on a public street causing a crowd 
to gather.” The next evening officers forcefully removed a college student from a 
downtown movie theater and searched him in the lobby without showing proper cause.52
These incidents infuriated African Americans and their white supporters, and 
several of them appeared before the September City-Parish Council meeting to express 
their displeasure with the police force. Numerous speakers described the police officers 
as racist, discourteous, and brutal and asked the council to take steps to rectify the 
situation. World War II activists Raymond Scott and Dupuy Anderson told the council 
that the black community supported law and order as much as the white community but
SI“NAACP Set to Attempt D. A. Recall,” Morning Advocate, August 17,1969, 
1; “Recall of EBR Parish DA to be Sought by NAACP,” News Leader, August 24,
1969, 1; “Human Relations Council Seeks Federal Marshals,” ibid.
52“Officer Freed in BR Killing; Negro Indicted,” Morning Advocate, August 13, 
1969, 1; “Grand Jury Indicts State NAACP Leader,” State-Times, August 13,1969, 1; 
“Human Relations Council Seeks Federal Marshals,” News Leader, August 24,1969, I.
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added that they also wanted justice. Working-class activist Jerry Johnson complained, 
“The major problem with the city police department is it seems that they treat us like 
we are some type of beast.” LSU professor and Council on Human Relations President 
Ralph Dreger echoed Johnson: ‘There are many white people who feel a black life is 
not worth as much as a white life is.” The city-parish council still refused to take action 
against the police force.53
Three days after the September 1969 city-parish council meeting, a Baton 
Rouge police officer killed yet another black suspect. The officer shot eighteen-year-old 
John David Reed in the back as he ran from the scene of a crime but claimed that he 
aimed for the young man’s legs. After Reed’s death, white officials realized that racial 
tension in the city remained incredibly high and feared that large-scale rioting would 
erupt in the city if  they failed to take action against the officer. Dumas and police 
officials decided to change police policy to prevent more rioting. Although he believed 
that Bryant and Douglas brainwashed “respectable and responsible Negro leaders,” 
Sargent Pitcher urged the mayor and the chief to take some action to preserve the 
standing of the racial diplomats within the black community. He accused the NAACP 
leaders of instilling the idea in the minds o f the black masses that police officers were 
racists who used unnecessary force in the apprehension of suspects. Pitcher also 
claimed that the “reputable” African-American leaders supported Bryant and Douglas 
in order to defend “their right to be classified as leaders with the rank-and-file Negro
53“Police Relations With Negroes Termed Good by Chief of City,” Morning 
Advocate, August 23, 1969, 8B; “Negroes Vent Their Feelings Here at Meet with City- 
Parish Council,” Morning Advocate, September 10,1969, 15C.
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community.”54 He urged Bauer to tell his officers to deploy their weapons only in 
extreme emergencies and not to use them to apprehend individuals suspected of 
committing misdemeanors unless attacked or threatened. Heeding Pitcher’s advice and 
fearing a repeat of the demonstration that followed Oliney’s death, Bauer, Dumas, and 
Sheriff Clemmons adopted a new policy that required the immediate suspension of any 
officer who used deadly force and applied it to the officer who shot Reed.ss
The revised rules appeased the racial diplomats and World War n  activists but 
did little to. ease the anger of Black Power activists. At a NAACP-sponsored rally 
following Reed’s death, several activists walked out when Douglas and Bryant invited 
white reporters to attend. Ironically, the purpose of the meeting was to discuss black 
unity. It ended when a Black Power activist tried to hit a white reporter. To insure the 
reporters’ safety, Douglas and the other organizers escorted them to their automobiles. 
The militancy and proclivity toward violence of the young men and women of the 
Black Power movement frightened the older activists. After events in Watts, Detroit,
^Pitcher listed Leon Netterville, T. J. Jemison, and Horatio Thompson as 
“respectable leaders.”
ssSargent Pitcher to Eddie Bauer, September 16, 1969, Field Director’s Papers, 
box 34, folder 8; “BR Policeman Shoots, Kills Fleeing Suspect,” Morning Advocate, 
September 14, 1969, 1; “BR Policeman Shoots, Kills Fleeing Suspect,” State-Times, 
September 14, 1969, 1; “Chief Relieves Policeman,” State-Times, September 15, 1969, 
1; “Officer is Relieved of Duty,” Morning Advocate, September 15, 1969, I; “Racial 
Situation Calm, Report Police Agencies,” Morning Advocate, September 16,1969, 
14A.
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and Newark, they realized that destroying white-owned businesses in the black 
community actually hurt African Americans because whites would not rebuild.56
The reaction of Black Power activists to white reporters and their denunciation 
of the new police policy on deadly force renewed the split between the young activists 
and the more moderate black majority. This division became apparent in 1972 when 
two more blatant incidents of lethal force by police officers against African Americans 
occurred. The first grew out of a visit to Baton Rouge by a group of Black Muslims. 
Not associated with the local chapter o f the Nation o f Islam, the outside group held a 
rally at the Masonic Temple Building on January 7 and promised to “deliver the city 
back to the black people.” Several local African Americans told them, “We never lost 
it.” Robert Williams, a Black Power activist and the law partner of civil rights attorney 
Murphy Bell, attended the meeting but left before it ended because the Muslims 
“appeared to be talking rhetoric with no real desire to ‘deal with honkies.’ ” In fact, 
their message attracted only young African Americans mostly teenagers who later 
staged protests at their high schools.57
On January 10 the Muslims assembled outside the Masonic Temple Building 
and a crowd of more than two hundred young African Americans gathered to listen to
56“NAACP Leaders Request Unity, Announce Plan,” Morning Advocate, 
September 18, 1969,1; “NAACP Branch Issues Call for Unity, Announces Plan,” News 
Leader, September 28, 1969,1.
^Harvey Britton to Nathaniel Jones, February 28,1972, Field Director’s Papers, 
box 13, folder 2; “Eight Downed in BR Flareup,” State-Times, January 10, 1972,1; 
“Relation Seen with Unrest at McKinley,” Morning Advocate, January 11,1972, 1; 
“School Troubles, Local Violence Connection Denied,” State-Times, January 11,1972, 
1; “2 Teachers Attacked at BR School,” Morning Advocate, January 12, 1972, 1; “Black 
Says Muslims Met by Disbelief,” Morning Advocate, January 14,1972, 1.
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their message. According to bystanders and businessmen in the area, the Muslims 
stirred up the crowd. Averill Aucoin, the white owner o f Owl Drug Store, which was 
located near the rally, reported that black teenagers entered his store shortly after the 
speeches ended and began throwing merchandise on the floor and breaking items.
When they left, he called police and locked his shop. However, the youths returned, 
jimmied the lock, and threatened him. He called the police again and waited half an 
hour for the officers to arrive and escort him to his car. While the angry mob ransacked 
Aucoin’s store, the Muslims began talking about killing whites and ordered all white 
journalists to leave. As the reporters turned to walk away, the crowd attacked them. One 
newspaper photographer, Bob Johnson, suffered severe brain damage, and two others 
also required hospitalization. Throughout the ordeal, no police presence could be 
detected.
When officers finally arrived, they ordered the crowd to disperse, but the 
Muslims refused to leave. Instead, they formed a line on one side of the street and 
policemen lined up on the other side. The two lines slowly advanced toward each other, 
and when they met, the African Americans began throwing bottles and rocks. Someone 
fired a shot, and a gun battle ensued. The officers claimed that the Muslims fired first, 
but they later found no weapons on them besides the ones that the African Americans 
had snatched from the hands of officers. In the end, two sheriffs deputies and two 
Black Muslims died and thirty-one others suffered injuries.58
S8“Law Officials Blast Claim of Negligence,” Morning Advocate, January 14, 
1972, 1; “Eyewitness Story of Violence Given,” Morning Advocate, January 11,1972,
1; ‘Two Detectives Lose Lives in Shootout,”ibid.; “Lawmen Die, Newsman Critical,” 
State-Times, January 11,1972,9A; “Bob Johnson Still in Critical After Beating,”
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White leaders reacted as they had after the 1969 protests. Mayor Dumas 
immediately declared a curfew and sent police officers and sheriff’s deputies, heavily 
armed and dressed in riot gear, to patrol the city. Governor John McKeithen activated 
seven hundred members of the National Guard and dispatched them to Baton Rouge. 
Both political leaders feared a repeat o f the attacks on whites and the arson that 
followed the 1969 protests. Even the civil rights leaders supported the curfew and called 
for calm. Emmitt Douglas issued a statement asking all Baton Rougeans, regardless of 
race, to cooperate with the police. Harvey Britton urged African Americans to be on 
their best behavior because police were “very scared and tense.” Although a few minor 
incidents occurred, no violence erupted in Baton Rouge, and no large-scale marches or 
picketing followed the shootings.59
Although Baton Rouge’s African-American community deplored the deaths of 
the Black Muslims, they also condemned the separatists’ use of violence against the 
white reporters and police officers. In November 1972, the split between the two 
factions became apparent when Southern students and the police clashed on campus.
The violence at the city’s black university grew out of the students’ longstanding
Morning Advocate, January 12,1972, 1; Account of 6 p.m. News Broadcast, January 
26, 1972, Field Director’s Papers, box 13, folder 2; Report, Baton Rouge Confrontation, 
February 28, 1972, ibid.
59“Pleas for Calm Voiced,” State-Times, January 11,1972,1; “The Monday 
Incident: A Senseless Tragedy,” Morning Advocate, January 11, 1972, 14A; Report on 
the Baton Rouge Confrontation, February 28,1972, Field Director’s Papers, box 13, 
folder 7; “Law Officials Brace to Meet Emergency,” Morning Advocate, January 11, 
1972, 1; “Curfew Again in the City,” State-Times, January 11,1972, 1; “National Guard 
Troopers Help to Maintain Order in the City,” Morning Advocate, January 11, 1972,
2A; “Curfew is Lifted Here; Guard Troops Go Home,” State-Times, January 13, 1972,
1.
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dissatisfaction with the operation o f the school. Throughout the 1960s, Southern’s 
student body had accused the administrators o f Uncle Tomism and demanded that they 
stand up to state officials to secure more funding for the university. Calling the 
administration corrupt, the Black Power activists, in October 1972, demanded the 
resignation o f President Leon Netterville. They also asked for the creation of an 
advisory council made up of students and faculty, for the inclusion o f student members 
on the University Senate, for improvement of facilities and equipment, and for student 
input on the Food Service Committee. On October 23, several students presented these 
grievances to Netterville. The following day, the university called for the students to 
follow existing channels for filing complaints and refused to review those presented 
directly to the president In response, about two thousand students marched to the 
downtown office of the State Board of Education to present their demands and then 
went to the State Capitol to give them to Governor Edwin Edwards. As marchers met 
with officials of the Superintendent of Education’s office, police dressed in riot gear 
and armed with night sticks, tear gas, pepper fogger, semiautomatic rifles, and shotguns 
waited outside the building.60
Angered by the lack of response from university and state officials, the students 
decided to boycott classes until their complaints were addressed. Wanting to get the 
university running again, Southern’s administration and the State Board of Education
^ ‘SU Students Stage March to Protest Life at Southern,” Morning Advocate, 
October 25, 1972,1; “Minor Tiff Seen Triggering March,” State-Times, October 25, 
1972,1; William Guste, Jr., Report o f the Attorney General’s Special Commission o f 
Inquiry on the Southern University Tragedy o f November 16, 1972 (Baton Rouge, State 
of Louisiana, 1973), 3; “SU March Brings Out Heavy Force,” Morning Advocate, 
October 24, 1972,1.
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met with student representatives on October 26 and attempted to work out a 
compromise. At this meeting student leader Fred Prejean o f Lafayette, Louisiana, 
demanded that a ratio of two students to one faculty member be established on 
department councils and that students be give a voice in hiring new faculty members. 
Prejean promised that once students gained a voice in the university the unrest would 
end. The Board o f Education members agreed to review the students’ demands but 
stated that they saw no problems with the Southern administration. At that point, 
Prejean and his supporters walked out.61
After their departure, the Board o f Education set up a seven-member committee 
to study the students’ grievances, and Netterville established several faculty and student 
committees. Unimpressed by these gestures, the students continued to boycott classes, 
and on October 31, a large group of them marched to the Administration Building and 
demanded a meeting with Netterville. Fearing that violence would erupt, the president 
called the sheriffs department to ask for assistance. In an attempt to defuse the 
situation, Netterville followed the precedent set by his predecessor and closed the 
university. Hoping that the tempers o f the students had cooled, he then reopened the 
campus on November 6. The majority o f students, though, continued to boycott classes. 
Netterville asked Sheriff A1 Amiss to send a contingent of deputies to the campus to 
maintain peace.62
6I“SU Group is Heard by Board,” State-Times, October 26, 1972, 1; “SU 
Students Stage Walkout at Meeting,” Morning Advocate, October 27, 1972, 1.
“ “SU Problems Probe Committee Named,” State-Times, October 27,1972,1; 
“Head of SU Pledges Action on Protests,” Morning Advocate, October 28, 1972, 1; 
“Southern University Students Continue in Boycott of Classes to Get Demands,” News
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The unrest concerned state and local officials and drew the attention of 
Governor Edwin Edwards. On November 7, he met with the Board of Education and 
agreed to appoint a committee to investigate conditions at Southern. The governor’s 
interest, however, came too late to prevent violence on the campus. The same day, 
explosions occurred in two building on campus, and officials found six Molotov 
cocktails near the Horticulture Bam. Police issued arrest warrants for eight students.
In the week that followed, tension continued to mount on campus. On 
November 10, Netterville promised amnesty to all students in exchange for an end to 
the protests. The Black Power activists declined the offer, and the following day, 
several students disrupted a football game. On the fourteenth, the boycott of classes 
resumed. The next day, Netterville withdrew the amnesty offer. November 16 marked 
the culmination of the protests. That morning, sheriff’s deputies arrested several 
students in connection with warrants issued on November 8. Director of Administration 
Services James Hunt had charged the four with interfering with the operation o f an 
educational institution. At 8 a.m., crowds of students gathered at various points on 
campus. The students converged on the Administrative Building and demanded to see 
the president. He agreed to meet with five of them, but the crowd pushed its way in.
The students demanded the release of the four arrested students. Netterville refused to 
discuss the matter and left the office. To prevent the students from following him, his 
aides barricaded the door. Netterville then ordered Hunt to call the sheriff. Before the 
deputies arrived, campus security convinced the students to leave the Administrative
Leader, November 5, 1972, 1.
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Building. After their departure, the guards found Netterville and escorted him to his car. 
He left the campus to attend a Board of Education meeting. Meanwhile, a crowd of 
students gathered outside the Administrative Building but never occupied it.
Sheriff’s deputies finally arrived an hour after Netterville’s departure. A 
misunderstanding between them and campus security occurred, and the deputies 
assumed that the students actually occupied the Administrative Building and were 
holding a security guard hostage. Under the direction of Sheriff A1 Amiss, units 
surrounded the building and prepared to use tear gas to disperse the crowd o f students. 
All deputies were heavily armed. When Amiss ordered the students to leave the area, 
most complied, but about fifty refused. They shouted, “Come and get us!” Without an 
order from the sheriff, one deputy launched three tear gas canisters into the crowd. The 
students picked two of them up and tossed them back at the officers, creating confusion 
among the law enforcement units. Simultaneously, the third canister went off, and the 
students scattered. Two students, Leonard Brown and Dennis Smith, brought up the 
rear, and as they ran past the officers, shots from a deputy’s rifle mortally wounded 
both. Netterville immediately closed the campus to prevent further violence.63
In the days following the incident, both white and black Baton Rougeans 
attempted to make sense out of the events at Southern. Unlike the aftermath of the 1969 
police shootings, peace prevailed. National Guardsmen and heavily-armed police 
officers did not patrol the city’s streets. The mayor did not impose a curfew and no 
arson occurred. The only hint of trouble came when an integrated group of LSU
63Guste, Attorney General’s Report, 5-20.
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students staged a march from their campus to the State Capitol. Harambe, a Black 
Power organization from LSU, sponsored the march. The organization’s president, Leo 
Hamilton, worked out an acceptable route with city officials, but whites participating in 
the march, mostly antiwar activists, urged the African Americans to stray from the 
agreed-upon a route to attract media attention. Hamilton refused to allow his group to 
be diverted because he knew that if  they followed the prescribed route, the press would 
cover their protest. Governor Edwards greeted them when they arrived at the Capitol 
and told them that the Southern students were responsible for the two deaths. The LSU 
students booed him, but the crowd remained peaceful.64
Unlike the earlier incidents of violence that ended with no discussion or 
examinations of events by whites, the Southern riots led to the formation of the Special 
Commission of Inquiry by the state’s attorney general. Made up of black and white 
leaders from around the state, the commission blamed the students and the sheriff’s 
department for the violent outcome. While acknowledging the “intensity and scope” of 
the students’ anger and frustration, the commission charged that they went beyond their 
First Amendment rights by creating disorder on campus and disrupting classes. But the 
blue ribbon panel decided that the sheriffs department bore some blame for the deaths. 
Its officers had arrived heavily armed and, in the heat of the moment, one unidentified
MLeo Hamilton interview, August 21, 1993,97-100; “Southern U Closes in 
Aftermath of Killings,” News Leader, December 3,1972, 1.
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sheriff’s deputy had fired the fatal shots. The students, the report concluded, had done 
nothing to justify the use of deadly force.65
Because the commission laid the blame on both the students and the deputies,
most African Americans in Baton Rouge applauded the panel’s report as fair and
balanced. The refusal to support the students grew out of the division within the black
community that had developed during the late 1960s. With the passage o f the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act o f 1965, African Americans achieved the
«
rights that activists had fought for since 1945. De jure segregation was dead, and race 
relations were improving. Joe Delpit won a seat on the city-parish council with white 
support. With their calls for black pride and separatism, Black Power activists attracted 
a committed following among young African Americans who denounced the gains of 
the civil rights movement as negligible because, for the most part, blacks remained 
powerless. For these young activists, the only way to attain power was through force.
To older activists, who adhered to the principles o f nonviolent protest and the ideal of 
an integrated society, the goals of the supporters o f Black Power would mean reviving 
segregation albeit self-imposed and the loss of progress. Although the issue of police 
brutality temporarily united the black community, longstanding divisions remained. 
Because of the split, participants in the Black Muslim and Southern riots garnered 
support from only a small segment of the black population. For white leaders, the 
events of 1972 marked the realization of their greatest fear— that black protests would 
end in violence. Yet the reaction of the African-American majority defused the
65Guste, Attorney General’s Report, 25-25; “Southern U Closes in Aftermath of 
Killings,” News Leader, December 3,1972,1.
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situation. Rather than staging marches, rallies, and boycotts, it simply allowed law 
enforcement to handle the situation. Peace and stability quickly returned. In addition the 
nation’s attention had shifted away from the civil rights movement and toward the war 
in Vietnam and the student protest movement. Because the Black Muslim and Southern 
riots ended quickly and produced very little national response, peace and stability 
quickly returned to Baton Rouge and business continued to flourish.66
“ Bartley, The New South, 343.
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Chapter 10 
Conclusion
Divided by social class, generations, and educational Levels, few racial groups 
are monolithic, but scholars often depict the civil rights movement as a battle between 
united groups of blacks and whites over the issue of segregation. In fact, the interactions 
among different racial groups shaped the speed and nature o f racial change. In places 
dominated by segregationists, whites who staunchly refused to accept integration met 
demands for integration with massive resistance. The violence that often accompanied 
civil rights protests in these areas attracted the attention of the national media and 
government and led to federal intervention, including the use of federal troops, to 
ensure the desegregation of Central High School in Little Rock and to protect James 
Meredith at Ole Miss. In communities controlled by moderate whites, peace and 
stability prevailed. Away from the national spotlight that violence brought, change 
occurred with little fanfare. Baton Rouge belonged to the latter type of southern 
community. Although all African Americans wanted to end segregation, the city’s black 
community was divided along generational and class lines. The resulting groups never 
agreed on the best method of obtaining equality. Similarly, most white Baton Rougeans 
wanted to maintain segregation but also disagreed about how to preserve it.1
Because the relationship between and among the various groups of African 
Americans and whites in Baton Rouge was multifaceted, the desegregation process was 
complex and change was spurred by a combination of local initiatives, federal
1 White liberals disagreed with the majority and advocated dismantling Jim Crow 
and granting African Americans racial equality.
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intervention, and the possibility o f violent confrontations. Civil rights activism, with its 
threat o f sustained protests and violence, prompted white leaders to make some changes 
to the system to maintain peace. The small alterations that they made in the system o f 
Jim Crow appeased most African Americans, especially the racial diplomats, who 
viewed changes as signs o f racial progress. In addition, the compromises convinced 
blacks who supported the civil rights movement, but were not activists, that they could 
do little to facilitate greater change. During the 1953 bus boycott, a large number of 
African Americans had advocated pushing for an end to segregation on public 
transportation, but the racial diplomats and white leaders negotiated a compromise and 
ended the boycott without consulting them. White leaders also discouraged many black 
Baton Rougeans from becoming involved in the movement by their harsh treatment of 
activists. Few ordinary black citizens were willing to risk arrest, high bails, and long jail 
terms to take part in demonstrations. While the compromises and arrests prevented 
sustained protests from occurring in Baton Rouge, they did not render the activists 
completely ineffective. As the civil rights movement intensified in the early to mid 
1960s, the increased militancy of the activists and the threat of violence pushed white 
leaders into granting more substantial concessions. The formation o f the biracial 
committee in May 1963, for example, followed an increase in protests by working-class 
activists and a series o f large-scale and violent demonstrations in B irmingham, 
Alabama. White leaders feared that the same thing would happen in their community if  
they failed to address some of the activists’ demands. Out of the committee came. 
compromises that brought some changes to the existing system without completely 
dismantling it. While white hospitals agreed to admit black doctors to their staffs, for
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example, they refused to allow African Americans to treat white patients. In a similar 
fashion, the agreement that allowed blacks to join the police force relegated them to 
segregated patrol cars and prohibited them from patrolling white neighborhoods.
Federal intervention helped to bring integration to areas that required blacks and 
whites to interact on a daily basis, most notably schools. Whites simply did not want 
their children to attend the same schools as blacks, and many shared the arch- 
segregationists’ belief that allowing African-American children to enroll in white 
schools would lead to the lowering of academic standards. While they did not want 
their children attending the same schools as blacks, white leaders refused to defy federal 
authority, which would attract negative national publicity and might lead to the 
deployment of troops to force integration. Therefore, accommodationists and white 
leaders decided to meet the minimum requirements for compliance. In 1963, they 
created a twelve-year plan for school desegregation designed to prevent the vast 
majority of black students from enrolling in white schools. White leaders in Baton 
Rouge successfully manipulated the courts and continued to maintain a racially divided 
school system more than three decades later.
The federal laws also helped to destroy Jim Crow in Baton Rouge. The Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 led to the desegregation of public facilities, including restaurants, 
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 removed all barriers to registration. Yet in these 
areas, activists had already forced white leaders to make concessions. Downtown lunch 
counters and facilities in the Municipal Building removed racial barriers in 1963, and, 
in the years following World War n , more than ten thousand African Americans in the
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city and parish had registered to vote. Therefore, federal law merely accelerated a 
process that local activism had already begun.
Violence brought few changes to the system of segregation. In late July 1969, 
rioting erupted in the black community following the shooting death of burglary suspect 
James Oliney by white policemen; white leaders responded with massive force and 
refused to punish the officers who killed the young African American or to address the 
racial problems that existed within the department. Instead, they charged activists 
Emmitt Douglas and Jerry Johnson with inciting a riot Even the selective buying 
campaign and the picketing that followed the riots could not convince white leaders to 
address police brutality. However, when an officer shot and killed another black suspect 
a month later, the threat of further rioting forced white officials to alter its policy on the 
use of deadly force.
Changes in race relations in Baton Rouge were shaped by the divisions within 
the racial groups and the interactions among the different factions. The presence of the 
activists pushed white leaders into granting concessions to the racial diplomats and led 
to greater changes than either they or the diplomats could have achieved on their own. 
Although activists and racial diplomats saw themselves as working at cross purposes, 
the presence of both groups served as a conduit for change that did not exist in 
communities dominated by segregationists and plagued by violence. However, most 
studies focus on the areas where violence accompanied desegregation. To understand 
more fully the civil rights movement and the nature of race relations in the decades 
following it, scholars must turn their attention away from the areas plagued by violence 
and massive resistence and look at community development and relationships between
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blacks and whites in areas where integration occurred peacefully. They must also look 
at how divisions within these areas affected the movement. Baton Rouge, with its many 
factions, was not unique, hi fact, similar splits existed in cities throughout the South, 
even those plagued by violence. Yet historians have too often depicted the freedom 
struggle as a battle between activists and segregationists and have paid little attention to 
the other groups that shaped the course o f events.
Although several violent incidents marred the last years o f the civil rights 
movement in Baton Rouge, white leaders working with racial diplomats managed to 
preserve the peace and stability of the community by responding to protests with 
moderate concessions, and the city’s economy continued to flourish. The civil rights 
movement in Baton Rouge ended segregation, led to African American participation in 
government, and opened jobs to blacks. Yet racial problems continued to plague the 
city after the 1972 riots and persist in 1999. Poverty and high crime still afflict the black 
community. Schools remain, for the most part, either predominately white or 
predominately black, and African Americans still face racial discrimination. To solve 
these problems, Baton Rougeans must once again go beyond black and white and form 
new groups to address the issues that threaten the peace and stability of the community.
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